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ABSTRACT 
 
John Peet 
The Politics of the Crucified.  
A study of the political theology of John Howard Yoder, Leonardo Boff and Jon 
Sobrino with special reference to the Crucifixion. 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. 
April 2010 
 
Jesus died violently on the cross, the form of execution imposed on those who 
threatened the Roman imperial order. What difference does this make to Christian 
political theology? What is the revelatory value of Jesus’ death with regard to 
political theology? This thesis explores these questions, using a Christocentric 
methodology and taking three theologians in particular as interlocutors -– the 
Mennonite theologian John Yoder and the Latin American liberation theologians 
Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino – with special reference to an examination of the 
ways in which their political theologies are shaped by the cross. The first part of the 
thesis consists of a close analysis and comparison of the writings of the above 
theologians concerning the cross. In Yoder, the theme of a cruciform, non-violent 
and non-resistant church is emphasised. In Boff and Sobrino the cross is seen to 
represent a protest against suffering in the name of a crucified God in solidarity 
with a crucified people. In the second part of the thesis the perspective widens to 
examine two issues which particularly arise from this analysis – how a Christian 
doctrine of political power is affected by the crucifixion, and how the contemporary 
church, particularly in Britain, might adopt a ‘cruciform’ political praxis. The 
conclusion is drawn that the chief Christian criterion for analysing political power is 
victimological – i.e. from the perspective of the victims of power, rather than those 
who exercise it. In the light of this, and given its increasingly marginalised status, 
the church in Britain should abandon any pretensions to ‘Christendom’, formulate a 
cruciform political theology and willingly live out a cruciform status.  
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Chapter 1    
Introduction – the cross and political theology 
 What difference would it have made had Jesus died in bed, of old age or 
illness? In particular, what difference would it have made to political theology had 
Jesus not died, a political prisoner, on the instrument of execution used by the 
imperial power of the time to keep potential disturbers of the established order in 
their place? The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the difference made to 
political theology by the fact that Jesus did not die peacefully, of natural causes, but 
was crucified, in common with tens of thousands of others, on a Roman cross. How 
should the crucifixion affect the way in which political theology is formulated and 
lived out? What are the implications of this for the political role of the church?  
 It is perhaps surprising that attention to the crucifixion has had a 
comparatively small place in the formulation of Christian political theology, at least 
until the impact of Moltmann’s The Crucified God. (Moltmann 1974) The cross has 
certainly played a more general role in illustrating the depths of human sinfulness, 
but the particular political circumstances in which the crucifixion took place have 
been too often been downplayed and their revelatory value neglected. The dominant 
tradition in political theology since the mid nineteenth century has been based upon 
an overall reading of more general Biblical themes, such as love, incarnation, 
justice, and sovereignty, and has attempted to construct a prudential political 
theology from them. In the Church of England, for example, political theology, 
following the tradition of Maurice and Lux Mundi, has rested largely on the 
doctrines of creation and incarnation. Without abandoning that tradition – I regard 
the cross as the ultimate point of incarnation - I would seek to place a greater 
emphasis upon the cross, and explore what that emphasis might entail. In particular, 
I seek to develop, in dialogue with three theologians, Yoder, Boff and Sobrino, a 
political theology where the significance of the cross is given due weight.  
 
 a) Methodology 
 
Research methodology 
My practical methodology for this thesis is primarily text based. I examine 
critically the writings of three theologians, attempt to establish linkages and 
disagreements between them, and seek to achieve, where possible, a new and 
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coherent synthesis. Some Biblical exegesis is attempted, although this does not 
form a major part of the thesis, which concentrates primarily on theologians (and 
politics) of the twentieth century. Also, some illustrations are drawn from twentieth 
century political history. Although the thesis is generally based on texts, rather than 
on direct analysis and interpretation of concrete situations, my work as a parish 
minister is an encouragement in considering the practical implications of the 
literature studied. 
 
Theological methodology 
 My theological methodology is Christocentric – in other words, primarily 
dependent on God’s self revelation in Jesus Christ. If God’s nature and purposes for 
humankind are revealed in the historical life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, the 
fact that Jesus’ life was ended, not naturally or peacefully, but by a violent political 
act, must have significant revelatory value in terms of political theology. The 
crucifixion and the political events which preceded the crucifixion should be seen 
not as a general and fluid metaphor for human sinfulness as a whole, but a definite 
indication of a particular type of human sinfulness, and Jesus’ response provides 
both a revelation of the divine nature and a model for Christian political action. 
Traditionally, theories of the atonement and redemption have centred (rightly) upon 
the death of Christ on the cross. I attempt to explore the particularity of that mode 
of death. I concentrate upon the relevance of this for political theology, but not in 
isolation from the doctrines of atonement and redemption, which, if they are to be 
holistic, must include the political. At the very least, the fact that political factors 
feature strongly in God’s way of atonement and redemption indicates that any such 
doctrine which does not include a political element must be deficient. A ‘pietistic’ 
non-political doctrine of atonement, with political elements as, at best, an optional 
extra, cannot be sufficient. It is not enough to say that Jesus died violently as a 
result of human sinfulness, as might perhaps be exemplified by a mugged traveller 
on the Jericho road who did not have the good fortune of being aided by a Good 
Samaritan. The violence of the crucifixion was the result of political choices, and it 
is against the background of those particular political choices, and Jesus’ response 
to them, that both a Christian doctrine of atonement and a Christian political 
theology must primarily be formulated. This is not, however, to restrict Christian 
political theology to a historical study of first century Palestinian politics. The 
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political choices which led to the crucifixion are paradigmatic, continue to be 
worked out in today’s world, and demand a response which, if it is to be Christian, 
must follow the pattern of Jesus’ response. If, by this methodology, the cross is seen 
to be privileged, it is because the uniqueness and power of the Christian revelation 
rests primarily upon the scandal of the cross, and the subsequent resurrection.  The 
cross is the ultimate consequence of the incarnation and the defining point of any 
theology which calls itself Christian.  
 It is perhaps worthwhile to indicate at the outset what I am not attempting in 
this thesis. I am not attempting to draw out political implications from certain 
models of the atonement. This has recently been widely discussed, for example by 
Jersak and Hardin in their symposium Stricken by God? Non-violent identification 
and the victory of Christ (Jersak and Hardin 2007). It is impossible to go directly 
back to Jesus’ cross totally unmediated by subsequent historical and theological 
interpretations, but I aim to concentrate on the historical crucifixion and its political 
implications rather than on subsequent more general models of the atonement. Nor 
do I explore at any great length the political implications of the resurrection. This 
has been recently attempted, for example, by Scott in Theology, Ideology and 
Liberation (Scott 1994). I acknowledge that, in the New Testament witness, cross 
and resurrection go closely together, and a theology which concentrates on one 
rather than the other runs the risk of imbalance. I am conscious of these dangers, 
and so would present my argument with the proviso that it is inevitably incomplete. 
Similarly, I make little reference to the Holy Spirit, while recognizing that 
pneumatology is a necessary component of a full political theology.  
 I have chosen three chief interlocutors - the Latin American liberation 
theologians Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino, with special reference to their 
Christologies and ecclesiologies, and the Mennonite theologian John Howard 
Yoder, primarily in relation to his social ethics but also to his ecclesiology. I aim 
not to analyse and bring into dialogue the whole of the teaching of the above 
theologians, which would be a task far beyond the limits of this thesis, but to focus 
on what they have to contribute to the main point of this study - the crucifixion of 
Jesus and its relevance for political theology. 
The above theologians have been chosen for the following reasons. First, 
since the issues facing Christian political theology and social ethics are increasingly 
global in their extent, there is a need for a global and ecumenical theology, drawing 
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on theological insights and contributions from a variety of cultural and 
ecclesiastical settings. While issues in social and political theology have ultimately 
to be interpreted locally and contextually, this is best informed by drawing on as 
universal and catholic a theology as possible. Boff, a Franciscan Roman Catholic 
working in Brazil, Sobrino, a Jesuit Roman Catholic working in El Salvador, and 
Yoder, a Mennonite working in the USA, represent a wide ecclesiastical and 
geographical range of background and experience.  
Second, the crucified Jesus is a supreme example, humanly speaking, of 
powerlessness.  Theologically, the truth of God is expressed through a tortured and 
humiliated victim of the powerful.  Since this would seem to indicate a perspective 
‘from below’, I have chosen as the chief interlocutors two liberation theologians 
working in Latin America who consciously attempt to do their theology from the 
perspective of the seemingly  powerless ‘victims of history’ and a Mennonite 
theologian who stands consciously outside the ‘establishment’ of political and 
ecclesiastical power. All three have, moreover, written specifically and extensively 
about the significance of the cross for political theology. 
 
Some preliminary definitions 
 I would happily adopt the definition of political theology given by 
Cavanaugh and Scott in the Blackwell Companion to Political Theology  
Theology is broadly understood as discourse about God, and human persons 
as they relate to God. The political is broadly understood as the use of 
structural power to organise a society or community of people…. Political 
theology is, then, the analysis and criticism of political arrangements 
(including cultural-psychological, social and economic aspects) from the 
perspective of differing interpretations of God’s ways with the world. (Scott 
and Cavanaugh eds. 2004: xi) 
If politics is, in general terms, the gaining and use of power, political theology takes 
place at the interaction between divine revelation and the interrelationships of 
human structures of power. All theology is, ultimately, political, in that it reflects 
the political loci of its practitioners, and has political ramifications. Political 
theology, more specifically, involves doing theology consciously in the light of 
politics, and politics consciously in the light of theology. While ecclesiology is 
important in political theology – my concluding chapter discusses how a cruciform 
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political theology can be embodied in the community of the church - the horizon for 
political theology is not the church, but the kingdom of God.  
 I have refrained from giving a tight definition to descriptions such as ‘the 
poor’, or ‘the oppressed’. The use, primarily by liberation theologians, of such 
language describes both the context in which they work and the interpretation they 
put on that context. Poverty, whether the absolute poverty of lack of food and 
shelter, or the relative poverty of exclusion from good things taken for granted by 
large sections of society, forms the background to much of their writing and 
therefore to much of this thesis. Oppression implies both ‘oppressed’ and 
‘oppressors’ – at its simplest, the ‘oppressed’ being those who, by the working of a 
political or economic system are coerced into, or forced to remain in a position of 
deprivation and suffering by those above them on the socio-economic ladder. 
Oppression entails the human infliction, whether deliberately or through neglect, of 
needless suffering. In the discourse of liberation theology, the oppressed are those 
who suffer such oppression – oppressors are those who inflict it, deliberately, or 
through culpable and uncritical participation in an unjust political, social, sexual or 
economic system.  I am content, in this thesis, to utilize this discourse, with which I 
am in substantial agreement.  
 
b) Outline of thesis 
The thesis is structured in the following way: In the first part (chapters 2 to 
10) I engage in dialogue with the three chosen theologians, Yoder, Boff, and 
Sobrino, and attempt a close analysis and criticism of their political teaching 
concerning the cross. In the second part (chapters 11 and 12) I seek a wider 
perspective, and attempt to use insights gained in the first part to construct, first, a 
theology of power and, second, a framework for a corporate outworking of a 
cruciform political theology.  
In order that a subsequent theology of the cross might be securely grounded, 
I begin in chapters 1 and 2 by ‘examining the foundations’. I pay particular regard 
to coherence – in chapter 2, the coherence of the cross based political theologies of 
Yoder, Boff and Sobrino with the totality of their theologies; in chapter 3, the 
coherence of their accounts of the historical circumstances in which the crucifixion 
took place with the historical evidence. In particular, I ask whether they are justified 
in constructing a definitive theology from those accounts. These foundations I 
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regard as essential, in that a political theology of the cross cannot be firmly 
established unless it coheres with an overall theological schema and can be firmly 
rooted in history, as far as that can be accurately ascertained. At the end of these 
two chapters I summarize what can be carried forward to form a basis for a 
constructive political theology of the cross.  
In the next three sections I attempt to ‘build on the foundations’. First, in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6, I draw from Yoder, Boff and Sobrino a cruciform response to 
suffering and oppression.  In chapter 4 I examine how each theologian treats the 
cross as definitive for Christian political ethics – in Yoder, the necessity of 
redefining the nature of Christian politics as cruciform, in Boff and Sobrino the 
cross as a protest against suffering in the name of the crucified God revealed by 
Jesus. In chapter 5 I describe the three theologians’ interpretation of the cross and 
political discipleship – in Yoder, the cross as a mark of radical nonconformity in 
imitation of the crucified, in Boff and Sobrino, the cross as inculcating a sacrificial 
spirituality of martyrdom. In chapter 6 I discuss the cross in relation to violence and 
the appropriate response for a Christian  – in Yoder, his Christological and 
cruciform pacifism (alongside comparisons with other forms of pacifism), in Boff 
and Sobrino the question of violence in response to political oppression. Again, at 
the end of these chapters I summarize the above and outline a theology and 
spirituality of cruciform and costly imitation of the non-violent crucified God.  
In the next section, in chapters 7 and 8, I analyse the theologies of Yoder, 
Boff and Sobrino in relation to two overlapping sociological communities – in 
chapter 7, the cruciform people, the church in its political responsibility, and in 
chapter 8, the crucified people, those who suffer oppression and injustice. In my 
discussion of the cruciform people, I concentrate chiefly on Yoder’s doctrine of a 
new way of doing politics through a cruciform church. In my discussion of the 
crucified people I concentrate on Sobrino’s emphasis on solidarity between the poor 
and the crucified Christ. Again, at the end of this section I draw together themes 
which emerge from the above - the meaning of Christian responsibility in the light 
of the cross, how the cross is manifested in community, the nature and use of 
powerlessness, and the crucified people as a criterion for political action.  
 In the third section of ‘building on the foundations’, chapters 9 and 10, I 
examine the cross in relation to eschatological hope and to divine and human power 
and powerlessness - Christian hope rests on the power of God manifested in the 
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resurrection of the crucified. In chapter 9 I discuss Yoder’s eschatological ethic of 
faith and hope in the ‘lamb who was slain’, and Boff and Sobrino’s proclamation of 
hope for the oppressed through the cross and resurrection. In chapter 10 I move to a 
discussion of the cruciform divine providence which forms the ground for that 
hope. Yoder’s kenotic teaching on the cross as the key to God’s providential action 
in overcoming ‘the powers’ is paralleled by a discussion of Boff and Sobrino’s 
doctrine of power in the light of the cross. I conclude this section, as before, by 
summarizing the themes of hope, power and the cross in the light of the resurrection 
and by outlining a theology of a cruciform hope based on a kenotic doctrine of 
divine power.  
 In the second part of the thesis I depart from a close analysis of the three 
theologians, and attempt to gain a wider perspective on some of the themes which 
have been identified. First, in chapter 11, I discuss the cross in relation to power, 
divine and political. I argue that the cross exercises a critical function vis-à-vis 
political power, and defines the telos, or end-in-view of political power. I analyse 
the nature of power, using the distinction between power over and power to, and 
then turn again to the Pauline doctrine of kenosis, describing the kenotic power and 
‘weakness’ of God in the light of the cross, before attempting to construct a kenotic 
and cruciform political ethic.  
 In chapter 12 I conclude by discussing how a cross based theology might be 
socially embodied. I return to the themes of the cruciform and crucified people, 
with special reference to the church in Britain, and end with a description of a 
cruciform church, based upon the beatitudes, as a community of solidarity, 
resistance, and hope.  
 
c) Hopes and consequences 
 Two of the major present challenges to Christian political theology involve 
questions of power: - globalisation, with all the issues of neo-imperial power and 
domination arising from that process; and war, with similar issues such as use of 
power, resistance to power, and reactions to threat. These form the background of 
my attempt to outline a cruciform political theology which has power as its focus. 
My personal situation is that of a British, Anglican / Methodist Vicar / Minister, 
seeking, in and alongside my parish work, to explore how the British churches can 
exercise a prophetic ministry in their social witness to the crucified and risen Jesus. 
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I would hope that a consequence of this thesis might be an increased understanding 
of what that social witness might entail in relation to these crucial questions of 
political power.  
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SECTION I EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONS 
 
Chapter 2    
The context of the political theology of the cross in Yoder, Boff and Sobrino 
Before analysing the use of the cross in the political theology of Yoder, 
Boff, and Sobrino, it is necessary to set this analysis in the context of the totality of 
their theologies. How far do their more general theologies of the cross cohere with 
their more specifically political theologies?  As will be seen, such a distinction is 
not always clear cut, since, methodologically, the ‘political’ cannot be neatly 
separated from the rest.  I do not attempt a detailed exposition of each theologian’s 
doctrine of the cross, but pay special attention to the role of Christology – the 
significance of the person on the cross; to Soteriology – how the cross is 
instrumental in salvation; and to the political and ecclesiological context of their 
work.  
I seek to demonstrate, as a basis for what follows in this study, first, that 
their political readings of the cross are not arbitrary additions to their theologies, but 
firmly situated within and coherent with their overall theological stance and, 
second, that the political nature of the cross has revelatory value and is not simply 
contingent to a ‘transactional’ soteriological purpose. (My use of the word 
‘transactional’ describes a doctrine of atonement seen primarily in terms of the 
intra-trinitarian relationship between God the Father and Jesus the Son, its historical 
outworking in the cross and resurrection, and its application to humanity through 
the Holy Spirit. I would not wish in any way to deny the truth and validity of such a 
view of atonement, but seek to extend its meaning.) 
 
a) The context of the cross in Yoder 
 
The importance of community – Mennonite and ecumenical 
Yoder is particularly concerned to root his theology in the church 
community, and regards it as his aim that his ethics should mould and guide that 
community. His ‘nonfoundationalism’ can perhaps be read most accurately in his 
taking the church community, rather than a preconceived philosophical position, as 
his epistemological and hermeneutical starting point. His is explicitly a church 
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theology, shaped by and intended to shape his context. For his social ethics, the 
distinction between ‘church’ and ‘world’ is crucial  – Christian social ethics are 
primarily for Christians, and only of secondary and indirect relevance to those 
outside the ecclesiastical body, which he sees as a voluntary organisation, freely 
constituted rather than imposed by the authority of the state. 
Yoder writes as a Mennonite, and that allegiance is closely bound up with 
his theology. The cross, both in Mennonite soteriology and in the history of a 
community which has frequently suffered persecution, has always been central to 
Mennonite belief. Yoder’s membership of, and the importance in his theology of the 
believers’ church, a church visibly identified as ‘other’ by ‘baptism, discipline, 
morality and martyrdom’ (Yoder 1998: 56) provide themes which run through his 
theology. His theological privileging of freedom and choice, and the willingness of 
a non-coercive God to respect that freedom, which, it will be argued, is one of the 
key themes of his theology (especially with regard to the cross) is firmly rooted in 
the free choice of adult baptismal membership of the church. The distinctive and 
demanding ‘cross bearing’ discipleship advocated by Yoder is undergirded and 
reinforced by a strong church discipline. The sense of a morality, both personal and 
social which is not necessarily shared by ‘the world’ and which may be antithetical 
to the world’s values, necessitates a refusal to participate in the generally accepted 
violence of the world, and hence involves a readiness to accept the often painful 
consequences of that refusal. This leads to one of the most significant ‘marks of the 
church’ - martyrdom, both in the sense of the inevitable suffering of the 
distinctively Christian church and the powerful witness inherent in that suffering. It 
is difficult to conceive of Yoder’s theology, especially with regard to the cross, 
divorced from its Mennonite context.  
Yoder, however, cannot be read solely as a Mennonite theologian. A recent 
study of Yoder, entitled Mennonite Patience, Evangelical Witness, Catholic 
Convictions (Nation 2006) illustrates the breadth of Yoder’s theology. As a 
contributor to the radical Evangelical community / magazine Sojourners and 
keynote speaker at the founding meeting of Evangelicals for Social Action in 
Chicago in 1973 (Carter 2001:15)Yoder was sufficiently trusted by evangelicals to 
address that section of the church which is notoriously suspicious of outsiders. His 
seminal work, Politics of Jesus (Yoder 1994) was a major influence on the revival 
of a more socially conscious and ‘left wing’ evangelicalism. Yoder was (not always 
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to his satisfaction) identified as an evangelical by both evangelicals and non-
evangelicals. (Nation 2006: xx-xxi) With regard to his theology of the cross, this is 
highly significant, given the stress placed by evangelicalism on the centrality of the 
cross and the emphasis on penal substitution as the privileged interpretation of the 
cross. Yoder in fact diverges significantly from this mainstream evangelical 
‘substitutionary’ reading of the cross, but continues to engage evangelicals by 
emphasising, first, the centrality of the cross for Christian faith in general and, 
second, the broader significance of the cross for social ethics (which has been a 
significant gap in evangelical soteriology, the acknowledgment of which has 
contributed to the growth of a politically more radical evangelicalism). Yoder’s 
catholic sympathies are seen explicitly in his teaching for thirty years at the (Roman 
Catholic) University of Notre Dame, but more generally in his insistence that his 
theology is not sectarian but for the whole church, and that his social ethics are an  
interpretation of what is inherent in the Chalcedonian formulations.  
 
Barthian Christocentrism 
If the church, in its present form as community and in its doctrinal  
formulations from the past give the context for Yoder’s theology, his methodology, 
at least for his social ethics, can most appropriately be described as a Barthian 
Christocentrism. For Yoder, as for Barth, traditional ‘Christendom’, with 
Christianity the default position for society as a whole, is over. The church is a 
distinctive minority community, marked out from the rest of society by its 
confession of faith. In this, Yoder shares one of Barth’s core beliefs in social ethics. 
He writes,  
The definition of the gathering of Christians is their confessing Jesus Christ 
as Lord. The definition of the whole of human society is the absence of that 
confession. (Yoder: 1994: 108) 
It is perhaps significant, from a European viewpoint of radically declining church 
membership and influence, to note that neither Yoder nor Barth seem to envisage a 
situation where the Christian church is in a very small minority position. Barth 
wrote at a time when the Christian churches in Europe were certainly in a numerical 
minority, but retained a considerable degree of strength and influence. The 
American churches which form Yoder’s theological backdrop still retain that 
position of strength and influence. For a more radical (and realistic) critique, 
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Bonhoeffer’s teaching on the powerlessness of a sidelined church is perhaps more 
relevant for the present European church. 
 Yoder’s social ethic is based on uncompromising obedience to the Lordship 
of Jesus Christ – especially the crucified Christ - and an exploration of the radical 
implications of his exemplarity. Christian social ethics, if they are to be Christian 
and not just ‘natural human ethics as held to by Christians among others’ (Yoder; 
1994: 10) must be controlled, firmly and definitively, by the example of Jesus. The 
centrality of the example of Jesus for social ethics cannot be overemphasized in 
Yoder’s theology, and this exemplarity, Yoder insists, must not be diluted by any 
other authority or ethical norm, whether ‘nature, reason, creation, or reality’ (Yoder 
1994: 19)  or by an appeal to ‘Trinitarian’ social ethics, which removes, or at least 
weakens, the definitiveness of Jesus. The incarnation is the ultimate revelation of 
the nature and purpose of God, and is normative in its historical particularity. Yoder 
criticises the incarnationalist reading (popular in certain Anglican traditions) 
according to which God, by taking on human nature, thereby ratifies human nature 
as revelation. Rather, ‘God broke through the borders of our standard definition of 
what is human, and gave a new, formative definition in Jesus’. (Yoder 1994: 99) 
This means that the historical deeds, attitudes, intentions, and strategies of Jesus (as 
far as we can read them) have revelatory value. Moreover, if the whole life of Jesus 
is revelatory, the cross, as the culmination and inevitable result of Jesus’ actions and 
teaching, has supreme revelatory significance. The cross must not be isolated as an 
ahistorical symbol either of sin or sacrifice, as is the tendency (paradoxically) in 
both ‘Christian realism’ and the liberal optimism of much 20th century pacifism. 
Rather, the historical choices made by Jesus which led to the crucifixion have no 
less revelatory value than the fact of the crucifixion itself. To see the cross in 
isolation, solely as an expiatory sacrifice, a substitutionary penalty, in terms simply 
of an intra-trinitarian transaction, or merely as a symbol, however important, of 
human sinfulness, is grievously to detract from both its salvific and revelatory 
value. Yoder attacks this approach by describing it as follows: - ‘Jesus had to die for 
reasons unrelated to his social humanity. Therefore the social humanity of how that 
necessity came to be carried out is unimportant’ (Yoder 1994: 99) - apart from 
illustrating the general sinfulness of humanity. Yoder characterizes this approach as 
one of the ‘docetic ways of avoiding the political Jesus’, and hence stresses the need 
to take the cross into account when formulating social ethics. 
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Chalcedonian Christology 
If, for Yoder, the cross is central to Christian theology and social ethics, the 
question of the identity of the crucified is also of the utmost importance. For Yoder, 
an ‘orthodox’ Chalcedonian reading of the incarnation, grounded in the historical 
acts and teaching of Jesus, is at the heart of his Christology.  
What becomes of the meaning of the incarnation if Jesus is not normative 
man? If he is a man but not normative, is this not the ancient ebionitic 
heresy? If he is somehow authoritative but not in his humanness, is this not a 
new Gnosticism? (Yoder 1994: 10) 
Yoder repeatedly looks back to the orthodox Christology expounded in the early 
creeds. His social ethic, he claims, is a drawing out of the implications of the 
church’s credal confessions, not by propounding a new Christology but by taking 
the Nicene and Chalcedonian definitions with the utmost seriousness. For Yoder, if 
Jesus is not, in Chalcedonian terms, true God (in that he definitively reveals the 
eternal purposes of God) and true man (in that those eternal purposes are revealed in 
a fully human life) his theology, and especially his social ethic, becomes weak and 
rootless. Since his social ethic depends upon the fact that God reveals himself 
definitively in Christ, any diminution of a high Christology is fatal to his project, 
and removes both divine authority and a sense of being in accord with, as Hauerwas 
put it in another context, ‘the grain of the universe’. (Hauerwas 2001) For Yoder, 
ethics is a reflection on reality as intended by God which in turn flows from the 
divine nature as exemplified in the human life (and death) of Jesus . Discipleship is 
the process of corresponding faithfully in the present time to the divine action in 
Jesus Christ in history. For Yoder’s political theology, the notion of correspondence 
between the disciple (and the disciple’s cross bearing) and the cross bearing action 
of God in Christ is central. 
 
Soteriology  
 How does Yoder’s overall soteriology cohere with his political reading of 
the cross?  Three themes recur – first, the elimination of any hiatus between the 
cross and preceding events; second, the incorporation into soteriology of the need 
for a potentially costly discipleship; and third, the emphasis on Christ’s (and God’s) 
respect for human freedom. In accordance with his ‘conversational’ style of 
theology, Yoder is reluctant to set out a definitive and systematic soteriology. The 
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closest he comes is in a repeated series of lectures to the Mennonite Biblical 
Seminary collected in Preface to theology. Christology and Theological Method. 
(Yoder 1982) It is worthwhile examining this in some detail, as it demonstrates the 
coherence, even identity, of Yoder’s political theology of the cross with his overall 
theology. Yoder’s political theology is not even to be seen as a deduction from what 
could be described as his more doctrinal theology – both are of one piece. First 
(Yoder 1982: 209ff) Yoder lists key New Testament models for explaining why 
Christ had to die –  substitution, reconciliation, revelation of the love and 
righteousness of God, ransom, sacrifice, adoption, and redemption. These have to 
be woven together into a soteriology that is congruent both with the incarnation – 
the genuine humanity of and the divine presence in Jesus - and with Jesus’ call to 
discipleship. Yoder then discusses various post-biblical models for atonement – 
Christus Victor, ransom, divinisation, moral influence, therapeutic, and satisfaction, 
and finds all of them wanting. He is especially critical of the Anselmian satisfaction 
theory, in that it sees God as the object, rather than the agent of reconciliation, and 
uses a substitutionary doctrine not supported by the New Testament. Salvation in 
the New Testament is (Yoder 1982: 221) ‘not primarily the remission of guilt or the 
cancellation of punishment; it is reconciliation (reestablishment of communion) and 
obedience i.e. discipleship’.  
 Yoder’s chief criticism of the Anselmian theory is that it has little to say 
about discipleship and obedience. Moreover, the actual historical life and death of 
Jesus has little relevance to the Anselmian theory: –  
How the cross happened, the social reality of Palestine, the promises which 
Jesus proclaimed, the actions that offended the authorities and led to their 
killing him, are all irrelevant to this view. The only obedience that is 
required of him is that he committed no sin. (Yoder 1982: 224)  
Yoder, while admitting the moral and spiritual force of the Anselmian soteriology, 
describes it as ‘not a biblically satisfactory theory’. (Yoder 1982: 224) ‘An 
alternative theory’, suggests Yoder (Yoder 1982: 226) in a key passage, while 
taking sin as seriously as Anselm, has to include those themes neglected by Anselm, 
particularly the ‘faith union’ with Christ, and, most of all must 
 see Jesus as he was as a man, as a social figure, as a teacher, and as a moral 
figure, Jesus as acting within the political and cultural situation of Palestine. 
We would seek some relationship between atonement and his talking about 
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the kingdom, his forgiving people, his teaching people, his making of people 
a church – a body of disciples – his sending people into mission. We would 
see his getting crucified and his being raised from the dead as a social 
process.  
Also integral to a full soteriology is a cruciform discipleship, since  
 the cross of Christ demands and enables the cross of the Christian. We 
might try to affirm the unity of obedience, sanctification with 
justification…the unity of these in Biblical thought links the unity of our 
obedience with God’s work in Christ, his cross with our cross, his death, our 
dying with him. This double unity is an element which is completely 
missing in Anselm and is present in the Bible. 
Yoder, characteristically, declines to set out a definitive model for atonement, but 
offers the following ‘presuppositions’ or components in an adequate doctrine. 
(Yoder 1982: 227) First, a real identification-communion with God in Christ is 
necessary for the believer, expressed by such terms as ‘faith union’, ‘abide in me’ 
and ‘in Christ’. Second, God’s way of dealing with evil is through an agape which 
expresses itself in non-resistance. And, third, there is a real difference between 
church and world, and the Christian faith is distorted if this is not clearly kept in 
mind. It is significant that this part of Yoder’s work dates from 1954, and can be 
seen directly to prefigure themes which emerge strongly in Politics of Jesus and 
thereafter – discipleship, non-resistance, and the world-church separation. Another 
‘presupposition’ is the freedom of humanity to choose, and God’s respect for that 
choice. Humanity is always given the freedom to choose whether to obey or 
disobey, and God’s honouring of that freedom is basic to the divine-human 
relationship. God takes the risk of disobedience, since ‘God is agape and agape 
respects the freedom of the beloved’ – with no exceptions. (Yoder 1982: 228) God’s 
total respect for that freedom leads to humanity’s lost state, since overcoming that 
freedom by a divine fiat would contradict the nature of agape. This tension between 
God’s desire both to save and to respect human freedom is at the heart of Yoder’s 
soteriology: -  
The question is how God can bring this man back to communion and 
obedience i.e. save him (expression of agape) and at the same time leave 
man free (expression of agape) which must include respecting the hold of 
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his sinfulness on him. How, in short, to reveal love to man without forcing it 
upon him, which forcing would contradict love. (Yoder 1982: 229) 
We will see that a similar tension is found in Yoder’s social ethics between the 
church’s necessary loving involvement in political issues and a non-resistant  
refusal to take political responsibility, between the demand actively to express love  
in political and social ethics and the necessity of ‘letting be’ the sinner. 
 
The obedient non-resistance of Jesus  
 The answer to the human predicament lies in Christ’s obedience (within the 
social and political circumstances of his time) to the absolute, freedom respecting, 
agape of God, which necessarily involves his non-resistance to those who would do 
him harm. Yoder sees the obedience of the perfect human being, Jesus Christ, living 
in free communion with God and loving humankind with divine love, as the focal 
point of atonement. Jesus respected the liberty of sinful humanity to the extent that 
he did not resist their sinfulness but himself bore the consequence of that sinfulness. 
This non-resistance demonstrates the fullness of divine agape in respecting to the 
utmost human freedom to sin against God and God’s human representative. In 
Yoder’s interpretation of the temptations, Jesus is faced with a series of short cuts 
which would undermine human freedom to reject him and therefore God. Yoder 
locates this within the political choices available to Jesus: -  
The temptation to use political methods of violent self-defense was one 
aspect of this possibility. The whole way meant the cross. For since murder 
is the worst sin, as it takes away freedom most utterly, so the utmost in 
agape is the utmost in non-self-defence, to undergo murder, respecting the 
other’s freedom to commit the worst sin out of love for the sinner-murderer. 
Which is what Jesus did. (Yoder 1982: 230)  
Jesus died a (self) sacrificial death in allowing God to express agape through his 
non-resistance, which culminated in the crucifixion. ‘His sinlessness, his obedience, 
is what he offered to God, and that sinlessness, utter faithfulness to love, cost his 
life in a world of sinners.’ (Yoder 1982: 230)  
 If some of the strengths of Yoder’s subsequent theology are prefigured here, 
so also are some weaknesses; Yoder can justly be accused of the tendency to isolate 
and absolutise certain concepts, and hence to lose perspective. It could be argued 
that Yoder makes this ‘agape-respect’ for freedom a mechanistic, legalistic concept, 
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unrelated to any realistic human analogy of agape;  a parent would, out of genuine 
agape, override the ideal of absolute freedom in order to restrain (and punish) a 
child who might hurt itself or others.  
 
Resurrection and faith  
 The resurrection is not to be detached from what precedes it – rather, it 
ratifies this sacrifice of the cross, and 
vindicates the rightness, the possibility, the effectiveness of the way of the 
cross. But our present concern is the place of the resurrection in the dialectic 
of God’s love, which sought to save man by respecting his freedom to sin so 
far as to die at his hands. (Yoder 1982: 251)  
These words (in my italics) seem to sum up Yoder’s soteriology. The resurrection is 
the ultimate endorsement of God’s love which persists even when human beings do 
their worst to the agent of that love. The resurrection of the crucified Jesus thus 
preserves both elements of the salvific love of God; it overcomes sin without 
denying freedom to the sinner. This act of God in Christ has to be appropriated by 
human faith; a faith identified not merely as intellectual assent, but as ‘faith union’. 
The Christian appropriates by repentance and faith the obedience of Christ, 
repentance being interpreted as an ethical ‘turning round of the will’. (Yoder 1982: 
251) In a similar way, faith is not merely the acceptance of something external 
which has been done on one’s behalf, but rather an obedient discipleship and faith 
union with the one who has, by his obedience, made that relationship possible. 
Forgiveness is interpreted not as a transactional cancelling of sin, but as a 
restoration of obedient relationship. Yoder concludes: ‘This view of salvation as 
restored communion and consequently restored capacity to obedience fits, better 
than Anselm’s view, all the New Testament figures for atonement.’ (Yoder 1982: 
231) Salvation, as restored communion with God affording the capacity for costly 
and obedient discipleship, based upon the sacrificial and non-resistant obedience of 
the crucified Christ, is the starting point of Yoder’s political theology.  
 
Can the cross bear the hermeneutical weight Yoder places upon it? 
 As one who adopts the Christocentric, Barthian, methodology, Yoder 
regards the person and acts of Christ, and especially the crucified Christ, as the key 
to his interpretation of Christian politics. Yoder is concerned to stress that he is not 
 18 
propounding a new Christology, but merely exploring the political implications of 
the orthodox Christology as traditionally taught and accepted by the church. The 
exemplarity of Christ, in the tradition of ‘every act of Christ is for our instruction’ is 
at the heart of his theology. Logically, therefore, Yoder must draw his theology 
from the totality of Christ and his impact on first century society, without isolating 
certain aspects to the detriment of others. Does he, in fact, over-isolate the cross?  
Or does Yoder treat as definitively revelatory aspects of the cross which are merely 
contingent to its salvific purpose? We have seen above Yoder’s possible tendency 
to overemphasize and absolutise. Against this criticism, Yoder strives to locate the 
cross as an integral and inevitable consequence of Jesus’ ministry. The cross, for 
Yoder, is not an accident, or an intra-trinitarian transaction worked out in isolation 
from the rest of Jesus’ ministry, but the culmination and consummation of the 
whole. In Politics of Jesus Yoder is at pains to stress the cross as the inevitable 
consequence of the political choices of Jesus. Moreover, he shows that this is 
precisely how the cross was interpreted by his first followers, as evidenced by them 
adopting a similar cruciform and cross-risking lifestyle. The political cross is also at 
one with the overall salvific purpose of God – the pattern of non-resistant respect 
for human freedom is as much part of Yoder’s doctrine of atonement as of his 
political theology. Given the traditional Christological framework of Christ the 
revealer of the divine nature and purposes, Yoder’s emphasis on the cross as the key 
to understanding and formulating a doctrine of Christian politics is justifiable. The 
cross is the radicalization of the incarnation, where the incarnation comes to its 
sharpest point. Yoder recognizes this and seeks to draw out its implications.  
 
b) The context of the cross in Boff and Sobrino 
 
Theology in the service of liberation 
 As with Yoder, the ecclesial and social background against which Boff and 
Sobrino write significantly colours their theology. Both work as liberation 
theologians in Latin America, where poverty, violence and political oppression 
form a constant theme. Boff lived through the military dictatorship in Brazil, one of 
the more prosperous of the Latin American countries, but still divided by gross 
inequality. Sobrino is rooted in the context of the bloody civil war in El Salvador 
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which claimed thousands of lives, mostly of innocent peasants, at the hands of 
military and paramilitary death squads. 
Boff’s work is a practical and developing theology designed for use in 
Christian liberative praxis. The ultimate criterion for the truth of theology is 
practical – ‘Theology is true insofar as it is translated into meditation, prayer, 
conversion, the following of Christ, and commitment to our fellow human beings.’ 
(Boff 1980: vii) This judging of theology by its fruits is by no means confined to 
liberation theology, but, for Boff, the accent throughout is on discipleship exercised 
with a prior commitment to human liberation. Praxis is the essence of spirituality – 
‘Knowing is not the decisive thing. The decisive thing is real, effective 
action.....Salvation takes place when we make the leap from theory to real, authentic 
practice.’ (Boff 1980: 36) Despite the Marxist influenced terminology, this need 
mean no more than James’ ‘faith without works is dead’. (James 2: 17)  Boff, 
however, goes beyond this to the distinctive emphasis of liberation theology that 
‘praxis’, commitment to liberation, is epistemologically prior to ‘doxa’, and that the 
standpoint from which theology is done decisively affects the content of that 
theology: –  
The poor are not just another theme in the Gospel. They are of the very 
essence of the Gospel....Only from the standpoint of the poor can we 
understand the hope embodied in the gospel message of Jesus. And we can 
be saved only if we adopt the perspective of the poor. (Boff 1980: 39-40) 
The setting for Boff’s theology of the cross is the suffering of the poor of 
Latin America, which Boff links intimately with the suffering of the crucified Jesus. 
His theology is consciously and intensely contextual, in that it both reflects and 
serves its context. For Boff, the cross cannot be understood or interpreted without 
constant reference to its parallels today, in the suffering of the poor and in their 
struggle for liberation from that poverty. The fact that God continues to suffer in the 
poor and oppressed is central to Boff’s theology of the cross, and crucial to his 
methodology. In his introduction to Way of the Cross, Way of Justice, he makes his 
programmatic statement: ‘Theology is ante et retro oculata; it has two eyes. One 
looks back toward the past, where salvation broke in; the other looks toward the 
present, where salvation becomes reality here and now.’ (Boff 1980: viii) This is 
not peculiar to Boff or to liberation theology, but it is given extra meaning by Boff’s 
insistence that there is a continuity and even an equivalence between the sufferings 
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of Jesus and those of the poor and oppressed today. Hence the ‘Way of the cross, 
with one eye focussing on the historical Jesus...Way of justice, its other eye 
focussing on the Christ of faith who continues his passion today in his brothers and 
sisters’. (Boff 1980: viii). This is the basis for Boff’s spirituality of the cross, 
emphasising the present encounter with God which is the basis of any spirituality. 
Boff’s writings on the cross and Christology are chiefly directed not so 
much to the poor themselves as to those within the church who serve the poor. A 
possible exception is Way of the Cross, Way of Justice, which he describes as ‘a 
prayerful theology or a theological prayer’. (Boff 1980: viii). This work can perhaps 
best be read as a popularisation of Boff’s work on Christology and soteriology, 
taking the form of meditations on the fifteen Stations of the Cross, on a theme 
familiar in Catholic devotion, in simple, non-technical language and blank verse. 
However, in general, it is true to say that the poorest themselves are not the most 
likely readers of Boff’s work. For example, in chapter 10 of Passion of Christ, 
Passion of the World, which summarises the themes of the work, emphasis is given 
to ‘preaching’ the cross. This emphasis may relate to Boff’s membership of the 
Franciscan order, where proclamation and action are not finely differentiated. Of 
equal significance is the intended audience for Boff’s work - not so much the poor 
themselves (for whom poverty is not a choice) but those Christians who have made 
a decision to place themselves alongside the poor (i.e. the practitioners of liberation 
theology) and act, in the Gramscian sense, as ‘organic intellectuals’.  
Although originating from Spain, Sobrino, like Boff, is a Latin American 
liberation theologian, differing in spiritual background (Jesuit rather than 
Franciscan), geographical location (El Salvador rather than Brazil), and language 
(Spanish rather than Portuguese). Both Sobrino and Boff share in a theology 
influenced by Moltmann and Marx, but, far more important than these, a locus 
theologicus of ministering in a context of suffering and poverty. This, especially, 
gives Sobrino’s theology of the cross a radically personal edge, springing as it does 
from his close acquaintance with those martyred in El Salvador, especially 
Archbishop Romero, assassinated in 1980 and Sobrino’s six Jesuit colleagues and 
their housekeeper and her daughter murdered by a ‘death squad’ in 1989. Sobrino’s 
theology of the cross is thus formed not in a position of detachment, but through 
involvement in the struggles for liberation. If, as Sobrino argues, the best location 
for a theologia crucis is in the midst of those experiencing similar crosses, his 
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theological situation gives a key hermeneutical privilege by his propinquity to 
contemporary crosses. Sobrino writes of ‘Latin America, where the cross is ever 
present. Among us the question is not, as it keeps being described in Europe, how to 
do theology after Auschwitz, but doing it in Auschwitz, that is, in the midst of a 
terrifying cross’. (Sobrino 1994a: 195) 
 
An Orthodox Christology from below 
In chapter 1 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World Boff begins by 
setting out the presuppositions that inform his work. There are two perspectives 
from which he is writing, both giving him a viewpoint ‘from below’. Theologically, 
he interprets the person of Christ from the point of view of a synoptic, Antiochene, 
Franciscan Christology, beginning from the humanity of Jesus, rather that his 
divinity. Sociologically, his locus is ‘the situation of captivity and resistance in 
which so many human beings live today’. (Boff 1987: xi) This orientation is in line 
with his role as a liberation theologian, doing his theology from the perspective and 
for the benefit of those at the grassroots.   
My interest, then, is directed to the detection of the mechanisms that led 
Jesus to rejection, imprisonment, torture, and a shameful crucifixion. My 
interest is to demonstrate that this denouement was a result of a commitment 
and a praxis that threatened the status quo of his time. …Finally, I seek to 
detail the meaning that the passion and death of Jesus possesses for our faith 
today as lived and tested in the context of our interest. (Boff 1987: 2)  
 It is important to note that ‘from below’ describes the perspective, rather than the 
content, of Boff’s Christology, which can best be described as traditionally 
orthodox. His method is of great importance, as he sees the New Testament 
interpretation of Jesus, and especially the cross, as developing in response to the 
various pastoral challenges (most of all the challenge of persecution) faced by the 
early Christian community. The corollary Boff draws from this is a freedom to 
develop a Christology and soteriology in response to contemporary challenges to 
Christian community. This ‘development of doctrine’ emerges very clearly in 
Boff’s interpretation of the cross – not denying the Biblical and ‘traditional’ 
explanations, but extending the meaning to answer contemporary questions. 
 Similarly, Sobrino’s Christology can be described as essentially orthodox 
and traditional, but with an emphasis on contextuality. Sobrino is concerned to 
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describe a ‘Latin American historical Jesus’ – that is, his Christology begins, not 
‘from above’ but from the historical Jesus as interpreted with the special insights of 
Latin America. This is especially relevant to what is probably the most significant 
contribution Sobrino has made to Christology, linking Jesus to the contemporary 
‘crucified people’ in a reciprocal relationship. The nature and theological 
significance of the crucified people is derived from the crucified Jesus, and a 
theology arising out of the crucified people provides insights into the nature and 
significance of the crucified Jesus. Sobrino is much influenced by the philosopher 
Zubiri, for whom a subject’s status is constituted by the relations in which that 
subject is embedded. Hence relationality plays an important part in Sobrino’s 
Christology, which begins by analysing the historical relations in which Jesus is 
embedded. The two basic Christological relations are to ‘the kingdom of God and to 
the God of the kingdom’. Also of great significance are Jesus relations with his 
followers, which, in the light of the cross, can be seen in history as that reciprocal 
relationship between the crucified Jesus and the crucified people. 
 Again, as with Boff, ‘from below’ describes the perspective, rather than the 
content, of Sobrino’s Christology. Sobrino certainly makes a distinction between 
the eternal Sonship of Christ, confessed in the Christological creeds and dogmas, 
and the realisation of that Sonship in history, expressed in the historical Jesus’ 
relationship with God. It is true, also, that the Vatican document detailing criticisms 
of Sobrino’s theology, the Notification on the works of Father Jon Sobrino, S.J 
(Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 2006) censures Sobrino for tending 
towards assumptionism, a form of adoptionism whereby the historical human Jesus 
was ‘assumed’ by the divine Son of God. These criticisms, however, can be levelled 
at most Christologies which begin from the perspective of below, and would seem 
to be a matter of perspective and emphasis rather than content. A more serious 
criticism is that Sobrino downplays Christ’s uniqueness, especially the uniqueness 
of his cross. This arises, most of all, from Sobrino’s linking of the theme of the 
crucified people to Christology. If the historical community which derives from 
Christ through relationality with him crucified is not solely the church, but a more 
diffuse and general ‘crucified people’, then such an interpretation of Christ is more 
vulnerable to the charge of pluralism or lack of specificity than a Christ whose 
being is tightly defined by ecclesiastical tradition and is confined to a community of 
explicit faith. This criticism points to an important fault line between liberation and 
 23 
more traditional theologies which will be explored later at greater depth.  If Jesus is 
portrayed merely as one of the millions of ‘crucified people’ in history, even as an 
‘elder brother’, this continuity between his crucifixion and theirs, it is argued, might 
detract from his uniqueness. In fact, however, the converse would appear to be true. 
The reciprocal relationship between Jesus and the crucified peoples certainly would 
not be possible without a radical continuity between them. Yet without a 
traditionally orthodox Christology there would be little point in Sobrino describing 
the suffering of people as ‘crucified’, rather than machine gunned, starved, 
impoverished etc. Although much of the theological importance of the crucified 
people is intrinsic to them and their sufferings (and does not depend on a 
relationship to anyone else) the theologoumenon ‘crucified people’ derives from 
their relationship with Jesus, the definitive Son of God, who was crucified in a way 
that parallels their sufferings. If Sobrino did not consider Jesus to be the Son of God 
much of the force and meaning of his specifically ‘crucifixion language’ would be 
lost.  
 
Soteriology 
 The relationship between Boff’s overall soteriology and his political reading 
of the cross is best seen in chapters 6 and 7 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the 
world, where he sets out and criticises Biblical, Patristic and Scholastic 
interpretations of the crucifixion. He begins with the earliest Christian communities, 
who interpreted Christ’s death in terms of the death that awaited any prophet thus 
needing no special explanation. However, the suffering and persecution experienced 
by the early Christian community caused them to use the ‘suffering servant’ figure 
in interpreting Christ’s death, introducing new meanings of expiation and vicarious 
atonement, reinforced by a sacrificial, expiatory reading of the Last Supper in 
Eucharistic theology. Paul’s theology of the cross is seen, first, in the light of his 
pastoral involvement with those ‘pneumatics’ or ‘spiritual’ Christians of Corinth 
who downgraded the earthly, crucified Jesus and boasted of their ‘wisdom’. Against 
this, Paul sets the ‘eschatologico-critical function’ (Boff 1987: 81) of the cross as 
the criterion of Christian wisdom, the criterion against which all else is to be 
measured. This cross-wisdom is not based on worldly power, but on apparent 
weakness.  
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Boff now turns to the ways in which the crucifixion has been interpreted in 
post-Biblical tradition. The criterion he uses is highly significant for political 
theology: ‘Do the images used in piety, liturgy, and theology to express Jesus 
Christ’s liberation really succeed in setting in relief the genuinely liberative aspect 
of Christ’s death and resurrection? Or do they conceal this aspect?’ (Boff 1987: 86) 
Boff stresses the fact that the images used to express Christian interpretation of the 
cross are culturally conditioned, and convey ideological interests - hence, these 
images need to be re-examined, or perhaps, deconstructed, to convey liberative 
meaning today. There is a clear political corollary - do these images assist in the 
liberative purpose of the church, or do they contribute to oppression? First, Boff 
returns to an earlier theme in refusing to isolate the death of Christ as redemptive. 
‘Redemption is basically a praxis, a historical process, verified...in the turbulent 
reality of a concrete situation.’ (Boff 1987: 89) In that praxis the whole of Jesus’ 
life, not merely the moment of death, is redemptive and liberative. Boff is 
concerned to avoid a solely transactional account of redemption - he seems to see 
redemption (although he does not put it in these terms) in function and process 
rather than ontological status. Redemption is the process of being redeemed in the 
totality of life (including the political), as a consequence of the totality of the life of 
Jesus. It is not to be reduced to a transaction of a single moment. And so Boff 
criticises both the Greek and the Latin approaches for separating parts of the earthly 
life of Jesus from the totality, the Greek for concentrating on the fact alone of the 
incarnation (and downplaying the actual redemptive details of Jesus’ life), the Latin 
for concentrating on the death of Christ to the detriment of the life which went 
before. Boff’s target is a ‘juridical, formal attitude toward sin, justice, and the 
relationship between God and human beings’. (Boff 1987: 91) He fears that 
concepts such as ‘expiation, reparation, satisfaction, ransom and merit conceal 
rather than communicate the rich novelty of the liberation that comes to us in Jesus 
Christ.’ Boff, however, seeks to salvage what he can from these images of 
redemption in a process of demythologisation.   
The first model is that of expiatory sacrifice for the sins of his people, which 
Boff re-interprets as self-surrender for the sake of the Other, and for others. 
‘[Christ] was ‘being for others to the last extreme. Not only his death, but his whole 
life was a sacrifice: it was wholly surrender.’ (Boff 1987: 94) The relevance of this 
for a spirituality of committed political action is evident - discipleship has an 
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‘outward’ orientation, both towards God and humanity, and this necessitates a 
commitment of the self away from the self which expresses itself in costly service. 
Next Boff turns to ‘redemption as ransom’, a model of ‘captivity and 
rescue’. This model emphasises the ‘gravity of human perdition...we were the 
possession of something that refused to allow us our authentic being’. Traditionally, 
this was seen as a ransom from the power of the devil in a suprahistorical drama. 
Boff reinterprets this in relation to the need for liberation from oppressive social 
and religious systems.  
Christ has delivered us from this captivity. Driven by a new experience of 
God and a new human praxis, he appeared among us as a human being who 
was really free, one who was liberated and liberating. By his violent passion 
and death, he paid the price of the liberty he had claimed in God’s name. 
(Boff 1987: 96)  
The third model is ‘vicarious satisfaction’, the juridical Augustinian and 
Anselmian conception of atonement, by which ‘satisfaction’ is offered to God for 
humanity’s sin by the incarnation and death of Christ. Boff transmutes this theory 
into one of a humanity whose salvation consists of ‘being ever more and more 
themselves’ (in their truest being as intended by God) (Boff 1987: 98) yet being 
aware of an incompleteness in itself, and unable to overcome that incompleteness 
and dissatisfaction. The process of humanisation, in which Christ stirs us to achieve 
the humanity he has achieved, overcomes that incompleteness and is thus a modern 
(i.e. non-medieval) equivalent of the satisfaction theory. This is perhaps the least 
successful of his translations of traditional images of the atonement into modern 
images relevant for a political spirituality. The necessity for the cross is unclear (as, 
it must be admitted, is also the case in the Anselmian theory), humanisation resting 
on the perfection of Christ’s incarnation, rather than on the crucifixion.  
Boff concludes this survey by asking the question – ‘How is he (Christ) in 
solidarity with us, and how does his salvific reality touch our reality, saving and 
liberating it?’ (1987: 99) Boff appeals to a sense of universal human solidarity, 
across geography, time and history. The incarnation, the divine-human unity is the 
key to (or the model of) the divine-human unity achieved by Christ in his solidarity 
with humankind.  
Herein is the secret, profound meaning of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
…Thanks to his solidarity with them in the same humanity, when he touches 
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them he opens to them the possibility of redemption and liberation, he 
inspires them with a project for the liberation of all their exiled sisters and 
brothers, he activates the forces that can shake off the yoke of all manner of 
servitude. (Boff 1987: 101) 
The cross fits into this schema as a part of the incarnation, in the ‘deadly conflict he 
underwent’, as part of ‘God’s maximal self-revelation’ and ‘the maximal revelation 
of the openness of a human being’. (1987: 100)  In other words, the cross is the end 
point of the incarnation. As elsewhere, Boff is determined not to isolate the cross, 
but to see it in close relationship with the rest of Jesus’ incarnate life.  
 This is also very much a theme of Sobrino’s soteriology – the totality of 
Jesus’ life-and-death is salvific, and it is a mistake to isolate Jesus’ death in an 
ahistorical soteriology. For Sobrino, salvation is deeply related to a primary 
conflict, between, as he puts it, ‘The God of life and the gods of death’. Salvation 
takes place within the one history, and is centred on the holistic coming of the 
kingdom of God in its concreteness. Salvation is not something performed by God 
alone, but by the co-operation of humans in the forwarding of the acts of healing, 
liberation and peacemaking that are specific to each situation where God’s kingdom 
is challenged. Sobrino writes:  
The salvation brought by the Kingdom – though this is not all the Kingdom 
brings (my italics)– will, then, be being saved in history from the evils of 
history. What the benefits of the Kingdom might be is determined above all 
by the actual situation of oppressed human beings and not by an a priori 
decision about what salvation might mean. (Sobrino 1994a: 125) 
 Sobrino appears to recognise, from the words in italics, that the totality of salvation 
means more than a reactive response to political and social oppression, but, given 
his context, this is where he chooses to place the emphasis of his soteriology. Jesus 
is the salvific mediator of the kingdom, as the Son of God who promotes authentic 
humanization and divinization (humanity and divinity being not mutually 
incompatible). 
 For Sobrino, as for Yoder and Boff, there is an intimate relationship between 
the historical reasons for Jesus’ death and its soteriological significance. The bare 
fact of Jesus’ crucifixion means nothing in isolation from the historical facts which 
caused that crucifixion. Jesus’ death is not a contextless sacrifice at the hands of 
those whose sin is general and ahistorical. It was a historical scandal, a crime, a 
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deliberate ending of a life lived in the service of a liberative kingdom at the hands 
of those who were threatened by that kingdom. Sobrino describes the soteriological 
role of Christ in traditional terms – as sacrifice, new covenant, suffering servant, 
liberation from the law (Sobrino 1993: 223-7) and emphasises two aspects of the 
salvific role of the cross. First (Sobrino 1993: 227ff) it is ‘the manifestation of what 
is pleasing to God.’ The sacrificial death of Jesus is pleasing to God, not in itself in 
isolation, but as the culmination of a life lived in love. The suffering in itself is not a 
good thing pleasing to God – there is no deification of suffering. Rather, what is 
pleasing to God is a love that is willing, if necessary, to suffer. The manifestation of 
this, of Jesus as the homo verus, is salvific in that it invites and inspires ‘human 
beings to reproduce in their own turn the homo verus, true humanity’. Sobrino 
1993: 230). Second (Sobrino 1993: 230ff) the cross shows the ‘credibility of God’s 
love’. The cross does not change God’s attitude to humanity.  
The cross is not only what is pleasing to God, but that in which God 
expresses himself as pleasing to human beings…Jesus’ life and cross are 
that in which God’s love for human beings is expressed and made as real as 
possible. (Sobrino 1993: 230)  
In Sobrino’s context of suffering in Latin America, the credibility of God’s love 
needs to be demonstrated in the most radical way possible. Sobrino quotes the 
famous words of Bonhoeffer which form a sub-text to much of Sobrino’s writing on 
the cross ‘Only the suffering God can help.’ (Bonhoeffer 1953: 361) God’s love can 
only be credible to the suffering if God himself has undergone the depths of 
suffering.  
 Various criticisms can be made of this soteriology, de-emphasising as it 
does certain aspects of the atonement familiar in more traditional interpretations – 
most notably the nature of sin being an offence, primarily, against God. The 
Notification on the works of Father Jon Sobrino, S.J (Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith: 2006) criticises Sobrino for an exemplarist soteriology that ‘reduces 
redemption to moralism’, the goal being ‘the appearance of the homo verus, 
manifested in fidelity unto death’. Salvation and redemption ‘cannot be reduced to 
the good example that Jesus gives us’. However, Sobrino can be defended in two 
ways. First, in general it is in the nature of liberation theology not to present the 
whole of Christian doctrine at any one point, but only that which is most relevant to 
the particular context in which the theologian teaches. Second, it is misleading 
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simply to portray Sobrino’s soteriology as exemplarist. The cross does not only 
reveal the love of God, but unleashes its reality in concrete situations. Sobrino looks 
to the cross of Jesus not merely as an example, but as a present and active force of 
suffering love.  
 
The ‘necessity’ of the cross 
 The question of the ‘necessity’ of the cross is important to Boff, in seeking a 
theology of the cross which avoids a deification and glorification of suffering. This 
is exemplified in Way of the Cross, Way of Justice, where Boff translates necessity 
into inevitability. ‘Viewed theologically, the passion of Jesus was the consequence 
of his fidelity to his Father and his fellow human beings.’ (Boff 1980: ix) Although 
‘God did not spare his Son, He handed him over to these cruel barbarities and 
allowed him to experience the depths of human wickedness’. (Boff 1980: 11) It is 
certainly not the case that God actively willed the crucifixion – ‘In the face of 
human rejection, the Father did not cease to will his kingdom and to press for its 
establishment even now in this world, even though it would mean the criminal 
elimination of his own Son.’ (Boff 1980: ix) The ‘necessity’ or ‘inevitability’ of the 
crucifixion, which is stressed in the Synoptic accounts lies in this – ‘Given the 
sinful condition of the world, Jesus would have to die if he wanted to be obedient 
and loyal to his Father.’ (Boff 1980: ix) 
Boff concludes, however, ‘Despite rejection by human beings, the kingdom 
triumphed through the sacrifice of Jesus, who accepted his sacrifice in selfless 
freedom rather than fatalistically.’ (Boff 1980: ix) This theme of inevitability recurs 
later - ‘Given the situation created by people’s refusal to undergo conversion, Jesus 
really ‘had to die’, as the scriptures put it’. (Boff 1980: 89) The fundamental cause 
of the crucifixion is human sinfulness – ‘In the last analysis it was this sinfulness, 
which had taken root in human beings, hardened their hearts, and perverted fraternal 
relations, that caused Jesus to be condemned to death.’ (Boff 1980: 6)  
Boff is attempting to indicate a place for the cross in the divine purpose 
without implicating God as actively willing the crucifixion. The cross is a crime, 
and Boff is determined not to minimize its criminal nature, or to make God an 
accomplice in the crime. God the Father is determined to realise his ‘project in 
history’, the ‘kingdom of God’, the ‘divine revolution’ (Boff 1908: 29), even 
though it will inevitably cost the life of his Son. Given the nature of the world in its 
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hostility to God’s ways, any ‘historical project’ of God will inevitably risk God’s 
agent’s suffering and death. God, in his love, freely accepts this sacrifice as a tragic 
necessity, in order that his ‘kingdom, which had been rejected, is re-introduced into 
history’. (Boff 1980: 29-30) This seems to be the way in which Boff, at least in Way 
of the Cross, Way of Justice understands the salvific nature of the cross. The 
kingdom of God will be realised through the death of his Son - ‘Jesus freely 
accepted condemnation to death. He died for our sins. In other words, he died 
because of our rejection of conversion brought about his death.’ (Boff 1980: 90) 
Boff is content to use traditional language to describe the crucifixion – ‘He took our 
sins upon himself, establishing solidarity with sinners, in order to free them from 
their wickedness.’ - but with a crucial addition – ‘In particular, he established 
solidarity with all the victims of human sinfulness’. This theme of solidarity with 
humanity is an important and recurring theme in Boff’s political theology of the 
cross. 
A similar doctrine of the ‘necessity’ of the cross is found in Sobrino. Again, 
‘necessity’ is probably better rendered as ‘inevitability’. Sobrino writes:   
Rather than viewing the cross as some arbitrary design on God’s part, we 
must see it as the outcome of God’s primordial option: the incarnation. The 
cross is the outcome of an incarnation situated in a world of sin that is 
revealed to be a power working against the God of Jesus.  
(Sobrino 1978: 201)  
In such a world, given the nature of sin and evil, the cross is historically inevitable. 
If there is to be an incarnation into the processes of human history, the cross is 
‘necessary’. This is not so much a theological necessity as an inevitable 
consequence of human history. Although God’s design of incarnation makes that 
crucifixion inevitable, human sin, not the will of God crucified Jesus. Here, again, 
Sobrino is careful not to ‘deify’ or to privilege suffering in itself. God’s suffering in 
Christ is not for its own sake, but for the sake of a diminution of human suffering. A 
spirituality of ‘dolorism’ is futile, if by that suffering the suffering of humankind is 
not diminished.  
 
c) Conclusion 
 Contextless theology, done in a social and ecclesiastical vacuum, is 
impossible. For Yoder, Boff and Sobrino the background against which they do 
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their theology is highly significant, though in differing ways. Yoder’s ecclesiastical 
setting in the Mennonite tradition of a non-resistant martyr church, and Boff’s and 
Sobrino’s situation of ministering to the suffering poor of Latin America determine 
the content of much of their theologies of the cross. All three theologians attempt to 
integrate their political theologies of the cross with their overall theologies – Yoder, 
with his insistence on a non-coercive God respecting (and permitting) human 
freedom, Boff with his liberative reinterpretation of traditional categories of 
atonement, Sobrino with his interweaving of Christology with the theme of the 
crucified people. All three profess an orthodox Christology, and seek to draw out 
the implications of an already well established theology for political and social 
ethics. All three have been criticized by more conservative members of their 
denominations for a defective (i.e. non-traditional) Christology, but have insisted 
that any divergence from the traditional is a matter of Christological perspective, 
rather than content. All three are concerned not to isolate the cross from its political 
causation in an ahistorical manner but to ascribe revelatory and salvific value to 
events preceding the actual crucifixion. Soteriology is, perhaps, less easy to assess. 
Yoder’s soteriology diverges significantly from the Evangelical doctrine of penal 
substitutionary atonement. Boff and Sobrino shelter behind liberation theology’s 
tendency to emphasize only those parts of the Christian faith which serve the 
particular liberative purpose, with the result that it is difficult to ascertain the full 
content of their soteriological beliefs. Boff, in his reinterpretation of the traditional 
models of atonement, elicits from these models images of use to current liberative 
practice, but it is difficult to ascertain which model he would use to express a more 
‘traditional’ form of atonement, where the focus is the restoration of relationship 
between God and humanity, broken by sin, rather than simply restoration of just 
relationships within humanity. Both Boff and Sobrino stress, however, the holistic 
or integral nature of salvation, and the fact that the kingdom of God, the goal of 
salvation, cannot be simply reduced to political activity, even though this is the 
focus of their concern. 
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Chapter 3 
The historical and political causation of the crucifixion in Yoder, Boff and 
Sobrino 
In the previous chapter I examined the theologies of Yoder, Boff and 
Sobrino, in order to test the coherence of their general interpretations of the cross 
with their specifically political theologies. In this chapter I discuss an equally 
fundamental question - how does each theologian present the causation for Jesus’ 
crucifixion as an historical phenomenon? What political causes do they identify?  It 
is important to note that the causation of the crucifixion cannot neatly be separated 
into the theological and the historical. When we claim that Jesus was crucified by 
the sin of humankind, this sin has no meaningful reality except in the concrete 
historical acts committed in reaction to him. Likewise, the revelatory quality of 
Jesus’ reaction to human sin was actualised in historically analyzable strategies. 
Hence the theological and the historical necessarily overlap.  
I pose the question –are the accounts given by Yoder, Boff and Sobrino of 
the crucifixion and its causation justifiable in the light of the evidence of the New 
Testament, especially as evaluated by current scholarship? A full and detailed 
examination of the coherence of the theologians’ accounts with Biblical scholarship 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. What needs to be shown, however, is that their 
accounts of the crucifixion are reasonably consistent with a possible historical 
reconstruction.  
 
Excursus – identifying the ‘political’ 
It is important to consider what is meant by ‘political’, as there is a sense in 
which most moral teaching has political ramifications, if pushed far enough. 
Socrates, for example, was a member of the politically participating class in Athens 
(i.e. free adult male citizen), took part in at least one of the significant political 
events of his time (the Arginusae debate in the Peloponnesian War), and was 
executed partly for political reasons, because some of his aristocratic followers had 
become involved as leaders in the oligarchic revolution of 404BCE. His teaching, 
by his own admission, was intended to make Athenian society re-examine its 
presuppositions, and in that sense was potentially subversive. In fact, one of the 
charges on which he was condemned was ‘corrupting the youth’. His concern for 
the truth and his pursuit of self-knowledge would, of course, in the end lead to a 
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better society if widely practised. However, this was only of tangential political 
significance, in the sense of direct engagement in the power politics of his day. It is 
difficult to penetrate beyond the Platonic overlay, where Plato uses Socrates as a 
mouthpiece for his own thoughts, but it is unlikely that Socrates’ teaching could be 
interpreted as having such direct political content. Although Socrates’ indirect 
political relevance was a crucial factor in his trial and condemnation, his teaching 
was, as far as we can tell, directed primarily to the individual, and he does not seem 
to have been  particularly interested in the business of political power or authority 
or in causing social or economic change. This, of course, is precisely how Jesus has 
been portrayed in certain strands of theology and spirituality. By contrast, the 
theologians studied in this investigation present Jesus as having much more direct 
political aims and influence. 
 
a) The historical and political causation of the cross in Yoder 
 
Jesus ministry as inescapably political 
Yoder certainly presents the ministry of Jesus in political terms. Most 
notably, his seminal work, Politics of Jesus, is an explicit attempt to demonstrate 
the political nature of much of Jesus’ ministry and its relevance for contemporary 
Christians. Yoder recognises that Jesus has often been presented as only possessing 
marginal political relevance, and insists that Jesus’ ministry was much more directly 
political. Two examples suffice, from the beginning and end of Jesus’ ministry. 
First, Yoder describes the jubilee influenced ‘Nazareth manifesto’ in Luke 4 as ‘a 
visible socio-political economic restructuring of relations among the people of God, 
achieved by his intervention in the person of Jesus as the one Anointed and endued 
with the Spirit’. (Yoder 1994: 32) Second, the ‘cleansing of the temple’ is described 
by Yoder as ‘the symbolic takeover of the temple precinct by One who claims 
jurisdiction there’. The attempt of the chief priests and other religious and political 
power holders to destroy him ‘is linked to the messianic claim acted out in the non-
violent seizure of the holy place, and not simply to the offence against order which 
might have been involved in his driving out the bulls’. (Yoder 1994: 41) In both 
instances, Jesus is represented by Yoder as deeply involved as an agent in questions 
of political power and change.  
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Nor is Jesus, according to Yoder, merely a solitary and individualistic 
prophet. The political and social change latent in Jesus’ words and deeds must find 
its reality in a new community. In describing the course of Jesus’ ministry, and the 
opposition to him by the power-holders, Yoder writes, ‘To organised opposition he 
responds with the formal founding of a new social reality.’ (Yoder 1994: 33) This 
alternative social reality is not another political party, but a whole new social order 
marked by the cross. Jesus, Yoder writes, is building a community ‘to share in that 
style of life of which the cross is the culmination’. (Yoder 1994: 37-8) Jesus 
broadens the ‘cross-bearing’ from himself to his community. He does not 
‘reprimand his disciples for trying to establish some new social order – he 
reprimands them for misunderstanding the character of the social order that is to be 
established’. (Yoder 1994: 38) If cross bearing is the mark of this new social 
order/community, the function of the community is political and social change. 
Yoder describes Jesus’ new community as having  
those sociological traits most characteristic of those who set about to change 
society…a nonconformed quality of ‘secular’ involvement in the life of the 
world…an unavoidable challenge to the powers that be and the beginning of 
a new set of social alternatives. (Yoder 1994: 39) 
  
A different kind of politics 
The new order taught, practised, and inaugurated in community by Jesus is 
intensely and directly political. But Yoder emphasises that it is a different kind of 
politics which Jesus promulgates. Again, the cross – or, more accurately, an 
approach to politics which would inevitably lead to the cross – is key. For example, 
Yoder reads the temptation narrative as a choice between different kinds of kingship 
the acceptance or refusal of which would define the nature of the mission and 
purpose of Jesus – in other words, the nature of the politics in which he was 
engaged. Similarly, Yoder sees the episode of the ‘bread in the desert’ (Luke 9: 10-
17) as the turning point of Jesus’ ministry, in that Jesus was dealing not merely with 
a small group of disciples but ‘the first wave of inquirers coming to see if this 
kingdom which the twelve was announcing was for real’. (Yoder 1994: 34) Jesus 
rejects definitively a certain kind of kingship or politics for himself and his 
followers. The crowd wish to acclaim Jesus as the new Moses, ‘the provider, the 
welfare king’. Yoder observes that ‘His withdrawal from their acclamation is …the 
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occasion for his first statement that his ministry was to be one of suffering and that 
his disciples would need to be ready to bear with him that cross.’ (Yoder 1994: 35) 
There is thus a clear choice between ‘cross and crown’. But Yoder stresses that this 
choice is not situated outside of, but within the arena of politics. It is a choice of a 
certain mode of politics, not a refusal of the political.  
Yet what he proposes is not withdrawal into the desert or into mysticism: it 
is a renewed messianic claim…The cross is beginning to loom not as a 
ritually prescribed instrument of propitiation, but as the political alternative 
to both insurrection and quietism. (Yoder 1994: 35) 
This last sentence sums up Yoder’s interpretation of the political choices of Jesus – 
a different way, certainly involving a challenge to the powerful, but not violent 
insurrection. That way, if not inevitably leading to the cross, certainly risked that 
outcome.  
An example of this occurs at the climax of Jesus’ activity in Jerusalem. 
After the cleansing of the temple, the next step would be to ‘storm the Roman 
fortress next door. But it belongs to the nature of the new order that, though it 
condemns and displaces the old, it does not do so with the arms of the old’. (Yoder 
1994: 43) In Gethsemane, too, the choice is not between political engagement and 
withdrawal, but between two options of engagement. Yoder asks (Yoder 1994: 45) 
what would ‘Remove this cup from me’ mean in the actual historical circumstances, 
and interprets this prayer in terms not of a withdrawal from a challenge to power 
but of a renewed temptation to messianic violence in pursuit of power i.e. a zealot-
type option. Jesus resists this very real option, and chooses a renunciation of zealot-
type means, in favour of the non-violent resistance which ends in, and is symbolised 
by, the cross. This, Yoder insists, does not imply the rejection of the need to pursue 
‘a kingdom’. On the Emmaus road, Jesus rebukes the disciples not because they had 
been looking for a ‘kingdom’, and should not have been. Rather, ‘Their fault is that, 
just like Peter at Caesarea Philippi, they were failing to see that the suffering of the 
Messiah is the inauguration of that kingdom’. (Yoder 1994: 51) Yoder concludes, 
‘The cross is not a detour or a hurdle on the way to the kingdom; it is the kingdom 
come. Jesus is not concerned with seizing power by violent means according to the 
‘old’ politics. Rather, his is a ‘new politics’, no less a challenge to the powers of his 
day, but reliant on non-violent means and hence vulnerable to the violence of the 
powerful. 
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Jesus as politically subversive 
The subversive (and hence, in the political situation vis-à-vis the Roman, 
cross-risking) nature of Jesus’ ministry is, according to Yoder, well established 
historically. Even before the climax of his ministry in Jerusalem, ‘Herod cannot be 
seeking to kill Jesus for heresy or prophecy; sedition would be the only possible 
charge.’ (Yoder 1994: 37) The language Jesus uses about taking up the cross is 
interpreted not in terms of a general self denial or dying to self but as a warning to 
the disciples about the standard punishment for insurrection or refusal to confess 
Caesar’s lordship – even as an echo of a phrase possibly used in zealot recruiting. 
‘The disciples’ cross is not a metaphor for self-mortification or even generally for 
innocent suffering – if you follow me, your fate will be like mine, the fate of a 
revolutionary.’ (Yoder 1994: 38) To use such a phrase metaphorically without 
taking into account its inevitably political connotations would be, at the very least, 
unlikely. The subversive nature of Jesus’ ministry has a parallel with the zealots, 
but with the difference that the zealots’ subversion was exercised violently, whereas 
Jesus, though equally subversive was non-violent. Reflecting the scholarly 
controversy current in the 1960’s over Jesus’ possible zealot links, Yoder agrees 
with Brandon, a proponent of the ‘Jesus as zealot’ theory, that Jesus was executed 
for sedition, was socially close to the zealot movement, and had his revolutionary 
nature concealed through apologetic motives in early Christianity. Yoder, however, 
argues that Jesus’ ‘revolutionary initiative’ was, in contrast to the zealots, non-
violent. ‘The fault we find with Brandon is not that he interprets Jesus as politically 
relevant, but that he assumes violence is the only model for such relevance’. (Yoder 
1994: 42) (Because of the doubts concerning the existence of a group specifically 
named ‘zealot’ in the time of Jesus I have throughout put the word ‘zealot’ in lower 
case. It is, however, almost certain that there existed zealot-type groups at this time, 
even if not bearing the name ‘zealot’.) 
The key evidence for the politically subversive nature of Jesus’ ministry is 
the cross itself. Any denial of this subversive nature and its consequence in the 
crucifixion (by what Yoder calls ‘spiritualistic-apologetic exegesis) must depend on 
a huge (and historically incomprehensible) misunderstanding. The cross itself 
demonstrates the real threat which both Pilate and Caiaphas believed Jesus posed to 
the established order, unless they totally misread his actions.  
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That the threat was not one of armed, violent revolt, and that it nonetheless 
bothered them enough to resort to irregular procedures to counter it, is a 
proof of the political relevance of non-violent tactics, not a proof that Pilate 
and Caiaphas were exceptionally dull or dishonourable men.  
(Yoder 1994: 49) 
Yoder omits the possibility that Pilate and Caiaphas may have mistaken Jesus for a 
violent insurrectionist, not realising that his approach was radically different from 
the zealots. Evidence such as the gathering of the crowds in the wilderness, the 
‘cleansing of the temple’, and the fact that Jesus’ close associates included at least 
one zealot sympathizer make that an understandable mistake. This does not vitiate 
Yoder’s main argument, that Jesus’ non-violent politics led to the cross – it simply 
means that Jesus’ politics were sufficiently close to the zealot option in their 
subversive capacity as to make Pilate’s and Caiaphas’ postulated mistake credible.  
 
Coherence with historical evidence 
 How far is this interpretation coherent with the modern historical 
reconstructions of the New Testament evidence? On one level Yoder takes what has 
become known since his first writing of The Politics of Jesus as a canonical 
approach, dealing with the evidence of the ‘surface’ text rather than historical 
reconstructions of what lies behind the text. However, in the second edition of The 
Politics of Jesus he admits that his argument would be seriously diminished ‘if the 
historical questers were to come up with solid demonstrations that the ‘real Jesus’ 
they find is quite incompatible with what we find in the canonical account’. (Yoder 
1994: 12) Yoder defends his position by examining the tendencies of the evidence 
on which a historical reconstruction can be based.  He claims that ‘any…serious 
attempt at hypothetical reconstruction does move toward taking more seriously the 
economic-political threat Jesus posed to the Romans than does the traditional 
ecclesiastical interpretation’. (Yoder 1994: 50) The more one digs beneath the 
surface of the text, the more political and social motivation in Jesus’ ministry is 
unearthed, not less – a point corroborated by New Testament scholarship of the late 
twentieth century, which has increasingly seen Jesus teaching and actions earthed in 
first century Palestinian economics and politics, and not as something floating in a 
quasi timeless void (as Yoder observes in Yoder 1994: 13 on the contribution of 
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Bammel and Moule, in their symposium Jesus and the politics of his day and the 
various writers of the ‘third quest’). 
When considering the social and economic background, Yoder rightly 
insists that his thesis is proved by a very low level of evidence: 
All that needs to be affirmed to make our point is that Jesus’ career had been 
such as to make it quite thinkable that he would pose to the Roman Empire 
an apparent threat serious enough to justify his execution. (Yoder 1994: 50)  
Starting from the fact that the cross was the mode of execution for those who 
threatened the existing political and economic order, it is legitimate to read back 
into the preceding career of Jesus elements which would indicate such a threat. The 
only argument against such a reading is that Jesus was totally misunderstood, or 
misrepresented, and that his execution was based completely on mistaken premises. 
That is a certainly a possibility, but Yoder rightly argues that his ‘political’ 
interpretation is overwhelmingly more likely. Moreover, Yoder provides copious 
evidence, in Chapter 5 of Politics of Jesus, which he entitles ‘The possibility of 
non-violent resistance’ of contemporary parallels to the type of non violent 
resistance with which he associates Jesus. Such teaching and actions were not 
unfeasible in the context of first century Palestine in such a way as to make his 
portrait of Jesus historically improbable. He concludes his argument (in the original 
edition) with this summary -  
Jesus was, in his divinely mandated prophethood, priesthood, and kingship, 
the bearer of a new possibility of human, social and therefore political 
relationships. At this one point there is no difference between the Jesus of 
historie and the Christ of Geschichte, or between Christ as God or Jesus as 
man, or between the religion of Jesus and the religion about Jesus. No such 
slicing can avoid his call to an ethic marked by the cross, a cross identified 
as the punishment of a man who threatens society by creating a new kind of 
community leading to a radically new kind of life. (Yoder 1994: 52)  
A similar point is made later, when Yoder points out that the episodes in the gospels 
which contain the most political significance are precisely those places where the 
‘historic’ and the ‘historical’ Jesus most coincide, ‘where there is least distinction 
between what the critic thinks must actually have happened and what the believing 
witnesses reported’. (Yoder 1994: 101-2) In other words, whichever interpretation 
is adopted, whether it is of the ‘Jesus of history’ or the ‘Christ of faith’, the sine qua 
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non is the crucifixion with all its political implications. In his epilogue, added in the 
second edition of Politics of Jesus, Yoder asserts,  
It is noteworthy that within that debate [i.e. concerning the ‘historical 
Jesus’] what is least open to debate, in all of the Gospel accounts and in all 
the critical reconstructions, is the historical/political dimension of what 
Jesus did. It is with regard to the Zealot option, that is, to the prospect of 
anti-Roman violence, that the gospel text is closest to the issues of historical 
conflict. (Yoder 1994: 55) 
 Yoder summarizes his argument in his second edition of Politics of Jesus, 
‘Scholarly developments have not had the effect of discovering an apolitical Jesus.’ 
(Yoder 1994: 15) More specifically, ‘It does not follow….that Jesus seen as sage, as 
rabbi, or as incarnate Wisdom, would be any less politically relevant than Jesus the 
non-violent Zealot.’ This is perhaps overstating the case. Given that, as argued 
above with the example of Socrates, the political nature of a teacher can be implicit 
or explicit, direct or indirect, there is a great difference between a teacher of moral 
(and mainly ‘religious’) aphorisms which are not necessarily directed to specific 
political, social and economic issues, but are only tangentially political, and one 
whose teachings (and actions) are more directly political. Hays (Hays 1996: 
286n141) notes correctly that ‘the politically detached Cynic Jesus imagined by the 
historical critics of the Jesus Seminar would stand in fundamental tension with 
Yoder’s work’. He points out that although Yoder disclaims reliance on historical 
reconstructions ‘behind the text’, his thesis does actually depend on a particular 
reconstruction of the events underlying the text. This is a fair criticism insofar as an 
individualist ‘Socratic’ or ‘Cynic’ type Jesus would significantly weaken Yoder’s 
argument – as would a ‘Jesus the magician’, if the miracles are understood merely 
(and wrongly) as cases of individual healing without further social relevance. 
However, the tendency of Yoder’s argument is that the need for direct historical 
evidence for much of Jesus’ ministry is not great in order for his case to be proved, 
given the overwhelmingly political nature of the crucifixion and the political, social 
and economic threat which can be read back from that into the rest of his ministry – 
that is, of course, unless the crucifixion was a complete mistake caused by a gross 
misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The work of, for example, Borg (Borg 
1984, 1988), Wright (Wright 1996), or Sanders (Sanders 1993) certainly does not 
rule out the political import of Jesus’ ministry – Jesus is directly ‘political’ to a 
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varying degree in their reconstructions, but the political nature of the crucifixion 
and the ministry which preceded it is certainly not excluded by such scholarly 
reconstruction. Such a political interpretation is strongly corroborated by scholars 
such as Crossan (Crossan 1991) and Horsley (1973), without necessarily ascribing 
to Jesus a strictly pacifist strategy.             
 
Crossing Lessing’s ditch 
 Yoder’s theological methodology makes him particularly vulnerable to the 
difficulty which Lessing referred to as the ‘ugly ditch’ that ‘the accidental truths of 
history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.’ Yoder’s political 
theology rests overwhelmingly on the revelatory content of Jesus’ reaction to the 
political circumstances of first century Palestine which led to his crucifixion. How 
can those contingencies form a solid foundation for a twenty-first century political 
theology? What, for example, would have ensued in the admittedly highly unlikely 
event of Jesus’ political programme being accepted by Romans, Sadduccees and 
Pharisees?  
Behind this question lies a huge debate concerning revelation and 
contingency. But in defence of Yoder’s cross-based political theology, there is a 
sense in which the cross was inevitable, whatever the details of the historical 
contingencies. Given human sin, in particular the tendency for the powerful 
ruthlessly to preserve their power and to destroy those who seek to undermine it, 
any Christ-like threat to power would inevitably lead to crucifixion or the 
contemporary equivalent. In Jesus’ passion predictions (e.g. Mark 8: 31) the 
language of necessity also bears the meaning of inevitability. The necessity of 
Jesus’ crucifixion lies not just in the salvific intention of God, but in the 
inevitability of the circumstances which faced Jesus in Jerusalem. Thus it makes no 
sense to posit the questions – what if the crucifixion had not occurred - where 
would that then leave Yoder’s theology? Given the sinfulness of humanity, 
independent of the details of the contingent historical circumstances, the cross has a 
tragic inevitability, 
 
Conclusion                           
Yoder’s strength is realistically to situate Jesus within the politics of his day, 
and to argue for a dangerously subversive, but non-violent strategy. In Yoder’s 
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account, he was seen as such a political threat to the Romans that he suffered the 
penalty for challenging the imperial order. Although close, in many ways, to the 
Zealots, he decisively rejected their violence. He set himself against the Sadducean 
and Herodian parties, who collaborated with Rome in order to preserve at least 
some of their power. He rejected strategies of political withdrawal, whether the 
monasticism of the Essenes or the personal piety of the Pharisees. The alternative 
was a strategy which, if not leading inevitably to the cross, at least seriously risked 
that outcome. 
 
b) The historical and political causation of the cross in Boff and Sobrino 
 
Jesus’ death as a consequence of his life 
As a liberation theologian, Boff is concerned to establish Jesus’ political 
relevance. He recognises, however, that the political agenda he brings to the gospels 
is not directly found in the gospels themselves, the interest of the gospel writers 
being primarily theological, rather than political. The gospels do not set out to 
analyse in any great depth the political causation of events in Jesus’ ministry - their 
interest is more in divine causation. Any ‘political Jesus’ has to be found, either 
indirectly in the oblique political implications of his actions (such as his healing, or 
breaking of the Sabbath rules), or by arguing that a more directly political Jesus lies 
concealed by the other interests of the evangelists. Boff argues that the almost 
exclusively theological reading of the passion, with its emphasis on God’s role, 
causes the gospel writers to downplay the actual historical causes and the political 
factors involved. The Passion is historically inexplicable otherwise. Boff states: 
This interest of ours does not militate against a religious, transcendent 
meaning of the passion and death of the Lord, but only seeks to supply the 
dimension constituted by the historical, political mediations - in fine, the 
underpinnings of that religious transcendent meaning. We must not forget 
that Jesus did not die in bed. He was sentenced to execution and violently 
eliminated. Human responsibility played a role. (Boff 1987: 7)  
By sifting through the interplay of fact and interpretation, Boff believes that there is 
sufficiently reliable material available to reconstruct some of the political factors 
which led to Jesus’ crucifixion: - first, Jesus’ overturning of religious traditions and 
systems of power in the name of humanity and justice (emphasised by Boff with 
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regard to his own struggles with religious authority); second, Jesus’ eschatology 
which, although not directly political, used potentially political categories (e.g. the 
kingdom of God) and which posited the coming of the kingdom as something which 
calls  into question human structures of power; and third, the passion narrative, in 
which Jesus is seen directly challenging the powers of his time (e.g. in the cleansing 
of the temple).  
 For Sobrino also, the political nature of Jesus’ ministry comes to a climax in 
his death. ‘Jesus died as a political offender and died the type of death that only the 
political power, the Romans, could inflict.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 206) This, in itself, 
does not prove the political nature of Jesus’ ministry - theoretically, as we have seen 
in our discussion of Yoder, a historical reconstruction could be made whereby 
Jesus’ death was due to the political authorities misinterpreting Jesus and ascribing 
to him non-existent political relevance – but Sobrino sets Jesus’ trial and death in 
the overall context of a political, or quasi-political confrontation between two 
‘mediations’, the kingdom of God and the Roman empire, played out in a ‘total 
encounter’ between Jesus and Pontius Pilate. ‘If one asks how a religious man like 
Jesus could be so dangerous to an empire, and have so much political influence, the 
answer is that religion touches and moves the foundations of society in a radical 
way.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 209) Jesus’ death is the sharpest point of this confrontation 
which shaped his whole ministry. 
Both Boff and Sobrino stress that Jesus’ death must not to be seen in 
isolation from his life, either theologically or historically. A person’s life gives 
meaning to their death, and vice versa. Hence Jesus’ death does not stand on its own 
as a salvific entity. Historical causation, including the events preceding Jesus’ 
death, is an essential component in constructing a theology of the cross. Boff 
implicitly criticises the tendency of the creeds, and certain soteriologies, to treat 
Jesus’ life as relatively unimportant (other than the fact that he was ‘incarnate’) 
compared to his death and resurrection. Hence the title of chapter 2 of Passion of 
Christ, Passion of the World – ‘Jesus’ death as consequence of a praxis and a 
message’. It is a deficient soteriology - and one which severely downplays the 
actual incarnation of Jesus as revelatory - to focus on the divine drama of the 
crucifixion but to ignore the human causation. Boff is concerned to root Jesus’ 
death in the concrete political history of his time, and to resist a dehistoricisation 
which sees the cross solely in terms of an intra-trinitarian transaction. ‘Jesus’ death 
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can be understood only from a point of departure in his historical praxis, in his 
message, in the demands he makes, and the conflicts he arouses.’ (Boff 1987: 9) 
Boff goes on to describe Jesus’ ‘historical project’, beginning with the challenges 
Jesus faced – ‘a general regime of dependency’; ‘socio-economic oppression’; and 
‘religious oppression’. Although Boff does not make the parallels explicit, the terms 
used to describe the situation of first century Palestine would seem to be intended to 
evoke his sitz im leben of Latin America and his own struggles with the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy.  
 
Jesus’ death as a political execution 
It is significant that Boff does not attempt to make Jesus an explicitly 
political figure, certainly not a zealot, or guerrilla, a temptation especially attractive 
to a theologian of liberation, writing, at least in part, for those involved in a struggle 
analogous to that of the zealots.   
He [Jesus] does not come forward as a revolutionary committed to modify 
the prevailing power structure, like a Bar Kochba. Nor does he rise up as a 
preacher interested only in the conversion of consciences, like a St.John the 
Baptist. (Boff 1987: 14)  
Jesus’ message is broader and, Boff argues, further reaching. 
 He proclaims an ultimate end, one that calls into question social, political, 
and religious interests........He does not proclaim a particular, political, 
economic religious meaning - but an absolute, all-comprehending, all-
transcending meaning... the ‘reign of God’. (Boff 1987: 14-5) 
 And not only does Jesus make the proclamation, which could be seen as merely 
one of a series of utopian proclamations - he actualises the kingdom, the reign of 
God, he lives it out, he anticipates the future. This is the focal point of Jesus’ 
ministry, and his death was caused by his faithfulness to proclaiming and living out 
that reign. Boff indicates various ‘redemptive, liberative’ aspects of that reign – a 
change from an oppressive religion of cults and sacrifices to one where the criteria 
of salvation are found in the love of neighbour; liberation from a society divided by 
wealth, class, race, disease and sex to a new solidarity; a respect for the freedom 
and rights of others, and an insistence on the need for justice, forgiveness and 
mercy; and a commitment to living life as a gift to others, as sacrifice on behalf of 
others. (Boff 1987: 16-21) These aspects of the reign of God are potentially 
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politically and religiously subversive, and, ultimately, caused Jesus to be crucified 
by those threatened by his praxis and message. Hence ‘Jesus died for the reasons 
any prophet ever dies. He placed a higher value on the principles he preached than 
on his own life’. (Boff 1987: 22) He thus joins the ‘thousands of others’ who have 
made a similar commitment. We are surely meant to see in this a reference to 
contemporary political activity and suffering in Latin America, not only in the 
church with its preferential option for the poor, but also in those working from a 
Marxist commitment who ‘have preached the betterment of this world and the 
creation of a human society more marked by a communion of brothers and sisters 
and by a greater openness to the Absolute’. (Boff 1987: 22) The terms Boff uses are 
familiar in contemporary struggles against oppressive regimes in Latin America. 
However, while using such language, which would suggest affinity with the zealots 
(or their forerunners), Boff’s analysis of the political nature of Jesus’ ministry 
avoids trapping him in a zealot framework, while giving him a both a genuine 
political relevance in first century Palestine and also a deeper, more lasting political 
relevance.  
Sobrino’s analysis is very similar. Jesus’ death is represented not in 
ahistorical isolation, but as an inevitable consequence of his life and ministry – 
inevitable in the eyes of those who see contemporaries murdered for pursuing 
similar ends.  
Why Jesus was killed is very clear in the gospels. He was killed – like so 
 many people before and after him – because of what he said and what he 
 did. In a sense, there is nothing mysterious about Jesus’ death, because it is a 
 frequent occurrence. (Sobrino 1994a: 209)  
Similarly, ‘Jesus’ death was not a mistake. It was a consequence of his life and this 
in turn was the consequence of his particular incarnation – in an anti-kingdom 
which brings death – to defend its victims’. (Sobrino 1994a: 210) This anti-
kingdom presents itself in various facets of oppression of the powerless by the 
powerful, some religious and only implicitly political, others more obviously of a 
political nature. ‘What needs no discussion is the fact that Jesus’ preaching and 
activity represented a radical threat to the religious powers of his time, and 
indirectly to any oppressive power, and that power reacted.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 196) 
The crucifixion was the culmination of the persecution Jesus encountered 
throughout his life from the ‘oppressors’ because of his words and actions on behalf 
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of the ‘oppressed’. ‘The causes cited for the persecution are various…Nevertheless, 
at root they are no more than Jesus’ condemnations of oppressive power.’ (Sobrino 
1994a: 200)  
 What differentiates Jesus from a contemporary revolutionary, whether a 
Camillo Torres (a Christian revolutionary) or a Che Guevara (a Marxist 
revolutionary whose motivation was not explicitly Christian)? Much of what Boff 
and Sobrino write about the self giving, freely chosen passion of Jesus and the 
defence of the ‘oppressed’ against ‘oppressors’ could just as well be applied to 
either of the above, and to many others less well known. Sobrino draws close 
parallels between the death of Jesus and contemporary events in El Salvador.  
Jesus was essentially a ‘man in conflict’ and because of this he was 
persecuted. The man in conflict got in the way, and, in the simple words of 
Archbishop Romero, ‘Those who get in the way get killed’. Jesus, 
surrounded by conflict, got in the way, in the last resort because he got in 
the way of the other gods and got in their way in the name of God.  
(Sobrino 1994a: 196)  
What difference, then, is there between Jesus’ crucifixion and the judicial murder of 
thousands throughout history? Boff gives two answers – first, the resurrection, and 
second, Jesus’ new experience of God as gracious Father. ‘Jesus incarnated the 
Father’s love and forgiveness. He was good and merciful with all, especially with 
those rejected by religion and society….. It was the concretization of the Father’s 
love in real life.’ (Boff 1987: 24) Boff seems at first to be treading a tightrope 
between holding to a Christology of uniqueness, and indicating the points of contact 
between Jesus and contemporary figures who strive for liberation. This is, however, 
a false dichotomy given the logic of Boff’s argument. There is no reason why Jesus’ 
crucifixion should be any different in nature or historical cause from any other 
judicial murder perpetrated by authorities who felt their power threatened. If it was 
different, it would lessen the self-identification of Jesus (and God) with those who 
suffer similarly today. The uniqueness of Jesus crucifixion lay in its theological 
meaning, in Jesus’ role in God’s plan to establish his kingdom – ‘God’s Son was 
required to remain faithful to the divine plan and to accept death as a consequence 
of his fidelity.’ (Boff 1980: 88) There is a salvific purpose to Jesus’ death which 
renders it unique – ‘He took our sins upon himself, establishing solidarity with 
sinners, in order to free them from their wickedness.’ (Boff 1980: 90) Boff seems to 
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be arguing that it is this salvific purpose and the fact that Jesus was ‘God’s Son’, 
confirmed by the resurrection, that differentiates Jesus’ death, theologically, from 
the other crucifixions - although, considered from the point of view of historic 
causation, no differentiation can (or should) be made.  
In chapter 3 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World, Boff investigates the 
Passion narratives, and attempts to reconstruct the events which led to the 
crucifixion. He begins with the Bultmannian warning that presuppositionless, 
neutral exegesis is not possible. Not only were the facts of the events leading up to 
the crucifixion interpreted in a certain way by the evangelists for the communities 
for which they were writing, but subsequent exegesis of those texts is conditioned 
by the situation, mind-set, and beliefs of the exegete. This is a commonplace in 
Biblical interpretation, but Boff emphasises it here to legitimise his re-interpretation 
of the Passion and to introduce interests different from those of the evangelists i.e. 
political, rather than solely theological. Boff represents Jesus as a prophet who 
makes the journey to Jerusalem as the place of crisis, where ‘all the great historico-
salvific decrees of the divine plan must be verified’. (Boff 1987: 30) He goes 
expecting the fate of the prophets, a violent death. The Last Supper is seen in terms 
of ‘covenant and sacrificial self-surrender’. (Boff 1987: 35) The Gethsemane 
experience is interpreted as anguish through Jesus’ awareness of the coming 
apocalyptic conflict. Jesus is tried on religious and political grounds, by the 
Sanhedrin, for blasphemy, and by Pilate as a ‘guerrilla subversive’. Jesus’ death 
was ‘judicial murder’ or ‘religio-political murder via an abuse of justice’. (Boff 
1987: 41) 
It is interesting that, on Boff’s account, the Jewish authorities and the 
Pharisees, rather than the Romans, appear to be the prime motivators of Jesus’ 
crucifixion. Boff takes a view, which does not sit easily with modern Biblical 
scholarship, that the Romans needed to be pressured into crucifying Jesus.  
The Pharisees loathe Jesus, for his liberal attitude toward the law and toward 
the God of their sacred traditions: Jesus has been perverting the people, they 
feel. Political, national and religious considerations, then, all conspire to call 
for the prophet’s liquidation. The Jerusalemites, incited by their threatened, 
fearful leaders, exert pressure on Pilate, who, out of cowardice, and fear of 
loss of favour with Caesar, orders Jesus to be tortured to death.  
(Boff 1987: 40-41)  
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On this account the Romans may not have felt Jesus to be so much a subversive 
threat as simply a victim whose sacrifice was worthwhile for the preserving of 
political order. This is bound to weaken the argument, adduced by Yoder, Sobrino 
(and Boff in other passages) that Jesus was crucified as a subversive of the Roman 
imperium. It is interesting, again, that Boff (along with Sobrino) takes a ‘traditional’ 
view of the trial and death of Jesus in not allowing himself the (tempting) path of 
portraying Jesus as a zealot, for which historical evidence is at best dubious. He 
insists, however, that political and quasi-political factors (i.e. structures of socio-
religious power being threatened) played a significant role in Jesus’ condemnation. 
What is undeniable is that Jesus suffered the death of those who were seen to be a 
threat to the established order - the servile supplicium, the punishment inflicted on 
those outside the prevailing power structures by those who wished to preserve those 
structures. 
 
Jesus’ interpretation of his death 
Boff, in chapter 4 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World, attempts to 
shed light on the question of the historical causation of the crucifixion by examining 
the question of the meaning Jesus himself ascribed to his death, one of the key 
questions at the juncture of history, Christology and soteriology. First, he asks the 
essential prior question - did Jesus anticipate his crucifixion?  
In general terms Jesus, as a prophet, knew the fate that traditionally befell 
prophets, the execution of John the Baptist being a recent example, and Jesus would 
probably have been aware that he was challenging vested interests in a similarly 
dangerous manner. In that sense, Boff argues, Jesus would have been aware of the 
possibility of his death. But in other senses he was not. Boff discounts the various 
passion predictions as vaticinia ex eventu, or as more general statements. In fact, 
Boff suggests that an awareness of the inevitability of imminent death only came to 
Jesus on the cross, with the cry of dereliction.  This suggestion short-circuits the 
question of Jesus’ interpretation of his violent death. It would be unlikely, to say the 
least, for Jesus to attempt to interpret something that he did not (at least 
immediately) anticipate would happen to him.  As to the question of what Jesus 
actually expected in Jerusalem, Boff suggests the following scenario: - Jesus, as an 
eschatological prophet, preaching that the kingdom of God was at hand and was, in 
fact, present in him and his ministry, expected his challenge to the theological and 
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sociological heart of his people to result in a time of apocalyptic trial, through 
which he (and the kingdom of God) would be vindicated. It was only on the cross 
that this expectation ceased - hence the terrible cry of dereliction - although Boff 
does not seem to be sure whether Jesus died with a shattering awareness of 
dereliction or in faith, freedom and trust in God. At one point he treats the Lucan 
and Johannine words from the cross as non-historical, post-resurrection additions - 
later, he appears to build from them a theology of Jesus’ final trust in God.  What 
Boff stresses is that Jesus’ persistence in and loyalty to his preaching of the 
kingdom of God brought about his death. In that lies much of the political 
significance of his death, the kingdom being a challenge to the political powers, 
with a ‘preferential love for the poor, the weak, the insignificant and the sinful’. 
(Boff 1987: 58) What differentiates Jesus from any secular prophet is his intimate 
relationship with God, and the divine, all-embracing, and eschatological nature of 
the ‘reign’ he proclaimed and lived. Boff returns to an earlier theme in stressing that 
Jesus’ death is not to be seen in isolation from the rest of his life, since it is Jesus’ 
whole life, and not just his death, which is redemptive. 
To Jesus, death represented the apex of his pro-existence, his being-for-
others. In complete dedication and freedom, Jesus lived his death as 
surrender to God and human beings, whom he loved to the end.  
(Boff 1987: 63) 
Faithfulness to God’s cause, not a consciousness of any further redemptive 
meaning, lay at the heart of Jesus’ self interpretation of his death. 
 This theme is echoed in Sobrino, whose interpretation of Jesus’ death 
closely resembles that of Boff. Sobrino discounts any self-interpretation of his death 
by Jesus in terms of models such as expiation, sacrifice, or satisfaction: 
There are no grounds for thinking that Jesus attributed an absolute 
transcendent meaning to his own death, as the New Testament did later. This 
does not mean, however, that Jesus did not look for a meaning for his own 
death, that he did not see it in continuity with and supporting his cause. 
(Sobrino 1994a: 201)  
Jesus saw, from the history of the prophetic protest and from the contemporary 
power structures which he faced, the likely consequences of his ministry. But his 
faithfulness was such that he persisted and, in his last actions in Jerusalem, 
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especially the ‘cleansing of the temple’ seems to have deliberately and consciously 
intensified his challenge.  
Jesus, then, suffered persecution, knew why he was suffering it, and where it 
might lead him. This persecution, consciously accepted, is the measure of 
his faithfulness to God…That is what later allowed his death to be 
interpreted as freely accepted and therefore, as an expression of love. But it 
also shows that Jesus knew and accepted the battle of the gods, and the 
negative power of history, which puts prophets to death.  
(Sobrino 1994a: 201) 
Again, Sobrino stresses the conflictual nature of Jesus’ ministry and Jesus’ 
determination not to shrink from the conflict. This faithful service is sacrificial, and 
ends in the sacrifice of death – not a deliberate self immolation, but a willingness to 
risk the almost inevitable consequences, in order that good might come. This is the 
meaning of the Eucharistic ύpiερ (on behalf of) words in the Last Supper – ‘His 
death will be something ‘good’ for others…for, on behalf of, and this produces 
positive fruits. It is an understanding of Jesus’ life as service, and in the end 
sacrificial service.’(Sobrino 1994a: 203) Jesus whole ministry was that of a ‘faithful 
and compassionate prophet to the end’. (Sobrino 1994a: 204). The ‘transcendent 
meaning’ of Jesus’ death is interpreted in terms not of a divine transaction, sealed 
by the blood of sacrifice, but of self-sacrificial and faithful service, which is not in 
itself unique but provides an example for others to follow.  
 
Coherence with historical evidence 
How far does the interpretation in Boff and Sobrino of the ministry of Jesus 
agree with the historical evidence given by the gospels and interpreted by current 
Biblical scholarship? (Boff’s work here predates the ‘third quest’ of the historical 
Jesus.) It has been noted above that Boff does not fall into the trap of making Jesus 
a first century politician. But the question remains - were Jesus aims and 
programme, which led to his crucifixion, such as Boff represents?  Or is he over 
selective in his interpretation of Jesus’ mission? The danger is that he may fall into 
the familiar snare of constructing a new Jesus in his own image – ‘Jesus Christ 
liberator’, in succession to the other images of Christ constructed by other writers of 
‘lives of Jesus’. Schweitzer’s criticism (of the liberal ‘Lives of Jesus’ in the 
nineteenth century) potentially applies to all reconstructions of Jesus. In fact, just as 
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the Christology Boff presents appears to be remarkably orthodox and traditional in 
its essence, so is his handling of the historical evidence. He seems to take the 
traditional Synoptic account of Jesus’ ministry and use it as it stands (for example, 
in the ascription of responsibility for the crucifixion primarily to the Jewish 
authorities) and, as noted above, he seems to take care to describe Jesus’ ministry as 
implicitly, rather than explicitly political.  His interpretation rests on the fact that 
Jesus could have posed a deeper political threat without being explicitly political in 
his programme, for example, in aiming to overthrow the Romans or to bring about 
an immediate transfer of political power from the Sadducees to other groups in 
society. The controlling theme in Jesus’ teaching, as Boff consistently points out, is 
the kingdom of God, which combines a primarily theological meaning with 
enormous and far reaching political ramifications. The question of whether or not 
Boff’s account of the reasons for the crucifixion are consonant with modern 
scholarship can be answered in the same way as previously in the case of Yoder, 
who to a great extent shares Boff’s view of Jesus’ ministry as having political 
relevance, but not readily or neatly fitting into the political categories of his day. 
 Sobrino emphasises the hermeneutically privileged status of liberation 
theology in assessing the events surrounding the crucifixion, in that the setting of 
liberation theology among the poor and oppressed mirrors the social class most at 
risk from crucifixion, the servile supplicium. He does not offer definitive answers to 
exegetical questions, but the locus from which he does his theology offers a sharply 
focussed perspective, especially on the cross. ‘The point I do want to make is that 
the cross that dominates the Third World greatly illuminates the coherence with 
which the passion and death of Jesus – as a whole – are described.’ (Sobrino 
194:196) This is a two way process, as Sobrino recognizes:  
The view of the victims helps us to read Christological texts and to know 
Jesus Christ better. Furthermore, this Jesus Christ, known in this way, helps 
us to understand the victims better and, above all, to work to defend them. 
(Sobrino 2001: 8)  
This double hermeneutic does not in itself provide a sure proof for Sobrino’s 
reconstruction of Jesus’ ministry, especially its culmination in Jerusalem, but it is 
significant that one of the increasingly used tools in studying ancient history and 
archaeology is the application of sociological, anthropological, and economic 
models derived from investigations of contemporary societies. One of the three 
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criteria of historicity Sobrino describes as guiding Latin American liberation 
theology is ‘the consistency of Jesus’ death with what is narrated of his life’ (the 
others being the criterion of multiple attestation and the criterion of dissimilarity).   
There [in Latin America] the deaths of hundreds and thousands of persons is 
analogous to Jesus’ death, and the causes of their death are historically 
similar to the causes of Jesus’ death. That Jesus must have lived and acted in 
the way he is reported to have lived and acted is not only plausible, it goes 
without saying. (Sobrino 1987: 74)  
This last comment is no doubt an exaggeration, but Sobrino points to an 
isomorfismo, or similarity in shape, between the experience of the first followers of 
Jesus and present day Latin American Christians, which enables the latter to, as it 
were, read the gospels from the inside. The dangers of a circularity of 
argumentation are clear – it is quite possible that the Latin American (or any other) 
Christian can read his own situation into the gospels – but this approach, if used 
critically and in conjunction with other criteria, should not easily be dismissed.  
 
Crossing Lessing’s ditch 
 As noted in the discussion of Yoder, any theologian seeking to build a 
Christology upon the actions and reactions of the historical Jesus has to cross 
Lessing’s ditch between the ‘accidental truths of history and the necessary truths of 
reason’. Sobrino attempts the crossing by universalising the suffering of Jesus by 
constantly juxtaposing it with the contemporary sufferings of the Latin American 
people. The idea of isomorfismo is crucial to this process, as is the constant pattern 
of power and oppression throughout history. In Sobrino’s words ‘Jesus’ death was 
not accidental, but the culmination of a necessary historical process.’ (Sobrino 
1994a: 199) All the groups that persecuted Jesus ‘hold some type of power: 
economic, political, religious, ideological, as religious models, military and police.’ 
It is not necessary to hold to the totality of a Marxist doctrine of class struggle to 
see such power structures, with the concomitant relationships between oppressor 
and oppressed (varying in different historical manifestations) as a constant 
throughout human history. 
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c) Conclusion 
 A number of themes are shared between Yoder, Boff and Sobrino. The cross 
must not be isolated, either historically or theologically, from the life of Jesus as a 
whole. The political nature of Jesus’ ministry is stressed. For Yoder, Jesus’ ministry 
is unashamedly political, but with a different kind of politics, involving a non-
violent refusal to take power. For Boff and Sobrino, Jesus’ ‘historic project’, the 
kingdom of God, has strong political connotations, and Jesus’ death is a political 
execution, caused by his faithfulness to that historic project. Boff and Sobrino, in 
their concern to defend liberation theology from the charge of reducing Christianity 
to politics are concerned not to overpoliticise Jesus in his historical ministry, but at 
the same time draw parallels between his faithfulness to his mission and the 
faithfulness expressed by those in Latin America who give their lives for a similar 
‘historic project’. Yoder is attempting to establish Jesus as a subversive political 
figure against a background in North American Christianity which sees him as a 
spiritual teacher and his death as part of an atonement conceived primarily in 
transactional terms. The theological, as well as the social, contexts, of these 
theologians are essential to their understanding.  
 All three theologians display a remarkably similar methodology in their 
handling of the historical evidence underlying their theology. Yoder adopts what 
has come to be called a canonical approach, using the Biblical text as it stands. He 
is not unaware of the possible historical reconstructions behind the text, but is 
content that those reconstructions do not seriously damage his overall picture of the 
political nature of Jesus’ ministry. Similarly, Boff and Sobrino work with the text as 
it stands, and do not rely on a political reconstruction of Jesus’ ministry which goes 
significantly beyond (or contradicts) the texts. All three theologians face similar 
problems in justifying their portrait of Jesus in the light of the ‘third quest’. 
However, their reticence in ascribing an over-definite political status to Jesus gives 
them sufficient leeway for their representations of Jesus not to be overturned by 
recent research – with the exception of that research which might portray Jesus as a 
teacher of individual morality who was crucified by mistake.  
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Summary  - towards a political theology of the cross (i) 
 In the last two chapters I have attempted to lay the foundations for the 
subsequent study of Yoder, Boff and Sobrino. Before moving on, I outline 
elements, chiefly methodological, arising from these chapters which I believe to be 
necessary for constructing a political theology of the cross.  
 
An ambivalence towards the cross 
 In order to establish a genuine political theology of the cross it is necessary 
to recover the power of the cross to shock. The cross was regarded, understandably, 
with horror in the ancient world, and the loss of that sense of horror in the modern 
world diminishes its power in political theology. The cross, as used by the Romans, 
was a bloody and obscene act of savagery perpetrated by a cruel and arrogant (if 
often well meaning) people whose imperial agenda led them to stop at nothing to 
hold onto their power, and to keep in check those outside the imperial power 
structure who threatened their rule, through the deliberate infliction of the 
maximum degree of pain and humiliation. The cross, when seen from this 
perspective, should elicit similar shock and revulsion as Auschwitz or the lynch 
rope. To use the cross as an object of devotion is to enter into a dangerous area of 
cognitive dissonance, and to risk, at best, sentimentalising, or, at worst, making God 
complicit in such suffering. To use the cross as a badge of political success – in hoc 
signo vinces - is to indulge in a gross contradiction in terms. The cross must be seen 
as a protest against suffering, the ‘cross against the crosses’, a protest in which God 
participates no less than does crucified humanity.  
 
 The importance of context 
 It has become widely recognised that any theology inevitably reflects its 
context, consciously or unconsciously. This recognition it useful both in terms of 
overcoming the ‘blind spots’ occasioned by the theologian’s context and also in 
ensuring that the theology speaks in a useful and accurate way to its context. In 
particular, an awareness of context provides at least a partial safeguard against the 
Marxist critique of theology as an obfuscating ideology whose (unintentional) 
consequence is to mystify the human situation and hence serve the interests of the 
dominant class. The context of any political theology of the cross is the crucifixion 
of millions of people – in other words, systems of economic and political power 
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which, while perhaps bringing many benefits, have caused and continue to cause 
unnecessary and avoidable suffering on a huge scale. The context for a political 
theology of the cross in European Christianity is that of the church’s increasing 
marginalisation and weakness. In many ways, as we shall see, this is not a wholly 
negative situation, for at the heart of a political theology of the cross is the 
realisation that political theology should be exercised not merely, or even chiefly 
from the perspective of the powerful, but from outside the gates of power, from 
among the vulnerable victims of the powerful and the recipients of the decisions of 
the powerful. In both of these contexts, a political theology of the cross cannot be 
dispassionate or disengaged, but must be a resource for liberative understanding and 
action as a result of the theological insights gained. Nor must a political theology of 
the cross begin from a neutral position, but from a prior, pre-theological 
commitment to love, compassion and justice, without which the cross is politically 
and theologically meaningless.  
The relation between the contextual and the universal is one of 
interpenetration – on the one hand, a theology of the cross must be local and 
contextual, as, for example, it speaks to the immediate victims and those who seek 
to bring them help and justice. But those contextual insights must be 
universalizable, in that a political theology of the cross must speak not just to the 
immediate context, but to victims, perpetrators, and those who are passive 
participants in a crucifying economic and political order. 
 
 The centrality of Christ in revelation 
If a political theology is to be Christian, it must begin with Jesus and explore 
his political and social exemplarity – in other words, the pattern of his interactions 
with the power structures of his time. In John’s Gospel Jesus is described as the 
logos, the self communication of God, the consequence being that by studying his 
historical acts we gain insight into the eternal truth of God and of his present 
workings. The saving exemplarity of the incarnation is central to a political 
theology of the cross, the cross being the radicalization of incarnation – more 
incarnate than the crucified Christ God could not become. The cross, therefore, has 
a necessarily central function in theology as a whole and in political theology in 
particular. The Lutheran saying, ‘every act of Christ is for our instruction’ can be 
taken to extremes, but to ignore one of the most important trajectories within the 
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life of Jesus, the way in which he reacted to the power structures of his day and the 
way in which they reacted to him, would be to omit something of enormous 
significance for political theology. In this study I adopt what might be described as 
a Trinitarian Christocentrism – my Christocentrism is set in the context of the 
Trinity, but the other persons of Trinity cannot be in contradiction to the central 
exemplarity of Jesus and the cross. This centrality, or uniqueness, of Christ, is 
inclusive rather than exclusive. On the one hand, Christ is the unique self 
expression of God, and his death a definitive expression of God’s salvific 
relationship with humankind. On the other hand, Christ’s death is in solidarity with 
and in historical circumstances no different from the millions of crucifixions 
through the ages, thereby expressing God’s co-suffering in all those crucifixions.  
 
 Christological and soteriological coherence 
 The exemplarity of Jesus as outlined above gains fullest force when allied 
with a high Christology. If Jesus is not the definitive ‘human face of God’ his 
exemplarity is much reduced. The methodology most profitable for a political 
theology of the cross is, in simple terms, not to set out a ‘new Christianity’, but to 
draw out fresh implications from the orthodox, traditional teachings of the church 
and the Bible, in the same pattern as can be traced in other movements of renewal 
within the church – to draw on the old sources of Christian faith in the light of new 
contexts.  
 In systematic theology, at least since Barth, there has been a tendency to 
identify a unity between creation and atonement, incarnation and redemption, so 
that these are not seen as separate categories, but as intimately related. Similarly, 
political theology must not be seen as separate in any way from other doctrines, but 
as something intimately bound up with the rest. A political theology of the cross is 
hence most effective if it coheres with an overall theological pattern, especially in 
terms of soteriology. A cruciform political theology should not be tacked on as if it 
were a separate issue, or even as a deduction from a perceived ‘central theme’, but 
should be integral to soteriology as a whole. For example, a recognition that God’s 
atoning act is non-violent and that any violence in the cross is human, not flowing 
from a divine ‘necessity’ for blood shed, will radically affect both soteriological and 
political doctrines. Similarly, if a dominant symbol in atonement is peacemaking 
and restored relationships through self sacrificial solidarity, then both doctrine and 
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politics will bear the stamp of that symbol. (See Jersak and Hardin 2007) Political 
categories should be incorporated as integral parts of an overall soteriology – for 
example, with regard to the relationship between corporate and individual sin and 
the role of the cross in the breaking of sin’s power over both individuals and 
structures. Moreover, it is important to recognize that soteriology depends not 
solely on the moment of Christ’s death, but on the factors which preceded and 
caused it – for example, for Jesus, his self chosen vulnerability, his resistance to the 
powerful, his refusal to use violence in response to evil and, for his crucifiers, their 
ruthless resistance to any threat to their power, their use of political and religious 
ideology to buttress that power, and their reliance on the power of the sword as the 
ultimate criterion. Without an investigation into such factors, sin and salvation 
become merely mechanical concepts untouched by human reality.  
 
 Coherence with historical scholarship 
A political theology of the cross as suggested above depends radically upon 
the historical exemplarity of Jesus, and hence upon our knowledge of the nature of 
Jesus’ ministry as sufficiently established by historical scholarship. This, however, 
need not entail a very high level of detailed historical reconstruction of Jesus’ 
ministry. For example, it is certainly not necessary to argue, in favour of a political 
theology of the cross, that Jesus was a zealot sympathiser. It is not enough, 
however, to ignore the importance of a careful historical reconstruction of Jesus’ 
ministry, since there are certain reconstructions which militate against a political 
theology of the cross.  The most damaging stumbling block would be to interpret 
Jesus as a Socratic individualist – in first century terms, a Cynic-type figure - whose 
political interest was only tangential. Rather, a political theology of the cross relies 
on Jesus’ choices and teaching being situated within, and not outside of politics, and 
adopting a politically relevant stance, albeit as a ‘third way’ beyond the established 
political categories.  
 Underlying the ‘shifting sands’ of historical research, though, is the fact that 
the historical incontestability of the crucifixion – even on a minimalist reading by 
the most radical critics - argues overwhelmingly for the political relevance of Jesus 
and therefore the possibility of a political theology of the cross. Within historical 
scholarship the cross is an almost universally agreed datum, but the historical 
causation of the crucifixion falls into three rough categories of interpretation, of 
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ascending political relevance. First, Jesus may have been crucified as a result of a 
mistake by the Jewish leadership and Pilate – he would still be an innocent victim 
of political power, but the political significance of the cross, on this interpretation, 
would be attenuated. Second, Jesus may have been crucified as a threat to the 
Jewish leadership, who co-opted the power of the Romans to have Jesus killed. 
This, the traditional explanation, points to Jesus being crucified as a threat to those 
holding religious and political power. Thirdly, Jesus may have been crucified as a 
threat to public order by the Romans, who regarded him as an outsider who 
threatened their rule and therefore qualified for the servile supplicium. All three 
options interpret Jesus as the victim of the powerful, although only the last two 
make this the result of his deliberate political choices.  
 In all three interpretations it is, moreover, essential to stress the relevance of 
class to an analysis of the historical circumstances of Jesus’ death.  Jesus was, of 
course, crucified on a Roman cross by Roman imperial power. But is it useful to 
note the degree of co-operation and pragmatic unity between Roman imperialism 
and local political and economic aristocracies (this practice, widespread throughout 
the empire, was mirrored in the British Empire by the policy of co-opting the local 
elites in maintaining imperial power). It is therefore not sufficient to state that Jesus 
was a victim of Roman imperialism – he was also a victim of those powerful classes 
(for example, those who benefited from the temple system, or those who gained 
economic benefit from association with the Romans, such as the Herodians) in his 
society who saw him as a ‘political’ threat to their order – and, unless those classes 
and authorities were peculiarly obtuse, Jesus must at least have seemed a sufficient 
threat to their order for them to have brought about his crucifixion. The hallmark of 
crucifixion was the reinforcement of the dominance of one class over another, the 
public confirmation of the status of the crucifier and the crucified. In the very public 
nature of crucifixion the status of the dominated and of the dominating class was 
explicitly confirmed in the eyes of any who may have wished to question or 
challenge that structure of power.  
 
 Crossing Lessing’s ditch 
One of the most serious charges against a political theology of the cross is 
that Jesus’ actions which led up to his crucifixion were contingent, restricted to his 
immediate context, not necessary (even irrelevant) to soteriology and therefore not 
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binding in a revelatory sense for the construction of a political theology of the cross. 
There are two interrelated issues here – first, the argument used by traditional   
soteriology that the only aspect of the cross of any salvific importance was that 
Jesus was crucified by sinful humanity in a sinful rejection of God’s Son, and, 
second, Lessing’s famous ‘ditch’ between the contingent facts of history and the 
necessary truths of revelation.  
I have argued above that a soteriology dependent on the moment of Jesus’ 
death is deficient, and restricts soteriology solely to an intra-trinitarian transaction 
potentially and dangerously disconnected from human reality. To cross Lessing’s 
ditch, it is important to recognise the continuing and unchanging patterns 
surrounding the crucifixion of Jesus which are evident in contemporary 
‘crucifixions’. For example, the continuing existence of classes of dominated and 
dominating , of powerful and powerless,  and the pattern of the cross-risking 
challenge to political power and the crucifying response of the powerful are the 
same in today’s world as in Jesus’ time. Similarly, a faithful and costly commitment 
to the kingdom of God and the values of justice, peace and reconciliation invite 
from those who hold a different ideology the same potentially lethal response today 
as in first century Palestine. There is a historical parallelism, or to use Sobrino’s 
term, an isomorfismo, which enables the contingencies of Jesus’ crucifixion to be 
transformed into the necessary truths of revelation. It is no shame to admit that 
Jesus was killed for the same historical reasons as a Camillo Torres or a peasant in 
El Salvador, since the fate of all three indicates a consistent and continuing pattern 
in human society.  
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SECTION II – BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATIONS  
1) A CRUCIFORM RESPONSE TO SUFFERING AND OPPRESSION 
 
 Chapter 4  
The cross as a definitive source of Christian political ethics 
In the previous chapters I have attempted to lay the foundations for a study 
of the cross in the political theology of Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino. I now turn to the 
ways in which these theologians interpret the cross in constructing political 
theologies of use to the contemporary church.  
 In this chapter I examine the role of the cross as a definitive source for 
Christian political ethics, and identify what the cross and ‘cruciformity’ might mean 
as a controlling theme for the above theologians. What, for each of them, is the 
basic relationship between Jesus’ cross and their political theology? In brief, for 
Yoder, the whole shape of ‘Christian politics’ as vulnerable non-violence is defined 
by the historical exemplarity of the crucified Jesus. For Boff and Sobrino, the cross 
is, most of all, a protest against suffering – the ‘cross against the crosses’, based on 
a doctrine of the ‘crucified God’. 
 
a) Yoder – The cruciform Nature of Christian politics 
Given the narrative and occasional nature of Yoder’s writing, any 
schematization of Yoder’s theology, such as it attempted here, is likely to have 
blurred and rough edges. The themes by which the theology of Yoder is analysed 
are not in any way self contained or distinct, and should not be read as such.  
 
Cruciformity as normative 
 For Yoder Christian social ethics are to be modelled on Jesus’ incarnational 
exemplarity. Since the cross is the radicalisation of the incarnation and the starkest 
and most critical point of Jesus’ interaction with the powerful and identification 
with the powerless of his society, the crucifixion is bound to have a strong 
normative function in any social ethic with a firm Christological base. Yoder’s 
achievement is to take this definitive cruciformity seriously – more seriously than 
many other Christian social ethicists - and to see where it leads. Yoder aims for a 
social ethic which is distinctively and authentically Christian, where the key aspects 
of the faith, Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom and especially his subsequent death 
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and resurrection, are given full weight. Jesus is not merely an ahistorical, if central, 
figure. Yoder attempts to construct a political theology out of the concrete politics 
of Jesus which led to his crucifixion. It could be argued that Yoder does not 
necessarily read the cross and resurrection correctly at all points with regard to 
social ethics, but I would not wish to fault his cross-centred methodology. 
The defencelessness of Christ on the cross is the lens, according to Yoder, 
through which we are to read God’s intentions for human politics. Indeed, Yoder 
seems at times to regard this function of the crucifixion as primary, constituting ‘a 
new stance to be taken by repentant hearers in the midst of the world’. (Yoder 1994: 
97) Hence Yoder interprets Jesus’ rejection of Peter’s efforts to defend him not in 
terms of ‘some metaphysically motivated doctrine of the atonement – it was 
because God’s will for God’s man in this world is that he should renounce 
legitimate defence’. (Yoder 1994: 98)  This emphasis has occasioned the charge 
against Yoder of dissolving the gospel into politics – an unfair criticism, since, as 
we have seen above, Yoder’s doctrine of atonement, with its insistence on a non-
coercive and non-violent Jesus, holds political categories firmly within the context 
of the soteriological. Politics and salvation are not identical, neither are they 
separate.  God’s eternal salvation is effected through an historical act (or series of 
actions) of Jesus which fall within the realm of the political. The movement within 
Yoder’s theology can be stated as follows: Jesus is the revealer of God’s will for 
humanity; Jesus, in a series of political actions, instigates a new non-violent and 
non-coercive way of living which challenges  the powerful and leads inevitably to 
his crucifixion; the character of God himself is thus shown to be non-coercive and 
vulnerable; therefore those who believe in that God are called to follow Jesus, 
individually and corporately, in a way of life that witnesses to that divine character.  
 
Redefining the nature of ‘Christian politics’ 
The nature of the politics in which Christians are called to participate is 
radically changed by the political acts of Jesus and their consequence in the 
crucifixion – and yet Jesus’ alternative to conventional politics is no less politically 
relevant. In fact, Jesus’ alternative of ‘rejecting the sword and at the same time 
condemning those who wielded it’ (Yoder 1994: 106) is so radically politically 
relevant that his opponents, the Jewish and Roman political leaders, felt it necessary 
to kill him ‘in the name of both of their forms of political responsibility.’ Yoder 
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argues that ‘Jesus’ way is not less but more relevant to the question of how society 
moves than is the struggle for possession of the levers of command; to this Pilate 
and Caiaphas testify by their judgement on him.’ (Yoder 1994: 106) Politics is 
radically redefined, but still remains politics. It is important to note that Yoder’s 
Jesus does not withdraw from politics – rather he refuses to play by the usual rules, 
or to ‘concede that those in power represent an ideal, a logically proper, or even an 
empirically acceptable definition of what it means to be political’. (Yoder 1994: 
224) Politics, for Jesus, is redefined, and it is redefined for the Christian by Jesus’ 
cross. 
  
Some criticisms 
Before examining Yoder’s political reading of the cross in more detail in the 
following chapters, some preliminary observations and criticisms may be made. 
First, Yoder’s is an unambiguous ethic. Combining his logic of the radical 
exemplarity of the historical acts of Jesus with the starkness of the cross as the 
defining symbol of Christian politics it is almost inevitable that this should be so. 
Such a social ethic can be contrasted with Niebuhrian realism, which recognises the 
inevitable ambiguity of most situations. This contrast, which will occur repeatedly 
in this analysis of Yoder’s social ethics, is between an ethic which idealises moral 
purity in the sense of consistency of witness and one which attempts to make the 
best of a situation where moral purity is not achievable. The Niebuhrian approach 
requires a degree of moral humility in decision making, and a willingness to risk a 
good for the sake of a possibly greater good. Yoder’s ethic is one of obedience and 
certainty, but its humility lies in a different direction - in its trust that God will 
honour the obedience given by the church and by Christians. Niebuhr’s ethic is one 
of getting one’s hands (and possibly one’s conscience) dirty. Yoder’s is one of a 
refusal to compromise a conscience formed by obedience. Both attempt to be 
faithful to the incarnation. The Niebuhrian might argue that the incarnation 
indicates a risk-taking compromise with the realities of history. Yoder argues that 
the incarnation does not baptize or ratify human sin, but offers a different model of 
humanity.  
Secondly, if Christ is the norm for social ethics, what kind of a norm does 
Yoder mean? Wright, a sympathetic critic, points out the difficulty in distinguishing 
‘between that in Christ which is absolutely, presumptively, or suggestively 
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binding’. (Wright 2000: 95) Jesus’ words and actions were directed towards a 
specific situation. How far, and by what process of interpretation, should those 
words and actions be seen as normative for different situations? Wright suggests 
that Yoder’s emphasis on redemption needs to be complemented by a fuller doctrine 
of creation, if the ‘normative meaning of Jesus for necessary institutions’ is to be 
made clear, and argues that  ‘There remains obscurity about Jesus’ mode of 
relevance and the building of the hermeneutical bridge from his situation to our 
own.’ (Wright 2000: 95) This is a significant criticism, partly answered by the fact 
that Yoder, with his emphasis on the eschatological nature of reality, does not 
differentiate sharply between redemption and creation, between ethics suitable for a 
‘crisis’ and the necessary institutional embodiment of ‘Christian politics’. 
Moreover, the process of ‘interpretative transfer’ from the first century to the 
twenty-first does not of itself necessitate any weakening in the radicality of Jesus’ 
ethic.  Yoder’s logic is that the crucifixion is where the incarnation, definitive of 
Christian political action, receives its full value. In whatever particular circumstance 
that incarnation might have occurred, the crucifixion is a necessary, in the sense of 
inevitable, concomitant. Therefore the pattern of the cross is definitive for every 
area of Christian social ethics and normative for Christian action in all 
circumstances – not just for first century Palestine. 
Does Yoder here arbitrarily overemphasize the cross? Again, we return to 
the necessity of the cross and its centrality to the incarnation. The cross is no chance 
concomitant, but the fullest and most inevitable expression of God’s vulnerable 
incarnation. Yoder’s methodology also argues against such an accusation. Yoder 
bases his doctrine of the centrality of the cross on the totality of the New Testament 
witness, involving both the gospel accounts, where the history of the cross (and the 
choices which led to it) is described and the Pauline corpus, where the impact of the 
cross on the social and personal practices of the early Christian community is 
explored theologically and ethically. This is far from plucking an aspect of Christ’s 
ministry without due regard for its centrality and using it as an interpretative crux. 
The charge of arbitrariness in the selection of the cross as the defining centre for 
social ethics can be met by pointing to Yoder’s care for the wholeness (at least as 
regards the New Testament) of the canonical context as evidenced by his seminal 
work, the Politics of Jesus, and his placing the cross within that whole context. This 
is especially powerful given that the gospel Yoder chooses to study, Luke, is not 
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one where the cross is most obviously the controlling feature, as it is more clearly in 
Mark. If his basic logic is followed, that Christian political ethics are, at root, an 
imitation of the pattern of Christ’s political life and execution, Yoder is justified in 
regarding the cross as the definitive source of Christian imitation of Christ, and, 
therefore of Christian political ethics. 
 
b) Boff and Sobrino - the ‘cross against the crosses’ and the ‘crucified God’  
 
Boff - The cross as a protest against suffering 
 For Boff and Sobrino, as for liberation theology in general, the cross is a 
symbol both of suffering and of protest against that suffering. Boff sees the 
crucifixion as an evil and criminal act, as something to be resisted in itself, and only 
to be ‘accepted’ as a means of  diminishing present and future ‘crucifixions’. He 
describes the cross, in chapter 10 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World, as a 
symbol of hatred, imposed by the ‘creators of crosses’ (Boff 1987: 131) on those 
who seek to remove the world’s crosses.  But when the cross thus imposed is 
accepted (in other words, suffering is risked as a necessary consequence of the task 
of removing crosses) a power is released: ‘To accept the cross is to be greater than 
the cross. To live thus is to be stronger than death.’ (Boff 1987: 131) The cross is 
not to be interpreted as ‘an exaltation of the negative’, or ‘dolorism’ (Boff 1987: 
132), but rather as the result of a positive commitment to following Jesus in making 
it ‘gradually impossible for human beings to crucify other human beings’. (Boff 
1987: 132) 
 Boff is greatly concerned to resist misuse of the cross, especially in Latin 
American Catholicism, in inculcating a fatalism, or even a glorification, of suffering 
as something willed by God as spiritually beneficial in itself. Following the Marxist 
critique, he argues that the cross has been used by the powerful to demonstrate ‘the 
need for suffering and death as part and parcel of human life’. (Boff 1987: 2) The 
cross is reduced to an individualist, fatalist and pietist necessity: individualist, in 
that there is no social consequence to bearing the cross beyond simply remaining 
within the class or social position in which one is placed; fatalist, in that there is no 
need or point in struggling against the situation, which simply has to be borne 
resignedly; and pietist, in that God blesses such an action. Crosses must be carried 
‘with patience and submission; indeed, it is by the cross that we reach the light, and 
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repair the offense done to the infinite majesty of God by our sins and those of the 
world’. (Boff 1987: 2) Passion of Christ, Passion of the World is, to a great extent, 
a polemic against such a theology, the propagation of which is in the interests of 
those who hold, and are unwilling to relinquish, political power. God, Boff argues 
throughout his work, does not have a preference for human suffering. His will is for 
human well-being, and his glory is expressed in and through human life and 
happiness.  The cross should not be idolised as an end in itself or made an object of 
devotion for its own sake, as if there is something intrinsically good in suffering. 
Rather, it is an inevitable concomitant in the struggle for liberation and against 
suffering. In fact, the essence of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World could be 
summarised as ‘the cross against the crosses’. The telos is not the cross but the 
resurrection, the two being in an inescapable dialectic. ‘Christian existence 
preserves its Christian identity only to the extent that it lives and maintains itself in 
the paschal dialectic of crucifixion and resurrection as an exigency of the 
discipleship and following of Jesus Christ’. (Boff 1987:  3-4) This tension, between 
combating and taking up the cross, between the cross as a hostile as well as a 
helpful symbol, is no merely theoretical technicality, but is central to a focussed 
political spirituality.  
 
Boff - modern theologies of the cross examined 
With this anti-suffering criterion in mind, in chapters 8, 9, and 10 of Passion 
of Christ, Passion of the World, Boff spends much energy on reviewing 
contemporary interpretations of the cross. In chapter 8 he considers various 
theologies of the cross, using the criteria of how they relate to human suffering, how 
evil is interpreted and, more importantly, how it is overcome. It is worthwhile 
analysing this chapter in detail, as it provides a good insight into the criteria by 
which Boff judges theologies of the cross. Boff’s overriding criterion is practical - a 
theology which legitimises evil, and provides no way of overcoming suffering or 
evil, is illegitimate. The task of the Christian is to overcome suffering, not to 
acquiesce in it or, even worse, to make it an integral and valued part of spirituality 
and theology. 
He begins with Moltmann’s The Crucified God (Moltmann 1974) which, 
following a Lutheran emphasis (although Moltmann is actually of the Reformed 
tradition) on the theologia crucis, puts the cross at the centre of the theological task 
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as the distinguishing mark of Christianity. According to Moltmann, in Boff’s 
interpretation, it is not enough to say that Christ died as a martyred prophet. The 
radical nature of the cross lies in the fact that Jesus was rejected by God, in addition 
to his rejection by his political and religious opponents. This fundamentally changes 
our concept of God, who is revealed in impotence, rather than power, beyond all 
human images which are nullified by the cross. This would, no doubt, be at least 
partially acceptable to Boff. But Moltmann moves beyond this to stress the 
profoundly intra-trinitarian nature of the cross - God the Father is instrumental in 
crucifying the Son, and suffers the death of the Son, in the pain of love. Crucifixion, 
death, is actualised in God himself, and ‘God assumes the passion of the world. 
Human suffering is no longer exterior to God. It transpires within God’. (Boff 1987: 
105) Death is not thereby eternalised, made permanent, as a part of God - for God is 
himself in process through his suffering love, and assumes his full identity when 
evil and death are conquered and God will be all in all (an aspect of Moltmann’s 
theology which Boff seems to downplay in subsequent criticisms). It is perhaps not 
difficult to see the problems Boff has with such a theology. The cross is seen (or 
can be portrayed as being seen) as part of the suprahistorical, intra-divine drama 
which may not only sideline the need for salvation to be worked out politically but 
also risks making suffering an integral part of the divine modus operandi. Although 
in the end, when God is all in all, evil is defeated, God is still responsible for 
imposing the death of his Son, as part of his plan of salvation. Again, this is a theme 
Boff is concerned to avoid, as a legitimisation of human suffering. According to 
Boff, the ‘necessity’ of Christ’s death lies not in a divine plan, but in the 
inevitability of Jesus’ suffering if he is to carry through his ‘historical project’. It is 
not something directly willed by God. Boff’s God is crucified, not in any sense a 
crucifier.  
Boff’s basic criticism of Moltmann is that although suffering is to be 
eventually overcome, it is somehow internalised within God to the potential 
detriment of humanity. This, however, would not be a valid criticism. To conceive 
of a divine internalisation of suffering is justified, if it is a way of sympathy and 
solidarity with human suffering in order to overcome it. The danger, of which Boff 
is very much aware, occurs when suffering itself is ‘deified’ or valued as something 
not wholly evil.  This critique, while pointing up certain inconsistencies in 
Moltmann’s theology, would seem, in practice, to be extreme and unfair. One of the 
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central aspects of Moltmann’s theologia crucis is his insistence on the relevance of 
the crucified and risen Christ to political change and his sympathy with those who 
suffer, especially the disabled. Moltmann has himself protested against the 
caricature of his theology as represented by the phrase ‘God the crucifier’. There is 
a wide difference between a sadistic deity who actively wills the crucifixion of his 
son, and Moltmann’s suffering God who ‘unwillingly wills’ or painfully allows 
Jesus to be crucified for the sake of fulfilling his mission of solidarity and love. 
Boff and Moltmann are, in fact, much closer than Boff allows, and the differences 
are perhaps exaggerated through the wish of certain liberation theologians to 
distance themselves from European political theology.  
Boff next turns to Hedinger’s Against God’s reconciliation with misery: a 
critique of Christian theism and a-theism. Hedinger’s thesis, that ‘suffering is not to 
be accepted, it is to be combated’ (Boff 1987: 106) receives Boff’s approval. 
Hedinger refuses to attribute evil to God, or to sublimate evil and suffering. God 
cannot be responsible for the death of Jesus, which was a crime of political murder. 
Jesus did not have to die on the cross in order to manifest the love of God his 
Father. ‘His death is the fruit of a life of fidelity to his Father.’ (Boff 1987: 106) It is 
clear that Boff finds Hedinger’s theology much more acceptable than Moltmann’s. 
Hedinger argues that only a God without love would reject his Son. The relationship 
of God with Christ on the cross is not a rejection of the Son but a suffering 
alongside him – in a key passage which sums up much of Boff’s theology of the 
cross, he argues that: 
We may say that God suffers with us, and suffers in Jesus Christ, that God is 
in solidarity with Jesus’ suffering and ours, that God is suffering too, to 
deliver us from suffering, introducing the universe to a kind of love that 
willingly assumes suffering and death, not because it perceives some value 
in it, but in order to render it impossible from within. (Boff 1987: 106). 
 The spirituality of a glorification of suffering, inculcating a political 
passivity, is one of Boff’s chief targets. Hence Boff concludes his survey with the 
contribution of liberation theology. He quotes Sobrino: ‘The cross is the outcome of 
an incarnation situated in a world of sin that is revealed to be a power working 
against the God of Jesus.’ (Boff 1987: 110) Boff continues, ‘The cross is to be 
understood as God’s solidarity with men and women in the condition of human 
suffering - not to eternalize it, but to suppress it… not by domination, but by love.’ 
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(Boff 1987: 110) The only cross that can be projected within the being of God is the 
cross of love - not the cross of hate. Boff concludes, in a highly significant phrase, 
that the task of the Christian faith is ‘to render the hatred that generates the cross 
ever more impossible, not through violence, which simply forces whatever it 
wishes, but through love and reconciliation’. (Boff 1987: 110) Here is a profound 
insight into the political role of the church. The cross is a symbol not of resignation, 
but of protest against the continuing infliction of crosses. Boff notes also that such a 
political theology of the cross necessitates belief in a God who suffers (quoting the 
famous phrase of Bonhoeffer, that ‘only the suffering God can help’ (Bonhoeffer 
1953: 361)) - that almost seismic shift in much late twentieth century theology, 
among theologians whom Boff criticises as well as those whom he praises. 
However, it is not enough to speak in general terms of a suffering God, or suffering 
‘in God’. More accuracy is needed in the language used to describe such suffering. 
There is a danger that a theology of the cross can be construed as suggesting that 
‘God causes pain in the world, and not merely that God suffers in solidarity with the 
pain of the world, suffers the pain of the world because the world suffers’. (Boff 
1987: 111) This is Boff’s chief point of issue here with Moltmann, whom he 
accuses of ‘a profound lack of theological rigour’ in speaking of a God who ‘is both 
object and subject of death, a God who dies and who causes death [in willing his 
Son’s death]’. (Boff 1987: 111) Such a God will be the God of a ‘deeply 
ambiguous, primitive theological discourse’. As we have noted, Boff’s concern is 
above all to avoid any suggestion of a theology that legitimises suffering, which 
treats it as anything other than an evil to be combated.  Boff (to my mind, most 
unjustly) accuses Moltmann of reducing the passion, ultimately, to a ‘single basic 
causality: that of God the Father’. (Boff 1987: 113) This he sees as both 
undermining the historical causes of Jesus’ death and also involving God in a 
‘dehumanising dynamism of suffering.....If he [Jesus] takes on suffering for the sake 
of suffering, because Suffering is God - because God, too, suffers: God is suffering- 
then there is no way to overcome suffering. Suffering is eternal’. (Boff 1987: 113) 
In opposition to this Boff proposes a simple theology of an almost apophatic silence 
after the enunciation of the faith statement ‘Jesus is God’. The cross is the ‘death of 
all systems’. Speculative theology gives way to an ethic of discipleship of this Jesus 
who is also God. How can we follow him so as to come ever nearer to him?’ (Boff 
1987:113) Faith seeks understanding not by speculation, but by discipleship; not by 
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‘theodicy’ but by ‘ethics’. This way is, in fact, more true to the being, purpose, and 
suffering of God. God suffers in solidarity with the suffering of his creation, but 
with the aim not of glorifying, but of abolishing suffering. ‘Of what use is 
suffering? To change and to transform the world? Then it has meaning.’ (Boff 1987: 
114) The quest for a politically relevant meaning to suffering is at the heart of 
Boff’s theology, his task being to provide spiritual resources for those of his 
contemporaries who suffer for the sake of justice. The deification of suffering, a 
view of the cross which produces fatalism and political apathy, is, as noted above, 
his chief target, both in his criticisms of academic theologians and of grass-roots 
Catholic spirituality. As has been argued, Boff may be unfair in his criticism of 
Moltmann, but his general emphasis, ‘the cross against the crosses’ is fully justified. 
 
Sobrino - Jesus as the revealer of the crucified God 
 In his first major theological work, Christology at the Crossroads, (Sobrino 
1978) Sobrino sets out fourteen theses on the death of Jesus. Number thirteen 
expounds what is possibly Sobrino’s major contribution to liberation theology, the 
linkage between liberation and the ‘crucified God’ in a Latin American context. At 
this point his theology closely follows and parallels that of Moltmann in a slightly 
earlier, European context.  
On the cross of Jesus Christ God himself is crucified. The Father suffers the 
death of the Son and takes upon himself all the pain and suffering of history. 
In this ultimate solidarity with humanity he reveals himself as the God of 
love, who opens up a hope and a future through the most negative side of 
history. Thus Christian existence is nothing else but a process of 
participating in this same process whereby God loves the world and hence in 
the very life of God. (Sobrino 1978: 224)  
There are also notable parallels with Bonhoeffer’s idea of the Christian life as 
participating in the suffering of God vis-à-vis his creation. 
 Sobrino, in Christology at the Crossroads, describes various ways by which 
the radicality and the scandal of cross are avoided: by concentrating on the 
resurrection; by burying the cross under the categories of noetic and salvific 
mystery; by holding a conception of God which does not begin from the cross; and 
by restricting the cross to the context of sacrificial cultic worship. (Sobrino 1978: 
185) However, far from being the unchanged and unchanging God of Greek 
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metaphysics, God suffers. And this suffering has a profound meaning for political 
theology, in pointing to a divine solidarity and a vulnerability which radically 
subverts a theology of power-as-force, of paternalism, or of withdrawal. In his last 
major Christological work, Christ the liberator (Sobrino 2001) Sobrino returns to 
the ‘audacity and honesty’ of the Fathers, who ‘upheld the divinity of Jesus Christ 
even without knowing where affirming the divinity of a crucified man was leading 
them’. (Sobrino 2001: 257) An Arian Christ cannot reveal a God whose being is 
expressed above all in solidarity, vulnerability, and in suffering alongside and on 
behalf of his creation.  
 Is, then, suffering intrinsic to God? How can Sobrino avoid the charge Boff 
lays against Moltmann, of deifying suffering?  Sobrino avoids this pitfall by 
stressing that suffering is intrinsic to God in his relationship to a suffering world. 
Since God is love, suffering is an inevitable concomitant of God’s response to a 
sinful and crucifying world. The cross is the inevitable result, given human sin, of 
incarnation. Sobrino describes God’s choice to become consistently incarnate in 
history, with the result that God is radically affected by sin and death. The cross is 
not arbitrary, or a cruel punishment inflicted on Jesus for the sake of a 
substitutionary atonement, but is a ‘consequence of God’s original choice, 
incarnation, a radical drawing near for love and in love, wherever it leads, without 
escaping from history or manipulating it from outside’. (Sobrino 1994a: 244) Since 
a large part of the sin which crucified Jesus and which ‘crucifies’ contemporary 
sufferers is political in nature (in the sense of a misuse of power), this divine 
incarnation-suffering has profound political implications. First, those who claim to 
follow Jesus are obliged to undergo a similar cross-risking incarnation. Sobrino 
quotes Romero in describing ‘a church incarnate in the problems of the people’. 
(Sobrino 2001: 273) Second, the cross demonstrates the divine solidarity-in-
suffering with the victims. Sobrino points out that ‘the phrase ‘crucified God’ is 
therefore no more than another term, provocative and shocking, with the same 
meaning as ‘God of solidarity’. But why does solidarity have to be shown through 
crucifixion? Sobrino argues that solidarity without participating in the struggles and 
sufferings of those with whom one is in solidarity would be at best paternalist, and 
at worst despotic. ‘Solidarity in a world of victims that was not prepared to become 
a victim would in the end not be solidarity.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 245) Suffering, 
therefore, is part of the divine, not intrinsically, but as a necessary consequence of 
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God’s choice to become incarnate in a suffering world. This suffering does not have 
value in itself, but only in relation to God’s love reaching out to the world. 
 A sub-text in much liberation theology (and in much political theology as a 
whole) is the debate over the relationship between divine action and passivity, and 
the consequent relationship between the political responsibility and non-
responsibility of the church (this tension is a major theme in Yoder’s theology). 
This paradoxical tension comes to the fore most starkly in the cross. Sobrino boldly 
grasps the fact that on the cross God does not actively intervene, but allows the 
tragedy of the crucifixion. He continues, ‘The cross therefore raises the most serious 
problem, whether and how not acting, not speaking, how silence, withdrawal, 
inaction can reveal anything of God’. (Sobrino 1994a: 240) Moreover, this divine 
non-intervention is not confined to the cross of Jesus, but to the ‘countless unjust 
deaths throughout history – which God did nothing to prevent’. (Sobrino 1994a: 
240) This tension is the crux of any political theodicy, but it is a tension which can 
be resolved only by a mixture of contemplation of the suffering God and action to 
relieve the suffering human.  
The scandal of God’s silence in the crucifixion, along with the faith that 
God, despite the scandal, is still present, is at the heart of genuine 
contemplation of the mystery of God, which can be honoured not by 
remaining simply in contemplation but by carrying the cross and taking 
responsibility for the crucified. (Sobrino 1994a: 252)  
This involves the Christian being open to the possibility of bearing suffering: ‘The 
only thing the cross says is that God himself bears suffering and – for those who in 
faith accept his presence on Jesus’ cross – that it has to be borne.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 
242) 
 This does not, however, mean that there should be any acceptance of 
suffering as anything other than an evil. Sobrino, like Boff, insists that suffering is 
never to be justified or thought of as something essential to the being of God, with 
the crucial exception of God in his relationship to a crucifying world. ‘What God 
encourages is real incarnation in history, because only in this way will history be 
saved, even though this leads to the cross.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 244) Much of the 
theological backdrop to Sobrino’s (and Boff’s) discussion is the trinitarian theology 
of Moltmann, which is interpreted as representing the Father being instrumental in 
the crucifixion of the Son, and thus being, ultimately, a crucifier, responsible for 
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suffering. God, according to Boff and Sobrino, does not eternalize suffering in 
God’s trinitarian being and thus perpetuate it. Rather, God resists suffering, even at 
the risk, in Jesus, of sharing victimhood with the victims. There is a necessary 
subtlety in the language used here. God did not abandon Jesus, neither did he 
intervene to stop him in his quest for faithfulness to his mission. God’s prior 
decision for incarnation made the divine sufferings inevitable. Does this mean that 
God is silent (and non-interventionist) over contemporary crosses? Stalsett (Stalsett 
2003: 465) points to a dialectic in Sobrino’s thought. God is absent, yet present, and 
his presence-in-absence makes possible his solidarity with contemporary 
crucifixions. In other words, God is present on the cross in the person of Jesus, yet 
God the Father does not intervene in the crucifixion of his Son but abandons him to 
the necessity of incarnation in a crucifying world. A similar idea of the presence 
and the hiddenness of God is found also in Sobrino’s recent theodicy following the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami. ‘God is hidden in the earthquake and suffers in silence with 
the victims. But hope does not die, and in hope God remains mysteriously present.’ 
(Sobrino 2004: 137) 
 
The crucified God and political salvation  
 ‘Only the suffering God can help’. (Bonhoeffer 1953: 361) Bonhoeffer’s 
profound words pose more questions than answers. How can a crucified, and hence, 
to a large extent, powerless, God help? Love without power would seem to be 
ineffective, and power without love oppressive. Sobrino discusses this key question 
by describing the need of the poor for a rescuer from outside (alterity) and a rescuer 
from alongside (affinity).  
The poor turn to God to save them with his power, and in that they see 
effective love. But they also turn to God when they find him close to their 
own suffering, and in that they see credible love. (Sobrino 2004: 145)  
This combination of vulnerability and intervention on behalf of the poor is, for 
Sobrino, exemplified in Archbishop Romero’s rejection of personal protection 
whilst denouncing the forces which eventually killed him. Sobrino makes the 
enigmatic statement ‘It is necessary to fight resolutely against sin in order to 
eradicate it, but this fight means bearing sin…injustice cannot be eradicated unless 
it is borne’. (Sobrino 1994a: 245-6) What does this ‘bearing of sin and injustice’ 
mean? This will be discussed at greater length in relation to the crucified people. 
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Suffice it to say, here, that the fight against sin and injustice is not conducted, as it 
were, from a safe place, but in solidarity with the victims. The crucified Jesus 
demonstrates both alterity – a salvation from outside (an intervention) – and affinity 
– a salvation from alongside (a sharing of the suffering).  
In bearing this suffering God says what side he is on, what struggles he is in 
solidarity with. God’s silence on the cross can be interpreted, very 
paradoxically, as solidarity with Jesus and with the crucified of 
history….History’s victims look for an effective love, but also welcome a 
credible love. (Sobrino 1994a: 246)  
Sobrino adduces this combination of alterity and affinity not merely as a theological 
formula, but as a guide to Christian pastoral and political practice. ‘Power 
intervention’ from outside of the situation must be balanced by empathetic presence 
from within. 
 
c) Conclusion  
 Yoder’s greatest contribution is to take seriously the normative nature of the 
crucifixion for Christian political ethics. Despite criticisms over a possible over-
isolating of the cross as a norm, I regard Yoder’s overall methodology as very 
fruitful and necessary. If a model of revelation is accepted in which Jesus is 
normative (and that is the basic assumption which Yoder makes, in my opinion, 
correctly), it is arbitrary to exclude either one highly significant aspect of Jesus’ life 
– the crucifixion and its political causes – or one area of ethics – the political. Yoder 
seeks to redefine politics in obedience to the social exemplarity of Jesus, brought to 
sharp focus in the crucifixion, and to encourage the church to trust that God will 
honour that obedience. 
 The focus of Boff and Sobrino is different. For them, the cross is ultimately 
a protest against suffering and a necessary symbol of a campaign against such 
suffering. Both, but especially Sobrino, base this upon the fruit of the great 
paradigm shift in twentieth century theology, the doctrine of a God who suffers in 
sympathy with the sufferings of humanity.  
 All three theologians find their focus primarily in response to the historical 
fact of the crucifixion but also in reaction to prevalent theologies and spiritualities; 
in the case of Yoder, the ‘Christian realism’ of Reinhold Niebuhr and in the case of 
Boff and Sobrino the politically conservative dolorism of the Latin American 
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church (and, to a lesser extent, a misunderstanding of Moltmann’s theology of the 
cross). Their starting points are different in terms of the background of spirituality, 
geography and politics against which they write, but their basic theologies of the 
cross are not necessarily contradictory.  
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Chapter 5 
The cross and political discipleship 
 For Yoder, Boff and Sobrino, the cross is intimately associated with the 
practical demands of discipleship. In this chapter I explore their theologies to 
examine how a political discipleship can be exercised in the light of the cross. 
 
a) Yoder – the cross and nonconforming political discipleship 
 
Discipleship as bearing the cross of nonconformity 
 Yoder insists that, just as crucifixion in the time of Jesus was a political 
event, as a method of preserving the current system of power and acting as a visible 
deterrent to those who would challenge that power, so the cross which the Christian 
disciple was called to bear in New Testament times and is called to bear in the 
present has inescapable and radical political connotations. Any other usage of the 
cross is, in fact, inexplicable, given the widespread knowledge in the ancient world 
of the cross as the prime Roman method of dealing with a challenge to their 
political hegemony. Yoder is, first of all, insistent in declaring what ‘bearing the 
cross’ (Mark 8: 34) is not. Contrary to popular usage, where bearing one’s cross 
means putting up with chance suffering due to sickness or other misfortune, Yoder 
insists that the ‘believer’s cross must be like his Lord’s, the price of his social 
nonconformity’. (Yoder 1994: 96) Yoder differentiates carefully between this 
political interpretation of cross bearing and what he describes elsewhere as the cross 
in Protestant pastoral care. ‘It is not, like sickness or catastrophe, an inexplicable, 
unpredictable suffering; it is the end of a path freely chosen after counting the cost.’ 
(Yoder 1994: 129) Nor is bearing the cross something inward or private, in the form 
of individual spiritual turmoil. Rather, it is ‘the social reality of representing in an 
unwilling world the Order to come’. (Yoder 1994: 96) Cross-bearing is not 
something which simply happens to a Christian in the course of his or her private 
existence – it is the risk taken, the consequence incurred, by the social 
nonconformity inherent in following Jesus. Persecution and suffering for the 
Christian are inescapable consequences of ‘our social obedience to the Messianity 
of Jesus’, and will parallel his suffering: ‘His people will encounter in ways 
analogous to his own the hostility of the old order’. (Yoder 1994: 96) Yoder gives a 
solemn warning to the contemporary church - discipleship involves a challenge to 
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the established powers, and, just as that challenge brought Jesus to crucifixion, so 
the Christian risks its contemporary equivalent.  
Yoder stresses this point, since so much of both Protestant and Catholic 
spirituality has privatised the bearing of the cross and hence seriously restricted its 
nature. He sums up the conflictual and freely chosen nature of cross bearing: ‘To 
accept the cross as his destiny, to move toward it and even to provoke it, when he 
could well have done otherwise, was Jesus’ constantly reiterated free choice.’ 
(Yoder 1994: 129) And that choice led to predictable results – ‘The cross of 
Calvary…was the political, legally-to-be expected result of a moral clash with the 
powers ruling his society.’ As we have previously noted, suffering in itself is not a 
virtue in an ascetic sense. It only has value as the result of a nonconforming and 
non-violent witness. The cross which the disciple bears is, therefore, the (potential) 
price of the social and political nonconformity which the disciple freely undertakes 
as a matter of deliberate choice in imitation of Jesus who likewise chose the path of 
such nonconformity. 
This theme runs throughout the Politics of Jesus, but is also stressed in other 
writings of Yoder. For example, in Royal Priesthood (Yoder 1998) in his discussion 
of the Notae Missionis of the church, Yoder writes, ‘The true missionary 
congregation is marked by suffering…not the result of misbehaviour but of 
conformity with the path of Christ…the meaningful assumption of the cost of 
nonconformed obedience.’ (Yoder 1998: 86) Similarly, in For the Nations (Yoder 
1997), in his discussion of the cross-language of Martin Luther King, Yoder writes 
that cross-bearing is not about ‘psychic or moral weakness’ – rather, it has to do 
with an ethical and strategic choice, consciously chosen suffering in response to 
injustice: ‘It signals the conscious choice of a path of vulnerable faithfulness, 
despite the knowledge that it will be costly.’ (Yoder 1997: 145-6) 
 
Discipleship as an imitation of the crucified 
At the heart of Yoder’s reading of the cross in this way is his insistence on 
discipleship as an imitation of Christ in the (often political) circumstances facing 
the Christian: - ‘social obedience to the Messianity of Jesus’. (Yoder 1994: 96) 
Yoder’s ethic in general is that of imitating the character of God as revealed in 
Christ. He is, however, careful to make the proviso that this imitation of Jesus can 
only be justified, by scripture, at the sole and particular point of the cross. Imitatio 
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Christi as a general pastoral, moral, or formational ideal (as in Franciscan 
spirituality or Islamic imitation of even the personal habits of Muhammad) is not 
justified by any appeal to the New Testament. It is only at the specific point of the 
cross (and the cross interpreted as the price of social nonconformity) that imitation 
is not merely allowed, but demanded. 
This argument is stressed in two striking passages in the Politics of Jesus, 
first in the chapter which sums up the midpoint of his argument (Trial Balance). 
Yoder discounts the ‘Franciscan and romantic’ idea of imitating Christ in every 
particular of his life. Rather, ‘only at one point, only on one subject – but then 
consistently, universally – is Jesus our example: in his cross’. (Yoder 1994: 95) 
Second, at the end of his survey of discipleship-language in the New Testament, he 
argues, in a key passage: 
There is no general concept of living like Jesus in the New 
Testament…There is but one realm in which the concept of imitation 
holds… This is at the point of the concrete social meaning of the cross in its 
relation to enmity and power. Servanthood replaces dominion, forgiveness 
absorbs hostility. Thus – and only thus – are we bound by New Testament 
thought to ‘be like Jesus.’ (Yoder 1994: 130-1) 
A criticism can perhaps be made at this point. Whilst Yoder’s is a useful corrective 
to the (pastorally useful, but Biblically unjustifiable) usages of cross-bearing 
language in terms of coping with unfortunate chance circumstances, he can justly be 
charged with neglecting the personal and psychological use of the cross in the 
Pauline terminology of dying and rising with Christ. Paul seems to go beyond 
Yoder’s interpretation of a political imitation to one which at least includes the 
‘inward experience of the self’. (Yoder 1994: 129) The cross as a political 
punishment for social nonconformity is, at least in part, used as a metaphor by Paul 
for an inward experience (which, of course, has social consequences). Yoder seems 
to posit an either/or rather than a both/and. The Pauline language of the cross, 
deriving as it did from the political event of the crucifixion, could well be used also 
in psychological or mystical terms.  
 
Martyrdom and ‘revolutionary subordination’ 
 Two aspects of a cruciform political discipleship identified by Yoder are 
martyrdom and ‘revolutionary subordination’. The idea of the church as the 
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community that witnesses through suffering will be discussed later, but here it may 
be sufficient to note the relevance of martyrdom for Yoder’s doctrine of political 
discipleship. Yoder writes in Royal Priesthood, in the discussion mentioned above 
concerning the Notae Missionis of the church, that suffering, due to the obedient 
following of the nonconforming Christ, is an inescapable mark of the church, and 
the church’s witness is born through the testimony of its innocent suffering. Nor is 
this merely a temporary phenomenon – it is ‘according to both Scripture and 
experience the continuing destiny of any faithful Christian community’. (Yoder 
1998: 86) The traditional link of witness with suffering, and the increased value 
suffering gives to that witness, is a major theme in Yoder’s theology of the church’s 
political interaction with society. The outright collision of the values of the world 
and the gospel resulting in martyrdom should not be shunned by a community 
defined by Messianic pacifism. Indeed, those who suffer publicly as a result of this 
collision should be regarded as truly representative of that community. Discipleship 
entails participation in a community whose non-violent social and political 
nonconformity risks suffering which witnesses both to the character of God and the 
community’s faithfulness to Christ. 
 Thus far Yoder’s reading of the cross and the place of suffering, although 
diverging from the traditional reading in ascribing greater political content to 
martyrdom, is relatively uncontroversial. His doctrine of ‘revolutionary 
subordination’ (chapter 9 of Politics of Jesus) has attracted more serious criticism, 
with good reason. Yoder seeks to answer the question of how far the cross-ethic of 
Jesus persists in the early church. He adduces the example of the haustafeln, the 
‘home and family ethics’ in the Pauline epistles, which, he argues, can be traced to 
the teaching and example of Jesus, especially his cruciform non-resistance. In brief, 
his argument is as follows: Slaves, women, and other people in ‘subordinate’ roles 
have received the news of freedom and worth in Christ. How should they use this 
freedom? By living out voluntarily Christ’s self-giving, exemplified by the cross. 
‘Subordination means the acceptance of an order, as it exists, but with the new 
meaning given to it by the fact that one’s acceptance of it is willing and 
meaningfully motivated.’ (Yoder 1994: 172) The weakness here is that while such 
subordination may conceivably be good for the soul of the individual (not a very 
Yoderian argument!) it is, in fact, a damaging collusion with an unjust social order; 
one is to realize one’s freedom but immediately relinquish it by locating oneself 
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again in exactly the same subordinate position in that social order. If a social order 
is unjust, it is dangerous to collude with it for the sake of supposed spiritual 
benefits, whether on earth or in the hereafter – the precise charge of Marx in his 
‘opiate’ accusation. It is difficult to see how there can be any motive for change, 
either from ‘below’ or from ‘above’, if the existing order is upheld as a legitimate 
and inviolate framework for the exercise of the Christian’s discipleship. Yoder 
argues that the haustafeln indicate a new and unprecedented reciprocity in social 
relationships, but still the underlying social structure is maintained. ‘Freedom can 
already be realized within his present status by voluntarily accepting subordination, 
in view of the relative unimportance of such social distinctions when seen in the 
light of the coming fulfilment of God’s purposes.’ (Yoder 1994: 182) Again, 
Yoder’s insistence on the ‘relative unimportance’ of the present corroborates 
Marx’s criticism. Yoder’s social ethics are radically eschatological, but it is highly 
dangerous to downplay the importance of the present in the light of a promised 
better future. Yoder denies that ‘subordination’ is simply a religiously sanctioned 
confirmation of the existing power structures of society. Rather, ‘The subordinate 
person becomes a free ethical agent when he voluntarily accedes to his 
subordination in the power of Christ instead of bowing to it fatalistically or 
resentfully’. (Yoder 1994:186) However, the hard fact is that the ‘free ethical agent’ 
is still a slave in that stratified society, with the stratification essentially 
unchallenged, and with all the injustices that entails both for himself and for others. 
Yoder is seeking to discover ‘…how in each role the servanthood of Christ, the 
voluntary subordination of one who knows that another regime is normative, could 
be made concrete’ (Yoder 1994: 187) but seems to omit the wider social 
significance of such subordination.  
Perhaps this is an instance of a recurring weakness in Yoder’s thought, in 
isolating a theme drawn from the example of the crucified Christ (in this case 
submission / subordination) and overemphasizing it in contexts where such an 
overemphasis is potentially misleading or even destructive. Yoder, while drawing 
this theme from the example of Christ, crucified through a certain combination of 
political circumstances, does not explain why it is intrinsically good in 
circumstances which may differ radically. We see here the form of action drawn 
from the crucified Christ – submission and subordination – overriding other equally 
valid aims.  
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b) Boff and Sobrino – cruciform spirituality and martyrdom 
 
Boff - a cruciform spirituality for political discipleship 
In chapter 10 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World, ‘How to preach the 
cross of Jesus Christ today’ (Boff 1987: 129ff) Boff sets out the practical 
conclusions of his study of the political relevance of the crucifixion. He begins his 
summary by pointing to the present meaning of discipleship in Latin America. 
Preaching the cross means commitment to the ‘kingdom’ values of love, peace, 
community, justice, and ‘a world where openness and self-surrender to God will be 
less difficult’ (Boff 1987: 130) and denouncing whatever opposes those values. 
‘The consequence of this engagement will be crisis, suffering, confrontation, and 
the cross.’ (Boff 1987: 130) In other words, the Christian is to take up Jesus 
‘historic project’, and to expect the same order of opposition, with the same 
potential result. This provides the self-declared subtext of Boff’s work - providing 
theological and spiritual resources for those involved in creating a more just society 
and, especially in this work, attempting to find a meaning in the suffering incurred 
by such a task. Boff’s aim is to provide help to those ‘who in their pain, seek to 
confer a meaning on the painful passion of the world’ and, by meditating on 
Christ’s passion, enable them to find ‘some unsuspected source of strength for 
resistance and resurrection’. (Boff 1987: xiii)   
 For example, in chapter 5 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the World  Boff 
offers encouragement to those whose self-surrender in the liberative political 
struggles of Latin America leads them to ‘the abyss of humiliation’. A spirituality 
emphasising total commitment is common in liberation theology, with the ever 
present reminder of, on the one hand the risks of martyrdom from oppressive 
governments and, on the other, the example of Marxist inspired ‘total commitment’ 
among the guerrillas of the left. The Christian has the example of the total 
commitment of Jesus which led not merely to a dead end in the cross, but also to the 
resurrection. The Pauline theme of dying to self, a dying paralleled and exemplified 
by the crucified Christ, is translated into a spirituality of political discipleship.  
Boff ends Passion of Christ, Passion of the World (Chapter 11, ‘Conclusion 
- the Cross: Mystery and Mysticism’) with a short meditation on the dual nature of 
the cross. On the one hand, it is a symbol of ‘the mystery of a human freedom in 
rebellion [against God]....a symbol of crime’. (Boff 1987: 134) On the other hand, 
 79 
the cross is ‘the symbol of the mystery of human freedom in its power. When borne 
by a commitment to overcome it, to make it gradually less viable in the world, the 
cross is a symbol of a new kind of life’. (Boff 1987: 134) When borne in this way, 
by one who ‘by combating it becomes its victim’ the cross can become a symbol of 
love. This paradoxical ambiguity of the cross has to be kept in tension, otherwise it 
loses its power as the logos tou staurou. This is, however, a ‘logic assimilable only 
through praxis: by combating and taking up, accepting, the cross and death’ 
(Boff1987: 135), a praxis which reveals ‘ultimate meaning and life’. Evil is 
overcome not by reflecting on it from a safe distance, but by resisting it in its 
historical reality, following the example of Jesus whose ‘historic project’ inevitably 
led to the cross. 
 
Boff - the power of martyrdom 
This leads to another prominent theme in Boff’s theology and 
spirituality, that preaching the cross involves martyrdom ‘for God and for God’s 
cause in the world’. (Boff 1987: 130) This ‘martyrdom for justice’ opens up the 
future, in the sense of being a protest against the fatalism which can leave ‘closed 
systems’ as they are. Martyrdom has a subversive effect in questioning the 
persistence of ‘how things are’ and in drawing attention to the disordered, inverted 
values prevalent in an oppressive society. The cross radically questions the 
commonly held values of such a society as ‘an ordering... of disorder’. (Boff 1987:  
130) ‘The martyr rips the mask from the face of the system’ (Boff 1987: 130) by 
embodying, and being willing to suffer for, another order. Boff speaks of those who 
‘suffer without hating, who bear the cross without fleeing’. (Boff 1987: 131) This 
seemingly paradoxical willingness to bear the cross is a prophetic sign of a reversal 
of values.  
The theme of the crucified people will be discussed in Chapter 8 with 
reference chiefly, to Sobrino. But Boff also stresses the continuity between the cross 
of Jesus and the ‘crucified people’ of today. ‘Jesus’ passion goes on in the passion 
of our suffering people.’ (Boff 1980: 7) 
Jesus continues to be crucified in all those who are crucified in 
history.....there are not enough Stations of the cross to depict all the ways in 
which the Lord continues to be persecuted, imprisoned, condemned to death, 
and crucified today in the ongoing passion of human life. (Boff 1980: 92-3)  
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The ‘history of the crucifixion’ did not end with the deposition of the body of Jesus 
- Boff sees it continuing in the present experience of those seeking liberation. 
‘Christ’s passion is being completed by each succeeding generation and its 
martyrs.’ (Boff 1980: 108) There is a definite identity, continuity and similarity: 
Today the passion of the mystical Christ, embodied in the lives of those who 
are sacrificed for the cause of justice, preserves the same structure as the 
passion of the historical Jesus. Like Jesus, many people today are being 
persecuted and killed for defending the rights of the lowly and the just 
claims of the poor. (Boff 1980: ix) 
Martyrdom, and the parallels, traditional in Christian spirituality and theology since 
the early days of the church, between those martyred and the crucified Jesus Christ, 
play a central role in Boff’s theology of the cross and, indeed, in Latin American 
liberation theology as a whole, with Archbishop Romero the most famous, but by 
no means the only, example. In chapter 9 of Passion of Christ, Passion of the 
World, Boff adduces a practical example of ‘suffering born of the struggle against 
suffering’ in the passio vitae of Fr.Carlos Alberto, symbolising the priests of the 
Latin American church who take up the liberation struggle and suffer through their 
commitment, those who ‘give their lives in defence of the sacred rights of others’. 
(Boff 1987: 120) As we have previously noted, Boff, in his examples, reveals the 
focus of his work.  He is attempting to offer spiritual resources to those who take up 
the defence of the oppressed, rather than primarily to the oppressed themselves. 
Boff draws an explicit parallel with the Acta Martyrum of the early church, and the 
catalogue of martyrs in Hebrews 11. The martyrs of the Latin American church, 
who go back to the very early days of the Spanish and Portuguese conquest, are to 
be seen in precisely the same category as the more traditional martyrs of the church, 
in witnessing to the truth of the gospel through their suffering and, in many cases, 
death. The truth of the gospel, ‘integral salvation’, is indivisible and so, Boff 
implies, there can be no distinction between martyrdom for purely ‘spiritual’ 
reasons and martyrdom for political commitment impelled by the gospel (as 
exemplified in the debate in the post war German church over the nature of the 
martyrdoms of the ‘political’ Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the ‘non-political’ Paul 
Schneider (see Slane 2004 and Foster 1995)). Their martyrdom has a profoundly 
subversive effect, in leaving behind a memory which both disturbs and gives hope 
(as in the memoria passionis in the theology of Metz). Through their commitment to 
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the gospel and their resistance to oppression, suffering is given a meaning. They 
follow in the steps of Jesus himself, of the ‘Suffering servant’ of Isaiah, and of the 
prophets who suffered because of their message. Again, Boff emphasises that 
suffering is not to be sought in itself, but only as an inevitable concomitant of 
resistance to those structures of oppression which contradict the gospel. Such a 
resistance inevitably involves conflict and suffering, but that suffering is not 
meaningless or hopeless, because it is undertaken with a positive end in view. 
‘Suffering is worthy of the human being when it is for the sake of a just cause.’ 
(Boff 1987: 122) And, for the Christian, there is the hope given by Christ’s 
resurrection in overcoming the historical manifestations of human sin which caused 
the crucifixion and which, through contemporary ‘structures of sin’ continues to 
crucify.  
 
Sobrino - a spirituality of martyrdom 
 Sobrino’s theology took shape in a context of political violence in El 
Salvador, in particular the deaths of those murdered by right-wing ‘death squads’, 
especially Archbishop Romero, to whom Sobrino acted as theological consultant 
and, even more personally, the Jesuit colleagues of Sobrino who were killed 
together with their housekeeper and her daughter. These, whom Sobrino describes 
as martyrs, are only the most widely known of the thousands of Salvadoreans killed 
in the civil war, predominantly by the army and paramilitary forces. Any reading of 
Sobrino’s theology must take into account this involvement with the political 
struggle and its personal consequences for Sobrino, in the tragic loss of colleagues 
and friends. It is perhaps no surprise that a cruciform spirituality of martyrdom is so 
prominent in his writing. Sobrino describes this most comprehensively in Witnesses 
to the kingdom: the Martyrs of El Salvador and the Crucified Peoples (Sobrino 
2003). ‘Liberation and martyrdom are fundamental realities for liberation theology 
and they endow it with a specific direction and pathos.’ (Sobrino 2003: 101) The 
combination of the two, in the light of a suffering God and a crucified people, 
constitute, alongside his Christology, Sobrino’s chief contribution to liberation 
theology. Sobrino stresses the close interrelationship: ‘Liberation and martyrdom 
recover and maintain two essential and foundational realities of the New Testament, 
the kingdom of God and the cross of Jesus; the relationship between them 
strengthens them both.’ (Sobrino 2003: 107) Without a willingness to witness to it 
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through the possibility of suffering, the kingdom of God risks becoming a 
superficial concept, divorced from the reality of a suffering world. Jesus, in the 
great prophetic tradition, witnessed to and proclaimed, in words and deeds, the 
kingdom of God, persisting in proclaiming it even when this brought him to 
crucifixion. The existence of martyrs in the contemporary church is the closest 
possible link with the ministry of Jesus. From one angle it provides the greatest 
hermeneutical aid in understanding the reasons for the death of Jesus: 
Any Salvadorean peasant, no matter how limited in social awareness and in 
the ability to read and write, knows perfectly well why they killed Jesus: 
they killed him for the same reason that they killed Archbishop Romero and 
many others. (Sobrino 2003: 109)  
There is, as we have noted previously, a parallel historical causation, in that the 
powerful necessarily eliminate those who threaten their power.  From another angle, 
the martyrs provide the most penetrating theological perspective in relating the 
‘crucified people’ to the crucifixion of Jesus. There is a parallel theological 
meaning, in that God, in Christ, suffers within and alongside the powerless at the 
hands of the powerful. The stark and physical fact of martyrdom brings those 
historical and theological parallels into the sharpest focus. Sobrino writes of the 
martyrs being a sign of the times in a suffering world; they bring realities to our 
attention and ‘in them the presence and the plans of God are made manifest’. 
(Sobrino 2003: 126-7) 
 Sobrino, like Boff, continually shifts the concept of martyrdom into another 
(less traditional) key, by referring to ‘Jesuanic martyrs’ who ‘die in the same way 
Jesus died and for the same reasons’. (Sobrino 2003: 120) These martyrs are ‘those 
who follow Jesus in the things that matter, live in dedication to the cause of Jesus, 
and die for the same reason that Jesus died’. Their violent death is a ‘culmination of 
a praxis of defending and loving the poor and oppressed, as Jesus’ death was’. 
(Sobrino 2003: 122) Odium fidei is transposed to odium iustitiae (Sobrino 2003: 
123 – also see Rahner’s defence of a wider concept of martyrdom discussed in 
Sobrino 1994a: 266). Jesuanic martyrs ‘express God’s will to accept the cross for 
the salvation of the poor’. (Sobrino 2003: 131) Here Sobrino decisively crosses the 
line dividing the ‘Paul Schneider religious martyr’ from ‘Bonhoeffer political 
martyr’, as in the post-war German debate. Sobrino takes up this debate in detail in 
Jesus the liberator (Sobrino 1994a) in an extended discussion of the dispute over 
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the status of the modern Latin American martyrs. He points to the anomaly that 
‘those who today are killed in a way that most resembles Jesus’ death are not held 
to share in this supreme death because they do not fulfil the canonical and dogmatic 
conditions for martyrdom’. (Sobrino 1994a: 265) Sobrino asks if, on the traditional 
criteria, Jesus himself was a martyr, and concludes that he was a ‘martyr for the 
kingdom of God’. (Sobrino 1994a: 268) This is a significant use, since the term 
‘kingdom of God’ transcends matters solely of faith, and extends infinitely further. 
This extended idea of martyrdom, claims Sobrino, is ‘death for the sake of love’. 
(Sobrino 1994a: 269) ‘People are not assassinated for purely external confessions of 
faith, but they are being assassinated for witness to the faith operating through 
charity (justice).’ The faith witnessed to in martyrdom is not a form of belief, but 
the social, ethical and political actions which flow from that belief, exemplified by 
the canonization of Maria Goretti (murdered in attempting to resist rape), whom 
Sobrino adduces as an example of witness borne through moral conduct being 
added to more traditional criteria for the status of martyr. (Sobrino 1994a: 266)  
 
Martyrdom, the crucified people and the church 
 So far we have seen Sobrino extending the concept of martyrdom to the 
social witness borne explicitly by Christians as a result of their faith. Sobrino 
extends the concept still further by including what may be called ‘implicit’ or 
‘anonymous’ martyrdom (in a way analogous to his fellow Jesuit Rahner’s concept 
of ‘anonymous Christian’). Sobrino seems to elide the term ‘Jesuanic martyrs’ with 
‘the crucified people’. It is possible, perhaps, to trace a hesitation in his thinking on 
this point. In Jesus the Liberator (Sobrino 1994a) he seems reluctant to ascribe the 
status of martyr to those who do not consciously and deliberately suffer as 
Christians for the sake of justice. (Sobrino 1994a: 269) What about those who are 
killed after having espoused violence? ‘By laying down one’s life for love… they 
can share in martyrdom by analogy.’ What about those masses innocently and 
anonymously murdered? There is no word to describe them – they are not martyrs, 
because they do not give their lives freely, since the poor do not have that freedom. 
Rather, they illustrate innocence and vulnerability. ‘Whether these are called 
martyrs or not these masses who are oppressed during their lives and die in 
massacres are the ones who illustrate best the vast suffering of the world.’ Does the 
exact terminology matter? In his later work, Sobrino insists that such martyrs are, 
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anyway, ‘martyrs in the church, but not of the church. They are martyrs of 
humanity, of the poor’. (Sobrino 2003:109) The distinction is made less sharp by 
the fact that the vast majority of the poor in Latin America are in fact members of 
the church. 
 Sobrino, in his later work, makes three important observations on 
martyrdom ‘in defence of the poor’. (Sobrino 2003:109) First, there can be an 
analogous understanding of martyrdom – the active martyrs, struggling against 
oppression, and the anonymous martyrs, the immense majority of the poor. Second, 
there must be a re-evaluation of sainthood – the active martyrs are saints through 
showing great love. Third, Sobrino stresses the importance of anonymous and 
passive martyrs ‘who have neither the freedom nor the heroic virtues that would 
enable them to become martyrs or saints’. Martyrdom, then, is a concept primarily 
and explicitly for those who are consciously acting and dying in the cause of (if not 
for the sake of) Christ. These bear witness to God’s desire for justice. This concept, 
however, is extendable by analogy to others who are simply the victims of violence. 
These bear witness to the need for God’s justice. 
 Sobrino’s is, above all, a political spirituality of the cross. In Christology at 
the Crossroads (Sobrino 1978), where he is working out the implications of a 
theology of the cross, thesis nine states: ‘The cross is the outcome of Jesus’ 
historical path: hence Christian spirituality cannot be reduced to a mystique [my 
italics] of the cross. Christian spirituality must consist in following the path of 
Jesus.’ (Sobrino 1978: 215) The martyrs within the Latin American church are 
those who have followed that path as far as death. Sobrino, in his discussion of 
martyrdom, reminds his readers that ‘The cross is not just private suffering – the 
cross is the death that comes from defending the oppressed and struggling against 
the oppressor. The cross is suffering caused by that elemental struggle’. (Sobrino 
2003: 146) The ‘martyr church’ in Latin America participates in that struggle, and 
in the same way in which the early church prized those who remained faithful in the 
face of persecution, it similarly prizes those who have remained faithful to the 
present calling to seek justice. Sobrino enumerates the benefits such martyrs bring 
to the church (Sobrino 2003: 134): the martyrs challenge the church not to fall back; 
the martyrs make the church an incarnate, real church – not docetic; the martyrs 
point to the salvation of the crucified people, not its own good, as the end of the 
church; the martyrs inspire the church to take up the cross of reality against the 
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‘anti-kingdom’ ; the martyrs inspire the church to live in freedom, joy and hope, as 
a resurrected church (as triumph over self-centredness, as triumph over sadness, 
hope against resignation). More specifically, he asks how his colleagues, the Jesuit 
martyrs, will live on. What benefits have they brought to Salvadoreans?  These 
martyrs are:  
Witnesses to the truth, so that they go on believing that truth is possible in 
their country….Witnesses to justice – structural justice, to put it coldly, or 
more expressively, love for the people….Witnesses to the God of life, so 
that Salvadoreans go on seeing God as their defender. (Sobrino 2003: 95) 
 
c) Conclusion 
 Yoder, Boff and Sobrino are deeply concerned to explore how the fact of 
Jesus’ cross affects contemporary discipleship. For all three, taking up the cross 
involves a radical and sacrificial commitment to living out the kingdom of God. 
Again, the differences in their interpretations of taking up the cross are in many 
cases due to background as much as to theology. For Yoder, in a North American 
context, taking up the cross denotes social nonconformity; for Boff and Sobrino 
taking up the cross can mean, literally, death. To take up the cross means to share 
the sufferings of Christ, whose social nonconformity cost him his life. For all three 
theologians, the cross is not to be sought in itself, but is the price of faithful and 
obedient praxis. Above all, taking up the cross is not merely a private, inward 
movement.  Rather, it is public and political, hence the emphasis on martyrdom and 
witness. Where Yoder and (particularly) Sobrino differ significantly is in the 
identity of those who bear the cross. Sobrino extends the martyrdom of cross-
bearing beyond the boundaries of church and explicit belief; for Yoder, witness is 
the task of the committed and faithful church. This difference is one which will be 
further explored in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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Chapter 6 
The cross and a response to violence 
 For Yoder, the cross is a mark of social nonconformity, as the faithful 
Christian finds the values of the gospel running counter to the accepted values of 
the world. For Boff and Sobrino, the cross, in the form of persecution and death, is 
the risk run by those who protest against an unjust social order. All three 
theologians are therefore faced with the possibility of conflict. How should that 
conflict be handled? How should the Christian respond to those who wage that 
conflict violently? How does the cross inform such a response? These questions are 
the subject of this chapter. 
 
a)  Yoder - The Cross and Non-Violence 
 
Christological pacifism 
The most significant contribution of Yoder to Christian social ethics has 
been to reinvigorate the pacifist tradition by providing a firm Christological 
foundation. Yoder sums up his central thesis in the Politics of Jesus as the pre-
eminence in the New Testament of ‘a social style characterized by the creation of a 
new community and the rejection of violence of any kind’. This is firmly based on 
the cross, which is the ‘model of Christian social efficacy, the power of God for 
those who believe. Vicit agnus noster; eum sequamur’.  (Yoder 1994: 242)  The 
message Yoder draws most of all from the crucifixion is a total rejection of violence 
and an absolute refusal to countenance its use. As exemplified by the ‘agony in the 
garden’, faced with the possibility of armed insurrection and the eschatological 
temptation of apocalyptic war with the support of ‘legions of angels’, Jesus 
deliberately chose the way of absolute, non-negotiable non-violence and allowed 
himself to be crucified – or, more strictly, took the path whose inevitable end was 
crucifixion.  
Yoder locates Jesus’ way of the cross against the background of political 
choices before him. He rejected the short cut of violence, the ‘zealot option’ of 
revolutionary armed struggle, even if that violence was to be exercised in what 
seemed an overwhelmingly righteous cause. Two other alternatives are also 
discounted: social and political withdrawal into a privatised spirituality (e.g. the 
‘monasticism’ of the Essenes or the ‘pietism’ of the Pharisees) or an alliance with 
 87 
the Sadducean establishment ‘in the exercise of conservative social responsibility’. 
(Yoder 1994: 97) Yoder is here referring obliquely to current political options for 
Christians: the violence in a righteous cause espoused, to a degree, by liberation 
theologians; the privatised spirituality of much evangelicalism and traditional 
Catholicism; and the Constantinian alliance with the political establishment on the 
Christendom model. Yoder sums up Jesus’ threefold rejection, which is to be 
paralleled by contemporary Christians, of ‘quietism …establishment responsibility, 
and the difficult, constantly reopened, genuinely attractive option of the crusade’. 
(Yoder 1994: 97) Against the liberation theologians (or, more accurately at the time 
of writing of the first edition of Politics of Jesus, the theologies of revolution 
popular in ecumenical circles) Yoder sets Jesus’ rejection of  ‘the temptation to 
exercise social responsibility, in the interest of justified revolution, through the use 
of available violent methods’. (Yoder 1994: 96) 
As we have seen, Jesus as interpreted by Yoder is in many ways close to the 
zealots (or their forerunners). There is a significant overlap in social stance on 
behalf of the poor, creation of a tight-knit community of committed disciples, and 
even in the language used. Where Jesus and the zealots differed was in the 
justification of violence in a seemingly righteous cause. For Jesus, in Yoder’s 
interpretation, the zealot option was not radical enough, since ultimately it rested on 
the same foundation as that of their opponents: the violence symbolized by the 
sword, the sacrifice of human lives to political ideology, the continuation of 
structures of oppressive power rather than divinely ordained suffering service. This 
interpretation closely echoes criticisms of liberation theology for not being thorough 
enough in its critique of the nature of power. 
Yoder’s pacifism, in line with his overall Christocentric method, is radically 
Christological. In his survey of ‘varieties of religious pacifism’, Nevertheless 
(Yoder 1971) he is careful to differentiate this Christological pacifism from other 
forms of pacifism – that, for example of ‘utopian purism, the virtuous minority, the 
categorical imperative, absolute conscience’ etc. Christological, or messianic 
pacifism, is the heart of Yoder’s social ethic. It relies for its justification not on a 
broader ethical basis (for example, consequentialism) but solely on the person of 
Jesus and the pattern of his political engagement, which inevitably led to the cross. 
Hauerwas correctly describes Yoder’s pacifism as a ‘correlate of his Christology’. 
(Hauerwas 1973: 252) It rests not on isolated individual teachings of Jesus (the 
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traditional criticism of both Anabaptist social ethics and much liberal pacifism) but 
on the historical actions of Jesus focussed on the cross, where Jesus’ non-retaliatory 
self-giving comes to its sharpest focus. Since Yoder’s Christology is a ‘high’ 
Christology, whereby Jesus definitively reveals the divine purposes, ‘messianic 
pacifism’ indicates, though the exemplarity of Jesus, the will of God for the pattern 
of human political action.   
This pacifism could additionally be entitled ‘pacifism of community witness 
to the non-violent Messiah’. Such a pacifism, although potentially attractive in 
some ways to the non-Christian, makes sense primarily as an outworking of the 
Christian profession of the lordship of Jesus, and can be properly exercised by those 
who voluntarily acknowledge that lordship. The validation of such pacifism is not 
by its immediate results, but by its faithfulness to the controlling pattern of Jesus’ 
non-violence as demonstrated by the cross.  This cruciform pacifism is in sharp 
contrast to any pacifism of immediate ends, or ‘calculating pacifism’. Yoder insists 
that non-violence is an absolute, not a mere tactic. Jesus’ crucifixion is grossly 
misunderstood ‘if we think of the cross as a peculiarly efficacious technique 
(probably effective only in certain circumstances) for getting one’s own way’. 
(Yoder 1994: 237) The accent is not on any calculation of effectiveness, but on an 
obedience which reflects the character of God. Suffering is not a tactical tool, but a 
sign of faithfulness to that divine character. Yoder continues, ‘The kind of 
faithfulness that is willing to accept evident defeat rather than complicity with evil 
is, by virtue of its conformity with what happens to God when he works among us, 
aligned with the ultimate triumph of the Lamb.’ (Yoder 1994: 237) The italicized 
clause is key to Yoder’s understanding of pacifism as a cruciform imitation of the 
crucified God. 
  
Some questions 
Yoder argues that Jesus’ ‘third way’ led inexorably to the cross. Is this a 
legitimate argument from the historical evidence? Did the choice of this particular 
strategy, of non-violent challenge, necessarily lead to crucifixion? Or, conversely, 
could Jesus have been crucified through following other political choices? The first 
is readily answered. The Romans were inordinately suspicious of any possible 
challenge to their hegemony (for example, Trajan’s letter to Pliny, the Governor of 
Bithynia, about the possible dangers of people combining even to form a fire 
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brigade! [Letters, Book 10]) If, as Yoder claims, Jesus’ gospel and practice 
involved a challenge, albeit non-violent, to the power structures of his time, he 
risked the accusation of subversion and therefore a subversive’s death, crucifixion. 
The second question is not so easily answered. The mere fact that Jesus died on a 
cross does not necessarily indicate his preceding strategy. As we have seen, Jesus 
could, perhaps, have advocated a spirituality of withdrawal, and been grievously 
and fatally misunderstood. He could have attempted some symbolic act intended to 
precipitate an apocalyptic conflict, and been labelled a subversive in consequence. 
He could, although the evidence is very much against this, have been an early first 
century ‘zealot’, with the inevitable crucifixion if apprehended. The cross of itself 
does not necessarily identify Jesus with any one strategy (apart, perhaps, from 
ruling out Sadducean collaborationism). It has to be seen in conjunction with Jesus’ 
general teaching and actions. This Yoder attempts to do, to set the crucifixion in the 
context of Jesus’ ministry whose credible, and inevitable, outcome is crucifixion. It 
is one of the triumphs of Politics of Jesus that Yoder reconstructs, from the survey 
of a whole gospel (and particularly key episodes such as the temptations and the 
cleansing of the temple), a credible account of Jesus’ ministry which led inevitably 
to his death as a subversive who adopted a radically different method of non-violent 
politics.  
 
Some criticisms 
Apart from the above historical question and criticisms of pacifism in 
general, two specific criticisms can be made of the methodology of Yoder’s 
messianic pacifism. The first is that Christianity is somehow dissolved into 
pacifism, and Christian politics made co-terminous with pacifism. However, any 
reading of Yoder’s work would indicate that there is much more to Christianity than 
pacifism. Yoder certainly sets pacifism firmly within the context of Christianity, 
and his Christological pacifism makes sense only on the basis of a strong 
Christology. But that does not mean that Christianity and pacifism are identical or 
co-terminous. It is true to assert that the pacifist, non-violent and non-coercive 
social ethic taught by Yoder rests upon a doctrine of God as peacemaking, non-
violent, and non-coercive, which colours Yoder’s whole theology. From that 
perspective, non-coercive pacifism and the overall action of God in Christ can be 
seen to mesh closely. This, however, should not be seen as a fault, but as a strength. 
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If this objection can thus be overcome theoretically, it is perhaps not so easily 
overcome in practice. The distinctiveness of Yoder’s theology, and of the 
Mennonite community as a whole, rests largely (although not exclusively) on its 
pacifism, and in practice, pacifism could be seen (unfairly) to be the focus of their 
faith rather than, as Yoder would assert, Christ.  
A second criticism is perhaps more serious. Mott (quoted in Wright 2000: 
92) argues that Jesus’ cross does not represent one definitive social-political-ethical 
option which is binding on subsequent Christian action. The cross is unique, and 
therefore Jesus’ actions which led to the cross are not normative for all time. ‘His 
powerlessness was a matter of timing rather than of ethical choice, not a principle of 
non-violence but the unique enactment of sacrifice.’ In other words, the crucifixion 
was a one-off event for a particular salvific purpose, and cannot be used as a pattern 
for Christian politics. What the Niebuhrian realist supports and the Yoderian 
pacifist refuses, armed defence on behalf of one’s neighbour, was not, suggests 
Mott, within the possible options presented to Jesus, and therefore his actions (and 
his crucifixion) cannot be a guide to Christian conduct in this area of social ethics. 
This argument can be answered on a number of levels. If the cross is primarily 
salvific, it is necessary (if God’s consistency is to be maintained) to assume that the 
mode of salvation and the method by which it is attained is consonant with both 
divine character and also the more general divine intentions for humanity. Yoder 
has demonstrated that non-violent non-resistance, exemplified in the crucifixion, is 
integral to the character of God and is not merely an arbitrary addition. Jesus’ non-
resistance on the cross and God’s non-coerciveness are one, and are therefore 
normative for the Christian. The atonement, although unique, should not be seen in 
isolation from (or indeed in contradiction to) other aspects of discipleship; salvation 
and sharing practically in the non-violent nature of God mesh closely. Finally, Jesus 
was faced with a genuine political choice. He could well have taken the zealot 
option, of violence in a righteous cause, taking up arms to defend one’s neighbour 
against a tyrannical aggressor. That option was open to him, but was refused, not 
just in the events which immediately preceded the cross but throughout his whole 
ministry. 
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Excursus – British liberal pacifism of the 1930’s 
 It is, perhaps, instructive and illustrative of Yoder’s method to compare his 
Christological and cruciform pacifism with the British liberal pacifism of the 1930s, 
the particular period of English history when pacifism was a widely adopted 
political and religious option (the more restricted nuclear pacifism of the 1950s and 
1980s is perhaps of a different order). How does its use of the cross differ from 
Yoder’s? This is an especially relevant question for a time when the cross was used 
in popular culture as a symbol of military self-sacrifice. 
 The 1930’s were the high water mark of traditional liberal theology in 
Britain. Although a Barthian theology of crisis was promulgated by theologians 
such as Hoskyns, it had not penetrated far into the general ecclesiastical 
consciousness. The leading pacifist theologian was Charles Raven, a vehement 
opponent of Barthianism, who combined an optimistic evolutionary liberalism with 
a Christocentric emphasis which saw the centre of Christianity as a personal 
relationship between Christ and the individual.  Raven, like Yoder, insisted on the 
exemplarity of the crucified Christ. Wilkinson comments: ‘Raven defines pacifism 
as the new way of defeating evil opened up by Christ on the cross.’ (Wilkinson 
1986:108) He saw the cross as the supreme example of pacifist non-resistance, and 
regarded martyrdom as the Christian’s ultimate obligation. Where he differed most 
markedly from the later Yoderian ethic was in his political optimism, shared by 
many at the time, that pacifism had the spiritual force to defeat the Nazi and Fascist 
dictators. This reflected the liberal evolutionary progressivism, which somehow 
survived the First World War, but not the Second. Yoder’s hope is more humanly 
pessimistic and starkly eschatological, without necessarily abandoning the 
(admittedly not sufficiently worked out) theme that ‘God will fight for us’ (chapter 
4 in Politics of Jesus). Also, Raven’s pacifism was, despite his membership of the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, primarily an act of individual discipleship. Yoder’s 
stress is much more on the corporate nature of the pacifist witness, the pacifism of 
the Messianic community. The great populariser of pacifism in inter-war Britain 
was Dick Sheppard, whose catchphrase was ‘Not peace at any price, but love at all 
costs.’ It is difficult to see Yoder disagreeing with this. Paradoxically, the ‘theology 
of crisis’ used the cross as an argument against pacifism. The proto-Barthian P.T. 
Forsyth wrote in The Christian Ethic of War (Forsyth 1916: 39) of liberal pacifism, 
‘It is the climax of a genial and gentle religion with the nerve of the cross cut.’ The 
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cross stands for a realism about sin which was absent from liberal optimism. One of 
Yoder’s greatest contributions to Christian social ethics was that he rescued 
pacifism from such liberal optimism, and constructed a pacifism which rests 
precisely and definitively upon the foundation of the cross. 
 Wilkinson (Wilkinson 1986: 125) identifies five characteristics of British 
pacifism of the inter-war period which it is useful to compare with the pacifism of 
Yoder. First, it rested on an optimism about human nature, a legacy of nineteenth 
century liberalism (with the cross being a more general symbol of tragedy) which 
both Yoder and Niebuhr criticize for its weak and unrealistic view of human 
sinfulness. Second, British pacifism was largely an act of individual dissent, rather 
than an expression of corporate witness. Britain has never had a consistent ‘peace 
church’ tradition. Nonconformity, despite its opposition to the Boer War and its 
campaign of passive resistance to the Education Act of 1902, joined vigorously in 
the jingoism of 1914. Even among the Society of Friends a third of male adherents 
enlisted in the First World War (Wilkinson 1986: 53). For Yoder, pacifism is not 
merely a personal, but a corporate witness, exercised not just by individuals who 
bear the cross, but by a cruciform church. The pacifism of individual witness was 
granted legitimacy by such as Niebuhr and Temple, but the pacifism of a defined 
and disciplined church (i.e. a Yoderian church) was certainly not. Third, there was 
no agreed political programme or set of objectives. Yoder deliberately eschews such 
thinking, but in the 1930’s there was much confusion about what practical steps a 
pacifist could take. Fourth, there was much discussion about the spiritual power of 
non-violence, especially influenced by Gandhi’s campaigns. For Yoder, although he 
recognizes the spiritual strength of pacifism, Messianic pacifism should not be 
turned into a technique for political achievement. Fifthly, pacifism and appeasement 
largely overlapped, and the difference between the more pragmatic ‘pacifiers’ and 
the more dogmatic ‘pacifists’ was blurred. Yoder’s pacifism can hardly be 
described as pragmatic. 
 
The cross and non-resistance  
 The cross is a sign of non-violence, but Yoder goes a step further in treating 
it as a sign of non-resistance. Whether Jesus actively offered himself as a willing 
sacrifice, or whether the cross was the unsought, but inevitable consequence of his 
strategy, the Jesus of Yoder (and of the gospels) does not resist his assailants. 
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Therefore, according to Yoder, the Christian and the church must espouse a similar 
non-resistance. It is, however, not always clear what this non-resistance entails. The 
traditional Mennonite insistence on non-participation in political life and their 
rejection of even non-violent resistance is certainly bypassed by Yoder, as shown 
by his admiration for Martin Luther King and Gandhi in their active opposition to 
evil. Also, acts of Jesus such as the cleansing of the temple can hardly be described 
as passive. However, as will be noted, Yoder distances himself from the Gandhian 
use of non-violence as a political tactic. This ambivalence is shown in Zimbelman’s 
survey of the ‘axioms of love [which, according to Yoder] constrain and shape 
Christian motives and actions’. (Zimbelman 1992: 389) These, Zimbelman 
suggests, include a commitment ‘to undertake one’s actions with the motives and 
intentions that conform to the mind of Christ; not to retaliate in kind.’ Thus far 
Yoder would be within the mainstream, Gandhian, pacifist tradition. Zimbelman, 
however, goes on to include commitments which are certainly not in the Gandhian 
tradition: ‘to avoid resistant action if it involves a Christian in a power struggle; and 
to avoid resistance of any kind if it jeopardizes the existence or proper functioning 
of duly appointed political authorities’.  While holding to a certain degree of non-
resistance, Yoder seems to be situated between an absolutist (traditional) Mennonite 
stance of non-resistance and a more Gandhian position.  
Another example of this attitude can be found in chapter 10 of Politics of 
Jesus ‘Let every soul be subject’, where Yoder discusses the Christian’s 
relationship to the state in the light of Romans 13. Yoder opposes the Calvinist 
doctrine of the legitimacy of rebellion against an unjust state, but does not ratify 
such a state. Relationships with the state are another area in which ‘subjection’ 
should be exercised. ‘The call is to a non-resistant attitude towards a tyrannical 
government.’ (Yoder 1994: 202) However, Yoder qualifies ‘non-resistance’ in a 
footnote, as not meaning ‘compliance or acquiescence in evil, but …the suffering 
renunciation of retaliation in kind. It does not exclude other kinds of opposition to 
evil.’ Such ‘other kinds of opposition to evil’ would presumably mean some form of 
non-violent civil disobedience, the setting up of alternative networks of ‘doing 
politics’ etc. The Christian is simultaneously to ‘rebel against all and be subordinate 
to all; for subordination is itself the Christian form of rebellion. In this way we 
share in God’s patience with a system we basically reject.’ (Yoder 1994: 200) For 
reasons discussed above, it is difficult to accept Yoder’s view of subordination as 
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‘the Christian form of rebellion’. However, his basic point is clear; the Christian is 
in an ambivalent (or perhaps dialectical) relationship with the state, being ‘subject’ 
and yet creating cruciform (and therefore non-violent and non-resistant) alternative 
ways of ‘doing politics’.  
 
The cross and non-coercion 
Yoder’s doctrine of the cross entails, first, non-violence and a certain form 
of non-resistance. In this he has much in common with a strong minority stream in 
Christian ethical thought. But he goes far beyond this in his insistence that the non-
violent and non-resistant cross entails also non-coercion. Yoder here reads the cross 
in the light of his Mennonite allegiance (Anabaptism was in the forefront of the 
struggle within Christendom against coercion in religion). His championing of 
political non-coercion is consonant with his overall theology; we have seen how 
non-coercion is at the heart of his theology of the atonement, and later we will 
examine how non-coercion is traced by Yoder from the character and shape of a 
non-coercive providence. The problem arises when Yoder seems to make the 
assumption that coercion is impossible without violence, or at least the threat of 
violence. He perhaps neglects the fact that, for example, governmental coercion is 
maintained usually through non-violent means (through consent and custom, backed 
up by police and fiscal powers) and that there is an important distinction between 
violence and force (a distinction  which Yoder himself later recognized (see 
Zimbelman 1992: 388)). 
 Non-coercion entails a radically different form of Christian responsibility. 
Yoder’s central and repeated claim is that it is not the responsibility of the church or 
the individual Christian to ‘move history in the right direction’ through coercive 
means. Even pacifism is not a technique, as such, to coerce others. This is not the 
task given by God to the church, which must see its role in different terms.  It is 
necessary to note that Yoder’s position has subtly changed in emphasis over time. 
Zimbelman describes how in his later works (after 1974) Yoder often uses the 
phrase ‘non-violent resistance’ rather than ‘non-resistance’ This usage reflects 
‘Yoder’s changing appreciation of the ways in which the Christian might 
expansively express a life of redemptive engagement and witness’. (Zimbelman 
1992: 388) This is a real shift in Yoder’s thinking, in acknowledging that a certain 
amount of non-violent coercion is indeed an option for the Christian. Yoder makes 
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the all-important distinction between violent force and a coercion which is not 
necessarily violent. Zimbelman comments that ‘rather than define force and 
coercion as simply the tools of individuals and states functioning in the 
Constantinian ethos, the terms are now used by Yoder to describe morally neutral 
classes of action’, force being defined as ‘application of power’ and coercion as 
‘force which opposes the intentional volition of another person’. This has 
significant implications for the life of the Christian community, since a recognition 
of the necessary coercive role of government opens up opportunities for Christian 
political involvement which would previously have been considered impossible.                            
 
Excursus – Yoder and Gandhian peacemaking 
In an earlier excursus Yoder’s cruciform pacifism was compared with 
British liberal pacifism in the 1930’s. Another form of pacifism, or near pacifism, 
which became a political option at this time was that of Gandhi (later adapted by 
Martin Luther King (see Bishop 1981)). Gandhian peacemaking, despite significant 
differences, shares much with a Yoderian approach. The word Gandhi invented to 
describe his political campaigns was satyagraha, literally meaning ‘holding on to 
truth’, or ‘truth force’, encompassing ahimsa - non-violence (or more strictly, non-
harm), sat (truthfulness) and a self-sacrificial commitment to social change.  
It would be foolish to deny the significant differences between Gandhi’s 
satyagraha and Yoder’s cruciform and Christological pacifism. Most importantly, 
satyagraha does not denote an absolutist pacifism. Gandhi actively recruited for the 
British army in the First World War and continued to regard violence as an option 
in extreme circumstances. Satyagraha, for Gandhi, was a technique conditioned by 
and fitted to circumstances, and was intended to have a direct political 
effectiveness, in contrast to Yoder’s rejection of the criterion of effectiveness. 
Yoder’s pacifism rests on an orthodox reading of Christology and of Christian 
doctrine and an attempt to be faithful to and controlled by Biblical revelation. 
Gandhi’s satyagraha is pragmatically eclectic in the extreme. Satyagraha, in 
Gandhi’s thought, is associated with strict asceticism. This aspect of spirituality is 
absent from Yoder’s pacifism. Finally, Yoder’s political theology has its focus in 
the church, an ideologically defined community with strong shared beliefs, rather 
than primarily in society as a whole. Gandhi’s satyagraha was intended to be much 
more of a mass movement.  
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Given these large and significant differences it is tempting to conclude that 
there is little in common between the two approaches. There are, however, striking 
similarities both in form and content, to which Yoder himself occasionally alludes. 
The practical parallels between Yoder’s non-violence and Gandhi’s ahimsa (refusal 
to harm) are plain, even if their theological source is different. The use of the 
Gandhian practice of ahimsa by Martin Luther King demonstrates the practical 
similarities and transferability between Gandhi’s work and a Christian pacifism. 
Such practice, moreover, in both Gandhian and Yoderian thought, is not merely the 
passive non-resistance of the weak, but the confident and creative non-violence of 
the spiritually strong. For both Gandhi and Yoder non-violence involves the 
voluntary acceptance of suffering, and hence demands a courageous and trained 
discipleship, adopting communal spiritual disciplines. Being a member of the 
church, for Yoder, involves a spiritual discipline analogous to that of the 
satyagrahi. The Gandhian ideal of renunciation can be paralleled by a Christian 
kenotic, self denying, discipleship. In both Gandhi and Yoder there is a refusal to 
separate ends from means, and an insistence on the corrupting nature of attaining 
‘good’ ends by evil means. Gandhi’s emphasis on nishkama karma, or disinterested 
service, doing the right thing because of its intrinsic value, without regard for 
consequences, has direct parallels in Yoder’s dismissal of a consequentialist 
defence of Christian pacifism. One difference of approach lies in the seeking and 
use of political power. Gandhi was a skilled and experienced politician who 
unashamedly sought and used political power to bring about large scale social 
change. Yoder’s views changed from a deep suspicion of power and an emphasis on 
servanthood to a more nuanced view of power, if exercised as servanthood, praising 
the work of Gandhi and King as examples of the potential for a minority ethic to 
accomplish political change. Finally the word, satyagraha, which Gandhi uses to 
describe his peacemaking, associates ‘force’ or ‘power’ with truth. Yoder’s 
pacifism is based on the revealed truth of the nature of God, and of the necessity for 
Christians to base their actions on the closest possible approximation to that nature 
as revealed in Jesus and not to deviate from the uncompromising truth of the gospel. 
There is an openness and directness about Yoder’s ethic which parallels Gandhi’s 
adherence to ‘truth-force’. 
Whilst the prime Christian influence on Gandhi’s satyagraha was the 
teaching of Jesus, the cross certainly played an important part – his favourite 
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Christian hymn was ‘When I survey the wondrous cross’, and the only icon he 
allowed in his ashram was that of the crucified Jesus. Whereas the chief meaning of 
the cross for Gandhi seems to have been a symbol of personal self renunciation, 
without the explicit connotations of political nonconformity ascribed to it by Yoder, 
the cross also had an implicit meaning as demonstrating the redemptive and 
transformative power of suffering love, which would certainly not be alien to a 
Yoderian interpretation. 
  
b)  Boff and Sobrino – a cruciform response to oppression 
 
Boff – violence and the cross 
 In his emphasis on Jesus’ commitment, courage, and self-surrender which 
culminated in the cross, Boff has in mind the similar qualities required of those 
struggling with poverty and oppression in Latin America. But Jesus’ death is more 
than an example of courage in the face of a cruel death; Boff touches tangentially 
(although, as noted below, he does not develop the theme) on Jesus’ death as a 
model for Christian resistance to evil. In this section we explore elements from 
Boff’s writing which indicate a cross-informed non-violent and non-retaliatory 
approach to resistance. Such elements in Boff’s writings go some way towards 
countering the accusation that liberation theology operates with the same categories 
of power, violence, and retaliation as its opponents.  
 For example, Boff writes of Jesus that ‘His reaction did not fall within his 
enemies’ scheme of things. A victim of oppression and violence, he nevertheless 
did not use violence and oppression to force himself on others.’ He continues: 
‘Though Son of God he made no use of the divine power that can change all 
situations.’ (Boff 1987: 64) Here Boff touches on a very fertile theme indeed - that 
of the relationship between the divine refusal (or redefinition) of power as 
expressed in the death of Christ and ‘power as domination’. The power of 
domination is ‘the diabolical side of power, this is the power that generates 
oppression and obstacles to communion.’ Rather, the true power of God is love, ‘a 
love that liberates, establishes human beings in solidarity with one another, and 
opens them to the laborious process of liberation’. (Boff 1987: 64) This liberating 
love is described in terms strikingly similar to those of Yoder; it excludes ‘all 
violence and oppression, even for the sake of imposing itself [my italics]’. The 
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effectiveness of love is in a different category to the effectiveness of violence, since 
violence brings about a change, but at the cost of human lives, and ‘fails to free 
itself from the spirit of oppression’. The effectiveness of love is more long term and 
enduring: ‘The courage to sacrifice one’s very life for love, and the certitude that 
the future belongs to right, justice, love and a communion of sisters and brothers, 
and not to oppression, revenge, and injustice.’(Boff 1987: 64-5) It is interesting that 
Boff begins this theme which is more fully taken up by theologians such as Yoder 
and Hauerwas, but does not follow up its implications – a regrettable omission, 
since it has great relevance to the debate in liberation theology over the ethics of 
revolutionary violence and the nature of political power. Later, Boff writes of the 
revelation of God’s power and salvation in weakness and powerlessness. In such 
vulnerability ‘is manifested the might of love itself, the power to conquer hearts, the 
strength to initiate a genuine salvific revolution’. (Boff 1987: 82) Again, the 
power/weakness motif is touched upon, but not fully developed. 
 We have noted Boff’s purpose of providing a spirituality for those engaged 
in the struggle for justice. But, no less significantly, he gives a pointer to the 
practical conduct of that struggle. The Christian is not merely committed to the 
struggle, but to a particular way of conducting that struggle. Boff writes of the 
efficacy of the ‘just in apparent defeat’, and contrasts this with the illusory 
effectiveness of violence, which ultimately fails because it locks the participants 
into the spiral of violence. By contrast: 
The effectiveness of suffering in consequence of a just cause is less visible, 
but is genuine. It demonstrates that what is in store for human beings, what 
is desirable for human beings, is on the side of right, justice, love and 
communion, and not on the side of greed violence and the will to power.’ 
(Boff 1987: 125) 
Here again are resonances of a Christian pacifist theology of suffering and the cross, 
as found in theologians such as Yoder and others in the Mennonite tradition. That 
this theology is not more fully developed is probably due to Boff’s sense of 
solidarity with those who feel compelled to adopt (defensive) violence in response 
to the violence of the state. However, it is significant to discover in Boff’s political 
theology seeds similar to those which in Yoder grow into a fully fledged pacifist 
ethic. 
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Sobrino – the question of violence 
 One of the major elements in Sobrino’s political Christology is that of the 
victimhood of Jesus, and the fact that any victory of Jesus is that of the ‘victorious 
victim’, from a position of affinity rather than alterity. This radically affects both 
the nature of the victory and the methods by which the victory is won. Sobrino is 
fully aware of the debate over the use of violence in resisting oppression, and over 
the possible overlap between Jesus and the violent ‘freedom fighters’ of his day, the 
zealots. For the Latin American church, the dilemma over the use of violence to 
resist evil is an ongoing ethical, theological, and pastoral problem. Sobrino adduces 
as an example Bishop Casaldaliga, who ‘would rather give his life than take 
someone else’s’ but teaches ‘that he has no right to forbid anyone to take up arms to 
defend the victims of horrible abominations and to try to change the centuries old 
structures that make these possible’. (Sobrino 1994a: 216) 
 Sobrino argues (Sobrino 1994a: 214) that there is no recorded attack by 
Jesus on the zealots, and that Jesus shared certain zealot attitudes. However, Jesus’ 
followers included a publican collaborator, and the Sermon on the Mount in many 
places runs directly counter to zealot violence. Jesus himself was certainly not a 
zealot, even though he ‘could be presented with some plausibility as close to those 
who sought the end of Roman domination by force of arms’. (Sobrino 1994a: 215) 
Rather, Jesus’ attitude to power is more nuanced. Sobrino’s recognition of this goes 
some way, as we have seen in our discussion of Boff,  towards countering the attack 
on liberation theology for advocating a doctrine of power not significantly different 
from that of the ‘oppressors’. Sobrino suggests that the kingdom of God does not 
consist in an apolitical stance or ‘pure pacifism – understood as an absence of 
struggle’ (a rather weak and unsatisfactory definition of pacifism, by either 
Gandhian or Yoderian standards), but is rather to be ‘expressed and established by 
the best of human values: by the power of truth, justice and love. It was to be 
established – and this is the greatest difference from all other groups – by grace.’ 
(Sobrino 1994a: 215) 
 It is perhaps worth noting that Sobrino, like Boff, does not link this view of 
power and violence explicitly to the cross. For Yoder, the definitiveness of the 
crucified Jesus refusing a violent response necessitates a rigorous and 
uncompromising pacifism. Sobrino is more doubtful as to how definitive a stance 
on violence can be ascribed to the words or actions of Jesus. Three examples may 
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suffice: ‘We cannot know for certain what Jesus would say today about violence…I 
do not think that we can deduce from his life and his words what he would say 
about the legitimacy of an armed insurrectionary struggle… violence is so complex 
that there does not seem to be a single response that is adequate and embraces the 
innumerable problems it poses, even in terms of the gospel of Jesus.’  (Sobrino 
1994a: 216)  ‘These facts [i.e. the historical evidence of the gospels] do not allow us 
to produce anything like a doctrine of Jesus on violence as a way of transforming 
society today, and the expectation of the imminent coming of the Kingdom would 
make it anachronistic.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 215) Sobrino does, however, set down four 
principles: first, the necessity of unmasking structural injustice as institutionalized 
violence; second, the fact that violence, even if legitimate, is potentially 
dehumanizing; third, that Jesus offers as an alternative to violence the utopia of 
peace as a goal to aim for and as a means to achieve it, through what Sobrino 
describes as ‘Utopian gestures’ i.e. vulnerability and forgiveness, which break the 
spiral of violence; fourth, that all violence needs redemption. (Sobrino 1994a: 
215ff) 
 Is the cross, then, a form of ‘utopian gesture’? It is here, perhaps, that 
Sobrino comes closest to Yoder in ascribing to the cross a power to overcome 
violence itself. In a meditation on the fact that violence always needs redemption, 
Sobrino writes: 
…in Christian terms, all redemption has a specific structure with an element 
that is necessary, though by no means sufficient: bearing the evil from 
which we have to be redeemed. This means fighting against the roots of 
violence, but also bearing it [my italics]. As historical violence comes from 
injustice, we have to bear the injustice, which means taking the side of the 
victims of injustice and its violence, the poor majority, and bearing their 
fate: violence cannot be redeemed unless it is borne in some way.  
(Sobrino 1994a: 216)  
 Here, in embryo, is a more Yoderian theology of the cross, where suffering the 
consequences of violence is a way (although Yoder would say ‘the’ way) of 
overcoming that violence.  
 Sobrino ends his excursus on ‘Jesus and Violence’ in Jesus the Liberator by 
quoting words of his colleague and mentor Ellacuria on the violent situation of El 
Salvador (Sobrino 1994a: 218). It is worth examining this passage in detail, as it 
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provides another useful answer to those who accuse liberation theology of a too 
ready advocacy of violence. The Christian faith regards violence as ‘intrinsically 
related to evil’. It is inevitable, even for a Christian, to ‘accept certain forms of 
violence…whenever it is non-terrorist liberating violence, related especially to 
liberation from the death which strikes the poor majority of the Third world.’ 
Violence in response to an overwhelming structural violence is not, therefore ruled 
out. Ellacuria, however, makes the striking statement: ‘It would seem from a more 
Christian point of view, that of the perfection of the discipleship of the historical 
Jesus, that Christians who are doubly Christian in their lives and actions, should not 
use violence.’ Using language which resonates (unconsciously) with that of Yoder, 
‘Christians as such do not normally give their specific witness through violence…it 
is a matter of giving the fullest and most comprehensive witness that life is above 
death and love is above hate.’ This, however, will only be effective if Christians, in 
the Yoderian sense, take up the cross. ‘This attitude would be acceptable and 
effective if Christians were willing to risk even martyrdom in defence of the poorest 
and in the fight against the oppressors with the witness of their word and life.’ A 
refusal to use violence is justified if Christians are willing to sacrifice themselves in 
(peaceful) defence of those at risk. ‘The Christian vocation calls for the use of 
peaceful means, which does not mean less effort, to solve the problems of injustice 
and violence in the world, rather than violent means, however much these may 
sometimes be justified.’ Jesus’ eschewing of violence even in a righteous cause is at 
the heart of Yoder’s theology, and it is significant that Ellacuria (quoted with 
approval by Sobrino) uses a similar argument. 
 
 c) Conclusion 
 Yoder’s vision of a Christological pacifism is firmly based on a theological 
foundation where non-violence is integral to the being and actions of God, and, 
therefore, obligatory for his people. It does not stand as an adjunct to Yoder’s 
theology – it forms the basis for that theology. Where Boff and Sobrino lean 
towards non-violence, it appears to be much less soundly based on a coherent 
theological framework, especially with regard to the cross. Differences in 
ecclesiastical background should not be underestimated. Yoder writes from a 
tradition of uncompromising pacifism, which he integrates into a coherent 
theological framework. Boff and Sobrino write from a tradition where pacifism is 
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exceptionally rare, and the just war theory dominant, and both would gain from a 
more systematic approach to the non-violence which Yoder sees inherent in the 
cross. However, faced with the structural violence of Latin America and the 
‘crosses’ which that violence inflicts, Boff and Sobrino appear to believe that a 
certain degree of violence is justified if the crucified are to be ‘taken down from 
their crosses’. The option of using violence is limited by the demands of the gospel, 
but both Boff and Sobrino are aware of the dangers of a doctrine of passive 
suffering which totally rules out active (and sometimes, as a last resort, violent) 
resistance. Such a doctrine would risk inculcating a fatalism which inevitably plays 
into the hands of the powerful. Both Boff and Sobrino could perhaps gain from 
Yoder’s interpretation of a cruciform pacifism which is soundly based upon 
Christology, exercised by community, and motivated by the divine demand for 
justice. Yoderian pacifism could perhaps benefit from the realism and immediacy 
with which Boff and Sobrino treat the ‘crucifixion’ of the poor and oppressed, and 
their attempts to ‘take the crucified from their crosses’, which may in extremis 
involve the reluctant use of limited violent means.  
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Summary  - towards a political theology of the cross (ii) 
 In the last three chapters I have attempted to explore how the theologies of 
the cross in Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino can shed light on political discipleship in a 
world of poverty, suffering and oppression. Before moving to a consideration of the 
‘cruciform and crucified people’, I outline elements arising from these chapters 
which I believe should be incorporated in a political theology of the cross.  
 
 A cruciform imitation of the crucified God in a crucified world 
 A political ethic which bears the name Christian must, at the very least, 
attempt to approximate to the pattern of Jesus’ incarnational social exemplarity. 
Since the crucifixion is the place where the incarnation is at its most radical, a 
Christian political ethic must be shaped by the cross – that is, it must be cruciform. 
This definitive cruciformity is an essential element (perhaps the essential element) 
in any political ethic which calls itself Christian. This can perhaps be summed up by 
the following formula: a cruciform imitation of the crucified God in the context of a 
crucified world. At the heart of Jesus’ ethical teaching is the command ‘Be as your 
Father’. The follower of Jesus is called, in all his or her actions, to act in conformity 
to the character of God as seen in the words and actions of Jesus: an imitatio dei 
through an imiatio Christi. Burridge describes the ‘entire story of Jesus’ as a ‘moral 
paradigm that offers normative guidance’. (Burridge 2007: 75)  It is clear that the 
above formula does not say all that needs to be said about Christian political 
involvement, but can it perhaps set a useful framework. A cruciform politics will 
attempt to imitate the character of God as seen in the historical acts of Jesus (and 
their consequence, the crucifixion), will bear witness to the character of God by its 
political actions, and will have the faith that God will honour that imitation and 
witness.  
This has relevance both to the content of the political ethic and to the 
location of its practitioners. The content of a cruciform politics, to give a very over-
simplified outline, is that of a non-violent, non-retaliatory form of political action 
which seeks justice and compassion, and which has the ever-present potential to 
threaten the powerful. The location of a cruciform politics is no less significant. Just 
as the crucified God is pushed to the margins of power, so the place where a 
Christian political ethic comes into sharpest focus is likewise on the margins, 
among the ‘crucified people’, or at least in contact with them, and with their 
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interests at the forefront. It must therefore be recognized that the cruciform nature 
of this political ethic means that a significant process of interpretative transfer must 
take place before it can be used by those holding positions of power. This is 
certainly not to argue that Christian political ethics are irrelevant to the Christian 
politician – that would be to take the Lutheran two kingdom doctrine to ridiculous 
lengths. It is, however, essential to recognise that the fons et origo of Christian 
political ethics is not Pilate’s palace or the offices of the Sanhedrin but the cross 
outside the gates of power.  
 
 A different criterion for political success 
 One of the most important tasks for a political theology of the cross is to 
investigate how the cross can be liberative, and not oppressive. Theologically, the 
cross entailed a reversal of values for the first Christians; politically, the cross 
entails a similar questioning of values. In Mark’s account, on the journey to the 
dénouement at Jerusalem, Jesus, having warned his disciples about the forthcoming 
crucifixion, makes one of his most significant political statements: ‘You know that 
among the Gentiles the recognized rulers lord it over their subjects, and the great 
make their authority felt. It shall not be so with you.’ [My italics] (Mark 10: 42-3). 
The cross likewise radically redefines both the aims and conduct of politics, calling 
into question established political values such as power or victory. For example, the 
cross subverts power as violent force, by its demonstration of the alternative power 
of suffering love; paternalism, by its demonstration of involved affinity rather than 
detached alterity; and ‘non-political’ withdrawal, by its demonstration of costly 
compassion. Most of all, the overriding aim of politics is redefined not as the quest 
for power per se, which is undercut by a cruciform hermeneutic of suspicion of 
power, but  the relief of human suffering – taking the crucified from their crosses – 
and its converse, the promotion of human flourishing.  
This view of Christian politics should be undergirded by a careful analysis 
of the relationship between God and suffering, especially with regard to the cross. 
God must not be represented as inflicting suffering, or in any way privileging it, in 
theologies either of providence or atonement. The only part God plays in the 
violence of the cross is to endure it, both ‘physically’ in the suffering of Jesus, and 
‘psychologically’ in his agonized and reluctant willingness to allow Jesus to endure 
crucifixion in fulfilment of his mission. Suffering is intrinsic to God only vis-à-vis 
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his suffering creation, as he seeks to diminish that suffering. Here we see the 
ambiguity in the symbol of the cross; the cross of Jesus is only valid theologically 
as a way to remove the crosses of humanity, both the ‘cross’ of physical suffering 
and the ‘cross’ of alienation from God. 
 
 A spirituality of costly commitment 
 The cross is at the heart of a spirituality of costly commitment for those 
working to bring about political change in the direction of the kingdom values of 
love, peace, justice and community, and opposing whatever contradicts those 
values. Jesus’ commitment to his ‘historic project’, which led to the cross, must be 
mirrored by those who continue that historic project, against sometimes lethal 
opposition. Their suffering is given meaning by the cross; in other words, their 
suffering is seen not just as individual suffering, but as part of a grand narrative in 
which they share. Again, the ambiguity of the cross is manifest; cruciform suffering 
is certainly not sought, but is the inevitable by-product of engaging in the struggle 
to remove the crucified from their crosses.  
This political spirituality is further resourced by the ‘justification by grace 
through faith’ which finds its focus, in Pauline theology, in the cross. The 
gratuitousness of salvation and the consequent redirection of energy away from a 
concern for one’s standing with God energized, for example, Wesley. A similar 
personal decentring and recentring on others frees the Christian for political action. 
A cruciform spirituality is based on decentred solidarity – solidarity with God in the 
divine suffering and solidarity with the suffering peoples of the world. Bonhoeffer 
wrote of ‘sharing in God’s sufferings at the hands of a godless world’, and that ‘it is 
not the religious act that makes the Christian, but participation in the sufferings of 
God in the secular life.’ (Bonhoeffer 1953: 361) A cruciform spirituality is 
conscious of this participation in the divine suffering, and also of solidarity in 
bearing the cross with others across national, ecclesiastical and socio-economic 
boundaries. This consciousness and this solidarity mean that Christian political 
involvement is based on affinity, rather than alterity – salvation from inside 
(compassionate and empathetic solidarity) rather than merely from outside 
(intervention ‘de haut en bas’).  
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 Non-violence the default option for the Christian 
The defencelessness of Jesus on the cross radically questions a Christian’s 
right to adopt premeditatedly lethal means of self defence, and indicates what can 
be described as a Christological pacifism. Such a pacifism, exercised by the 
Christian community as a whole, is based on imitation of God’s action in Christ, 
witnesses to God’s character as revealed in Christ’s reaction to violence, and rests 
on faith in God who raised the non-violent Christ from the dead.  
It is important to emphasize that this is not necessarily an absolute ethic, 
since there are (as we will explore in subsequent chapters) ‘ethics of conflicting 
duty’ to be brought into the equation. Short term and limited defensive violence in 
protection of the vulnerable may be a possibility, as Christology cannot totally 
trump consequentialism in ethical judgment. If Christians do not have the right to 
defend themselves, they may have the duty to defend others. A cruciform ethic may 
well be an ethic of vulnerability, but it may not be legitimate to sacrifice the 
vulnerable to theological consistency. This will be explored in more detail later, but 
is a potential Achilles heel of absolutist pacifism. To paraphrase Berdyaev’s famous 
saying about bread for myself and my neighbour, defence of myself may be a 
material question, but defence of my neighbour is a spiritual question. There is also 
the complicating factor of the complexity of violence, in the form of structural 
injustice and institutional violence, which means that to restrict pacifism simply to 
questions of war and peace is potentially misleading, in that it fails to come to terms 
with underlying violence which is often more pernicious than outright warfare.  
Can pacifism become a policy, rather than (or as well as) a witness?  Yes, in 
terms of a practical, if non-absolutist, pacifism. A cruciform social ethic entails a 
strong predisposition towards non-violence, with only exceptional factors 
overcoming a radical eschewal of violence. Just as Jesus shared many similarities 
with the zealots, but with the literally crucial difference of adopting non-retaliation 
and non-violence, so a cruciform ethic indicates an analogous role for the church, in 
going beyond categories of power and violence to conduct a different kind of 
pacifist (peacemaking) politics. This means, in practice, no ‘crusades’, in the sense 
of violence in a righteous cause, either, from the left, in revolutionary violence, or, 
from the right, as part of the military establishment. Violence must be radically 
questioned, since it is both dehumanizing (in the sense of being destructive of 
human life) and ‘detheizing’ (in the sense of being contrary to the character of God 
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and involving a defacement of God’s image in humanity). The futility of violence 
and its self replicating nature must be recognized, with a deep cynicism towards 
human motives in choosing violence, especially in military adventurism. If violence 
is to be used, it should be as an absolute last resort, and under the character of 
extended police actions rather than war. In short, a cruciform church can be a brake 
on the ever-present tendency to use the short cut of violence.  
It must be recognized, however, that such a non-violent stance on behalf of 
the church is only possible if Christians are willing to take up the cross which is the 
price of such non-violence. A cruciform response to violence involves not inflicting 
more violence, but rather, potentially, suffering the violence on behalf of others. As 
Gandhi observed (quoted in Wink 1992: 163) ‘Just as one may learn the art of 
killing in the training for violence, so one must learn the art of dying in the training 
for non-violence.’ 
 
 Martyrdom, and resistance to privatizing the cross 
Taking up the cross, for the Christian, is not something private or primarily 
individual, but public and corporate. Cross-bearing is the price of social 
nonconformity in imitation of the social nonconformity of Jesus which brought him 
to the cross. This is to be exercised both individually and corporately, in terms both 
of personal discipleship and of the church publicly seeking the kingdom of God and 
publicly paying the price for that commitment. A rediscovery of the concept of 
martyrdom is needed; the cross was a public political event, and is paralleled by the 
public political event of martyrdom, in the sense of a potentially suffering witness 
to the kingdom of God.  This witness can come about through compassionate 
action, conscientious withdrawal, and public payment of the penalty when that 
stance is rejected by an unbelieving society. The traditional concept of martyrdom 
can also be usefully expanded. Primarily, martyrdom is ‘Christian’– the traditional 
form, suffering and death for explicit faith in Jesus; secondarily ‘Jesuanic’, 
suffering and death for taking up Jesus’ ‘historic project,’ the justice, peace and 
wholeness of the Kingdom of God; and thirdly ‘anonymous’ – the unwilling and 
often unconscious witness made by the victims of the world’s crosses, who are 
martyrs by analogy, who suffer, not consciously in the cause of Christ, but in the 
same way and for similar historical reasons as Christ.  Such martyrs are ‘signs of 
the times’, prophetic indicators of different and often subversive values. The 
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effectiveness of such martyrdom cannot be precisely calculated or deliberately used 
as part of a political strategy (a point usefully made in Howey 2008). However, the 
political power of martyrdom should not be underestimated, as it demonstrates in 
human history the divine willingness to suffer without retaliation, and hence puts a 
brake on the spiral of retaliatory violence.  
 
 The inevitability of conflict and the necessity for engagement 
There is a profound paradox in that a political theology of the cross indicates 
non-violence, but also presupposes the inevitability of conflict. The cross is the 
conflictual meeting place of the powerful, ruthlessly seeking to defend their power, 
and the powerless, attempting to subvert (or escape from) that power. Any pacifism 
arising from a theology of the cross cannot expect an absence of struggle. Pacifism, 
in both its etymology and its fullest political meaning, is not withdrawal into 
neutrality, but active peacemaking; living, in the Quaker phrase, in the ‘life and 
power that takes away the occasion for war’. Christological and cruciform pacifism, 
in contrast to much optimistic liberal pacifism, seeks to be a realistic ethic, taking 
seriously the power of sin and conflict.  
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SECTION III – BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATIONS  
2) THE CRUCIFORM AND CRUCIFIED PEOPLE 
 
Chapter 7 
The cruciform people – the church and political responsiblity 
  One of the leading themes of the Bible is the way in which God is 
represented as working through sociological groupings: the family of Abraham, the 
people of Israel, and the Christian community. The way the ‘people of God’ 
organises and expresses itself politically is central to its task of bearing witness to 
God and acting as a channel through which God can work in the world. What does 
it mean, in this context, for the church to be cruciform – in other words, to 
correspond to the crucified Jesus whose present ‘body’ it is? How might that affect 
its political responsibility? In this chapter we examine the differing ways in which 
Yoder, Boff and Sobrino answer these questions. 
 
a)  Yoder - the church, the cross and the question of responsibility 
 
The question of ‘social responsibility’ 
Yoder’s aim is to enunciate a cruciform political ethic, and to guide the 
church to be cruciform in its political activities. We have noted how this leads him 
to conceive of the church’s political task in terms which differ significantly from 
the dominant ‘realist’ paradigm. The most severe criticism levelled at Yoder’s 
cruciform political ethic is in the area of political responsibility. Does the cross 
imply (and necessitate) a radically different form of responsibility, so different that 
the charge of irresponsibility (from a Niebuhrian perspective) can be maintained? 
Does Yoder react against what he terms Constantinianism so much that his theology 
becomes unbalanced at this point? Is his reading of the cross definitive, or is his 
emphasis on non-coercion drawn from other sources? Does Yoder take one aspect 
of the cross and over-emphasize it to the detriment of other aspects of Christian 
politics (a recurring criticism of Yoder’s theology)? These questions underlie the 
following discussion of Yoder’s doctrine of, if not non-responsibility, at least a 
radically different responsibility.  
A key statement on the aims of Jesus vis-à-vis social responsibility is found 
in Yoder’s discussion in Politics of Jesus of the temptations in the wilderness and 
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Gethsemane. These passages are especially significant since they delineate the 
range of possible options open to Jesus and the choice he makes – a choice which, 
in the one case, determines the nature of his ministry from the outset, and, in the 
other, confirms his political choices at the climax of that ministry. Yoder writes 
(Yoder 1994: 96) in a passage quoted previously: ‘The one temptation Jesus faced – 
and faced again and again – as a constitutive element in his public ministry, was the 
temptation to exercise social responsibility, in the interest of justified revolution, 
through the use of available violent methods.’ This is a central passage in 
understanding Yoder’s interpretation of the social and political role of Jesus. 
Yoder’s Jesus refuses to exercise social responsibility, even if in a good cause (i.e. 
for the sake of liberating his country from oppression) by adopting the politics of 
violence.  
Is Yoder’s Jesus interested in exercising social responsibility at all? Yes, but 
in such a different way that the meaning of social responsibility is radically altered. 
Jesus’ temptations are interpreted by Yoder as revealing Jesus ‘facing, and 
rejecting, the claim that the exercise of social responsibility through the use of self-
evidently necessary means is a moral duty’. (Yoder 1994: 98) Jesus does not refuse 
social responsibility i.e. kingship as such, but by refusing to play the game of using 
the obvious and traditional methods (i.e. violent and coercive) he transposes social 
responsibility into another, more distant key.  
What is the relationship of the cross to such a strategy? Yoder argues that 
Jesus’ non-violent and non-coercive yet politically subversive actions led to the 
cross. It is, however, likely that Jesus would have risked the cross equally (if not 
more) if he had set himself up as a violent and coercive rebel against the Romans. 
Yoder’s ‘different social responsibility’ seems therefore to be based not so much on 
the acts of Jesus which led to his crucifixion, as on the non-coercive character of 
God, who allows his Son to be crucified rather than sending the ‘twelve legions of 
angels’ to defend him. 
 
‘Moving history in the right direction’ 
 Yoder’s chief target for criticism is the view that the goal of Christian social 
ethics is to move ‘history in the right direction’, if necessary by coercive means and 
through the use of the political structures of power by the church. The place of 
Reinhold Niebuhr as the trusted adviser to American presidents is a prime example 
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of this ‘chaplaincy to power’ approach to social ethics. There is, according to 
Yoder, an obsession with ends; Christian social ethics are overwhelmingly 
teleological or consequentialist.  
Christians in our age are obsessed with the meaning and direction of history. 
Social ethical concern is moved by a deep desire to make things move in the 
right direction. Whether a given action is right or not seems to be 
inseparable from the question of what effects it will cause.  
(Yoder 1994: 228)  
Therefore ‘part if not all of social concern has to do with looking for the right 
‘handle’ by which one can ‘get a hold on’ the course of history and move it in the 
right direction.’ Once this ‘handle’ is identified, ‘it is justified to sacrifice to this 
one cause other subordinate values.’ Yoder adduces as examples Luther’s alliance 
with the Princes at the time of the Reformation and, from a Marxist angle, the 
compromises of Communist Russia with small scale capitalism. Yoder criticizes 
this theory on two grounds – he questions first whether it is possible to manage 
cause and effect with (inevitably) inadequate information to guide such 
management, and second whether the ‘overriding moral yardstick’ is effectiveness 
in achieving these goals (Yoder 1994: 230). Once the ‘right cause’ is identified, ‘it 
is assumed that we should be willing to sacrifice for it – not only our own values 
but also those of the neighbour and especially the enemy… This creates a new 
autonomous ethical value ‘relevance’, itself a good in the name of which evil may 
be done.’ (Yoder 1994: 248) 
Yoder’s intention throughout is to establish a political ethic concerned with 
faithfulness, and not with a calculation (if this were possible) of the consequences. 
This intention is Christologically grounded, in particular in the kenotic ‘hymn’ in 
Philippians 2, where equality with God is interpreted by Yoder as not some 
metaphysical attribute, but control over the universe. What was rejected by Christ 
was the ‘element of providential control over events, the alternative being the 
acceptance of impotence’ (Yoder 1994: 34) – an impotence graphically and 
definitively demonstrated by the cross. Jesus, according to Yoder, did not simply 
renounce ‘the metaphysical nature of Sonship, but rather the untrammelled 
sovereign exercise of power in the affairs of that humanity amid which he came to 
dwell.’ The kenosis Paul describes, the servant nature and the obedience to the 
death of the cross, is read as ‘his renunciation of lordship, his apparent 
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abandonment of any obligation to be effective in making history move down the 
right track’. (Yoder 1994: 235) This kenosis is honoured by God, the designation 
‘Lord’ being an ‘affirmation of his victorious relation to the powers of the cosmos.’ 
A kenotic strategy is extended to the cross-bearing of Jesus’ followers, being ‘the 
inevitable suffering of those whose only goal is to be faithful to that love which 
puts one at the mercy of one’s neighbour’. (Yoder 1994: 236)  
Cross-bearing is interpreted as something positive – not an aloof 
withdrawal, but active peacemaking and reconciliation. This, it seems, is ‘moving 
history in the right direction’, but in a more oblique way.  
What Jesus renounced is not first of all violence, but rather the 
compulsiveness of purpose that leads the strong to violate the dignity of 
others. The point is not that one can attain all of one’s legitimate ends 
without using violent means. It is rather that our readiness to renounce our 
legitimate ends whenever they cannot be attained by legitimate means itself 
constitutes our participation in the triumphant suffering of the Lamb.  
(Yoder 1994: 237)   
There seems to be a significant shift here (or possibly confusion). We are, after all, 
to ‘move history in the right way’ i.e. there are legitimate ends – but only by using 
legitimate i.e. cruciform, non-violent means, following the divine pattern 
exemplified by the historical acts of Jesus which culminated in his crucifixion.  
Yoder recognizes that modern social ethics are primarily (and almost 
inevitably) consequentialist and based on the use of immediately available power, 
rather than on a more long term faithfulness, which is only seen to be correct in the 
light of the resurrection and the ‘eternal glory of the Lamb.’ Christian politics, 
suggests Yoder, is not a question of ‘determining which aristocrats are morally 
justified, by virtue of their better ideology, to use the power of society from the top 
so as to lead the whole system in their direction’. (Yoder 1994: 238)  It is easy to 
identify Yoder’s targets here – ‘Christian realist’ social ethics, which operate from a 
position of ‘chaplaincy to power’. The question must be asked,  however, whether 
Yoder fails to recognize a difference between a Constantinian ‘seizure of power’ in 
order to ‘move history’ and action taken in response to particular situations in 
obedience to the love command of Jesus. In that particular, is the Christian to 
refrain from ‘moving history in the right direction? Yoder could justly be accused 
of setting up a straw man to demolish. As we shall see, Yoder has a (perhaps 
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dangerous) suspicion of the use of power itself. Yoder’s major adversary is that 
symbol of the alliance of Christianity and worldly power, Constantianism.  
  
The cross against Constantinianism 
Yoder interprets the cross as indicating a Christianity the ‘right way up’. 
Constantine, or the socio-religious changes associated with him, turned Christianity 
upside down, by systematically reversing Jesus’ emphases, to the extent that Jesus 
was crucified by the same empire and the same values which Constantine 
embodied. Constantinianism (whatever the exact nature and timing of the changes, 
and whatever Constantine’s own role in them) stands as an important symbol of 
Yoder’s diagnosis of a wrong turn in Christian social ethics which still has immense 
influence across the political spectrum. Constantinianism describes the church 
imposing what it sees as the values of Christianity from a position of political power 
and social privilege, and using that power to forward God’s will and kingdom as 
interpreted by the church. This ‘Constantinian postulate’ assumes a state church and 
Christian control, or at least very strong influence, on the levers of power, so that 
ideally there is a unity of ideology and intent between the church and the ruling 
powers. Hence the task of the Christian (and the church) in politics is to stand in 
solidarity and alliance with those who hold power in order to determine the course 
of society in a way which approximates as closely as possible to the kingdom of 
God. This view, which is close to the Christendom tradition, takes seriously the 
necessity for power to achieve (at least relatively short term) aims in politics – and 
short term aims in politics are the practical norm. Beyond that, Constantinianism 
aims for ‘Christianization’ of society as a whole, with the church the religious 
expression of the community in general.  
It is not difficult to see how such a vision is antithetical to Yoder’s 
cruciform Christology and ecclesiology. Jesus was crucified precisely by such an 
alliance of religious and political power, by those who sought to keep intact their 
handle on moving history in the right direction, and were willing to sacrifice an 
innocent man for that worthy cause. As a Mennonite, Yoder’s ecclesiology is that of 
a markedly separate, distinctive, and voluntary church, whose task is not to handle 
the levers of power (rather, it is to renounce all semblance of ‘control’) but 
faithfully to fulfil the function of vulnerable witness, prophetic worship, and 
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reconciling fellowship. The church’s prime responsibility is to be the church, and 
not to assume (a probably unrealistic) responsibility for everything that happens.  
By contrast, Constantinianism rests on the responsibility of those who hold 
power, of the individual Christian and of the church to exercise their power, where 
possible, to achieve righteous ends. This emphasis on responsibility implies 
accountability; both church and government are accountable to God for exercising 
or neglecting to exercise, if necessary by coercion, their power for good.  The 
contrast with Yoder’s voluntary, subordinate and non-coercive model, which sees 
‘responsibility’ in radically different terms, is stark; Constantinianism is centred not 
Christologically, but on the (presumably God given, but fatally sinful) capabilities 
of humanity.  
Yoder sees such Constantinianism as shared by political theologies both of 
the right (the traditional conservative alliance between church and state) and of the 
left (theologies of revolution and liberation). In the chapter ‘Christ, the hope of the 
world’ in The Original Revolution (Yoder 1972: 140ff) Yoder indicts liberation 
theology as ‘neo-neo-neo-neo Constantinianism’! The ideology of those in power is 
not so great a problem as the church’s attempts to associate with those in power. 
Echoing the criticism that liberation theology is not radical enough in its critique of 
power, Yoder finds fault with liberation theology not so much in its goals as in its 
Constantinian methodology, in overemphasizing the need for seizing political 
power. In brief, Yoder’s quarrel with Constantinianism seems largely to be over its 
use of coercive and often violent power even for ‘justifiable’ ends - God’s love, as 
expressed in the crucified Jesus, is radically non-coercive. The cruciform church, 
therefore, must eschew coercion as incompatible with the gospel.  
 
Criticism – an unwarranted suspicion of power 
Any theology focused upon the powerless figure on the cross is likely to 
exercise at least a hermeneutic of suspicion of the exercise of power.  But Yoder’s 
reading of God’s crucified and uncoercive love necessitating a distancing of the 
church from political power leaves him open to the charge of a dangerous suspicion 
(and avoidance) of power itself as expressed necessarily in government. This 
suspicion of Christian involvement in structures of power and government 
manifests itself at certain points in Politics of Jesus. Yoder is discussing the absence 
in the New Testament of an invitation to ‘the king to conceive of himself as a public 
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servant’. Yoder asks whether this was due to the social composition of the early 
Christian congregations, or to a more profound reason – ‘Was it that… Jesus has 
instructed his disciples specifically to reject governmental domination over others 
as unworthy of the disciple’s calling of servanthood?’ (Yoder 1994: 183) Yoder 
here comes perilously close to prohibiting Christians from taking part in 
government, by making servanthood the exclusive and solely determinant Christian 
social position vis-à-vis power. On this reading, Christians should be as servants, 
(or, to take the New Testament context seriously, as slaves) always on the receiving 
end of power, not its wielders. Good government is necessary – but Christians are 
excluded from the role of governors. This dangerous tendency in Yoder’s thought 
plays down the necessary servant aspect within government – as in the British ‘civil 
service’. He writes in a similar manner: 
Is there not in Christ’s teaching on meekness, or in the attitude of Jesus 
towards power and servanthood, a deeper question being raised about 
whether it is our business at all to guide our action by the course we wish 
history to take? (Yoder 1994: 230)  
Here Yoder is in danger of a simple withdrawal from anything resembling the 
exercise of power through his misreading of the example of Jesus, and especially 
the powerlessness of Jesus on the cross. His concentration on the target of 
Constantinianism can lead to a seemingly over rigorous prohibition of Christians 
exercising political power at all.  
At the heart of Yoder’s argument is his strict differentiation between church 
and state, especially with regard to their use of power, the church being a 
community of servanthood using non-violence and non-coercion, the state resting, 
ultimately, on coercion and at least the threat of violence. Problems arise when 
church and state are seen as hermetically sealed categories, with no interpenetration; 
where participation in one ‘power structure’ excludes participation in the other. The 
church and state are, indeed, correctly identified by Yoder as separate entities – but 
the relationship is a dialectical one, and individual Christians should not be barred 
from participation as ‘servants’ in the (God-given, as Yoder would agree) state 
structures.  
Yoder’s rightly observes that it is highly dangerous and contrary to the 
gospel for the church to exercise the function of state. But it is not legitimate to 
argue, by extension, that Christians are to remain wholly outside the power 
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structures of the state. This rests on an unstated presupposition that Christians have 
a minority status in the extreme. Otherwise who would staff the necessary police or 
law enforcement? Is this to be left to non-Christians? This argument applies not 
merely to the area of justice, but also of welfare and taxation, which rest not on 
voluntary participation, but on some form of coercion (even if this coercion is 
usually non-violent). It is difficult to identify the areas of the state in which the 
Christian can participate as a wielder of ‘power’. Are Christians, then, limited 
solely to free enterprise? One is bound to ask, with Hauerwas (Hauerwas 1981: 218) 
if Yoder is too Hobbesian in his understanding of the state. Coercion need not be 
violent, and laws within a community can be – and, in practice, usually are – based 
on common consent. It is only in extreme situations that the essence of the state is 
violence, and Yoder errs in neglecting the state’s constructive aspect, its reflection 
of the human capacity for co-operation for the common good. In modern Britain the 
state is symbolized not so much by the sword (i.e. violent coercion) as by the 
National Health Service and social services. 
Yoder’s definitive Christocentrism and concentration on the powerlessness 
of Christ crucified by an oppressive state risks neglecting a necessary Lutheran 
corrective, God’s ‘strange work’ which conceives of a divinely sanctioned use of 
power by government to limit human sin. Power is not necessarily an evil, and an 
overemphasis on Christ’s powerlessness as a necessary model for the Christian 
leads to a dangerous imbalance. A useful distinction in emphasis can be made 
between political theologies such as Christian realism, which emphasise the 
constructive use of power in the ‘long haul’ of human history, without much 
eschatological emphasis save in a far off final judgment, and theologies such as 
Yoder’s, which rest on a more immediate eschatological consciousness. Zimbelman 
discovers a more dialectical relationship with the state in Yoder’s doctrine of 
subordination - ‘It does not demand passivity….not absolute obedience. Christians 
may be subject to government, but they may also act in ways that run counter to the 
demands of unjust and ungodly structures.’ Zimbelman adduces acts ‘of 
conscientious objection and resistance aimed at altering specific attitudes, actions 
and policies of the state while still permitting a person to remain subject to the 
state’. (Zimbelman 1992: 398) There is a fine line but a crucial difference - between 
critical solidarity, where the Christian sees himself within the power structure and 
critical subordination, where the Christian sets himself deliberately outside (or on 
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the bottom rung of) such a structure, seeing participation in the power structure as 
not a Christian responsibility. In practice, Yoder allows a degree of the former, 
whereas his logic would probably necessitate the latter.  
  
Criticism - ethics of conflicting duty 
Another aspect of Yoder’s doctrine of ‘responsibility and non-responsibility’ 
which can justly incur criticism is in the area of ‘ethics of conflicting duty’. (Wright 
2000: 92) Such a criticism can be directed at pacifism as a whole, and  is certainly 
not confined to Yoder’s interpretation, but, in his doctrine of ‘messianic pacifism’ 
his disavowal of direct responsibility for preventing evil consequences lays him 
open to a sharper criticism. Yoder draws an absolute ethic of non-resistance from 
the non-resistance of the crucified Christ, and prescribes such non-resistance for the 
Messianic community which follows his example and witnesses to him. It might be 
argued that Yoder chooses the wrong absolute - he emphasizes non-resistance as an 
absolute, but the true absolute is love (which includes, as a subset, justice, and thus 
can sometimes mean coercion). Which takes priority – non-resistance or the welfare 
of the neighbour? 
 It is not simply a question of either/or; justice and peace are deeply 
interconnected, and the one cannot be treated in isolation from the other. But the 
question of priority, and of ruling out absolutely one form of action – a coercion 
which rests on violence as its ultimate sanction – is settled by Yoder firmly on the 
side of absolute non-violence. Neighbour-love, in the sense of intervening (with the 
possibility or probability of violence) on behalf of a neighbour in need of 
protection, or on behalf of a neighbour suffering injustice, takes second place to the 
priority of non-violence as a witness to the gospel. Yoder thus lays himself open to 
the Christian realist criticism that by aiming for the ideal he refuses to ameliorate a 
situation which it is within his power to ameliorate. He argues that there are hard 
choices, but insists that it is false to posit only two options and to ignore the 
possibility of non-violent resistance. He is reluctant to accept the necessity of 
ambiguous choice through fear of undercutting the maxim that Christian ethics 
should not be determined by hard cases or exceptional circumstances. An exception 
cannot be predicted. Once prepared for it becomes the determining norm. (As 
argued by Wright 2000: 91-2) It is true that borderline situations should not 
determine the overall thrust of ethics – yet war and violence are in themselves 
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grenzfallen or ‘exceptional circumstances’. Barth’s doctrine of borderline situations 
and Bonhoeffer’s example of a heroic individual taking responsibility for violence 
as simul justus et peccator can usefully be set alongside Yoder’s normative 
pacifism. Yoder runs the risk of neglecting this by his insistence on the absolute 
priority of ‘witness’ over ‘responsibility’. This tension is particularly acute in 
situations where to refuse to use force would allow greater evil to ensue, at least in 
the immediate context. The demands of love and justice, on the one hand, and non-
violence on the other may well come into irresolvable conflict, and the criterion of 
immediate ‘effectiveness’ cannot totally be discounted. Yoder’s emphasis on the 
crucial importance of the unalloyed witness of the church to non-violence and its 
long term value will be discussed in the next section. Here it may suffice to note the 
dilemma at the heart of all pacifist systems occasioned by the ethics of conflicting 
duty, which is particularly acute in the case of Yoder’s pacifism with its radical 
dependence on the example of Christ crucified transmitted through the church.  
 
Criticism - the social responsibility of the church 
What, then, is this social responsibility of the cruciform church? Does Yoder 
shrug off the question of responsibility - or is the difference merely between two 
varieties of social responsibility (which is probably a more accurate analysis of his 
position)? One approach could be described as proactive and direct, seeking to 
influence (if not control) policy from inside the walls of power. The other could be 
described as a reactive and indirect approach, prophesying and witnessing from 
outside those walls. Neither approach can justly incur the reproach of opting out. 
The key question for Yoder is which approach is most congruent with the one who 
was crucified ‘outside the gates of power’ by the powerful. Yoder insists that he is 
moving the goalposts concerning responsibility, and that one can be both faithful 
and responsible. If the common view of responsibility is accepted, then Yoder 
might be thought to be irresponsible. But the parameters of the discussion on 
responsibility, set by Troeltsch and the Niebuhrs, are precisely what Yoder 
questions, in the name of an alternative social construct, the church. The church’s 
primary ethical task is to be the church, and to live out a faithful and consistent 
witness. This is stressed by Yoder, whose theological and ethical strategy is shared 
by Hauerwas, who argues on the grounds of actual effectiveness as witnessed to by 
history: ‘The church does not fulfil her social responsibility by attacking directly the 
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social structures of society, but by being itself it indirectly has a tremendous 
significance for the ethical form of society.’ (Hauerwas 1981: 212) The issue is, 
according to Yoder ‘not whether the Christian is to be responsible or not, but rather 
what form that responsibility is to take in the light of God’s action in Jesus Christ’. 
(Hauerwas 1981: 214)  
‘Responsibility’ in the Constantinian sense is, as we have noted, a 
temptation both for left and right. The liberation theologian, however, might well 
argue - cui bono Yoder’s idea of responsibility? The damaging structures of power 
remain the same, and all the church does is nibble at the edges. Yet Hauerwas 
continues with the suggestion that one of Yoder’s strengths is that the ‘interest of 
the poor and disadvantaged’ is not the sole determining factor in Christian social 
ethics. Certainly, ‘the Church has a special relation to the poor as it is obedient to 
the call of its Lord, but this does not mean that it is its job to simply identify with 
the self interest of the poor in terms of the power strategies necessary to achieve a 
more relative justice’.  The conflict with liberation theology is clear. The church 
must be aware that ‘the political tactics used by the poor, while perhaps achieving a 
greater justice according to the world, only makes them as men more subject to the 
powers of this world’. (Hauerwas 1981: 214) This, as has been previously observed, 
echoes criticisms of liberation theology that its analysis of human sinfulness vis-à-
vis power is not deep enough, if its aim is merely to change one power structure for 
another. Rather, a more radical critique of power itself is required. This may well be 
true (and will be explored in depth later) but risks the obvious criticism, that a 
government which uses its power justly is clearly preferable to one which uses its 
power oppressively. For the poor on the receiving end of governmental power, 
proximate justice is preferable to preserving to what may seem to be an abstract 
theological principle. Hauerwas stresses (Hauerwas 1981: 215) that this must not be 
misused in a conservative way, but claims that ‘true justice cannot be achieved by 
engaging in action that forces us to join hands with the devil as we work for good 
ends’. This means that ‘the Christian cannot participate in every form of life he 
finds present in his societal context’. Any participation is secondary to this: ‘The 
first question of significance for Christian social ethics cannot be which social cause 
should the church support, but rather what form the church must assume in order to 
be true to the Lord of all society.’ (Hauerwas 1981: 216) That shape is cruciform, 
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which means, according to Hauerwas and Yoder, a radically different doctrine of 
responsibility. 
The most obvious example of such a church, whose prime theological 
concern is to be ‘the church’, is the Confessing Church in Nazi Germany, and it is 
instructive and perhaps disturbing to assess the political consequences of such a 
church. (It is no accident that Yoder’s theological mentor Karl Barth was one of the 
main theological influences on the Confessing Church). The Confessing Church 
steadfastly resisted Hitler’s attempt to co-opt the church, and separated from the 
‘German Christians’ who did so, thus maintaining its witness uncorrupted. It is all 
too easy  to criticize the behaviour of a threatened minority faced with an 
overwhelming tyranny, but the Confessing Church’s record of political resistance to 
Nazism and protest on behalf of the Jews (with the exception of Jewish Christians) 
was not good, despite the urgings of Bonhoeffer. A negative, even if pure, witness 
is not enough for a church which seeks to be cruciform. (A similar parallel from the 
German resistance might be between the ‘Yoderian’ non-violent approach of von 
Moltke of the Kreisau circle and the ‘realist’ assassination conspiracies of von 
Stauffenberg and other army officers.) The Confessing Church cannot be equated 
with a Yoderian church in its entirety – its doctrine was not self consciously non-
resistant and its witness not non-violent, since few of the members took a pacifist 
stance – but its concern for preserving an uncorrupted witness and its limited sense 
of wider political responsibility (caused, to some extent by the totalitarian society in 
which it was set, but also partly by its Lutheran social ethic) show both the strength 
and the potential weakness of Yoder’s ‘cruciform’ church.  In the next section we 
will explore how Yoder’s political theology of the cross utilizes a different and 
more positive view of historical causation and the church’s role in that causation. 
 
      A new way of ‘doing politics’ – through a cruciform church 
 The criticisms of aspects of Yoder’s theology as outlined above are serious, 
but need not be fatal to his central claim, that the Christian (and the church) is 
called to share in the pattern of the divine love as revealed definitively in the cross 
of Jesus. The manner in which God deals with evil through the patient non-violence 
and non-resistance of the cross might not supply an all-inclusive ethic, but certainly 
points towards a stance which has far reaching social and political implications. 
Whilst the correspondence between divine providential action and human political 
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action need not be absolute, it would be paradoxical and even ridiculous if the two 
were unrelated.  The fact that God’s way in Christ of encountering evil (in its 
starkest political form) involved self-giving, non-violent, and non-resistant love 
cannot be irrelevant to any strategy which can bear the name Christian. This 
necessitates, for the corporate church and for the individual Christian, an alternative 
way of doing politics. Yoder’s concern is to redefine what it means to ‘do politics’: 
He [Jesus] refused to concede that those in power represent an ideal, a logically 
proper, or even an empirically acceptable definition of what it means to be 
political. He did not say (as some sectarian pacifists or some pietists might) 
‘You can have your politics and I shall do something more important’; he said,’ 
Your definition of polis, of the social, of the wholeness of being human socially 
is perverted.’ (Yoder 1994: 94-5)  
In attempting to formulate a ‘Christian politics’ which conforms to God’s action in 
the cross, Yoder emphasizes the role of the church as the cruciform community, 
patiently suffering and witnessing, as the supreme agent of God’s purposes. The 
argument can be summarized as follows: the distinction between the church and the 
world is central to social ethics; the pattern of social ethics must be Christocentric 
and hence cruciform; this pattern can, indeed must, be required of the church, but is 
not expected of the world. An obedient church bearing a consistent, Christlike and 
cruciform witness to God’s kingdom in an unbelieving world through its ‘deviant’ 
values is at the heart of Yoder’s thinking. 
  The church itself is a social ethic, and the most valuable contribution the 
church can make to society is to be itself, uncorrupted and consistent. The 
cruciform church is to be a community of creative dissent, and is to beware of the 
temptation, in Martin Luther King’s analogy (King 1986: 300) , of merely being a 
thermometer reflecting the temperature of society (although perhaps Yoder would 
regard King’s rhetorical alternative, the church as thermostat controlling that 
temperature, as assuming too much direct responsibility). The key community for 
the exercise of ‘Christian politics’ is not the state and its exercise of coercive power, 
as in realist thought; nor the nation, as in conservative thought, but the church. 
Whereas the realist seeks to forward a Christian politics through close interaction 
with those who hold power, the Yoderian strategy is to concentrate on the church: 
first by the positive steps of building a Christlike community and second by the 
negative steps of refusing to participate in actions which violate the cruciform, non-
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violent essence of the gospel. Hence, the church, not the state, is the first target of 
prophetic criticism. Judgment begins within the house of God and the church’s 
contribution to the mentality in which nations wage war. ‘The polemic of a valid 
Christian pacifist witness must be theological and first of all directed to the church.’ 
(Yoder 1994: 240) ‘The audience to whom it needs to be directed is the circle of 
those who have affirmed knowledge of and commitment to an overarching divine 
purposefulness active in history.’  
This is especially relevant in twenty first century Europe with the demise of 
Christendom and no reasonable pretension to Constantinianism possible, either in 
its conservative or liberal variety, due to Christianity’s minority status. As will be 
explored more fully, the church’s witness is paradoxically more valid in a post 
Constantinian situation since it has been forced to relinquish Constantinian 
pretensions, and to bear witness from a position of relative powerlessness (a painful 
exception to this being the influence of the radical right on American government 
policies). Yoder acknowledges this new (at least post-Constantine) situation for 
Christian social ethics, where Christians live as a minority in a pluralist world, and 
any possibility of ‘managing’ society is excluded. The church exists through its 
solidarity-relationship to and unity with Christ, not through any parasitic 
relationship with the state. The church is theologically prior to the state, as a 
foretaste and catalyst of the reconciliation of humanity to God through 
evangelization and through preserving the purity of its essence and witness. 
 
Church, kingdom, and world 
 The church’s relationship to the kingdom is that of a foretaste, a model, and 
a herald of what is to be. The church itself is not the kingdom, but the reality of the 
kingdom must be distinctively visible in the church, in its conformity to the 
character of Jesus and in its solidarity with him. The church is a visible sign in time 
of the eternal realization of God’s kingdom – which means that salvation should not 
be over-identified in the liberative political movements which liberation theology 
regards as at least a part of the process of salvation. Not only, Yoder argues, is this 
neo-Constantinian, but also it is dangerous to read in a Eusebian way political 
victories as signs of God’s providence.  
 If there is a continuity in the relationship between church and kingdom, 
there is much less in that between church and world, due to the church’s cruciform 
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distinctiveness. Yoder’s non-resisting pacifist witness is, as we have seen, firmly 
Christological and cruciform – but such cruciformity cannot be expected of society 
as a whole, certainly not the voluntary cruciformity assumed by the church. We 
shall examine later how liberation theologians treat involuntary ‘cruciformity’. The 
believing, voluntary church is separate in its ethical norms from unbelieving 
society. Yoder asks, rhetorically, if it makes sense to expect the enforcement by 
public authorities of ‘standards of fraternity and equity which Christians can seek 
after in the church on the basis of the free assent of those who claim to be 
committed to Christian obedience’. (Yoder 1994: 239)  
The Christian is not to be indifferent to the politics of the world, since the 
relationship of the church to the world is parallel to that of God to the world – 
sacrificial and loving concern but without an attempt to manage or control. This 
delicate balance, of concerned engagement, but from a position of service rather 
than of power, is difficult to maintain, but could have the effect of liberating the 
church from a compulsion to control in order to exercise its proper role vis-à-vis 
society, primarily to be formed into a body which shares in the love of God as 
revealed in Christ and seeks to witness to that love by word and deed. Yoder 
suggests that ‘A church once freed from compulsiveness and from the urge to 
manage the world might then find ways and words to suggest as well to those 
outside her bounds the invitation to a servant stance in society.’ (Yoder 1994: 240) 
In The Priestly Kingdom (Yoder 1984: 96ff) Yoder writes of the church’s 
‘servant strength’. This servant strength, itself derived from the self giving of the 
crucified Christ, both requires and empowers patience, in its dual etymological 
meaning of persistence and suffering. Just as God (and, in his earthly ministry, 
Jesus) accepts and suffers the consequences of the world’s spurning of God’s saving 
initiative, so must the church do also. This does not mean that the church writes off 
the world and lives hermetically sealed from it. Rather, the church continues to 
serve the world even as the world rejects the gospel and, in that rejection inflicts 
suffering on the church. This is not a denial of responsibility, or a form of opting 
out. By its patience and its distinctiveness the Yoderian church preserves its 
capacity to be a channel for the divine movement of history which a more obviously 
‘responsible’ but compromised church would lose. The danger of a social ethic of 
‘responsibility’ is an over-identification of the church with the world, so that the 
social message of the gospel and the ethical nature of the church are watered down 
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into a pragmatism unsatisfying, ultimately, to both church and world; where the 
church attempts to formulate an ethic which is a weak compromise between the 
radical demands of faith and policies acceptable to the non-Christian. 
 Moreover, a conscious withdrawal from ‘responsibility’ is, paradoxically, a 
strategy supported by a strictly ‘realist’ view of social ethics, given the minority 
situation and social weakness of the church (a position much more marked in 
Britain than the USA). The church simply does not have the power to exercise 
‘responsibility’, since there are huge areas of life which cannot possibly be under its 
control, even if it believed it right to attempt such control. It must therefore, 
according to Yoder, free itself from fruitless concerns over responsibility, in order 
to concentrate on its true mission – its identity as a body bearing a consistent 
witness to the revelation of God in Jesus and its prophetic ministry, which seeks to 
speak to particular acts of injustice or abuse rather than to assume responsibility for 
the whole picture. 
 
Criticisms of Yoder’s doctrine of the cruciform church 
Yoder, in his view of a ‘non-responsible’ social ethic of a cruciform church 
witnessing within a majority unbelieving society, can be criticized at various points, 
both empirically and with regard to the doctrines of the Spirit and the Trinity.  
The first and major empirical criticism, is that Yoder idealizes (and 
idolizes?) the church. The church is the ‘Messianic community’ – but regarded 
empirically, it falls far short of its calling as a body which witnesses to Christ by its 
ethical consistency and solidarity with its founder. It can appear to many, both 
within the church and outside, that non-Christians often have higher ethical 
standards, at least in the realm of social ethics (for example, the destructive alliance 
between certain forms of evangelicalism in the USA and the political right). 
Moreover, even churches with a strong form of magisterium, whether ecclesiastical 
or Biblical, differ widely in their political ethics. A political ecclesiology such as 
Yoder’s has to be based on how the church actually is, and not merely on an 
idealised church. In addition to the discrepancy caused by human sin between the 
church’s ideal nature and actual performance, the church is always in a dialectical 
relationship with the community in which it is set. There is, perhaps, much more 
interpenetration, for good or ill, than Yoder recognizes, and his rigid church-world 
dichotomy is probably overdrawn – certainly in Britain, where the established 
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church has relatively weak boundaries. Yoder counters this empirical view of the 
actual performance of the church by asserting, that although the church falls short of 
its vocation, it is in a process of continual self-examination, self-criticism, and self-
correction. Yoder writes, in his introduction to The Priestly Kingdom that ‘Any 
existing church is not only fallible but in fact peccable. That is why there needs to 
be a constant potential for reformation and in the more dramatic situations a 
readiness for the reformation even to be radical’. (Yoder1984: 5) Yoder has in mind 
a disciplined body with a shared and accepted ethical strategy, a situation not 
possible for the traditional ‘Christendom’ churches. Perhaps as the churches are 
forced beyond Christendom to a position of minority status this distinctiveness 
might be easier to attain.  
Next, it is possible to criticize Yoder’s distinction (highlighted in Hauerwas 
1981: 205ff) between the ‘norm of Christ and the form of the world. The kind of 
life assumed by the faithful Christian is not the same as the secular man of good 
will’. It must be questioned how far this is empirically correct. Without accepting 
Rahner’s ‘anonymous Christian’ hypothesis in its entirety, there is surely a sense in 
which God’s Spirit can inspire, even if unconsciously, those ‘of good will’. For 
example, in participating in the attempted rescue of Jews in the Nazi occupied 
Netherlands, the ethical value of the actions of the devout Christian Corrie ten 
Boom was precisely equivalent to those of a secular Dutchman. A Christian may 
have (and does have) an added motivation, but the form of the world in a particular 
instance may often be identical to the norm of Christ. It is true that an ethically 
mixed body of people cannot have the same ethical discipline as a smaller, more 
homogeneous group, and cannot draw on the same resources as a faith community, 
but Yoder runs the risk of underestimating both the inescapable sinfulness of the 
church (which in effect may resemble ‘the world’ much more closely than he would 
perhaps care to admit) and also the role of the Spirit in working beyond the church.  
This aspect of the work of the Spirit is seriously downplayed in Yoder’s 
theology. Reinhold Niebuhr provides a necessary corrective, in criticizing a doctrine 
of an over wide disparity in the actual performance of ‘church’ and ‘world’ - ‘The 
church must recognize that there are sensitive secular elements within modern 
nations, who though they deny the reality of divine judgment, are nevertheless more 
aware of the perils of national pride than many members of the church.’ (Niebuhr 
1946: 33) Similarly, Daniel Day Williams suggests a broader perspective: ‘A 
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hidden Christ operates in history. Therefore there is always the possibility that those 
who do not know the historical revelation may be more repentant than those who 
do.’ (Williams 1968: ch.12) A more Trinitarian theology, with an increased 
emphasis on God the creator and sustainer, and on the Holy Spirit working beyond 
the boundaries of the church, would greatly enhance (and would certainly not 
weaken the impact of ) Yoder’s analysis. It is possible to assert the necessary 
distinctive and voluntary cruciformity of the church whilst acknowledging that the 
Spirit may work beyond the church, even (as will be investigated later) in an 
involuntary cruciformity in civil society.  
  
Cruciformity as suffering non-resistance 
To sum up: Yoder argues that the church’s cruciformity is exhibited in its 
non-resistance (and therefore non-participation in certain aspects of society) and in 
its readiness to suffer as a part of its witness. Non-resistance and non-participation, 
moreover, should not be seen as opting out in an irresponsible way, but as a 
contribution to social good. Yoder comments in a key passage in Politics of Jesus, 
that the Christian  
chooses not to exercise certain types of power because, in a given context, 
the rebellion of the structure of a given particular power is so incorrigible 
that at the time the most effective way to TAKE responsibility is to refuse to 
collaborate, and by that refusal to take sides in favour of the victims whom 
that power is oppressing. This refusal is not a withdrawal from society. It is 
rather a major negative intervention within the process of social change, a 
refusal to use unworthy means even for what seems to be a worthy end. 
(Yoder 1994:154)  
Sociologically, a minority community which chooses carefully the areas of its 
participation and non-participation in society can have a great impact through its 
promulgation of an alternative way of living. Its smallness can, paradoxically, be an 
advantage, in removing both the temptation to control and the threat to others whom 
the church might in other circumstances wish to control, and in allowing a 
consistency and a discipline impossible in a more disparate community. 
 The church, as an alternative society, must be prepared for suffering 
inflicted by the society to which it refuses to conform. This may not necessarily be 
for ‘religious’ reasons. Just as Jesus was crucified, not for his specifically religious 
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reasons but for his social nonconformity, so the church will suffer for its social 
nonconformity. Persecution is usually a response by the powerful to a challenge to 
their power. If the church’s message was merely ‘vertical’, there would be no need 
for persecution – it is when the ‘vertical’ aspects of faith impinge on the 
‘horizontal’ that persecution is incurred (for example, again, the debate in post-war 
Germany over whether Bonhoeffer should be accounted a martyr, because his 
execution was for political resistance). Yoder comments: 
Such a dichotomy between the religious and the social must be imported 
into the [Biblical] texts; it cannot be found there. The ‘cross’ of Jesus was a 
political punishment; and when Christians are made to suffer by government 
it is usually because of the practical import of their faith, and the doubt they 
cast upon the rulers’ claim to be ‘benefactor.’ Yoder 1994: 125).  
Suffering is not a good in itself, nor should nonconformity be courted for its own 
sake; it is only required because the values of ‘the church’ run counter to the values 
of ‘the world’ (although, as we have seen, the division is not always necessarily 
clear cut). This suffering has an added significance as a sign of participation in the 
divine presence and purpose. Yoder describes such suffering as ‘a participation in 
the character of God’s victorious patience with the rebellious powers of his 
creation’. (Yoder 1994: 209) By the suffering of the Christian church, ‘the suffering 
of the cross is perfected in history’. (Yoder 1982: 237) The suffering of God, and 
hence his power to ‘move history’, is represented within that continuing history by 
the suffering of the church. The importance of this concept of correspondence 
between the cruciform church, which takes up the cross of suffering, and God’s 
action in the crucified Christ is central in Yoder’s thinking. The church’s power and 
purpose derives from the witness it gives through that correspondence. It is through 
that witness that the church fulfils its chief role in politics. Zimbelman (Zimbelman 
1992: 383) contrasts the Constantinian rationale of direct, humanistic causation with 
Yoder’s theology of a providential vision of history where causation is more 
oblique. He describes this redefinition of the role of the church in politics in terms 
of an ‘expressive’ rationality, whereby deeds must be measured not only by whether 
they fit certain rules, nor by expected results we hope to achieve, but by what they 
‘say.’   
 The church, then, eschews a proactive role, to adopt a witness uncorrupted 
by compromise. In this, a cross-bearing pacifism is not an optional extra or a mere 
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tactic; it is intrinsic to the church’s distinctive being as ‘participants in the loving 
nature of God as revealed in Christ’. (Yoder 1994: 240) Any other stance would be 
self contradictory. This is not an ethic of withdrawal, for the essential ‘otherness’ of 
the church provides a base for a reactive political activity wherever the church 
discerns, first, that there is a need and, second, that it can act without going against 
its essential non-violent ethic. In Archimedean terms, Yoder seeks a dos moi pou 
sto (‘give me somewhere where I might stand’ and I will move the world) outside 
of (or at least on the fringes of) the compromises of politics, in contrast to the 
Niebuhrian who seeks to move politics from the inside. This nonconformist stance 
will bring suffering which, as martyrdom, is itself a witness to God’s essential non-
violence, suffering and patient love. As Yoder states in his conclusion to Politics of 
Jesus: 
The kind of faithfulness that is willing to accept evident defeat rather than 
complicity with evil is, by virtue of its conformity with what happens to God 
when he works among us, aligned with the ultimate triumph of the lamb. 
(Yoder 1994: 238) 
 
b) Boff and Sobrino – politics and a cruciform church 
 We now move to a discussion of what it means in the theology of Boff and 
Sobrino to be a cruciform church, and how the cross might inform the church in its 
political involvement. This will be discussed under three headings: cruciformity as 
sociological re-positioning; as persecution and martyrdom; and as a redefinition of 
accessing power. The three ecclesiological works discussed are Boff’s Church, 
Charism and Power (Boff 1985) and Ecclesiogenesis (Boff 1986) and Sobrino’s 
The True Church and the Poor (Sobrino 1984). 
 
Sociological repositioning 
 For liberation theology in general, the cruciformity of the church can be 
seen in its sociological location among the poor and powerless, rather than, as in 
Yoder, an policy of nonconforming self-restraint towards the use of power, and of 
suffering as a result of that nonconformity. The aim of liberation theology has been 
to become a ‘church of the poor’, and the ‘base ecclesiastical communities’ have 
become a significant component of Latin American church life, even if their growth 
and development has not matched the high hopes of the 1960’s and 1970’s. For 
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Boff, this is rooted in a Franciscan spirituality which seeks an authentic following 
of Christ in a committed community marked by poverty, equality, and a concern for 
the disadvantaged. For liberation theology in general, this was encouraged by the 
ecclesiology of Vatican II, with its emphasis on collegiality, subsidiarity, and the 
church as the ‘people of God’, and by the teaching by the CELAM Medellin 
conference on the necessity of taking the ‘option for the poor’.  
 As a Brazilian, Boff’s ecclesiological work is radically influenced by the 
Base Communities, which began to be founded in Brazil and Nicaragua in the mid 
1960’s and hence form the backdrop to much of his work. The Base Communities 
can be described as liberation theology in practice, groups of lay led Christians, 
usually in rural or slum areas, meeting regularly to read the scriptures, pray, 
worship, discuss community problems and how to react to them; a ‘popular’ rather 
than ‘institutional’ church, but usually with a link to parish churches for liturgical 
services. It is perhaps significant that the base communities do not usually seem to 
include the poorest of the poor, but are drawn from the more articulate, aware, and 
(potentially) politically active. There is a differentiation in Sobrino’s theology 
(which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter) between the ‘active 
crucified people’ and the ‘passive crucified people’ – those who are organized for 
political change, and those who are simply the passive recipients of disadvantage 
and injustice. It is arguable that the former are further to the forefront of Sobrino’s 
thought in his teaching concerning the salvific role of the crucified people. Boff 
champions such groups, and sees in them a ‘reinvention’ (Boff 1986: 23ff) of the 
church. His trenchant criticism of the institutional church caused him to be silenced, 
for a year, in 1985 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. He sees, 
however, a role for both institutional and ‘base’ church, while stressing the 
importance of the style in which the institutional church lives, ‘whether the 
functionaries are over the communities…or within them’. (Boff 1986: 60) Church, 
Charism and Power is specifically concerned with issues of power within the 
church, emphasizing power ‘from below’, lay leadership rather than clerical 
hegemony, but Boff’s analysis of power has political implications beyond the 
church. 
 The base communities are not universal in Latin America. In Central 
America, the Solentiname community in Nicaragua became famous through the 
work of Ernesto Cardenal, but in El Salvador the emphasis in liberation theology 
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has rather been on a more general ‘church of the poor’. Sobrino differentiates 
between a church ‘of’ the poor and a church ‘for’ the poor (Sobrino 1984: 92); the 
church must not just be concerned for the poor; such a church ‘assists the poor but 
ignores the poverty’. The privileged theological position of the poor means that the 
poor must constitute the essence of the church. The church of the poor ‘does not 
seek to organize itself on the basis of what the world calls power, wisdom, or 
beauty, but rather on the basis of the poor, the persecuted and all those crucified by 
history’. (Sobrino 1984: 154) It accepts the ‘scandal of history’ and uses it as a basis 
for its own structure. In this way it expresses authentic Christianity, deriving from 
Jesus himself and expressing his presence. Sobrino stresses that ‘the risen Lord who 
brings a community into existence is not just any human being or any Christ but the 
crucified Jesus of Nazareth’. (Sobrino 1984: 89) A church which expresses Jesus 
must reflect his crucifixion. This is achieved by making the ‘crucified people’ the 
sociological, as well as the theological, essence of the church.  
 
Persecution and martyrdom 
 Such a repositioning puts the church in a position of extreme vulnerability. 
Sobrino quotes Archbishop Romero’s words concerning the persecution of the 
church in El Salvador: 
I rejoice, my brothers, that priests have been murdered in our country. It 
would be a sad thing if, when so many Salvadoreans have been murdered, 
no priests would be murdered. They show that the church has taken flesh in 
poverty. (Ellacuria and Sobrino 1994: 695)  
Sobrino is writing against a background of persecution, most dramatically 
illustrated by the murders of Fr. Rutilio Grande and Archbishop Romero 
(documented in Berryman 1984, especially chapter 5 concerning El Salvador), and 
later by those of Sobrino’s Jesuit colleagues. The centrality of martyrdom has been 
discussed previously, and need not be revisited at great length here. Sobrino links 
the persecution of the contemporary church closely with the ‘persecution of Jesus’ 
and the cross which ensued. The church in following Jesus’ praxis will receive the 
same persecution. This, however, is not foreign to the mission of the church, but 
congruent with its early experience, uncorrupted by the Constantinian compromises. 
Boff contrasts the primitive martyr church with the later Constantinian (and, by 
extension, compromised contemporary) church. The primitive church ‘did not care 
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about survival because it believed in the Lord’s promise that guaranteed it would 
not fail…The later church was opportunistic; that it would not fail was a question of 
prudence and compromise that allowed it to survive in the midst of totalitarian 
regimes, at the expense of gospel demands.’ (Boff 1985: 54-5) Here, the idea of the 
consistency of the church, relying on the providence of God rather than prudence, 
leading to a possible crucifixion, is strikingly similar to Yoder’s insistence on a 
refusal to compromise the values of the gospel to maintain a position alongside the 
powerful. 
 
Redefinition of accessing power 
 At the heart of liberation theology is the conviction that the church is 
inescapably political. This, of course, is nothing new. The church has always acted 
politically in blessing certain governments, institutions, armies or weapons. A 
refusal to speak out, for example, against the widespread torture in Argentina under 
the military junta, was as political as denouncing such actions. It is, moreover, 
ironic that liberation theology should be accused of politicizing the gospel when, in 
the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic church has encouraged major party 
political involvement in the shape of, for example, the Catholic Centre Party in 
Weimar Germany and the Christian Democrats in post-war Europe. By contrast, 
liberation theology has exercised a remarkable reserve in refusing to endorse, or, as 
Gutiérrez puts it, ‘baptize’ specific political programmes, Christians for Socialism 
in Chile and the Cardenals’ participation in the Sandinista government in Nicaragua 
being relatively minor exceptions to the rule. Nevertheless, it is clear that liberation 
theology insists on the church becoming politically involved with the poor in their 
struggle for change and liberation. In what might be described as the seminal text of 
liberation theology, A Theology of Liberation, Gutiérrez writes that the church has 
an inescapable political dimension, and must both denounce unjust and 
dehumanizing situations and announce the need for transformation. (Gutiérrez 
1973: 114ff)  
Catholic social teaching (for example Sollicitudo rei socialis) emphasizes 
the need to transform sinful social structures. The contribution of liberation 
theology in this area has been to stress the need for change from the bottom up 
rather than by conversion of the power holding elites. Liberation theology looks to 
Christ crucified outside the gates of power, rather than to the residents of Pilate’s 
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palace. The stark image of Jesus the powerless crucified by the powerful provokes a 
radical suspicion of power, the motives of those who hold the power, and the 
lengths to which they will go to maintain that power. Hence power must be sought 
in different ways, not by associating with and attempting to influence the power-
holders, but by looking to power ‘from below’. In Ecclesiogenesis (where his focus 
is primarily power within the church, but his analysis can be translated to a wider 
critique of power) Boff contrasts the ‘top down’ institution with ‘from below’ 
community. He sees the institutional church as centred in ‘society’s affluent sectors, 
where it enjoys social power and constitutes the church’s exclusive interlocutor 
with the powers of society’. (Boff 1986: 8) The church is therefore faced with a 
choice: either to ‘continue good relations with the state and wealthy classes 
represented by the state or take the network of basic communities seriously, with 
the call for justice and social transformation this will imply’. This is a cross-risking 
path – for with this second course of action comes ‘insecurity, official displeasure, 
and the fate of the disciples of Jesus.’ 
 
c) Conclusion 
 In contrast to the next chapter, where the focus is upon the ‘Crucified 
People’ as interpreted by Boff and Sobrino this chapter has concentrated upon 
Yoder’s cruciform ecclesiology. Yoder’s teaching on the relationship between 
church and politics is a direct challenge to the ‘Christian realist’ school, and 
envisages an alternative approach which could be especially fruitful given the 
church’s increasing marginalisation from traditional political power. However, 
serious criticisms can be made. The social and political nonconformity indicated 
and empowered by the cross is arguably strong on form, but weak on content. 
Nonconformity of itself is morally neutral, and Yoder runs the risk of deifying 
nonconformity as such, without necessarily examining the destination to which that 
nonconformity leads. The ends of political nonconformity (e.g. justice, freedom, 
and ‘shalom’) are as important as the method by which those ends are attained, and 
both are intertwined. Yoder’s ethic here faces the objection that it provides an 
essential negative function – a way of criticising certain violent responses to evil 
and oppressive power and exploring how suffering can be used in a Christian 
response, in non-retaliation and non-violence. But in itself it does not provide a 
wide enough framework for a Christian politics. Yoder’s Jesus rejects certain kinds 
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of kingship, but how should a ‘king’ use the ‘royal’ power? Yoder goes half way – 
a crucial half way, but not the full journey. For example, Yoder’s remark that ‘the 
cross is the kingdom come’ could be seen to confuse means with ends. Yoder’s 
deliberate neglect of how to handle power could condemn the Christian to a state of 
mind where permanent opposition is preferable to government (as in certain 
sections of the Labour party in the 1980’s) or, paradoxically, to an attitude which 
serves the conservative purpose of keeping existing powers undisturbed. Of course, 
Yoder’s general oeuvre provides many examples of a wider framework (the 
necessity of justice, for example) but it would perhaps strengthen his case if the 
doctrine of the exemplarity of Jesus included, alongside cross-bearing, other aspects 
of Jesus life (for example his radical inclusiveness of ‘sinners and outcasts’).  
Against this criticism, Hauerwas argues that Yoder’s interpretation of cross-
bearing is in fact of the highest political significance, because it points to a radically 
different way of political interaction. Jesus ‘brought a definite form of politics by 
calling men to participate in the non-resistant community’. (Hauerwas 1973: 252) 
Christ’s cross is not primarily for my personal justification, whether pietist or 
existential – it is ‘the first mark of the creation of a new social reality’. (Hauerwas 
1973: 252) The defining characteristic of the imperial Roman order was that it ruled 
by violence – therefore a politics which did not attempt violence was in itself 
subversive of that ultimately destructive order. Non-resistance is not merely 
negative. It means being part of a community which ‘gives a new way to deal with a 
corrupt society; it builds a new order rather than smashing the old.’ (Hauerwas 
1973:253) Form, according to this argument, can be as significant as content. In 
defence of Yoder, it must also be stressed that in his definitive work, Politics of 
Jesus, he is not attempting a systematic and comprehensive statement of Christian 
politics, where issues of justice, equality, inclusiveness etc. might be further 
developed (although Yoder deals with such issues extensively in other more 
occasional articles). He is attempting to read off a definitive political method from 
the life, and particularly the death, of Jesus, which can be applied to contemporary 
politics. The Liberation theology of Boff and Sobrino does not start from the same 
theological basis as Yoder, but it is, ironically, in the Base Communities of Latin 
America that such a Yoderian politics has most vividly been put into practice. These 
Christian communities have taken a vulnerable position outside the ‘gates of power’ 
and have exercised a powerful political witness.  
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Chapter 8 
The crucified people – solidarity between the poor and the crucified Christ 
 The last chapter concentrated on the political ecclesiology of Yoder, and his 
attempts to express the relationship between politics and a cruciform church. In this 
chapter we change the usual order, and begin with the teaching of Sobrino on the 
crucified people. We then consider aspects of the theology of Boff and Yoder which 
might illuminate Sobrino’s teaching. 
 
a)  Sobrino – the crucified people 
 
Introduction – the theme of the crucified people 
 When discussing the theme of the crucified people in the theology of 
Sobrino, it is important to recognize its antecedents, especially the contribution of 
Ellacuria, Sobrino’s martyred Jesuit colleague in El Salvador. The ‘scourged Christ 
of the Indies’ has been a theme in Latin American theology since the time of De Las 
Casas. His famous saying ‘in the Indies I leave Jesus Christ, our God, being 
whipped and afflicted, and buffeted and crucified, not once but a thousand times, as 
often as the Spaniards assault and destroy those people’ (quoted in Sobrino 1994a: 
11) forms the backdrop to Sobrino’s (and Ellacuria’s) theology of the cross. 
Ellacuria, in an article written as a preliminary paper to the CELAM Puebla 
conference in 1979 (Ellacuria and Sobrino 1993: 580-603), linked this old, but often 
neglected, theme with soteriology in a new and radical way. In European theology, 
in his groundbreaking work The Crucified God (Moltmann 1974) Moltmann had 
formulated a theology of crucifixion, but in this early work he restricted the 
metaphor of ‘taking up of the cross’ to Christian believers without extending it 
more widely to those who do not choose to bear the cross, but have it thrust upon 
them. (Moltmann 1974: 64) It is significant that, probably under the influence of 
Latin American theologies of the cross, Moltmann later extended cross bearing to 
sociological as well as religious categories.  
 Sobrino locates the rediscovery of this theme in the political circumstances 
of El Salvador. He relates how Ellacuria ‘saw the Salvadorean reality as poverty, 
injustice, oppression, repression and war. He saw the people bearing the burden of it 
all. He called them ‘the crucified people.’ Ellacuria applied his reading of the 
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situation in El Salvador more widely, and interpreted the reality of the world in 
terms of crucifixion. A large part of humanity has been and continues to be 
‘crucified by the oppression of nature and, above all, by historical and personal 
oppression’. (Sobrino 2004: 50) The crucified people are a constant factor in world 
history, although the mode of crucifixion might change. They become the historical 
successors to the Biblical figure of the suffering servant. 
 Sobrino, following Ellacuria, links the present crucified people intimately 
with a fairly traditional and comprehensive Christology. He also integrates the 
theme of the crucified people with soteriology, and gives them an important 
soteriological role. This linking of the ‘crucifixion’ of peoples, of Christology, and 
of soteriology, in the light of such Biblical passages as the ‘servant songs’ and 
Paul’s enigmatic phrase about ‘completing in their flesh what is lacking in Christ’s 
passion’ (Colossians 1: 24) poses searching questions about the identity and salvific 
potential of Christ’s suffering body in history, the relationship between the cross of 
Christ and the individual or collective crosses of Latin America, and the spirituality 
which responds to such ‘crucifixion’ 
 In Sobrino’s early works the theme is present only indirectly. In Christology 
at the Crossroads (Sobrino 1978) Sobrino links contemporary Latin American 
suffering with the cross. He writes of ‘the cross of Jesus and the historical crosses’ 
in tandem. (Sobrino 1978: 230) In Jesus in Latin America (Sobrino 1987) Sobrino 
includes a chapter entitled ‘The Risen One is the One who was Crucified: Jesus’ 
resurrection from among the world’s crucified’ and describes the ‘crucified of 
history’ as constituting not just the conscious and faithful followers of Jesus but: ‘In 
the human race today – and certainly where I am writing – many women and men, 
indeed entire peoples – are crucified.’ (Sobrino 1987: 148) He adds, ‘We must not 
forget that there are millions of persons in the world who do not simply die, but, in 
various ways, die as Jesus died.’ (Sobrino 1987: 151) Sobrino’s collection of essays 
originally published in 1992 is significantly entitled, The Principle of Mercy: 
Taking the Crucified People from the Cross (Sobrino 1994b). The fullest 
outworking of this theme is found in his developed Christology, Jesus the Liberator 
(Sobrino 1994a) and in his tribute to and theological reflection upon the Jesuit 
martyrs in Witnesses to the kingdom: the martyrs of El Salvador and the Crucified 
Peoples (Sobrino 2003). In one of his later works, Where is God? Earthquake, 
terrorism, barbarity and hope (Sobrino 2004) Sobrino returns to this theme. The 
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motif of the crucified people  is ‘vigorous and rigorous’ – it denotes people really 
dead, not merely hurt; killed, not dying ‘naturally’; dying a shameful and 
undeserved death; and dying a death connected to Jesus and his fate. (Sobrino 2004: 
51) The ‘crucifier’ is injustice: ‘Injustice crucifies; there are different forms of 
crucifixion according to the circumstances.’ (Sobrino 2004: 53) It is from these 
works that a description and a critique of the theme will mainly be drawn, in 
dialogue with the Norwegian theologian and social ethicist Sturla Stalsett whose 
study The crucified and the Crucified (Stalsett 2003) is a comprehensive and 
penetrating examination of the theme from a Lutheran viewpoint. 
 
What is meant by the crucified people?  
 In discussing this question it is salutary to remember that the crucified 
people are, first of all, a tragic sociological reality and only secondarily a 
theological concept. Sobrino locates the theme of crucified people in the linkage 
between the historically crucified body of Jesus and a contemporary ‘body of 
Christ’. He asks of this contemporary ‘body’ ‘whether this body is crucified, what 
element of this body is crucified, and if its crucifixion is the presence of the 
crucified Christ in history’. (Sobrino 1994a: 254) The cross is not confined to the 
time of Jesus, but is a present reality, especially in the ‘historical catastrophe’ of the 
Third world, where ‘there is no doubt that the cross exists, not just individual 
crosses, but collective crosses of whole peoples.’ The only way to express the 
theological and sociological gravity of the situation is to use the term ‘crucified 
peoples.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 254) The term ‘crucified people’ denotes not just any 
death, but primarily that actively inflicted by unjust structures, the ‘institutionalized 
violence’ of poverty and oppression. There are not only victims but also 
executioners. On a religious level the cross represents the death that Jesus died, and 
therefore for the believer it can ‘evoke the fundamentals of the faith’ and link, in 
Stalsett’s term, the ‘crucified’ with the ‘Crucified’. The crucified people are the 
‘actual presence of the crucified Christ in history’. (Sobrino 1994a: 255) The 
relation between Christ and the crucified people is reciprocal: ‘In this crucified 
people Christ acquires a body in history and … the crucified people embody Christ 
in history as crucified.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 255)  
 Sobrino later amplifies this (in Sobrino 2003:156). The language of 
contemporary crucifixion is metaphorical and conveys much better than other 
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language ‘the historical enormity of the disaster and its meaning for faith.’ It 
denotes the ‘slow, but real death caused by the poverty generated by unjust 
structures’. Such death is multifaceted and includes not just the obvious violence of 
war. ‘  ...Swift, violent death, caused by repression and wars, when the poor 
threaten these unjust structures….Indirect but effective death when peoples are 
deprived even of their cultures in order to weaken their identities and make them 
more defenceless.’ It is a useful and necessary description of a conflictual reality 
‘because cross expresses a type of death actively inflicted. To die crucified does not 
mean simply to die, but to be put to death; it means that there are victims and there 
are executioners.’ The Latin American people’s cross has been inflicted upon them 
by various empires: Spanish and Portuguese yesterday, the US and its allies today, 
‘whether by armies or economic systems, or the imposition of cultures and religious 
views, in connivance with the local powers’. Such language is useful and necessary 
at the religious level also because the word ‘cross’, denoting the fact that Jesus 
suffered death on the cross and not any other death ‘evokes sin and grace, 
condemnation and salvation, human action and God’s action’. The cross is a 
symbol, but much more than a symbol; it is the presence of God himself on the 
cross that is an effectual sign to humanity. ‘From a Christian point of view, God 
himself makes himself present in these crosses, and the crucified people become the 
principal sign of the times. This sign [of God’s presence in our world] is always the 
historically crucified people.’ 
 The language used is metaphorical; cases of actual contemporary torture and 
execution by crucifixion, in a manner physically identical to that of Jesus, are of 
course not the point of Sobrino’s work. The relationship between the cross of Jesus 
and the ‘crosses’ of Latin America is analogical and as with any analogy it is 
essential to note there is not necessarily complete correspondence. We explore later 
how Sobrino perhaps aims for a more complete correspondence in terms of 
salvation than is warranted. The language of crucifixion, however, has a meaning 
which it would be difficult to express in any other way, especially for a Christian 
theologian seeking to link religious truth with the contemporary situation of 
suffering. It describes a conflictual situation common to both the crucifixion of 
Jesus and the contemporary world. Most of all it links the crucified people with the 
person of the crucified Jesus, in a reciprocal movement – the crucified people shed 
historical and sociological light on the crucified Jesus, and the crucified Jesus sheds 
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theological light on the crucified people. This is, perhaps, separating too sharply the 
theological and sociological; a liberation theologian would argue that the two are 
intimately linked.  
 
Who are the crucified people?  
 We have already noted that one of the innovations of Ellacuria and Sobrino 
was to extend the bearing of the cross from those who specifically choose to do so 
as Christians to those who have ‘crucifixion’ thrust upon them, those who, in 
Rahnerian terminology, are ‘anonymous’ cross bearers rather than cross bearers by 
choice. Ellacuria defines the crucified people as follows: 
That collective body, which as the majority of humankind owes its situation 
of crucifixion to the way society is organized and maintained by a minority 
that exercises its dominion through a series of factors, which taken together 
and given their concrete impact within history, must be regarded as sin. 
(Ellacuria and Sobrino 1993: 590)  
Hence the term denotes those suffering from the consequences of a sinful ordering 
of society. This suffering is not due to the chance misfortunes of life, but to a 
situation of structural oppression, deliberate in that there are those who benefit from 
sinful structures and seek to keep them in place. Given the metaphorical nature of 
the language, there is some inevitable flexibility in its usage, and this lack of 
precision can lead to potential dangers, especially when the crucified people are 
linked with soteriology. Perhaps Sobrino uses differing aspects of the crucified 
people imprecisely? Liberation theology is, above all a contextual theology, and it is 
important to recognize how changes in context broaden the scope of the theme of 
the crucified people. Analyses of Latin American poverty have increasingly 
encompassed issues of sexual and racial inequality and erosion of traditional 
culture, and globalization has (at least partially) changed the nature of economic 
poverty from oppression to exclusion. Does Sobrino have in mind the poor as 
politically organized (most specifically, the base communities) or, in Marxist terms, 
the ‘lumpenproletariat’ poor who simply ‘die en masse, innocently and 
anonymously’ (Sobrino 2003: 132)?  
 The theologically controversial leap undertaken by Ellacuria and Sobrino is, 
as suggested above, to extend ‘cross bearing’ from those who bear the cross as a 
result of their following Jesus to a wider suffering community. Is it justifiable to 
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make such an extension, from suffering explicitly for Jesus’ sake to a more general 
suffering? If Rahner is at all correct in arguing for ‘anonymous Christianity’ i.e. that 
it is not necessary to name Christ explicitly to be sharing his way, then the corollary 
might be that it is not necessary to suffer explicitly for Christ to share in his 
suffering. It is necessary only to suffer in the way that Christ suffered, and for 
similar historical reasons – at the hands of those who hold power, and crucify those 
who threaten that power. Sobrino wrestles with this in his discussion of the relation 
between the ‘Jesuanic martyrs’ and the crucified people: 
If martyrdom is the response of the anti-kingdom to those who struggle 
actively for the kingdom, then the analogatum princeps is being like Jesus, 
as exemplified in Archbishop Romero. If martyrdom is bearing the burden 
of the sin of the anti-kingdom, then these defenceless majorities – killed 
innocently, massively and passively, are the analogatum princeps.  
(Sobrino 2003: 132)  
The crucified people ‘without intending it and without knowing it…. fulfil in the 
flesh what was lacking in the passion of Christ.’ Sobrino will be aware that in using 
this verse (Colossians 1: 24) in this way he is going far beyond the meaning of Paul, 
who refers in that passage to those engaged in apostolic labours for the sake of the 
church. Is this transposition justified? Or is Sobrino pushing the language too far in 
identifying the crucified people too closely with those in the New Testament who 
suffer with and for Christ?  I would argue that such an identification is justified, so 
long as the metaphorical nature of the crucified people language is recognized, and 
an attempt is not made to apply the metaphor indiscriminately to every point of 
comparison. 
 
Interpreting the role of the crucified people 
 As before, it is important to recognize that the ‘crucified people’ do not, 
primarily, have a ‘role’; they simply exist in their own right and are defined as 
crucified people by their oppressed situation. Stalsett has attempted to describe 
three ‘axes’, or interpretative relationships, between Jesus and the crucified people 
in Sobrino’s theology. (Stalsett 2003: 164-5) The first he names as 
‘Epistemological-hermeneutical’, denoting the two-way hermeneutic we have 
already noted between Jesus and oppressed peoples today. Theological and 
sociological understanding of one aids similar understanding of the other. The 
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second he describes as ‘Historical-soteriological’. Salvation is manifested and 
transmitted in history by the crucified people. The third of Stalsett’s ‘axes’ is 
‘Ethical-praxical’.  Jesus’ historical praxis and that of the crucified people ‘mediate 
a call from God to all human beings to participate in the mission to overcome all 
suffering – to ‘take the crucified down from their cross’’. (Stalsett 2003: 165)  
 Although I would regard these ‘axes’ as useful, I wish to analyse the theme 
of the crucified people in a slightly different way: first, in relation to a discipleship 
shaped by the reality of suffering interpreted through the prism of the cross of Jesus; 
and, secondly, in relation to solidarity and salvation. Since the second is the most 
theologically innovative, I will devote much of my discussion here to the 
soteriological aspects of the crucified people. This is not, however, to downplay the 
pastoral and ecclesiological aspects of the crucified people, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later. 
 
The crucified people and a theology of cruciform discipleship  
 The reality in which Sobrino does his theology is a crucified reality – in 
other words, a reality of suffering, and this crucified reality forms the bedrock of his 
interpretation. It may be argued that to regard reality as fundamentally ‘crucified’ is 
arbitrarily to pluck out one aspect and to privilege it above all others. This criticism 
can be answered in two ways. First, liberation theologians work consciously from 
their context (liberation theology argues that other theologies likewise work from 
their context, but often unconsciously), and Sobrino’s context in war torn and often 
desperately poor El Salvador is best described, theologically, as crucified. Secondly, 
a downplaying of suffering, when it is regarded as merely yet another aspect of the 
world, risks the accusation of theological and social complacency and an ignorance 
(unconscious or wilful) of the mechanisms by which the powerful hold their power 
and the powerless are excluded. A theological and pastoral recognition of the 
crucified people makes possible a true knowledge both of the crucified reality of the 
world and of the divine response to that crucified reality. What Gutiérrez described 
as the ‘underside of history’ (Gutiérrez 1983) is brought to the surface. This gaining 
of a true knowledge of reality through the prism both of the cross of Christ and of 
its historical concomitant, the crucified people, forms a concrete and transformative 
‘epistemological hermeneutic’. 
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 The transformative potential of the hermeneutic provided by the crucified 
people is immense. At its simplest, for theology to recognize the existence (and 
centrality) of the crucified people is to shift the perspective in theology from the 
powerful to the victims. This is the prism through which theological truth is 
mediated in a privileged way. Theology and praxis are intertwined, so that the 
theological truth thus mediated is translated into compassionate discipleship, an 
encounter with the crucified people in a discipleship of the crucified Jesus. This 
encounter must not be from a position of neutrality or for a purpose of detached 
observation or philosophical theodicy.  Sobrino, as we have seen, extends the first 
world’s dilemma of how to do theology after Auschwitz to the yet more challenging 
how to do theology within Auschwitz. In such a situation, analysis of crucifixion 
without an attempt to abolish crucifixion is pointless. Sobrino recounts how 
Ellacuria admired Moltmann’s The Crucified God (a bloodstained copy of which 
was found in Ellacuria’s house following his murder by a paramilitary ‘death 
squad’) but he made a point of stressing a more urgent practical and theological 
idea: the crucified people. ‘The sole object of all this talk must be to bring them 
down from the cross’. (Sobrino 2003: 155) 
 
The crucified people, solidarity and salvation 
 In exploring a parallelism between the crucified Christ and contemporary 
suffering, Ellacuria and Sobrino have followed a path which can be traced in more 
traditional theology. However, in ascribing salvific significance to the crucified 
people they consciously go beyond the traditional. It is important to preface an 
analysis of this by a consideration of what Ellacuria and Sobrino mean by salvation. 
Sobrino states: ‘There is no history of salvation without salvation in history.’ 
(Sobrino 1994a: 262) Salvation is not simply an intra-trinitarian operation, nor 
something solely to be awaited in a far off unworldly future, but something to be 
experienced in the present history of the world. This is not totally to discount the 
more traditional views of salvation (although there is little doubt that in practice the 
traditionally ‘heavenly’ aspects of salvation are downplayed in much liberation 
theology) but to emphasize its present reality in the particulars of history. In a 
similar way, Gunton argues that ‘the universal salvation must take concrete shape in 
particular parts of the creation’. (Gunton 1988: 170) It is the role of the Holy Spirit 
to ‘particularize the universal redemption in anticipations of the eschatological 
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redemption’. Salvation is seen by Boff and Sobrino in such terms as humanization 
and deification (the two not being contradictory). It is not simply brought about by a 
divine fiat of grace but is (at any rate in its historical manifestations, upon which 
liberation theology concentrates) accomplished by active human participation. It is 
important also to note the gap not only between traditional and liberation 
theologies, but between Protestant and Catholic understandings of salvation: the 
Protestant emphasizing the never to be repeated gracious action of God in Christ; 
the Catholic the ongoing participation in that action by humanity. As a Roman 
Catholic liberation theologian, it is hardly surprising that Sobrino’s view of 
salvation presupposes salvation as something to be worked out in the present. The 
correctness or otherwise of this presupposition deeply affects any judgment of the 
appropriateness of utilizing the theme of crucified people, especially in soteriology. 
 Sobrino’s doctrine of the crucified people rests on a solidarity between God 
in Christ and those who suffer. Sobrino argues: ‘The crucified people are the 
presence of Christ crucified in history….it is idle to say that Christ crucified has a 
body in history and not identify it in some way.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 264) There is a 
parallelism which goes beyond mere similarity – Stalsett usefully describes a 
communicatio idiomatum, a mutual exchange of properties (Stalsett 2003: 166) 
between the suffering Jesus and the suffering people. If the cross of Jesus 
demonstrates the vulnerable presence of God in sharing human suffering, then it is 
analogically correct to ascribe God’s vulnerable presence also to the crosses of the 
contemporary world. This divine sympathy is in itself a sign of salvation, in 
demonstrating God’s solidarity with those who suffer. Sobrino takes this further by 
utilizing the Isaianic figure of the ‘Suffering Servant’ (especially in Isaiah 53). He 
finds significant similarities between the suffering servant and the crucified peoples 
of today, in their suffering, in their being ‘despised and rejected’, and in their being 
killed for ‘establishing right and justice’. This triple identification, of the suffering 
servant, of Jesus, and of the crucified peoples, is the starting point for Sobrino’s 
new soteriological departure.  
 It is interesting to note that Sobrino does not necessarily ascribe a greater 
salvific role to those who are active in political and economic change. He certainly 
likens this role to that of the servant: ‘The Servant shares both Jesus’ mission and 
his fate…..Too many die formally like the Servant for trying actively to establish 
justice.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 257-8) But identification with the suffering servant is not 
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restricted to those who identify themselves as Christians or who are political 
activists:  
Among the crucified people there are also many – the majority – who end up 
like the Suffering Servant but not directly for what they actively do, simply 
for what they are. They are killed passively, for just being what they are: 
even when they say nothing, they are the greatest proof of injustice and the 
greatest protest against it. (Sobrino 1994a: 258) 
The relationship is a reciprocal one. ‘Without the active Servant, the passive 
Servant would have no voice, and unless the passive Servant existed, the active 
Servant would have no reason to exist.’ (Sobrino 1994a: 259) The Servant ‘bears 
the sin of the world’. (Sobrino 1994a: 260ff) In other words: ‘The invisible wrong 
done to God becomes historical in the visible wrong done to the victims. ‘Died for 
our sins’ …means really to be crushed in a particular historical situation – by 
sinners.’ What, then should be done about sin? It is necessary to ‘eradicate it, but 
with one essential condition – by bearing it’. The theme of ‘sin bearing’ is crucial 
for Sobrino: ‘Rather than taking on the guilt of sin, bearing the sin of others means 
bearing the sin’s historical effects: being ground down, crushed, put to death.’ This 
is not merely negative, but has soteriological import: ‘The crucified people bear the 
sins of their oppressors on their shoulders…nevertheless, by really taking on the sin 
historically, the Servant can eradicate it.’ This is a remarkable statement by 
Sobrino, especially when followed by: ‘It becomes light and salvation and the 
scandalous paradox is resolved.’ The crucified people become bearers of ‘historical 
soteriology’ - in a similar way to the suffering servant’s role as bearer of salvation. 
In a significant later passage Sobrino writes: ‘The one chosen by God to bring 
salvation is the servant, which increases the scandal.’ (Sobrino 2003: 160) The 
scandal is salvation coming ‘from below’, from an unexpected place. The crucified 
people are not only those to whom God’s salvation is primarily offered, but are also 
the key to the world’s salvation (there is an interesting parallel in the privileged 
position of the proletariat in Marx’s scheme of ‘salvation’). Sobrino downplays the 
‘vicarious expiation’ aspect of the Servant’s role as not illuminating ‘what salvation 
the cross brings, far less what historical salvation the cross brings today’. (Sobrino 
2003: 160) And yet, to be true to the Biblical model, salvation must somehow be 
found in the figure of the suffering servant. This is not ‘only or principally a matter 
of speculation and interpretation of texts. It is a matter of grasping the reality’. 
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Sobrino attempts to describe three ways in which the suffering servant/crucified 
people can be said to be bearers of salvation – ‘as shedding light on the human 
situation; as offering humanizing values; and as bearing the ‘sin of the world’.   
 First, the crucified people bring into sharp focus the injustices of the world. 
Sobrino writes of the light given by the crucified peoples: 
It will produce panic and disruption, it will also dispel the darkness and 
heal….It will produce the light of utopia: that true progress cannot consist in 
what is offered now, but in bringing the crucified people down from the 
cross and sharing the resources and everybody’s goods with all.  
(Sobrino 2003: 161)  
This light ‘Shows the nations what they really are’. It unmasks lies: ‘If the First 
World cannot see its own reality in this light, we do not know what can make it do 
so.’ It demonstrates the ethical unsustainability of the present situation: ‘The 
solution offered by the First World today is factually wrong, because it is unreal; it 
is not universalizable. And it is ethically wrong, for them and for the Third World.’ 
(Sobrino 2003: 160) The first step (although, as Sobrino perhaps neglects to 
mention, only the first step) in salvation is the manifestation of the sin, what might 
be called in traditional evangelical language ‘conviction of sin’. The existence of 
crucified people means that economics and politics are revealed to be a matter not 
merely of figures on a balance sheet or games played by the powerful, but involve 
actual crucifying effects on human beings. They show the reality of sin, its effects 
upon humanity, and what must be done with it. 
     Next, Sobrino turns to the positive and notes the salvific (in Sobrino’s terms 
‘humanizing’) values which the crucified people bring (Sobrino 2003: 161): 
The crucified people offer values that are not offered elsewhere…… 
evangelizing potential….  the gospel values of solidarity, service, simplicity 
and readiness to receive God’s gift; a humanizing potential, offering 
community against individualism, co-operation against selfishness, 
simplicity against opulence, openness to transcendence against blatant 
positivism, so prevalent in the civilization of the Western world.  
(Sobrino 1994a:  263)  
The crucified people offer  hope, great love, forgiveness, a faith, a way of being 
church ‘and a holiness that are more authentic, more Christian and more relevant to 
the present day world, and that recapture more of Jesus’. Sobrino is aware of this 
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from personal and pastoral experience – there is the danger, though, that in other 
hands this doctrine could veer too closely toward a naïve Rousseau-like 
idealization. The crucified people of the ‘third world’ offer these gifts to the whole 
world in what could be a beneficial exchange: ‘Liberated and given grace by the 
crucified people, the first world could become grace and liberation for them.’ 
(Sobrino 2003: 162) Moreover, the crucified people demonstrate some of the most 
striking features of Jesus’ life in the world, and hence show what it means to share 
in Jesus’ status as a son (or daughter) of God. In this sense, they mediate the life of 
Jesus to the world. 
 Third, the poor ‘bear the sin of the world’. The crucified peoples, as the 
chief recipient of the harmful results of sinful economic and political structures, can 
be said to ‘bear the sin of the word’ in that they bear its consequences. However, 
Ellacuria and Sobrino seem to go beyond this relatively simple concept in 
suggesting that the power of sin can only be overcome by bearing its consequences, 
by suffering under it. Stalsett interprets this to mean that ‘Salvation in history can 
be achieved only through confronting sin in an active struggle against it, and 
bearing the consequences of the opposition which such a struggle always – by 
historical necessity – will meet’. (Stalsett 2003:141) This would in itself be an 
adequate and fruitful interpretation, but Ellacuria and Sobrino seem to go beyond 
this in ascribing to the crucified people a special salvific role with the phrase: 
‘There is no liberation from sin without the bearing of sin.’ But does ‘sin’ (in the 
liberation theologian’s sense of injustice and dehumanization) have to be ‘borne’ in 
the sense of suffered, for ‘salvation’ to take place? Can it not simply be halted, 
changed, brought to an end? This change may well involve suffering on behalf of 
those who attempt such a course, but Ellacuria and Sobrino seem to suggest that 
there is something not only ultimately beneficial but absolutely necessary in 
‘soaking up’ the sin by suffering injustice and oppression. This image (Christ 
nullifying the power of sin by ‘soaking up’ all that could be directed at him) has 
been fruitful in providing a new model of atonement, but it is difficult to see how 
this can be used profitably with the crucified people, whose liberation lies not in 
receiving more injustice in order to ‘soak it up’ but in being delivered from it.   
 Stalsett provides a useful summary of the salvific benefits of the crucified 
people and attempts to integrate Sobrino’s teaching with more traditional doctrines 
of salvation (Stalsett 2003: 538ff). ‘Since God’s presence with the crucified Jesus is 
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a salvific presence, there are signs of God’s salvific presence also in the crosses of 
history.’ This happens in the following ways: ‘The crucified people share salvation 
with the world by testifying to God’s salvific presence, and by transmitting and 
communicating signs and fruits of this salvation to others.’ Their role is that of an 
effectual witness: ‘…through hope, through promoting life, forgiving, they generate 
solidarity and mercy, and confess the God of life’. Stalsett is careful to distinguish 
between Jesus and the crucified people in the mediation of salvation: the crucified 
people mediate salvation in a derived sense; Jesus is the prime mediator, and calls 
others to follow him. Similarly, whereas the crucified people are indispensable for 
salvation, they do not create salvation. They are not, in Stalsett’s view, saviours, 
and do not play a salvific role in an ultimate sense. Jesus alone is the saviour. They 
do not carry the sins of others away; this, according to Stalsett, would be a wrong 
extension of the suffering servant analogy. They may carry other people’s sins as 
scapegoats, in a Girardian sense, but Christianity breaks the logic of scapegoating, 
since Jesus is on the side of the scapegoat, and enables those who are scapegoats to 
break free. Suffering in itself is not salvific – salvation lies in the love of God, 
present in the Crucified.  
 I would largely agree with Stalsett’s sympathetic critique. This doctrine of 
the crucified people is a dramatic and vivid transposition of the historical cross of 
Jesus to present circumstances. By analogy with the presence of God in the 
suffering Jesus, it emphasises God’s solidarity with those who suffer today. Perhaps 
Sobrino would have been wise to restrict salvific value to that divine solidarity, and 
to have been more hesitant in over applying the analogy with Christ. Sobrino risks 
appearing to suggest that the crucified people themselves take over the work of 
Christ, if not in toto, then to a substantial degree. There are two problems with this: 
first, that it derogates from the unique and definitive nature of Christ (although 
Sobrino is clear that the crucified people’s mediation of salvation is a derived 
mediation, and in line with the traditional theology of the body of Christ 
perpetuating Christ’s ministry); and second, that it portrays only a partial view of 
salvation – there is (rightly) nothing ascribed to the crucified people encompassing 
such soteriological models as atoning sacrifice, substitution, etc. which are found 
within the model of the suffering servant. Perhaps refuge can be taken in the 
argument that liberation theology only emphasises that part of theology which is 
particularly relevant for its own situation – it does not deny the rest, but 
 147 
concentrates on certain aspects. For example, the crucified people undoubtedly 
illustrate certain aspects of salvation, in acting as an ‘open wound’ of humanity thus 
bringing into sharp focus political and economic sin and the need for redemption. 
There is, however, a further problem in directly ascribing salvific value to 
the crucified people’s sufferings. True, their sufferings do bring to light an unjust 
situation, but that is, as we have seen, only a preliminary to salvation, not salvation 
itself. Sobrino himself suggests that salvation occurs when the crucified people are 
taken down from the cross. Their sufferings may well enable acts of remedial 
justice, kindness, compassion to take place, and hence have value, but that is similar 
to a pastoral situation where a seriously ill, or disabled person is informed that their 
life has value and purpose in being a focus of love, in being a recipient of care and 
an opportunity for others to demonstrate compassion. This may well be true, but it 
fundamentally transgresses the Kantian ethic of never treating humans as means to 
an end, but as an end in themselves. Sobrino’s theology here risks instrumentalising 
the crucified people – in addition to the ever present danger of legitimizing poverty. 
This danger can to some extent be countered by his insistence on the absolute 
primacy of taking the crucified from their crosses. Although God, in Sobrino’s 
theology, chooses the poor as the principal means of salvation, this does not mean 
that he intends them to remain poor or sacralises their poverty. 
Much of the above criticism is lessened if the salvific element of the 
crucified people is specifically identified as those (within the crucified people or 
acting on their behalf) who actively resist systems of poverty and political 
oppression, and suffer as a consequence. The obvious candidates, close to Sobrino’s 
own experience, are those other sections of the church which seek to ‘take down the 
suffering people from their crosses’ (most notably, the martyrs of El Salvador). 
Sobrino states that ‘Ignacio Ellacuria said many times that the specifically Christian 
task is to fight to eradicate sin by bearing its burden.’ (Sobrino 2003: 96) This 
would describe very accurately those within the Latin American church who 
actively campaign against poverty and oppression, and bear the burden of suffering 
which this entails. Sobrino continues: ‘Although it is true that historical sin can only 
be eradicated by means of a power outside the sin, it also has to be done by 
someone willing to bear the burdensome reality of that sin which destroys and sows 
death’. (Sobrino 2003: 103) In other words this means not merely attacking the 
‘system’ from the outside, but bearing the consequences of that system from within 
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and being willing to accept the possible outcome. Suffering, in itself, does not bring 
salvation, but a willingness to suffer for a salvific cause is part of the salvific 
process, a distinction well made by Stalsett: ‘Life in service of the kingdom saves, 
with death a possible and likely consequence. Therefore the suffering people are 
salvific only insofar as there is a reproduction of Jesus’ service for the kingdom in 
history.’ (Stalsett 2003: 148-9) That service, and therefore salvific action, can be 
unconscious or anonymous (in the Rahnerian sense) and Jesus does not need to be 
named for the service to be Christlike. Sobrino is well aware of the distinction 
between ‘active’ salvific action and ‘passive’ salvific action. Perhaps his 
unwillingness to dismiss ‘passive’ salvific action is due to a justifiable reluctance to 
separate too radically the politically active from the masses they represent. It would 
probably be more accurate to identify different sections of the crucified people with 
different parts of the salvific process – the ‘passive’ with the role of providing 
evidence for ‘conviction of sin’, the ‘active’ bearing the weight of that sin in order 
to overcome it. 
  
b) Boff and Yoder – a theology of solidarity 
 
Boff and cruciform solidarity 
Sobrino’s doctrine of the crucified people rests on the solidarity of God with 
those who suffer. This theme of solidarity, between the poor and the crucified 
Christ, and, by extension, between the poor and the present body of Christ, is 
central to Boff’s theology. In his summary chapter ‘How to preach the cross of 
Jesus Christ today’, he expounds this theme in two ways: ‘To carry the cross as 
Jesus carried it means taking up a solidarity with the crucified of the world.’ (Boff 
1987: 130) This commitment and solidarity involves the dangerous process of both 
defending the oppressed and denouncing their oppressors. ‘Jesus’ cross and death, 
too, were the consequence of such a commitment to the deserted of this world.’ 
(Boff 1987: 130) Boff no doubt has in mind the option for the poor adopted by the 
Roman Catholic church in Latin America following Medellin. Also, the cross is the 
sign of God’s actual, historical solidarity with the victims of history.  
God’s preferred mediation is the concrete, real-life suffering of the 
oppressed...To draw near to God is to draw near the oppressed. To say that 
God took up the cross must not be a glorification or eternalization of the 
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cross. That God has taken up the cross shows only how much God loves. 
God loves sufferers so much that he suffers and dies along with them.  
(Boff 1987: 132-3)  
Boff finds a radical congruence between the perspective of the poor and that of the 
crucified Christ. A key Biblical passage in Boff’s interpretation of the cross is 
Matthew 25: 31-46 (‘When did we see you.....?’)  He comments: ‘God really does 
lie hidden and unknown beneath every person in need.’ (Boff 1980: 37-39) The fact 
that God, or Jesus, continues to suffer in the poor and oppressed is at the heart of 
Boff’s theology of the cross, and crucial to his methodology. 
Hence, Boff writes of the ‘one eye focussing on the historical Jesus... the 
other eye focussing on the Christ of faith who continues his passion today in his 
brothers and sisters’. (Boff 1980: viii) This forms the basis for Boff’s spirituality of 
a present encounter with God. Where does that encounter occur? What are the 
ramifications of that encounter?   Boff stresses the mystical solidarity between Jesus 
(and God) on the cross and those ‘crucified’ today. ‘Since God himself was 
crucified in Jesus Christ, no cross imposed unjustly is a matter of indifference to 
him. He is in solidarity with all who hang on crosses’. (Boff 1980: 16) How does 
God wish to be encountered? ‘God wishes to be encountered and served in the face 
of this humiliated and outraged person, in the disfigured face of this man who was 
the victim of violence.’ (Boff 1980: 45) This divine choice is central to genuine 
spirituality: ‘God chose to concentrate his presence, to privilege certain situations. 
If we do not encounter him there, where he chose to be, then we simply do not 
encounter him at all, nor do we commune with the real God of Jesus Christ.’ (Boff 
1980: 46-7) The locus chosen by God for the divine human encounter is first of all 
Jesus Christ, a ‘frail, powerless human being’. (Boff 1980: 47) ‘Second, we 
encounter God in the lives and faces of the humiliated and the downtrodden’ Boff 
combines Jesus as the ‘human face of God’, Matthew 25, and the identification of 
God with Jesus on the cross to create a spirituality of encounter with the divine in 
the ongoing ‘crucifixion’ of human beings.  
 To adopt Kitamori’s phrase (Kitamori 1965), Boff’s is a theology of the 
‘pain of God’. Boff stresses that God suffers as a result of being love, and takes up 
the cross as something very much extra deum as an expression of that love. ‘Here is 
the meaning of a God on the cross, a God in pain.’ (Boff 1987:115-6) A 
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contemplation of God in such suffering, and human suffering in the perspective of 
the divine, means that: 
Only in solidarity with the crucified can we struggle against the cross; only 
in identification with the victims of tribulation can there be real liberation 
from tribulation. And this was Jesus’ road, the road of God incarnate…God 
assumes the cross in solidarity with and love for the crucified of history, 
with those who suffer  the cross. (Boff 1987: 115-6)  
The cross and suffering is extra deum, and therefore not intrinsic to God, but God 
takes them up in freedom, and invites others to take up the cross in freedom and 
love as a means of accomplishing liberation from the ‘crosses’ of oppression. This 
is the basis for Boff’s cruciform spirituality of liberation: the cross is ‘the place 
where the power of love is shown. The cross is hatred destroyed by a love that takes 
up the cross and the hatred. This is liberation.’ (Boff 198: 116) The chosen and free 
solidarity of God, in Christ, with the suffering of the oppressed must be paralleled 
by a similar chosen and free solidarity on behalf of the church. In this way the 
church truly incarnates the present ‘body of Christ’.  
 This emphasis on solidarity is fundamental to Boff’s Christology, and is a 
radical outworking of his doctrine of the ‘cosmic Christ’. Through the resurrection, 
‘Christ penetrated [the world] in a more profound manner and is now present in all 
reality in the same way God is present in all things.’ (Boff 1978: 207) Boff is 
indebted to Rahner (as pointed out in Waltermire 1994: 40) in the extent to which 
sees the ‘cosmic Christ’ at work in all people. This means that ‘each person is 
actually a brother or sister to Jesus and in some way participates in his reality’.  
(Boff 1978: 218) Presumably the converse holds true, that the ‘cosmic Christ’ 
participates, often incognito, in the reality of each person. Reality, in Teilhardian 
terms, has a ‘Christic structure’. (Waltermire 1994: 42) 
 
Yoder – discipleship as solidarity 
 Yoder’s cruciform discipleship rests on a multifaceted solidarity with the 
crucified Christ. The disciple, in imitation of the character of God as revealed in 
Christ, shares radically in Christ’s sufferings. Yoder uses such words as 
‘participation’ or ‘correspondence’ to describe this relationship (Yoder 1994: 113), 
and describes ‘suffering with Christ as the definition of apostolic existence’. (Yoder 
1994: 120) The Christian thus shares in the ‘divine condescension’, exemplified in 
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the incarnation and especially the crucifixion of Jesus. Christ’s free solidarity with 
suffering humankind through the cross is paralleled by the church’s willingness to 
suffer in solidarity with him. Being ‘in Christ’ necessitates and empowers an 
identity between Jesus and the disciple-church which gives the church both its 
political ethic and its vulnerability to suffering. This solidarity-in-suffering of the 
church with the suffering Christ is the practical and historical source and outcome 
of the political nonconformity undertaken by the church in obedience to Christ.  
 
3) Conclusion 
 Boff’s stress on the solidarity of God through Christ with the world’s 
suffering is a useful complement to Sobrino’s doctrine of the crucified people. Both 
themes are Christologically focused, through Boff’s teaching on the ‘cosmic Christ’ 
and Sobrino’s linking of the ‘crucified’ with the ‘Crucified’. Both rest, too, on a 
theology of a suffering God who in freedom suffers the pain of the creation, and 
both give rise to a political spirituality of commitment, encounter and identification. 
Both (particularly Sobrino) are concerned not to restrict the crucified people to 
those claiming explicit Christian commitment or church membership. This is the 
critical point of divergence between Yoder’s theology of Christ in solidarity with 
his suffering (Christian) people and Sobrino’s theology of a crucified people whose 
only qualification for the title is their suffering. For Yoder, such solidarity is gained 
not through a more general suffering, but through suffering specifically as a 
member of a Christlike, persecuted church. As previously noted, it is important to 
recognize that the distinction may not in practice be as clear cut as it first appears. 
Sobrino and Boff write within a situation where the ‘default position’ of most 
people is Christian, and where despite the decline in the practice of Catholicism in 
Latin America, most would regard themselves as Christians and members of the 
church. For Yoder, membership of the church is, both sociologically and 
theologically, more a matter of choice.  There is, however, a fundamental difference 
between Sobrino’s approach, much influenced by Rahner’s ‘anonymous 
Christianity’ and Yoder’s theology, which is based on a committed and disciplined 
church, consciously imitating Christ’s suffering. I would argue, however, that the 
two approaches can be combined. Yoder’s committed and suffering community is 
an explicit sign of Christ’s cross - but that does not diminish the truth that a God of 
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sympathy and solidarity does not restrict that sympathy and solidarity to those who 
bear the name of Christ. 
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Summary  - towards a political theology of the cross (iii) 
 The last two chapters have discussed the cross in relation to two categories 
of people – the cruciform and the crucified people. I now attempt to outline 
elements arising from these chapters which I believe should be incorporated in a 
political theology of the cross.  
 
The corporate Christ and the people of God 
  In Pauline theology, Christ has a corporate, as well as an individual, nature. 
This is especially significant in Paul’s teaching about the ‘body of Christ’, referring 
not just to the physical body of Jesus of Nazareth but to his community of 
followers. From the human perspective, what is described as the ‘body of Christ’ is 
a continuation in physical form, in the present, of the reality of the historical Jesus. 
From the divine perspective, it denotes that part / aspect / mode of the divine that 
was in Jesus which takes shape in human reality today. Hence the ‘body of Christ’ 
is intimately linked with the historical Jesus as well as being a present sociological 
reality. In that sense, the body of Christ is an extension of the incarnation. How can 
that present body act politically, as Jesus did? How far is that body bound to follow 
the same pattern of life which, for Jesus, led to crucifixion? How far does that 
‘body’ extend? Is it restricted to those who bear the name of Christ, or does it 
include those who have done to them what was done to Christ? In general terms, I 
have described the former as the ‘cruciform people’ and the latter as the ‘crucified 
people’. There is certainly an overlap, but the term ‘cruciform people’ denotes those 
who actively choose to be members of a community seeking a political path which 
may lead to ‘crucifixion’; the ‘crucified people’ denote those whose ‘crucifixion’ is 
not necessarily chosen, but inflicted as a result of their unchosen sociological 
location. Both can claim to share in the corporate nature of Christ, the former 
through willing participation in his mission, the latter through unwillingly 
undergoing the same persecution he suffered at the hands of those whose power is 
threatened. 
 
The cross and a modified responsibility 
The church’s political responsibility is enlarged, not diminished, by the 
cross. The fact that Jesus’ political choices led him to a position of non-resistance, 
non-violence and non-coercion does not mean that Christian responsibility for the 
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world is denied. The Christendom approach may involve a tragic category mistake 
in conflating Christianity with civil power; the Niebuhrian ‘chaplaincy to power’ 
strategy runs the risk of complicity in evil, but the Christian’s loving responsibility 
for a suffering world cannot be escaped. The question is – how is that responsibility 
to be exercised? In the teaching of Jesus, sins of omission are as harmful as sins of 
commission, and a refusal to ameliorate a situation when it is within one’s power to 
do so should not be countenanced unless for overwhelmingly good reasons. The 
ethics of conflicting duty – on the one hand to peace and non-violence, on the other 
to justice and love of neighbour – mean that moral decisions cannot necessarily be 
clear cut, and the tension between witness and responsibility remains acute. The 
Christian should not be afraid of wishing to move history in the right direction; in 
the light of the eschatological hope of the coming kingdom, the Christian 
recognizes a telos and seeks to move towards it.  
 This is not to argue in a totally consequentialist manner that the telos 
requires a strategy to which all else can and should be sacrificed. There are 
legitimate ends – but the means to those ends are as important as the ends 
themselves. Legitimate Christian responsibility should only be exercised through 
legitimate (i.e. non-violent and non-retaliatory) channels. Can the goodness of the 
legitimate ends ever outweigh the evil of illegitimate methods? A short term 
Niebuhrian realist would answer in the affirmative, the Yoderian (relying on the 
efficacy of long term witness) in the negative. For reasons outlined above, it is 
difficult totally to discount the short term approach – provided that one maintains a 
deep awareness of human sinfulness, a wise cynicism about the motivation for 
supposedly good actions, and an awareness of unforeseen and unintended 
consequences. The Second World War is, perhaps, a prime example: a war fought 
for overwhelmingly legitimate ends, in defence against a criminal, vicious, and 
racist expansionary dictatorship, but fought in alliance with a comparably evil 
totalitarian regime, and with increasingly barbaric methods (such as the escalation 
of bombing from purely military targets to civilian terrorization). Can responsibility 
and a faithful witness to the non-violent nature of God be combined? This will be 
discussed more fully in the next section, but it is worth noting at this point that the 
truest witness to God reflects all possible aspects of the divine nature. A non-violent 
church witnesses to the non-violence of God, but also a responsible church 
witnesses to the loving responsibility of God. The church can never witness 
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perfectly to the character of God – the best that can be hoped for is an ethic of 
approximation to the form of Christ.  
 It is a false dichotomy to posit the choice between ‘being the church’ and 
taking on the responsibility of ‘doing politics’. ‘Being the church’ in a negative and 
defensive way is not enough, even if this preserves, in one sense, a purer witness to 
one aspect of God’s character. Nor is it a question of Christian social ethics 
choosing between ‘which cause should the church support’ and ‘what form should 
church take’. The church supports ‘causes’ because of what it is, and its actions – 
or, on occasion, abstaining from action – witness to what kind of a body it is. Either 
way it can incur the risk of ‘crucifixion’. This risk of crucifixion is the hard 
alternative to fight or flight. Jesus, in the garden of Gethsemane, was confronted by 
the alternatives of fight (the legions of angels), flight (returning quietly to Galilee) 
or remaining and facing the inevitable crucifixion (a point well made by Hovey 
2008: 86). Similarly, the church can fight (attempt to integrate itself into a system of 
power), flee (into a withdrawn and supposedly pure state which contradicts the 
principle of the incarnation) or remain, as a vulnerable martyr/witness of the gospel. 
 
The cruciform people, the state and the church 
 The cross provokes a strong hermeneutic of suspicion of Constantinian 
power. The Constantinian revolution was unfortunate, if perhaps inevitable, in co-
opting Christianity to the power of empire. The crucifier assumed the mantle of the 
crucified, and the effects of that uncomfortable fit have skewed Christian social 
ethics ever since. Most perniciously, the concept of Christian territoriality arose, 
and Christendom became an entity to be defended by violence. Crusade replaced 
cruciformity. The myth of ‘Christian nations’ hid the fact that there is no 
sociological entity which can properly bear the name Christian except the church 
(and, to a limited extent, certain para-church organizations). This hermeneutic of 
suspicion of Constantinianism need not lead to a refusal by Christians to support 
movements which seek political power (for example, liberation theologians 
supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua). It would be foolish to deny that for the 
victims of society, a benevolent government is better than an oppressive tyrant. 
However, one should still retain a radically cruciform suspicion of power (both on 
the left and the right) and an awareness of the danger of its corruption. 
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If the cross entails a hermeneutic of suspicion of civil power, it should 
equally entail a hermeneutic of suspicion of the church, since it was an alliance 
between civil and religious authorities which crucified Jesus. The separation of the 
church from the world can be overemphasised, the relationship being better 
described as dialectical, and the boundaries between church and society often 
blurred. The church, like any other human institution, is corrupt and fallible, and 
falls foul of the temptations of illegitimate power. While it is unrealistic, given 
human sinfulness, to expect the church to be anything other than what it is, the 
inescapable essence of the task of the church is to be a foretaste of and a witness to 
the kingdom of God. There is a sense in which the prime (but certainly not the only) 
community for the exercise of Christian politics is the church. The church should be 
the community in which the salvific values of the kingdom of God are promoted 
most energetically and seen most clearly.  
 It is a mistake to see the church as essentially ‘other’ with regard to politics, 
as if it could stand outside politics and move politics from a position of grand 
detachment. However, attention needs to be given to the question of where the 
church positions itself vis-à-vis state power. Here, the liberation theologian’s 
championing of a ‘church of the poor’ is significant. A cruciform church is most 
effectively situated among (or at least in touch with and conscious of) the needs of 
the vulnerable. Whereas the church’s relationship with political power has 
traditionally been from a position of equality and collegiality, a different approach 
is indicated. Speaking from the position of the vulnerable and assuming the 
possibility of conflict entails a critical yet participative approach to power which 
takes the perspective of the crucified rather than the crucifiers. Any engagement 
with and participation in structures of power must be done in terms of service rather 
than power seeking, with an awareness of the ever present danger of co-option. 
Withdrawal can of itself be a positive witness by refusing to collaborate with an 
oppressive state and taking sides with its victims. 
 
Powerlessness and persuasive witness 
In the kenotic hymn in Philippians chapter 2 Paul describes Jesus as 
rejecting control and choosing a powerlessness which culminated in the cross. 
Jesus’ choice is paralleled by the prior decision of God, whose chosen power is that 
of suffering love. God chooses to restrain the divine power, abstaining from any 
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coercion which might destroy human freedom, and, ultimately, the possibility of 
loving relationships. This restraint, although based on God’s free choice, is not 
totally contingent, given both God’s nature of love and the necessity, for human 
freedom, for God to distance himself from his creation. The church aims to share in 
this pattern of divine love, revealed to its greatest extent in the cross of Jesus, and 
seeks to live in a self-giving, non-violent, self-sacrificial love which best witnesses 
to the divine character. Hence the church should not use coercion as a strategy, but 
should rely on the persuasive power of its witness - the more consistent the witness, 
the stronger the persuasive power. However, while the church qua church should 
not use coercion, there is no reason why the individual Christian, acting as an agent 
of a beneficial state should not use a degree of coercion, provided that this coercion 
is exercised within the limits of love. It is important to recognize that the state is not 
normally constituted by the sword of lethal violence (rather than that of limited 
coercive police action). 
The church in twenty first century Britain seems to be moving into a 
position of imposed and involuntary powerlessness. Such cruciform powerlessness 
is not to be sought as an ideal in itself, but is nevertheless a situation from which 
good things can come and which can release spiritual resources otherwise fettered 
by a reliance on the short cut of power and force. This theme will be developed in 
the final chapter. 
 
The crucified people – metaphor and reality 
 The phrase ‘crucified people’ sheds light both on the crucifixion of Jesus 
and on contemporary suffering, conveying the shocking enormity of that suffering 
and linking it with Christology. The crucified people are a constant throughout 
world history, the grim and continuing story of executioner and victim, of powerful 
and powerless. It is, however, important to stress the metaphorical nature of the 
language used. As with any metaphor, there is not a complete correspondence 
between the language used and the reality described. If this is forgotten, it could 
seem that the negative is being unduly privileged. The whole reality of the crucified 
people is not described by this metaphor; joy, community, co-operation, faith and 
love co-exist with the ‘crucifixion’.  
 The phrase crucified people is, however, more than a metaphor. It describes 
the continuation in space and time of the sufferings of Christ, and his solidarity with 
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those who suffer. The parable of the Sheep and the Goats in Matthew chapter 25 
illustrates this solidarity, as does Paul’s enigmatic phrase in Colossians 1: 24 
‘…completing what remains for Christ to suffer’. This, as has previously been 
discussed, raises the question of the extent of the crucified people. If it is those who 
choose to bear the cross, its extent will be limited to Christians. If it is those who 
stand in the place where Jesus stood and are killed for the same reasons as Jesus, 
then its extent is far wider. As has been suggested, Rahner’s use of the phrase 
‘anonymous Christians’ may perhaps be found useful. God’s solidarity with 
suffering is not restricted to those who bear the name Christian, and the concept of 
the ‘anonymous crucified’ might express the link between those who consciously 
and willingly bear the cross of Christ and those who have it thrust upon them.  
 
The crucified people and salvation 
While the theme of the crucified people links well with Christology, the link 
with soteriology is less well established. Much depends on how salvation is defined, 
and, as mentioned above, there are significant differences not only between 
liberation theology and more traditional theology but also between Protestant and 
Catholic understandings of salvation. Care is needed with the language used, 
especially by liberation theologians, lest salvation be understood as being simply 
coterminous with social justice. Equally, more traditional theology must be aware 
of the possibility that salvation can be represented as hardly touching the earth at 
all, but detached from the reality of human struggle and the concreteness of sin. At 
the heart of salvation is a gift of God given in absolute grace through Christ, which 
restores a right relationship both between God and humanity and between human 
beings. That gift has to be appropriated, and that appropriation produces the fruits 
of justice, peace, restored relationships, healing ‘humanization and deification’. 
Others can mediate salvation, but Jesus is the only definitive saviour. How then can 
the crucified people be described in soteriological terms? Do the crucified people 
save others, or are they simply recipients of the saving love of God? It is perhaps 
best to describe the crucified people as: first, a vivid sign of the need for salvation; 
second, a sign that that salvation is in process; and third, the locus where the saving 
God is especially evident and present. 
 The crucified people stand as an open wound of humanity, and provide a 
shocking revelation of the reality of the world and hence its need for salvation. In 
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that sense they enable repentance and conversion by dispelling ignorance, bringing 
to consciousness as nothing else can the stark fact of human sin. They ‘bear the sin 
of the world’ as an exposed nerve bears the pain of the body. In their struggles for 
liberation and in the love, solidarity and compassion they display within that 
struggle they demonstrate that salvation is at work, and offer those hard won values 
both to the rest of the world in general and to other ‘crucified peoples’ in particular.  
 
The crucified people, ideology and idolatry 
  Theologically, the crucified people demonstrate the reality of Jesus, in the 
sense that they are the most vivid parallel possible in the present world to the 
historical crucifixion of Jesus. By demonstrating that reality, they prevent God from 
being seen idolatrously as a dispassionate monarch, rather than a ‘fellow sufferer 
who understands’. (Whitehead 1979: 350)  The ever present temptation to idolatry 
is most effectively overcome by the cross, which rules out any easy interpretation of 
the divine as conforming to, and thereby buttressing, structures of human power. If 
the cross, and the incarnation in general, is to be interpreted most accurately in the 
present world, the crucified people provide the most illuminating context for that 
interpretation. Their suffering forms a definitive place of encounter with the God 
who shares that suffering and seeks to abolish it.  
An attention to the theme of the crucified people can also help preserve 
theology from the Marxist charge against Christianity of forming a misleading 
ideology. Ideology, in the Marxist account, is described by Scott as follows: ‘Ideas 
have a particular function: either as a contribution to the explanation of our situation 
and so to overcoming or transcending this situation or as a contribution to the 
mystification or misconstrual of our situation.’ (Scott 1994: 15) Marxism accuses 
theology of ‘a capacity to mystify or obscure the ‘real’ social relations of 
contemporary capitalist society’ (Scott 1994: 64) thereby preserving the power of 
the dominant classes in society. According to this charge, the ideological effect of 
Christianity is ‘autonomous individualism or, at best, an intersubjectivity’. (Scott 
1994: 60) This, according to Marxist analysis, has a doubly pernicious result – the 
suffering classes are prevented from accurately recognising their true situation, and 
those who analyse society are given a misleading short cut by an over-general and 
non-historical doctrine of sin. If everything can simply be ascribed to ‘sin’, there is 
a diminished need for social analysis.  
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The theme of the crucified people provides a robust answer to these 
criticisms. First, the identification within Christian theology of a theological and 
sociological category of people as ‘crucified’ by analyzable socio-economic and 
political factors sheds light upon, rather than mystifies their oppressed situation. 
This is not a short cut, avoiding socio-political analysis, but an added layer of 
analysis. Mere individualism is explicitly renounced – the people are crucified as a 
people, and not merely as individuals. Second, the self-recognition by the oppressed 
as ‘crucified people’ enhances, rather than diminishes, their knowledge of their 
situation. Since domination often requires the ‘consent’ of the dominated, through 
ignorance of their true potential,  the self-consciousness of a people as being 
‘crucified’ helps to dispel that ignorance and provides potential for ‘resurrection’ in 
what Foucault described as ‘the insurrection of subjugated knowledges’. (Foucault 
1980: 81) 
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SECTION IV – BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATIONS  
3) HOPE, PROVIDENCE, POWER AND THE CROSS 
 
Chapter 9  
Hope, eschatology and the cross 
 We now turn to wider questions of providence, power and eschatology in 
the light of the cross. It is essential to recognise that in the New Testament the cross 
is not seen in isolation from the resurrection. In this chapter, therefore, we continue 
to focus on the crucified Jesus, but also consider the impact of his resurrection from 
the dead. We begin by examining the place of hope in Yoder, Boff and Sobrino. 
What difference to Christian politics does it make to hope in a crucified saviour? 
 
a) Yoder - the cross, the church, and the political providence of God  
 
An ethic of faith and hope  
One of the most important elements in the theology of Yoder’s cross-based 
pacifism is the centrality of faith in the resurrection and of eschatological hope. In 
chapter 4 of Politics of Jesus, ‘God will fight for us’, the Holy War tradition in the 
Old Testament is interpreted as a call for Israel to trust in God, who ‘fights’ for his 
people, and not in their own (armed) strength. Yoder’s is an ethic of active faith in 
God and trust in his appointed strategy, and the seeming ‘risk’ of faith in a God 
whose purposes are active in history is accepted as the ethical norm.   
The resurrection of the crucified Christ is central to that faith and hope, in 
opening up hitherto unsuspected possibilities and confirming the rightness of the 
way (of the cross) chosen by Jesus. This is no arbitrary or short term choice, but 
corresponds to the divine pattern of working within history – a vulnerable love that 
is willing to be crucified. The resurrection demonstrates both the rightness of that 
choice and the fact that the universe is indeed open to such cruciform action. In a 
key passage summing up the argument at the centre of Politics of Jesus, Yoder 
writes that the resurrection pre-empts a choice between ‘crucified agape’ and 
(violent) ‘effectiveness’ since ‘in the light of the resurrection crucified agape is not 
folly (as it seemed to the Hellenizers to be) and weakness (as the Judaizers believe) 
but the wisdom and the power of God’. (Yoder 1994: 109) If politics is the art of the 
possible, the resurrection pushes far back the accepted boundaries of the possible. 
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Since the victory of God takes place through the divine act of resurrection, neither 
calculations of cause and effect nor reliance on control or violent self defence can 
have the last word. The last word lies with the God who raises the crucified Jesus 
from the dead, and thus opens up unforeseen possibilities and instils courage to 
follow faithfully.  
Yoder thus postulates a particular form of causality, through the action of 
God, of which the resurrection of the crucified is the major example. His 
Christological pacifism is throughout based on the character of God and the work of 
Jesus Christ, therefore ‘the calculating link between our obedience and ultimate 
efficacy has been broken, since the triumph of God comes through resurrection and 
not through effective sovereignty or assured survival’. (Yoder 1994: 239) This must 
beg the question: how does ‘resurrection’ actively take place within history, except 
in 33CE? It is easier to read crucifixion into political history in terms of the 
suffering of peoples than it is to interpret resurrection. Does Yoder mean a divine 
intervention, which God brings about in response to God’s people’s obedience? Is it 
possible to point to such past ‘interventions’ in history? Or is Yoder speaking more 
figuratively in terms of God’s Spirit encouraging, directing, and healing, and 
generally bringing good out of tragedy in honouring the faithfulness of God’s 
people? The resurrection, as an event within as well as beyond history, is a sign of 
God ratifying a cruciform historical course of action, and thus acts as a hopeful 
indication to the Christian that acts corresponding to Jesus’ life and character follow 
the grain of God’s intentions. This must be received by faith, but perhaps the only 
true verification, for Yoder, is eschatological.  
 Yoder’s pacifism is based in realism, not a Niebuhrian realism but a reliance 
on the perceived reality of the nature of the universe when seen in the light of the 
cross and resurrection. If the cross and resurrection give ultimate meaning to 
history, the Christian can have hope that what seems to be weakness will in the end 
turn out to be strength.  Pacifism, on this account, may not necessarily be ‘effective’ 
in the immediate situation, for the pacifist, the aggressor, or the victim. Its 
effectiveness is more long term, in the overall fulfilment of God’s purposes. Yet 
signs of the eventual accomplishment of God’s purposes are evident in the very act 
of peacemaking and non-violence itself, in what can be described as the active 
inbreaking of God’s kingdom, or as manifestations of the Spirit at work. 
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An eschatological ethic  
For this reason the eschatological context of Yoder’s theology is highly 
significant. It is instructive to compare Yoder’s eschatological perspective with that 
of ‘Niebuhrian realist’ or ‘Constantinian’ theology. Yoder’s view of the Christian 
faith is radically eschatological, looking for the inbreaking of God’s kingdom and 
living in faithful anticipation of that inbreaking.  By contrast, ‘realism’ is more an 
ethic for the long haul, with no end in sight, save a distant heaven, making the best 
of a bad job with human resources, in the belief that this is the responsibility to 
which God has called humanity. Any early Christian political eschatological hope 
was in effect neutralized by the establishment of a Constantinian Christendom. If 
Christian political success was measured in terms of holding the levers of power, 
there could be nothing more to expect. Politically, eschatology was realized in the 
Constantinian settlement, and the element of hope, in the sense of active divine 
involvement, was downplayed. Without this hope, and the ‘freedom for obedience’ 
this brings, Constantinianism felt obliged to resort to violence, as the only option 
for change (argument in Carter 2001: 230). In contrast to the anthropocentricity of 
the Constantinian and ‘realist’ analysis, Yoder’s eschatological orientation is 
theocentric. His political eschatology focuses on the cross and the resurrection in 
equal measure, avoiding both a sense of hopelessness and also a facile evasion of 
the fact of suffering (it is no coincidence that Moltmann’s first magna opera 
concerned first hope, and then the cross).  
The church is the bearer of the new aeon, and points beyond the possibilities 
of the old aeon to another form of historical causation. In his 1994 epilogue to 
Politics of Jesus, changing his emphasis a little to include ‘effectiveness’ and 
answering criticisms of irresponsibility, Yoder defends his pacifism against the 
realist accusation of sacrificing effectiveness and liberation in favour of moral 
purity and heavenly recompense. To trust in Christ means that ‘in Jesus we have a 
clue to what kinds of causation, what kinds of community building, which kinds of 
conflict management, go with the grain of the cosmos’. (Yoder 1994: 246-7) Of that 
cosmos ‘Jesus is both the Word (the inner logic of things) and the Lord (‘sitting at 
the right hand’)’. In other words, history does not need to be ‘moved’ by the church. 
It is the church’s ethical task to align itself with the divine movement of history, to 
witness to that without deviation from it, in the faith that this is where true long 
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term effectiveness lies, since the world is ‘enclosed within… the sovereignty of the 
God of the Resurrection and the Ascension’. (Yoder 1994: 246-7) 
 
Discerning the presence in history of ‘the lamb who was slain’ 
  Long term effectiveness, resting on the ‘Lamb who was slain,’ is the key to 
Yoder’s interpretation of the movement of history, and the political role of the 
church within it. For the church to fulfil its purpose it must correctly read and 
faithfully follow the pattern of God’s action (in the sense of long term historical 
causation).Yoder argues that the church’s calling is to be the ‘conscience and the 
servant within human society’ and points to the necessity to discern ‘when and 
where God is using the Powers.’ (Yoder 1994: 155) This task calls for wisdom to 
recognize God’s working in history. This, as Yoder recognizes, is no 
straightforward task, given the danger of falling into what he describes as the 
‘Sadducean or ‘German Christian’ temptation, to read off the surface of history a 
simple declaration of God’s will’. (Yoder 1994: 155) Reading ‘the signs of the 
times’ accurately is central to the church’s political task – in other words, locating 
the interpretative key to history and its movement. ‘Jesus Christ is Lord’, writes 
Yoder ‘is a declaration about the nature of the cosmos and the significance of 
history, within which both our conscientious participation and our conscientious 
objection find their authority and their promise.’ (Yoder 1994: 157) And, most 
significantly, the Christ who is Lord is the ‘Lamb who was slain’, which gives us a 
clue to both the nature of the universe and the political (and individual) ethics by 
which the world must live. The ‘Lamb who was slain’ is one of the key images in 
Revelation, and it is in interpreting this apocalyptic imagery that Yoder provides his 
most cogent portrayal of the cruciform meaning of history. The Biblical 
apocalypses, suggests Yoder, demonstrate  
how the crucified Jesus is a more adequate key to understanding what God 
is about in the real world of empires and armies and markets than is the ruler 
in Rome, with all his supporting military, commercial and sacerdotal 
networks. (Yoder 1994: 246)  
(By extension, the crucified Jesus is a better model for Christian political ethics than 
is a church relying on an alliance with military, economic and ‘establishment’ 
power.) The apocalypses attempt to describe God ‘active in history’, God working 
in past history and promising to be active in the present. How does that divine 
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activity take concrete form in the power structures of the world? In a key passage, 
and one which sums up the thrust of Politics of Jesus as a justification for pacifism, 
Yoder writes that the Lordship of the ‘lamb that was slain’ means that ‘the cross 
and not the sword, suffering and not brute power determine the meaning of history’. 
(Yoder 1994: 232) As a result of this, the Christian is called to be patient – a key 
word in Yoder’s social ethics, combining, as we have seen, both waiting and 
suffering. Yoder contrasts this with the realist criterion of effectiveness. The 
Christian can be patient – in other words, can wait in a potentially suffering 
hopefulness – and be obedient to God’s call to non-violence because the 
fundamental reality of history is on the Christian’s side. ‘The triumph of the right, 
although it is assured, is sure because of the power of the resurrection and not 
because of any calculation of cause and effects, nor because of the inherently 
greater strength of the good guys.’ (Yoder 1994: 232) There is a different, divine 
causality which, if the church is to be faithful, it must respect: a causality not based 
on human power but on that of the cross and resurrection. All this is firmly rooted 
in Christology, in the historic pattern of the life and crucifixion of Jesus, whose 
choices, of ‘suffering servanthood rather than violent lordship, of love to the point 
of death rather than righteousness backed by power’ form the inescapable pattern 
for the Christian.  
Jesus himself is the key to the meaning of history – he is both ‘a mover of 
history and as the standard by which Christians must learn how they are to look at 
the moving of history’. Jesus is the prime example of the choice facing the 
Christian, between immediate effectiveness and long term obedience; the 
apocalyptic motif of the slain Lamb is inseparable from the political execution of 
Jesus by the Romans.  Jesus could have aimed at ‘success’ or ‘effectiveness’ by an 
alliance with the forces of the zealots or some other power group; this was a 
genuine option, but was rejected. ‘The choice he made in rejecting the crown and 
accepting the cross was the commitment to such a degree of faithfulness to the 
character of divine love that he was willing for its sake to sacrifice ‘effectiveness’.’ 
(Yoder 1994: 234) This is not to be seen as a kind of backdoor route to 
effectiveness, since ‘Jesus excluded any normative concern for any capacity to 
make sure that things would turn out right’. Yoder’s intention throughout is to 
establish a political ethic concerned solely with faithfulness (i.e. faithful and 
consistent witness to the character of God), not with a calculation of consequences. 
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This follows closely the imagery of Revelation, where the Lamb receives his praise 
from those who defeated the dragon ‘by the blood of the lamb and by the word of 
their testimony (i.e. by martyrdom) for they loved not their lives even unto death’. 
(Yoder 1994: 235)  
To conclude, Yoder describes the paradox, inherent in his work, of the 
dialectical relationship of faithfulness and effectiveness, of the long term 
effectiveness of a counter-intuitive neglect of short term consequences. Loving the 
enemy will in the long run be effective, because it follows the nature of God, yet 
effectiveness is not the reason why a Christian acts in such a way. The rejection of 
violence is counter-intuitive in the short term:  
It remains foolish like the cross of Jesus. Its only moral ground is the 
conviction that the cosmos is like that. Yet it is precisely people who think 
that about the cosmos who tend to get things done. (Yoder, in an 
unpublished paper presented at the AAR Section on Religion, Peace, and 
War in Philadelphia, November 18th 1995)  
 
b) Boff and Sobrino – hope for the victims  
 
Boff - hope for the oppressed through the cross and resurrection 
 Although Boff and Sobrino grant a larger role to human endeavour in the 
moving of history than Yoder, eschatology, in the sense of a hopeful faithfulness, 
plays an equally important part in their theology and political spirituality. For Boff, 
the cross and resurrection give a meaning to suffering which is not wholly negative. 
Boff is aware of the danger of glorifying suffering per se, but writes, ‘[Jesus Christ] 
transfigured suffering, pain, and condemnation to death by transforming them into a 
way to God and a new approach to those who rejected him.’ (Boff 1987: 131) The 
self abandonment or ‘de-centring’ involved in taking up the cross achieves an 
ultimate meaning which is made sure and manifest by the resurrection. 
‘Resurrection is the fullness and manifestation of the Life that resonates within life 
and within death. The only way for the Christian to make this assertion is to look at 
the crucified Jesus - who now lives.’ (Boff 1987: 132) Moreover, the life of the 
resurrection is found not just after death, but ‘lies hidden in death itself’. (Boff 
1987: 132) ‘This life is found in the life of love, solidarity and courage that has so 
suffered and so died’. There is a unity between passion and resurrection, with the 
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result that those ‘who have died in rebellion against the system of the world....are 
the risen ones. Insurrection for the cause of God and neighbour is resurrection.’ 
(Boff 1987: 132) Here Boff confuses (perhaps deliberately) the ways in which he 
writes of resurrection - the resurrection of Jesus, which he treats as having a 
historical and definitive nature, in that Jesus was raised by God as a validation of 
his nature and mission, and resurrection as meaning that those who die in the cause 
of liberation are ‘risen’ because of the liberative nature of their death. Is Boff 
justified in running together these meanings of resurrection? It could be argued that 
this rather loose use of language confuses, rather than clarifies. Because of his 
radical empathy expressed in the cross, God takes the side of the oppressed. ‘God 
intervenes and justifies, in the risen Jesus, all the impoverished and crucified of 
history.’ (Boff 1987: 133)  Again, Boff’s use of the motif of justification is looser 
than the traditional, Pauline, sense. It might seem as if a person is put in a right 
relationship with God solely through his or her poverty, so that poverty and 
oppression replace faith as the channel of justification. Rather, he interprets this in 
terms of the resurrection:  
The meaning of the resurrection is that justice and love, and the struggles 
waged for both, have meaning. Their future is guaranteed. Justice, love, and 
our struggles to attain them only appear to have failed in the process of 
history. They shall triumph. Good, and good alone, shall reign.  
(Boff 1987: 133) 
Boff thus interprets the resurrection retrospectively, in justifying and ratifying 
former actions (the liberative ministry of Jesus) and prospectively, as encouraging 
and strengthening future actions (the liberative ministry of Christians, and those 
who follow Christ’s way). He represents the resurrection both as God’s stamp of 
approval, or vindication, of Jesus and his liberative ministry, and also as a ‘matrix 
of liberative hope’ (Boff 1987: 66), where death is not the ultimate reality. The 
resurrection is ‘the epiphany of the future that God has promised’. (Boff 1987: 67) 
It is, however, significant that Boff identifies ‘resurrection’ even within Christ’s 
crucifixion, in terms of ‘self-surrender for our sake and God’s ...so boundless, so 
complete that it defeated death’s very dominion. This is the meaning of 
resurrection, resurrection bursting forth from the very abyss of humiliation.’ (Boff 
1987: 65) Again, there is a potentially dangerous looseness of meaning here. On the 
one hand, resurrection must be seen to be that of the crucified Christ, whom God 
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raised to ratify his faithful self surrender. In that sense resurrection arises from the 
midst of the crucifixion, and resurrection hope is offered to those crucified in the 
struggles of history. On the other hand, to identify crucifixion and resurrection too 
closely could obscure the sense of tragedy, cruelty, and (in a human sense) finality 
of crucifixion. Crucifixion has a dread (and theologically significant) reality apart 
from resurrection. 
 The timing of Boff’s writing is important in understanding this aspect of his 
work, in which he attempts to use the crucifixion and resurrection to give meaning 
to the present sufferings and the lack of success of movements of political 
liberation. Passion of Christ (originally published in 1977) and Way of the Cross 
(originally published in  1978) were  presumably written in the late 1970's,  
following the defeat of Salvador Allende in Chile but prior to the Sandinista victory 
in Nicaragua, at a time when the tide of revolutionary optimism in Latin America 
was on the ebb. This is the background to such statements as, ‘Even in defeat they 
can give meaning to their lives. Rather than allowing themselves to be conquered by 
evil, they can overcome it by goodness. They can offer up their lives as a sacrifice 
to God...’ (Boff 1980: 82) He stresses the importance of hope for those who find it 
difficult, in the midst of the struggle, to envisage success. Human struggle is a 
history of many defeats, but the Christian can have a firm hope. 'God has 
guaranteed final victory in the triumph of the Kingdom of love and goodness, but 
God allows the Way of the Cross with its suffering and seeming failure to go on 
from one century to the next.’ (Boff 1980: 99) 
In other words, Boff is encouraging those working for justice and liberation 
to see their struggle in the context of a grand narrative, where, even if they do not 
see the results final success is assured. (as in Boff 1980: 99) Crucifixion, either of 
Jesus or of themselves, is not the end; the cross and the ensuing resurrection give 
meaning to the present struggle. There is a creative tension throughout Boff’s 
thought. On the one hand the cross is a symbol of defeat, of suffering criminally 
imposed, in which God shares the victims’ victimhood. On the other hand, the cross 
is a sign of hope, that rests on the very fact that God does share the victims’ 
victimhood, and is therefore ‘on the side’ of the victim. And the crucifixion, as we 
have noted, is not to be seen in isolation from the resurrection, which ‘proves that 
the sacrifice of one’s life out of love for the downtrodden and abused is not 
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meaningless. It means sharing in the fullness of life and the definitive triumph of 
justice.’(Boff 1980: ix-x) 
 Boff continues, ‘The Crucified One is the Living One. Those who are 
crucified today will also live.’ Here again Boff utilises the idea of solidarity, which 
we encountered in our discussion of the crucified people. There is an identity 
between the ‘crucified’ and the ‘Crucified’ in both cross and resurrection. 
Moreover, the resurrection is a sign, embodied in the risen person of Jesus, of God’s 
intentions, where the eschatological purpose of God breaks into history:  
The resurrection realises the utopia of God’s kingdom - not universally 
because of human rejection, but personally in the destiny of Jesus. In the 
person of Jesus, we glimpse what the cosmos and humanity are summoned 
to achieve, complete victory over everything that divides and threatens 
life....God was not defeated by the ability of human beings to reject him... 
(Boff 1980: 124-5) 
This aspect of Boff’s theology of the cross and resurrection is exemplified in his  
discussion of Metz’s theology of memoria passionis, a subversive memory of ‘the  
humiliated and the wronged, of those who were vanquished but whose memory can  
stir up dangerous visions, and launch new liberation movements’. (Boff 1987: 108)  
This is the story of Jesus, and the task is simply to tell the story of the crucified  
victim. The present ‘negativity with no present meaning whatever’, the meaningless  
suffering of the present victims can have a glorious future revealed in the risen  
Jesus. Hence a memoria passionis becomes a memoria resurrectionis. Meaning is  
not solely the monopoly of the powerful; the resurrection reveals another kind of  
meaning,  the future of those whose lot it has been to be the massa damnata, those  
forgotten by history. By retelling the story, by living the memory, the church  
functions as an ‘unmasker of totalitarian ideologies’ and a conveyor of resurrection  
meaning to those who are oppressed.  
 
Sobrino – the crucified as participating in resurrection 
 In his ‘Theses for a historical Christology’ from Christology at the 
Crossroads Sobrino’s thesis 14 states that: 
The cross is not the last word on Jesus because God raised him from the 
dead. But neither is the resurrection the last word on history because God is 
not yet ‘all in all’. Christian existence in history draws its life from the 
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dialectics of Jesus’ cross and resurrection. This translates into a faith against 
unbelief, a hope against hope and a love against alienation.  
(Sobrino 1978: 229) 
 Although Sobrino’s most original contribution to theology concerns the cross of 
Jesus and the crucified people, the cross is not the ‘last word’. The resurrection is 
central, as a historical triumph over injustice, an eschatological sign, and an 
existential question. In his collection of essays Jesus in Latin America (Sobrino 
1987) he develops those three aspects. Chapter seven is entitled ‘Jesus’ resurrection 
from among the world’s crucified’, and stresses that ‘Jesus’ resurrection is to be 
concrete, Christian good news and not abstract and idealistic good news’. (Sobrino 
1987: 148) It is the triumph, not simply of life over death, but of justice over 
injustice, of the unjustly victimized over their victimizers. Second, the resurrection 
is a sign of hope: ‘Jesus’ resurrection is first and foremost hope for the crucified. 
God has raised a crucified one, and from this moment there is hope for the crucified 
of history.’ (Sobrino 1987: 151) Third, a searching question is posed by the 
resurrection: ‘whether we too do not participate in the scandal of putting the just 
one to death – whether we are on the side of the murderers or on the side of the life-
giving God’. (Sobrino 1987: 150) 
In his second work of Christology, Christ the Liberator (Sobrino 2001) 
Sobrino develops these themes. Resurrection is described in terms of hope in the 
providence of God – in an echo of Niebuhr, the impossible becomes possible, the 
crucified are taken down from the cross and given life. The task of the Christian in 
overcoming oppression is described in terms of giving analogous signs of the 
resurrection and the approaching kingdom. (Sobrino 2001: 48) This analogous 
giving of signs or, as Sobrino writes, ‘putting oneself at the service of the 
resurrection’  involves ‘ working continually, often against hope, in the service of 
eschatological ideals: justice, peace, solidarity, the life of the weak, community, 
dignity, celebration, and so on’. Sobrino is careful to qualify these as only partial, 
but ‘these partial ‘resurrections’ can generate hope in the final resurrection, the 
conviction that God did indeed perform the impossible, gave life to one crucified 
and will give life to all the crucified’. (Sobrino 2001: 49)  
For Sobrino, the resurrection is both a historical and eschatological reality. 
(At least, the disciples’ faith in the resurrection is a historical reality – Sobrino 
seems to regard it as impossible, in terms of historical verification, to go beyond the 
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fact of the disciples’ faith.) Sobrino does, however, appear to believe in the 
resurrection as objective, rather than subjective truth and a present (and equally 
eschatological) reality for Jesus’ disciples. This reality engenders hope, which 
allows the disciple, even when faced with ‘crucifixion’, to look to God for ultimate 
victory. This hope is of special relevance to the crucified people, since the historical 
circumstances of Jesus’ death and resurrection show it to be not just a generalized 
victory over death, but specifically a victory of the victims over their oppressors. 
Sobrino would appear to share an ‘inaugurated’ eschatology, in that he sees the 
kingdom as not yet present in history in its fullness, but as initiated in history by 
Jesus and lived out by his followers in hope, joy, and anticipation. 
 
c)  Conclusion 
 Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino all take eschatology seriously in underpinning 
their political theologies, and in stressing the need for faith in God who is active in 
history, most notably in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the vindicated victim.  
Yoder’s reliance on God, rather than the church, to ‘move history in the 
right direction’ particularly rests on an active eschatological hope. Eschatology, for 
Yoder, is faith’s projection into the future of the character of the world as designed 
and intended by God, where those who practice non-violence and justice are 
working with the true grain of the universe, and not against it. The resurrection of 
the crucified Jesus opens up new possibilities by justifying the historical non-
violent acts of Jesus and offering his disciples power to follow in his steps.  
For Boff and Sobrino, the resurrection of Jesus offers hope to those who are 
crucified within history. A criticism can, however, be made, especially of Boff - a 
paradoxical criticism to make of a liberation theologian. Does Boff take history 
sufficiently critically as a means of revelation of the divine nature and purpose? He 
stresses, correctly, the ‘continuing history of crucifixion’. But the problem with 
reading history as a continuing pointer to revelation lies in its potentially selective 
nature. The controversy between Barth and the ‘German Christians’ such as Hirsch 
is a salutary example of the possible pitfalls.  There are few problems with reading 
from history evidence for a ‘crucified people’. But that, by itself, gives limited 
hope.  It is more difficult to read evidence in history for an analogous resurrection. 
History, the liberation theologian would argue, is overwhelmingly a story of unjust 
and repeated human suffering. It is possible to identify the passion and crucifixion 
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of God in human suffering; it requires more subtle analysis to identify the 
‘resurrection’ acts of God in liberation. How is God’s active power at work in 
history? How does the conjunction of the divine weakness as evidenced by the 
crucifixion and the divine power as evidenced by the resurrection bring about 
liberation? It could be argued that the two are not equivalent. The passion, whereby 
God is ‘acted upon’ by humanity and the resurrection, which is an act of God 
‘breaking into’ human history, may be thought of as belonging to different 
categories. As the language suggests, one is ‘passive’, the other ‘active’. To give 
human beings freedom, God’s ‘active’ power has necessarily to be restrained. 
Hence it is unreasonable to expect similar forms of ‘evidence’ in history for 
‘crucifixion’ and ‘resurrection’. Boff is able to point to evidence of ‘resurrection’:  
The resurrection is a process that began with Jesus and that will go on until 
it embraces all creation. Wherever an authentically human life is growing in 
the world, wherever justice is triumphing over the instincts of 
domination......there the purpose of resurrection is being turned into a 
reality. (Boff 1980: 126)  
The resurrection is an event which is part of, and yet transcends, history, a sign of 
the final purpose of God which was proleptically realised in the resurrection of 
Jesus but which has finally to be realised through the slow processes of crucifixion 
and resurrection in human history.  
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Chapter 10 
Power, providence and the cross  
 In this chapter we explore the themes of providence and power in the light 
of the cross. We begin by examining the doctrine of kenosis, which I regard as 
central to Yoder’s theology, and which provides fruitful possibilities for a political 
ethic which will be more fully discussed in the next chapter. We then move to a 
consideration of Yoder’s use of ‘powers’ language, and end with a brief 
examination of the teaching of Boff and Sobrino on this theme. 
 
 a) Yoder - the cross, power and  providence  
 
Yoder - kenosis and politics 
 ‘The conviction that the cosmos is like that’ is the foundation on which 
Yoder builds his pacifist ethics. Christian politics, then, according to Yoder, is an 
imitation of God’s patient, kenotic and cruciform relationship with the cosmos. Key 
to Yoder’s argument is his use of the ‘kenotic hymn’ in Philippians 2. Yoder notes 
that although the initial kenosis lies further back behind the cross, in Jesus 
abandoning the privileges of the divine nature, yet in Paul’s interpretation kenosis is 
radically cruciform: ‘The reference to humiliation becomes not simply ‘human 
form’ but the ‘form of a servant’, and this even to the extremity of death on a cross.’ 
(Yoder 1994:109) Yoder further notes that the equality with God rejected in the 
hymn is not a metaphysical attribute of the divine nature, but ‘providential control 
over events, the alternative being the acceptance of impotence’(Yoder 1994: 234) 
and also the ‘claim to govern history’.(Yoder 1994 passim in Chapter 4) Yoder sees 
it as significant that the point in Philippians 2 at which the Christian is invited to 
follow the example of Christ is his rejection of sovereign exercise of power over the 
world: ‘What Jesus renounced was thus not simply the metaphysical nature of 
sonship, but rather the untrammelled sovereign exercise of power in the affairs of 
that humanity amid which he came to dwell.’(Yoder 1994: 235) His kenotic 
acceptance of the form of servanthood and obedience unto death is ‘precisely his 
renunciation of lordship, his apparent abandonment of any obligation to be effective 
in making history move down the right track.’ This renunciation, this rejection of 
direct control over events, rather than something negative, is judged by God to be a 
positive step in the fulfilment of the divine purposes. ‘This ancient hymn…one of 
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the earliest extended snatches of Christian worship on record, is thus affirming that 
the dominion of God over history has made use of the apparent historical failure of 
Jesus as a mover of human events.’ (Yoder 1994: 236) Yoder thus suggests a 
philosophy of history ‘in which renunciation and suffering are meaningful.’ This is 
‘profoundly linked with the person of Jesus’ who in concrete historical 
circumstances rejected the zealot (or, for that matter, the collaborationalist) option. 
The hymn is not just about a mythical Christ figure, coming down from heaven and 
returning thither, but about the historical Jesus and his political execution.   
The renunciation of the claim to govern history was not made only by the 
second person of the Trinity taking upon himself the demand of an eternal 
divine decree; it was made also by a poor, tired rabbi when he came from 
Galilee to Jerusalem to be rejected. (Yoder 1994: 236)  
 Yoder’s logic is this: Jesus’ historical rejection of power and control mirrors 
God’s refusal to exercise ‘powerful’ control over history, and necessitates a 
corresponding political posture in the Christian. Yoder skilfully links the actual 
historical circumstances of Jesus’ political choices and the historical causation of 
the cross with the grand narrative of God’s ultimate purposes. The first two 
rejections of power and control – those by Jesus and by God – are, in my opinion, 
theologically valid. The consequences for human politics are not so firmly 
established. As we have already frequently noted, Yoder discounts an ethic of 
loving compromise for the sake of the immediate good of humanity in favour of a 
long term ethic of correspondence with the nature of God.  
  
The cross as the hermeneutical key to God’s providential action 
Yoder uses the cross as the hermeneutical key for interpreting the New 
Testament as a whole, including passages which are otherwise interpreted in 
cosmological or incarnational terms. The cross reveals not simply the political 
events of first century Palestine, but the whole shape of the divine interaction with 
the world. If Jesus is the definitive logos (as in John 1) his words and deeds reveal 
the pattern of the action of God in the whole of history. This is the fundamental 
Yoderian method, to draw eternal patterns from the historical circumstances of 
Jesus’ life. We have already discussed how Yoder attempts to cross Lessing’s ‘ugly 
ditch’ at this point. The particular kenotic action of God in Jesus, in becoming 
vulnerable to the actions of humanity, is a sign of God’s eternal nature. The self 
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emptying of the creator in creating and suffering is paralleled and lived out 
historically by the crucified Jesus. The cross marks not only marks a point in the 
historical existence of Jesus, but reveals the nature of creation as a whole. The cross 
in Yoder is an interpretative sign of all divine action in history vis-à-vis humanity; 
God’s whole relationship with humanity is cruciform and therefore, according to 
Yoder, non-coercive. This is seen particularly (but not exclusively) in the 
atonement. (It is a welcome characteristic of Yoder’s overall theological method 
that the atonement, creation, and discipleship cannot be seen as self-contained units, 
but as deeply interrelated in God’s cruciform dealings with humanity.) The cross is 
the supreme revelation of God’s response to evil; in the forgiveness of the guilty, in 
the refusal to use violent or coercive means even in self defence, in the non-resistant 
way in which suffering was patiently born, we see revealed the whole character of 
God, the nature of divine providence, and the way of atonement. 
The patience of God in the face of suffering (it is again useful to remember 
the dual aspects of patience as suffering and waiting) is most of all exemplified by 
the cross, and therefore indicates the same attitude for the believer. Yoder suggests 
that ‘The willingness to suffer is then not merely a test of our patience or a dead 
space of waiting; it is in itself a participation in the character of God’s victorious 
patience with the rebellious powers of his creation.’ (Yoder 1994: 209) A coercive 
and violent seizure of power, even for the laudable aim of avoiding or diminishing 
suffering, is outlawed. Wright draws attention to the analysis of Yoder’s method by 
Gayle Koontz, who notes that God, according to Yoder, 
Persuades and suffers rather than determines; his providence is expressed by 
redemptive and suffering love rather than through the limitation, sustenance 
and control of humans...Yoder’s theology revolves around how God 
responds to evil and his refusal to violate his creatures’ freedom through 
coercive interventionism….It is the pattern of all the divine activity towards 
humankind…(Wright 2000: 94)  
The persuasive power of suffering love in Yoder has (perhaps surprising) links with 
the idea of providence outlined in process theology, where a potentially changing 
God (suffering implying the capacity to be changed) persuades rather than compels. 
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Methodological and ethical criticisms 
I regard the above as a meaningful and legitimate reading of God’s 
providential working, and Yoder’s theology is remarkably consistent in drawing out 
the implications of this reading.  The question must, however, be asked whether it is 
justifiable to read off from a ‘letting be’ of evil (to use McQuarrie’s phrase 
(McQuarrie 1966 passim)) in the divine working of providence a corresponding 
human ‘letting be’ of evil in politics and society? Is Yoder’s parallelism, in fact, a 
form of category mistake? One reason why God does not use ‘coercion’ in 
atonement may well be, as Yoder argues, God’s determination to exercise an agape 
which absolutely privileges and preserves freedom (although, as we have noted, by 
analogy, a parent is not bound by agape to preserve the absolute freedom of a child 
– that freedom is limited by agape). On this account Yoder’s ‘letting be’ of evil may 
be transferable to human politics. But another reason could be that God forswears 
direct coercion to preserve the gap, necessary for a faith/love relationship, between 
the human and the divine (the Jewish doctrine of zimzum, as applied by Moltmann 
to Christian theology (Moltmann 1985: 88)). Were God to intervene too readily, for 
example in a more ‘coercive’ atonement or providence, that necessary gap would be 
destroyed. Here the concern is more to preserve God’s ‘otherness’ than to privilege 
human freedom.  The criticism could also be made that God’s ultimate freedom is 
compromised by Yoder’s insistence on agape as demanding total freedom for 
humanity (as Pinches argues in 1989: 250). Against this, God’s ‘ultimate freedom’ 
is in any case always ‘compromised’ by God’s nature of love, and if love 
necessitates freedom, that is bound to restrict God’s options in providence. The 
‘gap’ argument can be answered by the fact that any such ‘gap’, while necessarily 
preserved for the sake of  God’s ‘otherness’ is equally or even more necessarily 
preserved for the freedom of the human counterpart. The question remains, 
however, whether there is (or should be) a total parallelism and correspondence 
between God’s action and human action, and whether there are some aspects of 
God’s work that humans are not to ‘copy’ in their entirety. A Yoderian would 
answer that what is to be ‘copied’ is God’s character as revealed in the historical 
acts of Jesus, and the fact that God’s character is of such a kind determines God’s 
actions and therefore the actions of the Christian. 
 A more telling criticism, as has been previously argued, is the 
seeming complicity with evil which the non-resistant pacifist position might entail. 
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Yoder is well aware that his doctrine of absolute divine respect for human freedom, 
as an essential component of agape, is subject to this criticism, but describes it in 
terms of patience, rather than complicity. A severer criticism could be levelled 
against this ‘patience’ when transferred to the human reaction to evil. A ‘realist’ 
would argue that a person (or a nation) who is able to protect a victim from unjust 
aggression and yet does not is morally culpable, whereas a Yoderian pacifist 
certainly would not. There are real difficulties here, not least since the Yoderian 
view, as has been previously argued, seems to contradict an important trend in 
Jesus’ teaching; that sins of omission are of even greater weight than sins of 
commission. This points up the fundamental difference between the ‘realist’ and the 
‘Yoderian’- the insistence, for the latter, on the absolute primacy of human freedom 
and divine patience, the overriding necessity for the Christian to witness to God’s 
character, and the eschatological hope that following this course faithfully will 
ensure a sharing in God’s ultimate triumph. The Christian’s duty is obedience and 
faithfulness, rather than a calculation of responsibility. Through such an obedient 
and faithful community, the church, God can work most effectively. 
  
Conflict with ‘the powers’ 
 It remains to examine another aspect of Yoder’s political theology, the 
relationship between the cross and ‘the powers’. Yoder devotes chapter 8 of Politics 
of Jesus to this theme, developing a theology of the cross as a critique and 
unmasking of the powers, and hence power itself. This requires a different kind of 
politics to the ‘domination system’, in Wink’s phrase.(Wink 1992 passim) 
According to Murphy, ‘the most significant contribution that Yoder’s reading of 
scripture makes to political analysis is his use of the Pauline doctrine of the 
‘principalities and powers’. (Murphy in Hauerwas et al 1999: 49) This is perhaps 
overstating the case, as much work had already been done (by the time of the 
writing of Politics of Jesus) on this subject primarily by Hendrikus Berkhoff. 
(Berkhoff 1962) (Yoder in fact translated Berkhoff’s seminal work, making it 
available to the English-speaking world). However, Yoder’s exposition of the 
‘powers’ adds significantly to his argument in Politics of Jesus, and indicates ways 
in which the early Christians framed their language to interpret the impact of the 
crucifixion on the power structures of their day. 
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 The ‘powers’ are necessary in the providence of God, as structures of 
regularity, system and order without which human beings cannot live, but they have 
become absolutized and enslaving. Salvation has to deal with these powers, not in 
the sense of abolishing them (since they are necessary for human existence) but by 
setting them in their proper place, with their sovereignty broken, but ‘holding 
together’ in Christ - fallen, yet redeemed. Yoder writes ‘If then God is going to save 
his creatures in their humanity the Powers cannot simply be destroyed or set aside 
or ignored.’ (Yoder 1994: 144)  The ‘powers’ as created by God are essential to the 
functioning of human society, as demonstrated, for example, by the benefits of 
Roman imperial rule in Palestine. But those same powers become tyrannical and 
oppressive, as demonstrated by the practice of crucifixion. And so it is necessary to 
break their sovereignty. This, argues Yoder, is what Jesus did, ‘concretely and 
historically, by living a genuinely free and human existence. This life brought him, 
as any genuinely human existence will bring anyone, to the cross’.  The death of 
Jesus was a direct result of his conflict with ‘the powers’, symbolized by the Roman 
imperial and Jewish religious authorities, who acted in collusion to bring about his 
crucifixion. The positive side of the powers – the peace, good government, order 
and stability which the Roman Empire at its best provided, and the religious 
devotion of both the Pharisees and Sadducees, were corrupted horrifically into 
collusion in judicial murder.  
Preaching and incorporating a greater righteousness than that of the 
Pharisees, and a vision of an order of social human relations more universal 
than the Pax Romana, he permitted the Jews to profane a holy day (refuting 
their own moral pretensions) and permitted the Romans to deny their 
vaunted respect for law as they proceeded illegally against him.  
(Yoder 1994: 144) 
It is interesting to observe Yoder postulating the cross as a form of entrapment, in 
causing the powers to overreach themselves fatally – with echoes of earlier ‘baited 
hook’ theories of the atonement. Murphy, in her chapter in Yoder’s ‘posthumous 
festschrift’ links his theology of the powers with various traditional models of the 
atonement. She draws attention to the closeness of Yoder’s doctrine of the 
atonement to the ‘classic’ model, but points out that he ‘fills the gap left by the 
excision of a mythical Devil by means of the interpretation of the ‘principalities and 
powers’ described above’. (Murphy in Hauerwas et al 1999: 54) Jesus frees 
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humankind from these superhuman power structures ‘both by his example [and here 
the moral influence theory gets its due] and by stripping them of the illusion of 
absolute legitimacy, precisely because their most worthy representatives abused him 
in his innocence’. Here again, the cross is central, as in the substitution models of 
atonement, but for different reasons: ‘Yoder does not ignore personal sinfulness, but 
he gives it neither the significance nor the inevitability that it has in Augustinian 
Christianity.’ (Murphy in Hauerwas et al 1999: 54) Yoder concentrates more on 
‘institutionalized sin’ – in other words, structural sin as interpreted by liberation 
theology.  
One aspect of the corrupted ‘powers’ is their tendency towards a ruthless 
self-defensiveness when challenged as, in this case, by Jesus. ‘This they did in order 
to avoid the threat to their dominion represented by the very fact that he existed in 
their midst so morally independent of their pretensions.’ (Yoder 1994: 145) Jesus 
by his very life challenged those pretensions, and by persisting in his moral 
consistency even to death he gained a victory over them – and not only over the 
proximate ‘powers’ of the Roman and Jewish establishment, but over the ‘powers’ 
in general. The victory of the crucified Jesus over the ‘powers’ lay in his authentic 
humanity, free from the pretensions of the powers, even when those powers 
threatened his life. ‘This authentic humanity included his free acceptance of death at 
their hands. Thus it is his death that provides his victory’.  
 It is clear that Yoder (and other theologians, such as Berkhoff, who 
champion the ‘powers’ language) use the word ‘triumph’ in a moral, rather than a 
physical sense. In the latter sense, the ‘powers’ triumphed over Jesus by crucifying 
him – in the former sense Jesus, by his death, won the victory. Yoder quotes 
Berkhoff in describing the Pauline theology (in Colossians 2:13-15) of the victory 
of Christ over the powers. (Yoder 1994:146)  First, Jesus ‘made a public example of 
them’, by demonstrating, most vividly and radically in the crucifixion, their true 
nature. ‘Now that the true God appears on earth in Christ, it becomes apparent that 
the Powers are inimical to him, acting not as his instrument but as his adversaries.’  
Every ‘power’ with which Jesus comes into contact has its pretensions exposed – 
the scribes, the Pharisees, Pilate, representing religious law, personal piety, and 
secular justice, are unmasked by their complicity in the crucifixion. The power of 
illusion is the greatest weapon in the hands of the ‘powers’ – ‘their ability to 
convince men that they were the divine regents of the world, ultimate certainty and 
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ultimate direction, ultimate happiness and the ultimate duty for small, dependent 
humanity’. Now that the illusion is stripped away by the cross, it can be said that 
Christ has ‘disarmed’ the Powers. The Christian who sees the public degradation of 
the powers as revealed in the cross, and the divine justification of Christ in the 
resurrection, is freed from that most powerful illusion. ‘Unmasked, revealed in their 
true nature, they have lost their mighty grip on men. The cross has disarmed them: 
wherever it is preached, the unmasking and the disarming of the Powers takes 
place’. (Yoder 1994:146) 
 
The church as sharing in the victory of the cross over the powers 
 The church is the body of people who have grasped this freedom from the 
dominion of the powers and now live as a sign of that freedom. (Yoder 1994:147ff) 
The church itself is ‘resistance and attack’ as it demonstrates in its fellowship how 
Christians can live freed from the Powers. The ‘weapons’ the church bears are 
defensive: ‘Our weapon is to stay close to Him and thus to remain out of the reach 
of the drawing power of the Powers.’ As we have seen previously, the first task of 
the church in Yoder’s political theology and action is, simply, to be the church. 
‘The very existence of the church is its primary task. It is in itself a proclamation of 
the Lordship of Christ to the powers from whose dominion the church has begun to 
be liberated.’ In this the cross is vital, since the church is the society formed by 
reconciliation brought about by the cross and bearing the marks of the cross in its 
ongoing life. It is a counter cultural witness, a new humanity created by the cross 
and not the sword. (There are significant parallels here with the ‘crucified people as 
martyrs/witnesses’ theme which we have noted in the theology of Sobrino.)  
Another key Yoderian theme emerges here: the primary social structure 
through which the gospel works to change other structures is the Christian 
community. Power is the good creation of God, and so Christians cannot opt out of 
the power structures of society entirely. Yoder’s is not an ethic of Essene type 
withdrawal, but of a choice not to exercise certain types of power. The existence of 
a cruciform church that suffers through its ongoing stand against the powers 
continues nothing less than the work of the crucified Christ. Just as the powers were 
defeated by what Yoder calls the ‘concreteness of the cross’, so they continue to be 
defeated by the church whose faithfulness and consistency mirrors that of Jesus: 
‘The historicity of Jesus retains, in the working of the church as it encounters the 
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other power and value structures of its history, the same kind of relevance that the 
man Jesus had for those whom he served until they killed him.’ (Yoder 1994:158) 
And, just as Jesus suffered at the hands of the ‘powers’, so the church risks 
suffering when it stands against the powers and empowers others to do so.  
 
The cross, power and the powers 
The question of power is central to Yoder’s work and, as is his practice, he 
seeks to redefine its meaning. His exegesis of ‘powers’ language points towards 
such a redefinition. The powers are real – otherwise Jesus would not have, very 
concretely, been crucified at their hands. And yet their power rests on a shaky 
foundation, which the cross uncovers. This tension is both a strength and weakness 
in Yoder’s work, which is shared by other theologians who talk the ‘powers’ 
language. From one perspective it makes little sense to talk about the defeat of the 
powers when they continue to tyrannize. The concreteness of oppression is quite 
definitely not an illusion, and it would be grossly mistaken to deny that 
concreteness in the name of the ‘illusory’ nature of the powers. The cross reveals, in 
fact, both the continuing strength of ‘the powers’ and also their undermining. The 
strength in Yoder’s ‘powers theology’ is to point to the potential, enabled by the 
cross, of victory over the powers. The weakness is to tend to give an impression that 
such victory has already somehow been concretely achieved. Cullman’s image of 
D-Day and VE-Day (in Christ and Time, Cullman 1951) is appropriate here: a 
decisive victory has been won, but the final victory is yet to be, and much suffering 
lies between.  
Perhaps the most telling use of this language is its redefinition of divine 
power. Rather than power being understood as coercive, and at least potentially 
violent, divine power is interpreted in the light of the cross as uncoercive, 
persuasive, and creative. The radical nature of this shift, both theologically and 
practically, cannot be underestimated, since it undercuts many mainstream secular 
and religious doctrines of power. Pinches, in his exposition of Yoder’s political 
theodicy, describes how   ‘the cross of Christ is in fact a new definition of truth, 
both as power and as wisdom’ and comments that ‘The truly powerful forces in 
history are perhaps those which stand clear of the coercive mainstream and call 
noncoercively, as Jesus did, for a transformation of the human spirit.’ (Pinches 
1989: 248) A vision of ultimate effectiveness is gained by recognizing this shift in 
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the definition. The cross radically redefines power and how it can most effectively 
be accessed. According to Yoder, the view of power-as-destructive-force is futile 
and leads to an ethical blind alley.  
 
b) Boff and Sobrino and the question of power 
 
Liberation theology and ‘power’ language 
 One of the strengths of liberation theology has been its acknowledgment of 
the significance of power. The theologian’s setting in the political and economic 
structures of power is, according to liberation theology, crucial for self 
understanding and for the very nature of the theology taught or written. For 
example, an insistence on the structural nature of sin, as against a purely 
individualistic doctrine, is a major emphasis of liberation theology. Overcoming the 
power to oppress and promoting the power to liberate is at the centre of the 
liberationist project. One criticism already noted is, indeed, that liberation theology 
does not go far enough in its critique of power; early forms of liberation theology 
may have given the impression of being interested in merely changing the power 
holders, rather than challenging the form and nature of political power itself. It is 
then, at first sight, puzzling that the kind of powers language found in Yoder and, 
more recently, in Wink (Wink 1984, 1986, 1992, and 1998), has not loomed large in 
Latin American liberation theology. Perhaps this is due to the danger of syncretism 
in a culture where Catholicism sits alongside other religious movements in which 
powerful ‘spirits’ are deemed to be an ever present force. It could be argued that 
this provides an opportunity for such language, but possibly the risk of 
misinterpretation would be too great. 
  
Boff and Sobrino – oppressive and liberating power 
 The fact that neither Boff nor Sobrino seem to use the language of ‘the 
powers’ does not mean that they do not seek to convey something similar in 
different ways. Boff, in Church, Charism and Power (Boff 1985), discusses power 
within the church, rather than secular political or economic power, but his analysis 
is significant over a wider area. In chapter 5 he sketches a history of the early 
church, from its first three centuries as a movement lacking significant political 
power to its Constantinian rebirth as an institution not only allied with state power 
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but incorporating those structures of power into its essence. Boff, like Yoder, sees 
the Constantinian revolution as a disaster - as the paganisation of Christianity, 
rather than the Christianization of paganism. (Boff 1985: 50) The key concept in 
Catholicism came to be potestas – power exercised in a similar way to secular 
power, but worse since backed by divine sanction. This power, seen (and personally 
experienced) by Boff as oppressive, continues to this day, and leads to both a 
deadening centralization within the church and an unscrupulous defensiveness in 
relation to the world, exemplified by the concordat with Nazism. By contrast, the 
power of God is revealed in Jesus Christ, who ‘renounced power as domination; he 
preferred to die in weakness rather than use his power to subjugate people to his 
message’. (Boff 1985: 60) It is significant that Boff here adduces the death of Christ 
as the prime example of a refusal of power, in terms strikingly similar to Yoder. 
The power of love, on which Jesus relied, is ‘fragile, vulnerable, conquering 
through its weakness and its capacity for giving and forgiveness’. (Boff 1985: 59) 
Again, the emphasis on a cruciform power, in its chosen vulnerability, is striking.  
 Sobrino, too, links a Christian view of power with the cross. In his ‘thesis 8’ 
on the cross he questions what kind of power mediates God.  
Is it the kind of power advocated by the Roman Empire and the Zealots, or 
is it the kind of power exemplified in Jesus? The power of Jesus is that of 
‘love immersed in a concrete situation’, ‘political’ rather than ‘idealistic’. 
The whole question of the true nature of power becomes acute when one 
views it in terms of Jesus’ cross. (Sobrino 1978: 209)  
Sobrino does not naively view power in a consistently negative light – to do so 
would, in his opinion, be to make a nonsense of belief in God, whose nature 
presupposes a form of power. To deny that would be to fall into ‘logical 
contradiction. But Jesus denies the oppressive and authoritarian nature of power’. 
(Sobrino 1993: 144) God’s power is liberating power, a power which allows 
‘human beings their freedom and responsibility for themselves’. In a similar way to 
Yoder, Sobrino interprets the temptations of Jesus in terms of what sort of 
Messianic power he should exercise – ‘whether to carry this out with the power that 
controls history from outside or with immersion in history, with the power to 
dispose of human beings or with self-surrender to them’. (Sobrino 1993: 149).  
 The distinction between a power from above, dominating and (at least 
potentially) oppressive, and a power from alongside, encouraging and suffering, is 
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fundamental to Sobrino’s theology of the cross. Power as such is not liberating, but 
some power is needed to bring about liberation. Sobrino argues from the point of 
view of ‘history’s crucified who await salvation. They know that power is necessary 
for this. At the same time they mistrust pure power, since this always shows itself 
unfavourable to them in history.’ (Sobrino 1987: 152) As previously discussed, 
Sobrino recognized the need of the poor for a rescuer from outside (alterity) and a 
rescuer from alongside (affinity). This power from alongside is seen, paradoxically, 
in the weakness of the cross. ‘On Jesus’ cross, in a first moment, God’s impotence 
appeared. Of itself this impotence is not a cause of hope. But it lends credibility to 
the power of God that will be shown in the resurrection.’ (Sobrino 1987: 153) The 
impotence of the cross is something positive and salvific, the ‘expression of God’s 
absolute nearness to the poor, sharing their lot to the end.’ The affinity aspect of 
salvation is, thereby, satisfied. God’s power is not oppressive. Sobrino stresses the 
cross-demonstrated nearness of God to human beings. Without that nearness, he 
argues, ‘God’s power in the resurrection would remain pure otherness and therefore 
ambiguous, and, for the crucified, historically threatening. But with that nearness, 
the crucified can really believe that God’s power is good news, for it is love.’ The 
alterity is the inbreaking of divine power in the resurrection of the crucified.  
 
c) Conclusion 
 There is certainly a difference in language used by Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino 
to describe the use and abuse of power. We have noted how liberation theology 
largely avoids the ‘powers’ theology of Berkhoff, Yoder, and Wink. However, there 
is much more shared ground in their teaching on the nature of the powers, in the 
sense of sinful structures which extend beyond individual and personal sinfulness, 
the pretensions and oppressive nature of those powers, and their undermining by the 
cross of Jesus. Yoder questions the nature of power and the relationship of the 
Christian with power more radically than Boff and Sobrino, stressing (perhaps 
overstressing) the reluctance of Jesus to take power, and hence deducing the 
necessity for the church to refuse the responsibility of power. Boff and Sobrino, on 
the other hand, helpfully point to the soteriological need of a power which combines 
both affinity and alterity. The sympathy of affinity is not, in itself, sufficient; a 
power which can actually rescue the vulnerable from their oppressors is also 
required.  
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Summary  - towards a political theology of the cross (iv) 
 The last two chapters have explored the cross in relation to hope and power. 
As before, I attempt now to outline elements arising from these chapters which I 
believe should be incorporated in a political theology of the cross.  
 
Hope, power, and the cross 
 The categories of hope and power are fertile ground for an exploration of the 
paradoxical nature of the cross. Perhaps the paradox can too easily be missed - the 
cross of Jesus, in one sense, is the epitome of hopelessness and powerlessness, as it 
was for tens of thousands of unfortunates in the Roman world. Politically, the cross 
was intended to humiliate, and to be a public demonstration of the dead end of 
rebelling against the imperial power.  
The Roman world was notorious for its lack of hope, at least in the sense of 
hope for improvement of social conditions. The imperial ideology promoted hope, 
but only in a very general and superficial sense, as was displayed on the often 
fatuous slogans on imperial coinage. At the advent of a new emperor, especially 
after a time of war, a new age of peace and prosperity was often proclaimed. It is 
difficult to imagine any thinking person taking this seriously. One possible 
exception, at the juncture between Republic and Principate, was Virgil’s 
‘Messianic’ Eclogue, heralding the birth of a new ruler and a time of new hope after 
war, but by the early imperial period that Virgilian hope had turned to an Ovidian 
cynicism. A future ‘golden age’ was so far off as to be totally unrealistic. In general, 
in the Roman world there was little conscious movement towards significant social 
reform, apart from minor efforts from some of the more humane emperors. Any 
sense of social progress, in a progressive liberal or Marxist sense, was absent. Hope 
was replaced by a static fatalism about social conditions.  
This fatalism was reinforced through means of callous violence and the 
exercise of crushing power by the imperial authorities, whose interest lay in a 
passive acceptance of the status quo by the people of the empire. Any resistance to 
the imperial order led to the living death of the mines or the torture of the cross. The 
acquisition of imperium (power) was the goal of political success, and when seized 
was exercised ruthlessly. The absolute powerlessness of the cross was the reverse 
side of the coin of the Roman idolization of political power, which kept the mass of 
the people hope-less. To associate hope for the future with the cross would have 
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seemed to Jesus’ gentile contemporaries totally paradoxical. To the Jews, whose 
sense of social hope was in many ways more real and vibrant, the paradox would 
have seemed even greater. Their hopes rested on a Messianic future, and for a 
Messiah to be crucified was a contradiction in terms.  
For the early Christians, these paradoxes could only be resolved by the 
resurrection. Therefore a contemporary political theology of the cross must 
incorporate a corresponding emphasis on the resurrection. Otherwise, the element of 
hope, essential for a balanced political theology, is missing.  
 
A cruciform faith as a precondition of hope 
 One of the major differences between the Yoderian and ‘realist’ is over the 
need for faith. The ‘realist’ approach rests not so much on faith as on wisdom and 
discernment. The Yoderian approach simply does not make sense without faith – 
faith in God who turns death to resurrection, faith that the universe is as it is, and 
that by going with the grain of the universe God’s purposes will be forwarded. 
Yoder does not expect miraculous ‘quick fixes’, but sees God’s involvement in 
terms of a long term divine purpose, a divine pattern running through the processes 
of history, which it is the church’s task faithfully to imitate in a trustful reliance on 
a causality different from that of the crude categories of power and force. That faith 
constitutes the church in its political choice and stance. To be the church 
consistently, to bear the seeming ‘folly of the cross’ of nonconformity, requires 
continuous acts of faith in the divine nature and the divine pattern within history. 
Faith seeks to be realistic, in the sense that the reality believed in is, in fact, the 
ultimate reality. Yoder claims that his, rather then Niebuhr’s is, paradoxically, the 
true realism, because it is based on a Christocentric faith in that ultimate reality. 
Hope projects that faith forwards into an expectation that reality is now, and will be 
in the future, congruent with the form that is seen in Jesus, and especially in his 
cross and resurrection.  
 How far is it possible to construct political policy on such faith and hope? 
The Yoderian would regard this as an illegitimate question, since it is not the task of 
the church, the primary Christian political body, to construct policy. Moreover, 
political policy is almost always short or medium term, and a Yoderian Christian 
politics takes the long view. However, it is the church’s task to recall the politician 
to that long view as a measure of the rightness or otherwise of shorter term policies, 
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and the Christian politician’s task to have that long view in mind in creating those 
short term policies.   
 
Reading crucifixion and resurrection in history 
Twentieth century theology provides notable examples of (mis) reading 
contemporary history theologically. The convergence of liberal Protestantism in the 
early twentieth century with an optimistic secular belief in inevitable human 
progress was shattered by the First World War. The controversy in the 1930’s 
(documented in Ericksen (1985) and Reimer (1990)) between the Nazi Hirsch and 
the Socialist Tillich over recognizing ‘kairos moments’ in history demonstrated how 
two theologians, beginning from similar theological presuppositions, could come to 
diametrically opposed political conclusions.  
The danger of this conflation of revelation with contemporary history is 
compounded by a loose use of language to describe events in history, when words 
such as resurrection and justification have their meaning so far extended from their 
original usage as to cause a conceptual confusion. This tendency has been noted 
among liberation theologians, but is by no means restricted to them. The problem is 
that the opposite course, to confine such concepts either, at one extreme, to a divine 
realm ‘above’ human life or, at the other, solely to events in Palestine in 33 CE is, 
first of all to diminish their relevance to the present and also to be untrue to their 
very nature. The crucifixion and the resurrection are both historical (in the sense of 
having happened at a certain time and in a certain place) and also meta-historical, 
because of the ‘corporate’ nature of the Christ who is crucified and risen and the 
work of the Spirit which continues the reality of Christ in the present. In that sense 
Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection are contemporary events, and their signs 
should be discernable in history. Every liberative, salvific and humanizing change 
in human history is both an act of God and an event potentially open to socio-
scientific examination.  
How, then, does Jesus’ resurrection give hope for an earthly, as well as a 
heavenly, future? Does the resurrection give an immediate hope, or a long term 
hope that in the end all will be well? The long term heavenly hope certainly has 
political relevance, in providing a telos for human endeavour, the vision of which 
can be worked back into current politics. It is not merely to be discounted as a 
distraction from earthly reality, since the hope in God of ultimate healing provides 
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an incentive for a more proximate healing of the world. In the shorter term, one of 
the key themes in Paul is that of the power that raised Jesus from the dead being 
released into the world in a pattern of crucifixion and resurrection. This shorter term 
expectation, which can be described as partial vindications of the ‘Lamb who was 
slain’, is the work of the Spirit, who strengthens the Christian as he or she follows 
the divine pattern of vulnerable love. Contemporary ‘resurrection’ after 
‘crucifixion’ is not merely a metaphor, but is brought about by the same Spirit 
which raised Jesus from the dead.  
In the light of this hope, can there be discernible progress within history 
towards the eschatological telos? The persistent presence of the crucified people 
within history would say no. It is misleading to speak of hope in the sense of an 
inevitable progress in history – hope is for the short and medium term, in that God 
can bring the possibility of good things out of any ‘crucified’ situation and will 
strengthen those who work in accordance with the divine pattern, and for the long 
term, in the sense of a ‘heavenly hope’. In the light of this hope, the realist prizes 
immediate effectiveness and puts off a purity of conscience to the long term (and 
trusts to the mercy of God for forgiveness for the compromises thus entailed), but 
the Yoderian prizes immediate obedience in the expectation of long term 
effectiveness (and is willing to suffer the consequences in the meantime). 
 
The relationship between cross and resurrection in political theology 
 In the New Testament the cross and the resurrection are not seen as 
independent entities, but as inseparable. What relevance has this unity for political 
theology? First, the resurrection ratifies the meaning of the cross. Jesus’ ways of 
non-violence, his political choices which led to the cross, are given the divine stamp 
of approval. The cross is confirmed in its role of stripping away the illusory nature 
of the ‘powers’. Those who are willing to die like Jesus in a liberative cause can see 
themselves justified in the grand narrative of cross and resurrection. Second, the 
resurrection is not only the raising of someone who was dead, but also the 
vindication of a victim. There is therefore hope for victims of underserved suffering 
because God is on their side. The cross is a stark symbol of injustice, the 
resurrection of its overturning. Third, the resurrection opens up new possibilities by 
setting free new power in the world, especially the possibility that the crucified can 
be taken from their crosses and live. Whatever the situation of crucifixion there can 
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always be new possibilities of resurrection, thus engendering ‘hope against hope’. 
Fourth, the cross and the resurrection demonstrate both sides of salvation, alterity 
and affinity – affinity by the divine empathy with the crucified, alterity by the 
divine power that raised the crucified. God’s radical empathy is not defeated by 
death but has the final victory. Last, the resurrection brings the future of hope into 
the present of crucifixion. A Christian, living in a state of crucifixion yet in the light 
of the resurrection, brings God’s just future into present reality and recognizes 
analogous signs of resurrection. These signs, moreover, are not merely analogous, 
but are the working of the same Spirit by whom Jesus was raised from the dead.  
 
Kenosis and the cross 
 The kenotic hymn in Philippians chapter 2 is a key text in a political 
theology of the cross. It is important to recognize the radically cruciform nature of 
this kenosis; the self emptying of Christ would make sense if applied simply to the 
incarnation, but is immensely deepened by its application to the cross (as Paul 
recognizes in verse 8). The doctrine of kenosis describes the abandoning by Jesus of 
not just divine attributes, but also of the exercise of coercive power. Behind the 
kenotic Christ is the kenotic God, who similarly abandons ‘control’ in the exercise 
of providence, choosing instead to work through a different paradigm. The cross, 
therefore, is the key to interpreting God’s providential working. Persuasive patience 
replaces the power of dominion. God is revealed as uncoercive, vulnerable, 
liberative and creative, rather than controlling.  
 This necessitates a radical redefinition of power – the difference between 
power from above, dominating and (potentially at least) oppressive, and power from 
alongside. Through this redefinition of divine power, which combines a restraint in 
the use of power and a willingness to suffer the consequences of that restraint, 
God’s whole relationship with creation is seen as cruciform. It is that cruciform 
pattern that the church is called to imitate in order to conform and witness to the 
character of God. A fuller exploration of these themes is attempted in the two 
concluding chapters.  
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SECTION V – A WIDER PERSPECTIVE 
 
Chapter 11 
The cross and political power 
The question of power is central to both theology and political ethics, to 
such an extent that it is impossible to construct a valid political theology without a 
realistic doctrine of power. In theology, the doctrine of providence attempts to 
explain and illustrate how God’s power operates in the world. Creation and 
redemption are, at their root, doctrines of power, in the sense that they involve a 
divine ability to bring about change through the working of divine power. (I define 
power as the means of change used by its possessor in order to bring about a state of 
affairs closer to the possessor’s intention.) Power is no less central in political ethics 
and forms a key concept in analyzing the workings of national societies and 
international relationships. The earliest reflections on government in Greek political 
philosophy employ power terminology: democracy is the power, or kratos, of the 
demos, the people en masse; aristocracy, the power of the aristoi, the political elite 
established by birth. In the political culture contemporary with Jesus, a key concept 
was imperium¸ the power of the person or nation which is given (or seizes) 
dominance over others. The language of power is fundamental to an understanding 
of contemporary politics. For example, the globalization process is increasingly 
regarded as involving a neo-imperialism of the ‘north’ over the ‘south’, and 
American foreign policy is interpreted, with praise or blame, as instituting an 
American ‘empire’ (for an eloquent critique, see Nelson-Pallmeyer 2005). 
Imperialism, whether traditional or ‘neo’ exemplifies an imbalance in power 
relationships. The imperial power exercises economic or political domination over 
the (relatively) powerless subject nation or community. This imbalance of power is 
not confined to international relationships. Questions of power and the possibilities 
of its imbalance are involved in every area of human existence, from personal 
relationships to macro-economic transactions. Although the conservative political 
or structuralist sociological critique may see these imbalances as inevitable, 
harmonious, and creative, there is always the potential for such imbalances to 
become oppressive, and for the less powerful to become the suffering victims of 
those who hold the power.  
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The crucified Jesus is both an historical example and a potent symbol of this 
victim status. Historically, Jesus was the victim of both the imperial power of Rome 
and the national power structures of first century Palestine. In devotion the figure of 
the crucified Jesus has symbolized a victim both of human violence and of a divine 
decree interpreted, tragically, in terms of God the Father actively inflicting violence 
upon God the Son. How can a Christian doctrine of power, both in terms of divine 
providence and political ethics, be formulated in the light of the crucified and 
powerless Jesus?  What sort of power is legitimate?  How can the Christian concept 
of power be reformulated so as to be consistent with a ‘crucified God’?  Is there a 
sense in which political power can parallel and be modelled upon the providential 
power of God, so that the ‘grain of the universe’ as intended by God can be a guide 
to the well-being of human relationships, thus bringing the doctrine of providence 
and political ethics into convergence? What political ethic can be thus formulated? 
These questions form the background to this chapter.  
Our previous interlocutors have radically different attitudes to power, and to 
Christians exercising power. Yoder in effect rules out from Christian political action 
the immediate use of political power, as traditionally conceived. For him, the 
(literally) crucial power, on which, by faith, the Christian is to draw, is the 
eschatological power of God, as demonstrated historically in Jesus. The liberation 
theologians Boff and Sobrino, by contrast, have no such hesitation in encouraging 
the seeking of political power in order to ‘remove the crucified from their crosses’.  
 
a) The cross as criticism of political power 
 
Dissonance and applicability 
 It must be acknowledged at the outset that there is a striking dissonance in 
attempting to incorporate the cross, an instrument of oppression by the powerful 
over the powerless, into a theology of political power, unless that theology is 
primarily done from the perspective of the powerless. For the powerful to adopt the 
cross as a political symbol (the first and most notorious being Constantine) is a 
glaring contradiction in terms. Christian political thought has long suffered from 
this unresolved and frequently unnoticed dissonance. One tactic is to opt out of 
questions of political power. Yoder comes dangerously close to constructing a 
political theology which seeks to insulate the church from having to ask the 
awkward question: what sort of help might a Christian involved in politics receive 
 192 
from their faith, and, especially, from the cross, the hallmark of their faith? The 
most obvious Yoderian outcome is that of a sect entirely withdrawn from politics, a 
course which Yoder, nevertheless, eschews.  
 There is little doubt that there is a better ‘fit’ between a cruciform politics 
and those who are situated on the periphery, outside of ‘Caesar’s palace’, rather 
than within the corridors of power. One of the chief differences between a Christian 
and an Islamic view of politics is that for the first three hundred years of its 
existence Christianity was a religion of the politically powerless, whereas almost 
from the beginning Islam was the religion of the rulers of the community or state. 
Where a non-violent ‘cruciform’ politics has been attempted by those who have 
entered the political process, there have certainly been successes (Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King being striking examples) but this has to be balanced by the 
confusion in pacifist politics in the 1930’s, exemplified by the spectacle of the 
devoutly Christian pacifist Labour leader Lansbury being instructed by the ‘realist’ 
Ernest Bevin to ‘stop hawking his conscience around the conference table’, which 
was to lead to Lansbury’s resignation as Labour leader and Bevin’s successful 
participation in the wartime coalition government and subsequent role as Foreign 
Secretary at the beginning of the Cold War. (Taylor 1965: 381-2)  It is tempting to 
suggest that Lansbury’s withdrawal from politics signified the only possibility for a 
consistent cruciform pacifism, thus corroborating Niebuhr’s dismissal of pacifism 
as a useful minority vocation. 
 Nevertheless, the question of political power cannot be sidestepped so easily 
unless Christianity is indeed to withdraw into a sect mentality.  An attempt must be 
made, pace Yoder, to find a place for a distinctively cruciform politics within the 
centres of political power as well as on the fringes. What might be described as a 
cruciform political epistemology is indicated – in other words, an attempt to 
understand politics from the point of view of the ‘crucified people’, the victims, 
those on the periphery, so that political decisions involving the exercise of 
governmental power may be informed by cruciform insights. This might be 
achieved in three ways. First, the starting point for cruciform politics must be the 
periphery. The ‘cruciform politician’ (the verbal dissonance is striking, but must be 
held in tension unless political withdrawal is chosen) must begin from, (or at least, 
relocate to) a position among those on the periphery, not from within the established 
centres of power as a member of a political elite. Second, the cruciform politician 
 193 
must continually keep in touch with the periphery by physical, psychological and 
economic location, and through that location exercise a continual hermeneutic of 
suspicion of political power, resisting the temptation to seek power for its own sake 
rather than for the sake of the vulnerable and suffering. The creation of a political 
‘class’, whether a traditional quasi aristocratic elite or career politicians detached 
from ordinary life and comfortable in power, is antithetical to a cruciform politics 
thus conceived. Thirdly, a cruciform politician must use the cross and the 
theologoumenon of the crucified people as a test to assess the validity of policy – in 
other words, what the effect of policy decisions might be on the vulnerable, the 
crucified people.  
 
The ‘telos’ of political power 
 The above criteria pose a more basic question: what is the goal, or telos, of 
political power, in the light of the cross and of the crucified people?  The 
overarching principle is, as we have seen, and as has been eloquently propounded 
by liberation theologians, to ‘remove the crucified from their crosses’. In other 
words, the fundamental political task for the Christian is the diminution of suffering 
and oppression, and, its converse, the promotion of justice, freedom, wholeness, and 
flourishing. This perspective is, of course, not one peculiar to Christians, but the 
shocking fact of the cross and the crucified God at the centre of the Christian faith 
immensely concentrates this humanitarian protest against suffering. This telos for 
Christian politics does not exclude other elements, such as (as Yoder stresses) 
bearing witness to the nature of God, but this is achieved both by the very act of 
‘removing the crucified from their crosses’ and by the methods used. Nor does this 
telos provide an exclusive agenda for the church, given its other roles alongside the 
political – worship, mutual upbuilding in fellowship, evangelism. But for the church 
qua political body, and especially for the Christian involved in politics, the telos is 
all important. And the church, no less than other human institutions, falls under the 
judgment of that telos. There is a key division in interpretation within Christian 
political thought between an ‘independent’ Jesus standing, as it were, outside 
Christianity and questioning the power structures of church and Christendom, and a 
‘domesticated’ Jesus standing within Christianity and questioning those outside, 
whether contemporary Jewish authorities, Roman power structures, or modern 
governments. Perhaps, as Wilfred Owen wrote, to see Jesus ‘in no-man’s land’ 
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(Owen 1973: 68) is the better perspective, which can allow the crucified Jesus to 
critique all structures of power, both within the church and in society as a whole.  
 It might be argued that the above telos is all too obvious, and perhaps naïve. 
Does not all political action at least claim the intention of improving the human lot? 
This would, however, be to ignore the radical hermeneutic of suspicion (entailed by 
the cross) of political power, and the necessity, as mentioned above, for a cruciform 
political epistemology. Such a hermeneutic of suspicion needs to be consistent and 
thorough. In whose interests is political power actually sought and exercised? Is it, 
in reality, for personal or national self aggrandizement, to defend the vested 
interests of a particular class (of power holders)? The cross necessitated, among the 
earliest Christians, a radical questioning, even a reversal, of theological values, as 
they attempted to come to terms with the paradox of a crucified Messiah.  Perhaps 
the huge scale of a similar redefinition of the aims of politics required by the cross 
has been underestimated.  
 The European theologian who has most contributed to this cruciform 
redefinition is Jürgen Moltmann who, in his Crucified God (Moltmann 1974) points 
to a suffering, rather than a monarchical God, and draws the conclusion that the role 
of Christian politics is to use power to aid the suffering, alongside whom God also 
suffers, not to preserve present power structures corroborated by divine sanction. 
For Moltmann, the cross radically critiques any idolatry of political power (as in 
Luther’s ‘crux probat omnia’ – quoted in Moltmann 1974: 7). The cross is seen at 
the heart of a Christian ‘critical theory’, parallel to the Marxism of the Frankfurt 
school, posing such questions as how can the false values of existing society, 
concealed by ‘ideology’, be exposed, so that there can be a transformation of the 
present structures of power?  The cross, in Moltmann, performs an iconoclastic 
function, stripping bare any religiously corroborated illusions by which the present 
order of power is undergirded, since  Jesus was crucified ‘in the name of the state 
gods of Rome who assured the Pax Romana.’ (Moltmann 1974: 136) The danger of 
political religion occurs where religion is used for social or national self-
justification, to confirm the existing power structures and to absolutise those who 
rule (communist, capitalist, or fascist). The fact that Jesus died in powerlessness at 
the hands of the politically powerful means that religion can never be used as a 
sanction for political power. Any religious justification of political power from 
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above (i.e. monarchical or hierarchical) is ruled out. This critique can be extended 
to a continuing hermeneutic of suspicion of all power. 
 The telos of ‘removing the crucified from their crosses’ is another way of 
stating the necessity of seeing  history from the perspective of the powerless rather 
than the powerful – in other words, those who actually suffer, rather than those who 
control (or attempt to control) the degree of that suffering. A Christian telos for 
politics must inevitably be victimological, and political power must be judged by 
how it affects its victims. The dominant criterion is that of social pain, as 
exemplified by the cross and the crucified peoples. Social pain, on this account, can 
never be a price worth paying for supposedly beneficial advances. Martin Hengel 
has usefully illustrated this aspect of the crucifixion in his analysis of how 
crucifixion might have been regarded by different sections of Judean society. ‘The 
Palestinian peasant…saw in it the hated and feared instrument of repression 
employed by his Roman overlords.’ This is contrasted with the probable attitude of 
the inhabitants of the Hellenized cities, who will have regarded it as a horrible but 
nevertheless necessary ‘instrument for the preservation of law and order against 
robbers, violent men and rebellious slaves’. (Hengel 1977: 79) For the latter, the 
infliction of such social pain was a price worth paying for political stability and 
civilized well-being. A cruciform political theology denies that the creation of even 
a minority crucified people is justified in terms of a supposed future good. A 
modern illustration can perhaps be found in a conversation between the Skipton 
World Development Movement Group and their local MP, when discussing the 
possible long term benefits of globalization set alongside the social pain inflicted on 
large numbers of people in the (supposed) short term. It was pointed out that, with 
hindsight, the undoubted gains of the industrial revolution were achieved at a vast 
and unjustifiable social cost, and that a greater awareness of that cost could have 
greatly ameliorated the social pain without significantly diminishing the future 
good. Perhaps a similar analysis will be made of the globalization process by future 
economic historians. A cruciform theology, aware of the current social pain of a 
crucified people, and seeing economics from a victimological perspective, is a 
necessary corrective to the optimism of the ideology of globalization.  
 The traditional focus of the cross, theologically, has been God orientated, in 
terms of salvation or theodicy. Without in any way diminishing that focus, a more 
human orientation is valuable in the analysis of power and the political process. 
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This has been attempted in our discussion of the crucified people and the political 
criterion of the diminution of social pain. Where the divine and human orientations 
most fruitfully coincide is in the area of power, in a cruciform analysis of divine 
power and political power.  
 
b) The nature of political power 
 In this section the nature of political power will be examined in a broad 
context. Two aspects of political power will be identified, critiqued, and contrasted, 
and a preliminary outline of a theology of power suggested. All this is preliminary 
to the final section of this chapter, when a theology of power with particular 
reference to the cross is proposed.  
 In addition to my definition of power at the beginning of this chapter, 
another general definition of power might be ‘the realization of possibilities through 
the voluntary or coerced co-ordination of agents’. This can be applied to the power 
of an individual human body as much as to the power associated with human 
relationships, including politics and government. It has already been suggested that 
power is the central concept in political analysis. For example, Bertrand Russell 
writes that ‘the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in 
which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics’. (Russell 1938: 10) Politics 
centres around the acquisition, distribution, and use of power. Tillich stresses that in 
pursuit of love, Christians should not be afraid of power, but should harness it in the 
work of love (see Tillich 1960). This is echoed by Martin Luther King, who states 
that ‘Power, properly understood, is the ability to achieve purpose...to bring about 
social, political, or economic changes. In this senses power is not only desirable but 
necessary in order to implement the demands of love and justice.’ (King 1967: 37) 
Love requires the dynamic energy of power to be effective, and power needs the 
discipline of love to be just. In the American Civil Rights struggle the quest for 
freedom was naturally overtaken by the demand for power, but King was careful to 
differentiate between the potential violence of Black Power and the non-violence of 
collaborative and transformative power. Christine Hinze, to whose analysis of 
power this section is indebted, points to a significant split in the analysis of power, 
between, in her terms, power over and power to. (Hinze 1995 passim) 
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Power over 
 Power over can be described as the power of authority and control. It is 
hierarchical, structured, coercive, asymmetrical and dominating. This idea of power 
is at the heart of Max Weber’s analysis of politics and society. He defines power as 
macht, ‘the probability that one actor in a social relation will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests’, exercised as herrschaft, the ‘authoritarian power of command’, 
‘the probability that a command with a specific given content will be obeyed by a 
given group of persons’. Political power, as defined by Weber, is ‘the possession of 
a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a given territory’. It is potentially 
backed by violence, and is an inevitable and inescapable phenomenon in human 
society, whatever the economic system which underlies it. It is interesting, given 
Yoder’s disavowal of ‘responsibility’ as a guide in Christian politics, that Weber 
distinguishes between gesinnungsethik  (conviction, inspiration, ultimate ends, 
moral codes of love and compassion) and verantwortungsethik (ethic of 
responsibility based on desired political consequences). (Hinze 1995: 33) On this 
analysis, for a responsible social ordering, a strong element of coercion backed 
ultimately by lethal force is necessary in order that society should hold together in 
the face of potentially disruptive and violent forces within it. Coercion is not 
necessarily overt; authority can be founded on convention, prestige, custom, or 
communal agreement. Potentially violent legitimate force is, however, the bedrock 
on which political power resides. This analysis of power has been prevalent in much 
early twentieth century Christian political analysis. Power as ‘superordination’ has 
been treated as basic to human social and political living, given the need to govern, 
justly and efficiently, large and complex nations and societies for the common 
good. For Niebuhr, the will to power is one of the chief sources of social sin, but 
legitimate superordinationist power is ‘the primary weapon for checking that sin’. 
(Hinze 1995: 85)  
 This superordinationist view of power has been criticized most 
fundamentally by Marx, who sees such asymmetrical relationships as the power of 
one class to dominate another, the power-exercising state being in the possession of 
the dominant class. Alienation arises when ‘people’s communally generated 
transformative efficacy, or power to [see below], is wrested from them and re-
introduced as an alien force, which is then experienced as dominative power over 
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the community’. (Hinze 1995: 44) In the Marxist analysis, the possession of power 
by the mass of the people rather than by a controlling elite is the goal of politics, 
hence the Marxist warning that no matter what the ruling class gave to the workers 
in terms of better living and working conditions (as in the proto-welfare state of 
Bismarckian Germany) they would never give them power. In general, liberation 
theology seems to envisage democracy as the sharing of power by the mass of the 
people, in the sense of both governing and refusing to be dominated, and demands 
that this power sharing democracy should be extended to economics no less than 
politics. Power over can be criticized also in non-Marxist terms for its innate 
pessimism (which its defenders would, of course, describe as realism). To use the 
terminology of Radical Orthodoxy, original violence is presupposed, and society 
regarded as a scenario of conflict, tension, and grasping. Hinze points out that on 
the power over analysis, von Clausewitz’ axiom, that war is simply politics carried 
on by other means, ‘is equally truthful when inverted’. (Hinze 1995: 114)  The task 
of politics is to win the conflict, to impose one’s (beneficial) policies, and to defend 
them, ultimately by the use or threat of force.  
 
Power to 
 Power to, in contrast to power over can be described as the power of 
transformative creativity. Hinze defines this mode of power as ‘effective capacity – 
power is primarily people’s ability to effect their ends’. (Hinze 1995: 5) Such power 
is collaborative and non-hierarchical (or, at least, not necessarily hierarchical), 
involving the co-ordination of resources to achieve a goal. This may necessitate 
some elements of power over, but the emphasis is on shared growth and creativity, 
rather than dominion of one individual, group, class, or nation over another. If 
Weber is a prime example of a power over analysis, Hannah Arendt can serve as an 
example of promoting power to. She stresses the nature of power as capacity to 
effect creative change, tracing a wrong analysis of political power to Plato who 
‘identified rule as constitutive of politics, mistaking relations of asymmetry and 
force for the heart of public life’. (Hinze 1995: 132) The essence of power is not the 
rule of one person or social group over another, but collaboration to achieve shared 
goals. Force and coercion are not the norm in social and political life, but a stop 
gap, which takes a decided second place to the power generated by the common 
consent of the people. Power is a shared strategy to enable human flourishing, 
 199 
rather than the coercive upholding of an asymmetrical structure. The power 
exercised by government does not exist for the sake of the government, but in 
service to the common good of the governed, who give that power by their consent.  
 The reaction against power over has been greatly strengthened by feminist 
social theory, through its critique of the masculinist dominance model in personal 
relationships and wider politics. Feminism ‘emphasizes transformative capacity and 
seeks ways to foster and enhance the collaborative and efficacious features of social 
and political relations’ (Hinze 1995: 164), with a view of power that emphasizes 
‘energy and competence rather than dominance’. (Hinze 1995: 169) The aim of 
power to is the enhancement of the capabilities of others, rather than the 
diminishment of their freedom, through empowering, interdependent, collaborative 
relationships. The purpose of power within a community is not to perpetuate 
structural differences, but to enhance the flourishing of each member in a creative 
and harmonious, rather than a conflictual and zero-sum, manner. Similarly, 
liberation theology stresses the liberative transformation of people from the status 
of being objects within a class based hierarchy to that of subjects who develop their 
own powers in a context of mutual community. Power is realized when the 
previously powerless gain an energy and capability formerly denied them.  
 The chief criticism of power to is on the grounds of its perceived political 
naivety and unrealistic utopianism. Power over theorists such as Weber and Niebuhr 
certainly acknowledge the virtue of power to, but regard power over relationships as 
inevitable, given the fact of human inequality, and necessary, since even in mutual 
co-operation some authority is needed to bring about the co-ordination required to 
achieve goals. For Niebuhr, the sinfulness of humanity confines the practicability of 
power to within the realm of interpersonal relationships and eschatological 
aspirations. Justice in a fallen world needs power over relationships as a defence 
against individual and sectional threats to the common good. Against this, power to 
theorists argue that it is a mistake to make power almost synonymous with violence, 
since this omits much of the essence of power, and privileges what is only a 
comparatively small, and anomalous, element. Domination is sinful, and not 
therefore inherent to human wellbeing, and, although it may not be eliminated, 
should be minimized. Yet even power to is in itself ambivalent. Co-operative 
effectiveness can be used in collaboration for the greater good of a nation or 
community, but can also be turned to evil ends, for example, in the holocaust, 
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impossible without the SS’s esprit de corps and the co-ordination of modern 
technology and transport. 
  
The use of power and its dangers 
 It is clear that neither of the two above mentioned aspects of power is 
sufficient in itself to provide a total analysis of political power. For many Christian 
social ethicists the greatest problem with power over has been its maldistribution. 
Power over in itself is morally neutral; problems arise when that power is kept as 
the preserve of the few, exercised to perpetuate existing oppressive structures of 
power, and leaves the powerless at the mercy of the powerful. Powerlessness can be 
as morally corrupting, in terms of fatalism, despair, and self destructive apathy, as 
the holding of power. There is therefore religious justification for taking power 
from those who use it unjustly (a tradition going back to the Calvinist theory of 
revolution) and using it for the common good. Power is not to be sought per se, but 
as an instrument for social change, and, even in a power structure of command and 
obedience, the presupposition is that of basic human equality between those who 
command and those who obey.   
 This critique is significantly broadened, especially in feminist writings, by 
questioning any justification for power over. It is admitted that there may be a need 
for a limited instrumental power over. This is, however, only provisional, temporary 
and fluid, as in parent-child relationships; it is strictly subservient to the goal of  
co-ordinating resources for the common good; it is for the emergency rather than 
the norm. In other words, it provides safeguards against occasional threats rather 
than being the overriding social factor; and serves to empower others, not to remove 
power from them. In political action, even when the aim is to gain power over, the 
means for this should be consistent with the end goal of a shared, creative, and 
mutual relationship of power to (as exemplified in the tradition of Gandhi and 
King). Walter Wink illustrates the differences between power over and power to by 
comparing the ‘domination system’ with ‘God’s domination free order.’ (The two 
roughly correspond to Hinze’s distinction between power over and power to.) The 
contrast is drawn between a power to take life and to control destiny and a power to 
support and nurture life; between domination and partnership; between win-lose and 
win-win; between competition and co-operation; between exploitation, greed, 
privilege or inequality, and sharing, sufficiency, responsibility, or equality; between 
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domination hierarchies and actualization hierarchies; between the authoritarian and 
the enabling. (Wink 1992: 46) God’s new order, and its embodiment in Jesus, is 
antithetical to the ‘domination system’, and the conflict between the two, Wink 
believes, caused Jesus’ death: ‘When the domination system catches the merest 
whiff of God’s new order, by an automatic reflex is mobilizes all its might to 
suppress that order.’ (Wink 1992: 139)  
 
A preliminary theology of power 
 Hinze usefully suggests that there is no simple correspondence between 
Christian doctrines and power ‘over’ or ‘to’. (Hinze 1995: 286) Both elements of 
power are present in Christian conceptions of God, and in the doctrines of creation 
and redemption. Traditionally, the prevailing power-image of God has been that of 
dominance, with images of God as king, Lord, Almighty. Feminist theologians have 
questioned the power-anthropology engendered by this one sided theology, and 
stressed the need for images of holy power as creative capacity, reciprocal and 
mutual power in addition to (or in place of) the traditional power over 
images.(Hinze 1995: 246-50) This is of great significance not only for a doctrine of 
God but also for social ethics, since, if God’s normal way of exerting power is 
through human creatures, the character of the God exerting the power will radically 
affect the ways in which the human creatures expect to exercise power. A 
misguided dynamolatry will inevitably have deleterious political consequences. 
Barbour writes that ‘divine love, like human love at its best, seeks neither 
[domineering] power over others nor [ineffective] powerlessness’. (Barbour in 
Polkinghorne 2001: 15) The theologian’s task is to construct a doctrine of divine 
power which utilizes not only the traditional power-as-dominance images, but 
‘power as gentle efficacy’ and creative empowering. A liberative theology rests on 
the divine power to energize God’s creatures both to realise their own liberation, 
and to become instruments of God’s liberating will for others. In constructing such 
a theology the cross, as we will see, is central. 
 
c) The cross, kenosis, and power 
 
Kenoticism, Philippians and the cross 
 I will argue in this section that the theological model which best expresses 
this liberative power of God is the kenotic, and that this model most accurately 
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describes God’s cruciform interaction with the world, providing the clearest 
indication of a Christian politics and a doctrine of political power in conformity 
with the character of God. I will also argue that while kenoticism may be valid, up 
to a point, without the cross, it is immeasurably deepened and strengthened by the 
crucifixion. One proviso must, first, be made. Kenoticism is a diverse concept, and 
covers a wide gamut of usage; the metaphor of self emptying can be used in various 
ways, including self-sacrifice, self-giving, self-limitation etc. I begin with a brief 
description of 19th and early 20th century kenoticism, turn to more contemporary 
exegesis of Philippians 2: 5-11, and conclude with an adumbration of a cruciform 
kenoticism which will form the basis for a theology of a kenotic, cruciform God and 
a kenotic, cruciform political ethic. Yoder’s use of the kenotic motif has already 
been noted. In the following description of kenoticism it should be noticed how 
much of Yoder’s theology is fleshed out, especially with regard to the self limitation 
and patience of God. 
 Kenotic theology arose in Germany in the mid to late 19th century and in 
Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in answer to the Christological 
problem of how to speak realistically of Christ’s human life whilst maintaining his 
divinity. Given that Christ was truly human, with the limitations inherent in human 
life (limited knowledge, physical and psychological growth and development etc.) 
how could the doctrine of the incarnation preserve the traditional duality in unity of 
humanity and divinity in one person? A doctrine of the incarnation had to be 
reformulated in the 19th century context of the rise in historico-critical studies of 
Jesus revealing his limited knowledge, and of the increasing psychological research 
into human growth and development. If Christ retained the divine prerogatives, 
perfection, and powers of the eternal Son, how could he be truly human? The 
answer given by the German kenoticist Gottfried Thomasius, the English Charles 
Gore, and others, drawing on Philippians 2: 5-11, was that God in Christ ‘emptied 
himself’ i.e. took up a human existence with the necessary limitations of time, space 
and knowledge, and lived a human life, with the human processes of growth and 
development. Divine attributes, such as omnipotence and omniscience were laid 
aside (or, at least, concealed). Moltmann usefully points out (Moltmann in 
Polkinghorne 2001: 137-151) that this 19th century kenoticism dealt not so much 
with Christ who has become human (i.e. the life of the historical Jesus) as Christ in 
his becoming human (i.e. the point at which Jesus entered history as a human 
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being). The divine logos retained the attributes which appertain to God’s eternal 
inward nature – holiness, love, mercy, faithfulness – but renounced the ‘external’ 
divine attributes relating to the world – omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence 
etc. It is important to note that the kenotic doctrine arose not in opposition to 
incarnational Christianity, but in support of it. In more modern interpretation of 
kenoticism, Balthasar (as in Balthasar 1990) interprets the kenotic motif in 
Trinitarian terms, in seeing the historical self-emptying of Jesus paralleling the 
eternal self giving of the Son to the Father. In becoming a ‘servant’ Christ’s divinity 
is not compromised, but rather reinforced, since his eternal relationship with the 
Father is played out in human history.  
 In traditional kenoticism Christ is a pre-existent being who, in becoming 
incarnate, divests himself of divine attributes. More recent exegesis of Philippians 2 
has questioned this account, locating Paul’s focus in a kenosis within the life of 
Jesus rather than in a pre-incarnate decision. It has been argued that traditional 
kenoticism interpreted Philippians 2 in the light of subsequent Patristic 
Christological debate, and that Jesus’ kenosis was not metaphysical, but ethical and 
socio-political. Dunn interprets Philippians 2 as speaking of the humanity of Jesus, 
whose sharing in the form of God denoted not pre-existence but the perfect likeness 
of God in the sense of the first Adam. (Dunn 1989: 114ff) Moltmann comments that 
in Paul’s account ‘Jesus did not take advantage of his superiority over virtually all 
humans in status and ability. Instead, he showed what the image of God truly is by 
serving others, by healing, forgiving, and submitting in love to the power of evil.’ 
(Moltmann in Polkinghorne 2001:152) The emptying is not the incarnation in itself, 
but the humble and self giving course of Jesus’ incarnate life, culminating in the 
cross. The kenosis, on this account, focuses much more on the cross than on the 
incarnation. McClendon draws attention to the political implications of such an 
interpretation, in pointing out that Christ’s renunciations are meant to parallel Paul’s 
list of renunciations in the previous chapter of Philippians – race, tribe, status – for 
the sake of Christ. Jesus’ choice not to grasp the ‘form of God’ means ‘a rejection 
not of metaphysical perfections, but earthly temptations to kingship, in favour of 
identification with servants and outcasts, even though that identification would lead 
to his death’. (McClendon 1994: 268, quoted in Murphy and Ellis 1996: 176) This 
would clearly be very much in line with a Yoderian theology and also, given its 
emphasis on Jesus’ self sacrifice, with a cruciform political theology.  
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 Much modern exegesis of Philippians 2 is not, then, concerned so much with 
the metaphysics of the Trinity as with the structure of the incarnational narrative 
used by Paul to make an ethical point to his readers. For our purposes it is this 
narrative structure of the humiliation and exaltation of Christ which is important, 
rather than the precise starting point of that narrative. Even more important, the 
narrative structure is inescapably cruciform. Both traditional and modern 
interpretations describe a narrative of descent (or humiliation) and exaltation – it is 
simply that one (the traditional) starts further back than the other. Both end the 
downward movement with the cross, followed by the upward movement of the 
exaltation. On the traditional interpretation, taking the form of a slave included the 
act of the incarnation; compared to pre-existent divine glory any human limitation, 
even that of a king, would seem like slavery. But Paul (as the traditional 
interpretation agrees) goes far beyond this to describe a certain kind of cruciform 
incarnation. Philippians 2 is about more than simply becoming human; it is about a 
certain way of becoming human. There is a definite progress in the narrative of 
Philippians 2 from the humanity of Christ to a certain kind of humanity – a slave – 
ending with the particularly servile punishment (the servile supplicium) of the cross. 
In both interpretations, kenosis is inescapably cruciform in the narrative of descent 
to the lowest point, the crucifixion. Without the cross, the kenosis of the incarnation 
would lose much of its power. As has been argued previously, the cross is the 
radicalization of the incarnation; more incarnate than this God could not be, than to 
suffer the death of crucifixion. This is not to argue that cruciform and kenotic 
theologies are co-terminous; it is possible to have the one without the other, though 
both would lose considerable force. Hengel makes this point vigorously: 
The thanatou de staurou [death of the cross] is the last bitter consequence of 
the morphen doulou labon [taking the form of a slave] and stands in the 
most abrupt contrast possible with the beginning of the hymn with its 
description of the divine essence of the pre-existence of the crucified figure, 
as with the exaltation surpassing anything that might be conceived…. If it 
did not have thanatou de staurou at the end of the first strophe, the hymn 
would lack its most decisive statement. (Hengel 1977:  63) 
Kenosis is associated by Paul inextricably with the cross. Without the cross there 
would indeed be a kenosis in the incarnation (if that is what Philippians 2 is about) 
but it would be a much diminished kenosis, with a diminished political relevance.  
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The cruciform and kenotic character of God  
In addition to the differences in the exegesis of Philippians 2, there has been 
a significant shift in emphasis from the primarily Christological concerns of the 
19tth and early 20th century kenotic theologians to an attempt by late 20th century 
users of the kenotic motif to apply kenoticism to God’s intrinsic nature, and in 
particularly to God’s providential relationship with creation. MacGregor describes a 
contemporary suspicion of kenoticism as a solution to the Christological puzzle, but 
indicates an increasing openness to a kenotic understanding of the very being of 
God. (MacGregor 1987: 71) That the concept of kenosis has been expanded 
significantly beyond its original Christological context is hardly surprising, given 
Jesus’ role as the revealer in time of God’s eternal essence. Christ, kenotic in either 
(or both) his incarnation or his earthly life (but especially his crucifixion) reveals an 
eternal divine kenosis. Robinson sees the human limitations of Jesus not as 
antithetical to divinity, but as a plerosis of divinity. (Robinson 1973: 208) God, in 
freely restricting the divine power is not less, but more, divine. God is seen as 
almighty in humility and self giving rather than simply raw power. This emphasis 
on power as creative and loving self giving rather than on power as dominance and 
control is clearly paralleled by the distinction mentioned above between power over 
and power to, and makes a significant difference to our understanding of both 
divine and political power.   
 The temporal actions of Jesus reveal the eternal kenotic nature of God’s 
providential action. Moltmann in The Trinity and the kingdom of God (Moltmann 
 1981) draws attention to a long tradition in Anglican theology of linking a self-
sacrificial God with the revelatory example of Christ. He quotes C.E. Rolt: ‘What 
Christ did in time, God does in eternity. His nature is the eternal self sacrifice of 
love. His suffering love is at the root of all evolution and all redemption…’ 
(Moltmann 1981: 31) Even earlier, F.D. Maurice interpreted the crucifixion in 
similar ways:  
The crucifixion of Jesus does not represent an emergency rescue package 
hastily put together to deal with the unforeseen consequences of human sin; 
it is a revelation of the eternal character of God, ‘for the mind of the ruler of 
heaven and earth is a mind of self sacrifice; it is revealed in the Cross of 
Christ.’ (Bradley 1995: 172) 
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If the crucified Christ is, as Paul writes in Colossians 1:15-20, the pattern of 
creation, the source of all distinctively Christian discourse about God in his creation 
and providence, then it follows that the overall activity of God in creation and 
continuing providence is cruciform and kenotic. The Barthian movement in 
theology, of which Yoder was very much a part, championed the insight that the 
humiliation of the cross, far from denying Christ’s divine nature, revealed God’s 
fullness. Hence, to go beyond some of Barth’s interpreters (though not the later 
Barth himself), there should be no contradiction between ‘natural’ and ‘revealed’ 
theology in a cruciform doctrine of providence. What we see definitively in the 
pattern of Christ’s ministry, death and resurrection, and what we read less 
definitively in the pattern of creation and providence, should be congruent. 
Peacocke, both a biochemist and a theologian, writes:  
 Belief in Jesus the Christ as the self expression of God in the confines of a 
 human person is entirely consonant with those conceptions of God, 
 previously derived tentatively from reflection on natural being and 
 becoming, which affirm that God, in exercising divine creativity, is self 
 limiting, vulnerable, self emptying, and self giving – that is, supremely love 
 in creative action. (Peacocke in Polkinghorne 2001: 41) 
The kenotic creative and providential actions of God are universal, but are revealed 
in concentrated and definitive form in the actions of Jesus Christ. These actions 
took shape not in a vacuum, but in a political context where questions of human 
political power were remarkably paralleled by questions of God’s power in 
providence. 
 The cruciform and kenotic (therefore vulnerable) character of God 
necessitates an alternative way of interpreting power and political effectiveness, as 
we have seen, in Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino. For Sobrino and Boff the pain and 
vulnerability of God continuing in and reflected by the ‘crucified people’ is central 
to their political theology. For Yoder, a kenotic and cruciform doctrine of God 
revealed through Jesus’ ministry and crucifixion is the basis for an eschatological 
doctrine of political effectiveness. In For the Nations, Yoder writes [My italics]: 
…the church’s being shaken and moved, being vulnerable, defines or 
constitutes its participation in the travail of the Lamb who was slain and is 
therefore worthy to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and 
honour and blessing. That suffering is powerful, and that weakness wins, is 
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true not only in heaven but on earth. That is a statement about the destiny 
not only of the faith community, but also of all creation. (Yoder 1997: 35)  
The nature of the power of God, and therefore human political power, is radically 
questioned by the cross and by a cruciform doctrine of providence. The contrast 
between, to use Hinze’s distinction, a dominating power over God and a vulnerable 
power to God is the basis for much of Moltmann’s thesis in The Crucified God 
(Moltmann 1974). Here the distinction is repeatedly made between the political 
consequences of a theologia gloriae and a theologia crucis. The concept of power is 
naturally and instinctively linked to God, and an image of power-over is most 
closely associated with much of the Biblical language (almighty, king, etc) used to 
describe God. Hence the shock of a cruciform doctrine of God, which does not 
totally rule out power over, but admits suffering into that sovereignty and leads to a 
much greater emphasis on power to. Bonhoeffer contrasts the natural human desire 
for divine power with the cruciform divine power revealed in Jesus: ‘Man’s 
religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world, and the 
Bible directs man to God’s powerlessness and suffering.’ (Bonhoeffer 1953:  361) 
If, as Hall points out (Hall 2003: 79) God’s purpose is to bring us salvation through 
the ‘power of suffering love’, then ‘no application of power in the usual (i.e. power 
over) sense can attain this object’. If power is interpreted as power over, the ‘weak’ 
suffering of the power holder would seem to decrease that power – hence the 
unwillingness of traditional theology to allow a doctrine of divine suffering (as 
suggested by Hinze 1995: 270). But if power is interpreted as power to, there is a 
more integrated relationship between power and suffering, between vulnerability 
and creativity, between self sacrifice and transformation. This ‘weakness’ inherent 
in suffering is paradoxically the divine strength in salvation – as Paul stresses in the 
Corinthian correspondence, especially in 1 Corinthians 1: 25 and  2 Corinthians 2: 
9-10.  
  
The power and ‘weakness’ of God in the light of the cross 
One of the most moving and powerful statements of divine cruciformity is 
found in the poetry of Studdert Kennedy (especially Studdert Kennedy 1947), 
inspired by the sufferings of the First World War. A similar poetic statement can be 
found in ‘Jesus of the Scars’, by Edward Shillito, also written in response to that 
war (most notably quoted in Temple 1945: 385): 
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The other gods were strong, but thou wast weak 
they rode, but thou didst stumble to a throne 
but to our wounds only God’s wounds can speak 
and not a god has wounds, but thou alone 
What does it mean to ascribe ‘weakness’ to God? The term can cover a wide range 
of options from, on the one hand, a power over which allows itself in some areas to 
become vulnerable, but retains what might be described as reserves of power, to a 
metaphysical weakness where the very being of God is totally contingent upon the 
response of creation. Adapting descriptions commonly used of the Trinity, a 
distinction may be made between the ‘essential weakness’ and the ‘economic 
weakness’ of God, the former seeking to describe God’s metaphysical essence, and 
the latter seeking to describe God’s relationship with creation. This is not an 
absolute distinction, as we will see, but can perhaps serve to clarify the concept of 
divine weakness. As examples of  essential weakness I take Process Theology and 
the ‘weakness’ theology of John Caputo and to illustrate economic weakness the 
Lutheran tradition of which Bonhoeffer and Moltmann (Lutheran in his cross-
theology, if not in his ecclesiastical allegiance) are a part.  
 It is sometimes difficult to penetrate Caputo’s playful post modernist talk of 
God as ‘event’, and the boundaries between realism and non-realism are 
(deliberately) obscured, so it is virtually impossible to describe the ‘metaphysical’ 
essence of God in Caputo’s work. His ‘weakness theology’ is, however, a 
fascinating combination of Derrida and the cruciform theology of Paul. Caputo 
contrasts a traditional ‘strong’ church theology, complete with its traditional images 
of God as king, divine rule, the control of history, hierarchy, powerful domination, 
with a ‘weakness theology’ which portrays God as a subversive and vulnerable 
promise for the future and a summons to justice. God is not a dominant power or 
even a metaphysical force, but a ‘weak’ and vulnerable force which nevertheless 
claims us persuasively, persistently, and unconditionally. Caputo writes of the 
‘power of powerlessness’ and the ‘kingdom of weak forces’. (Caputo 2006: 16) 
God is a ‘weak force that lays claim to us unconditionally but has no army to 
enforce its claims’. This ‘weak force’ has political connotations  
 Suppose the sense of ‘God’ is to interrupt and disrupt, to confound, 
 contradict, and confront the established human order … Suppose God has no 
 time for the hierarchical power structures that human beings impose upon 
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 one another and even less time for the power of God over human beings, 
 which is actually the power that human beings exert ‘in the name of God’.. 
 (Caputo 2006: 34) 
Caputo locates the focal point of this ‘weak theology’ on the cross  
The weak force of God is embodied in the broken body on the cross…..The 
power of God is… the power of powerlessness, the power of the call, the 
power of protest that rises up from innocent suffering and calls out against 
it, the power that says no to innocent suffering, and finally the power to 
suffer with innocent suffering, which is perhaps the central Christian 
symbol. (Caputo 2006: 42) 
A more systematic, if less dramatic and provocative, approach to the ‘weakness’ of 
God is that given by Process Theology, which understands the divine interaction 
with creation as involving persuasion rather than coercion. In the famous words of 
Whitehead, God is a ‘fellow sufferer who understands’. (Whitehead 1979: 350) 
God, as an entity, is affected by other entities, and hence vulnerable to change, 
while remaining constant in character. Hence Whitehead’s doctrine of God as 
dipolar, sympathetically responding to the world and experiencing the painful 
struggle endemic to creation, but still remaining God. Thus, for a process 
theologian, kenotic self restraint is not chosen by God, but is an integral part of the 
divine nature, which is limited and vulnerable in its very essence.  
 There is a sense, however, in which the distinction between essential and 
economic weakness, or necessity and contingency, is unreal. Process theology 
suggests that the kenotic limitation on divine power occurs from metaphysical 
necessity rather than through divine choice. But if God’s essential nature is to be 
loving and creative, it is impossible that God could choose to be other than loving 
and creative. If love implies vulnerability, and God’s freedom is freedom only to 
love, then God’s vulnerability is not so much a choice as a necessity compelled by 
God’s own nature. Or, to put this another way, divine omnipotence is not a power to 
do everything, but to act to the limits according to God’s nature of love. So the 
omnipotence of God, with regard to creation, is to share the suffering of creation to 
the fullest extent. The humiliation of the cross is not a diminution of divine 
omnipotence, but its fullest outworking.  
 In the Lutheran tradition the cross is central to knowledge of God and 
therefore of God’s power.  In the Heidelburg thesis number 20 Luther wrote that 
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‘He deserves to be called a theologian who comprehends the visible and manifest 
things of God seen through suffering and the cross.’ This theme of a cruciform 
epistemology is emphasized by Bonhoeffer, in his stress on knowing God as 
marginalized and excluded. Contrary to a ‘god of the gaps’ epistemology, humanity 
knows God through what we experience as a prime human category – suffering. For 
Bonhoeffer, a (potentially) suffering discipleship of a suffering God is the mark of 
Christian living by participating in the divine passion in the midst of ordinary life. 
‘Man is summoned to share in God’s sufferings at the hands of a godless world.’ 
(Bonhoeffer 1953: 361) God does not help us by omnipotent power over, but by the   
power to manifest in creative suffering:  
God lets himself be pushed out of the world onto the cross. He is weak and 
powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which 
he is with us and helps us. Matthew 8, 17 makes it quite clear that Christ 
helps us, not by virtue of his own omnipotence, but by virtue of his 
weakness and suffering. (Bonhoeffer 1953: 360) 
Similarly, for Moltmann, God’s power is limited by the nature of his creative love. 
Moltmann’s political theology is predicated on the centrality of the cross in giving 
true knowledge of God’s compassion, sympathy and fellow suffering. In his 
doctrine of creation he uses the Kabbalistic concept of zimzum, God’s withdrawal of 
omnipotent power over in order to give room for his creation’s free flourishing. God 
is powerful, but in the sense of power to, in giving power from the divine self to 
creation. ‘God does not create merely by calling something into existence…he 
‘creates’ by letting be, by making room, and by withdrawing himself.‘ (Moltmann 
1985: 88) God’s greatness is not compromised by such a withdrawal: ‘God never 
appears mightier than in the act of his self-limitation, and never greater than in the 
act of his self-humiliation.’ (Moltmann in Polkinghorne 201: 148) This power 
involves the patience of suffering. As Moltmann continues, ‘God acts in the history 
of nature and of human beings through his patient and silent presence, by way of 
which he gives those he has created space to unfold, time to develop, and power of 
their own movement.’ (Moltmann in Polkinghorne 2001: 149) Nor is this patience 
simply uninvolved waiting, but God is gently at work, persuading and inviting a 
response, and suffering both the rejection of that offer and the pain of humanity as it 
suffers the consequences of that rejection. This forms a major theme of Moltmann’s 
The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (Moltmann 1981) where (in chapter 2, entitled 
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‘The Passion of God’) he outlines attempts to construct a model of divine action 
taking as its starting point the suffering of the cross, rather than, as in previous 
Christian tradition, the concept of impassibility. In addition to such diverse 
authorities as the Jewish Heschel, the Spanish Catholic Unamuno, and the Russian 
Orthodox Berdyaev, Moltmann draws on a strong tradition in Anglican theology (in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century) of God’s passibility. Although 
Moltmann links this specifically with the Anglo-Catholic doctrine of Eucharistic 
Sacrifice, there are significant parallels with the contemporary emphasis on kenosis. 
We have seen how Moltmann particularly adduces The World’s Redemption by 
C.E. Rolt, (Rolt, 1913) a specialist on the mystical theology of Dionysius the 
Areopagite. Rolt stresses that the omnipotence of God must be interpreted in the 
light of the cross, as the ‘almighty power of suffering love’. The ‘cross on Golgotha 
has revealed the eternal heart of the Trinity’, and the ‘historical passion of Christ 
reveals the eternal passion of God’ (Moltmann 1981: 31-32), self sacrifice being of 
the very essence and nature of God.   
  
Power, weakness, and love 
Is it correct, then, to speak of God’s ‘weakness’? If by weakness we mean 
helplessness and a total powerlessness, in terms of either power over or power to, 
such a description is grossly misleading. But if by weakness we mean vulnerability, 
kenotic humility, and restraint in exercising power, even on a power over model, 
weakness is a justifiable description, provided that weakness is interpreted 
economically and not essentially. From a power to perspective, such weakness is 
better interpreted as creative and vulnerable kenosis, self emptying, which, in the 
form of love, is an integral attribute of God. This weakness is certainly not 
helplessness, but the fullest and most effective compassion. God’s nature of non-
coercive love gives birth to a suffering creativity, the infinite and yet costly ability 
to give and share power. God is, as McGregor put it ‘self emptying being’. 
(McGregor 1987: 179) God’s nature is to give self sacrificially in love, and that 
nature defines and limits the nature of the power God exercises. As feminist 
theology necessarily points out, God’s power is not a magnification of normal 
human (masculinist) power; human power is redefined by the self giving power of 
God. 
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In his cantata Ani Maamin (I believe) Eli Wiesel (Wiesel 1973) meditates on 
the shattering impact of the holocaust on the fate and faith of the Jewish people. 
God’s deliverance comes six million deaths too late, and such a God seems 
powerless – a remorseful deity who can suffer but cannot enable. McGregor states 
bluntly, in his kenotic theology He who lets us be (McGregor 1987) that a 
powerless deity is useless to anyone. This problem has been discussed above in the 
debate concerning Yoder’s priority of witness over (at least short term) 
effectiveness and in Sobrino’s distinction between a God of affinity, a co-sufferer, 
and a God of alterity, a rescuer. A sufferer may well ask, is God powerful enough to 
do anything about their suffering, other than to sympathize?  There is a risk of 
polarization between a theology of the suffering of God which may leave the 
sufferer untouched and unrescued, and a theology of controlling divine power 
which is both experientially unsustainable and results in an idolatrous and sub-
Christian view of God.  
 The question of the effectiveness of divine power cannot be sidestepped. 
The traditional power over images of God’s sovereignty and authority have clear 
connotations of effectiveness – but so do the power to images. If God’s power does 
not sustain creation, promote creation’s flourishing, and empower others, it cannot 
reasonably be designated as any kind of power at all. George Murphy wisely 
comments that kenosis ‘does not mean God’s abdication, but God working in a way 
that is not recognizable to the theologians of glory’. (Murphy 2003: 80) Similarly, 
Polkinghorne draws the contrast: love without power means that God is a 
compassionate but impotent observer; power without love means that God is a 
cosmic tyrant. (Polkinghorne 2001: 91)  How can a ‘weak’ or power-to God be 
transformative? The traditional Christian answer, in 2 Corinthians 12: 9, speaks of 
strength made perfect in weakness. God’s purposes come to fruition not despite 
suffering, but through it. Perhaps a better designation, beyond the power over / 
power to dichotomy, is power from alongside, the power which is particularly 
demonstrated by a kenotic incarnation. God’s power is seen as uncoercive, 
vulnerable, not controlling, and yet liberative, healing, and creative.  
 These questions are discussed here not so much in an attempt to discover an 
answer as to point up their relevance to political theology. A political theology 
modelled on power to may be more in accordance with God’s cruciform nature and 
action – however, weakness, in the sense of loss of power over, risks (at least in the 
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short term) a lack of ability directly to protect the vulnerable or to decrease 
immediate suffering.  
   
d) Constructing a kenotic and cruciform political ethic 
 
The relationship between divine power and human power 
 In Yoder and the liberation theologians the strict distinctions between the 
doctrines of creation and atonement, of incarnation and redemption, are minimized. 
This accords with a general trend to see such doctrines not independently but as 
intimately related. A similar process can be seen in political theology: in Yoder, for 
example, his stress on an uncoerced response to love in his doctrine of atonement 
leads naturally to an avoidance of coercion in his political theology. In attempting to 
construct a kenotic and cruciform political ethic, an important question must first be 
tackled: how far is it possible to model a political ethic on God’s nature and 
character as expressed in the creation, incarnation and atonement? We have seen 
how divine power is not solely or chiefly power over, but power to – or more 
accurately, power alongside. Since it is at the heart of a Christian anthropology to 
see humanity in the image of God and created according to the divine plan and 
purpose, there should be some kind of relationship between divine power thus 
redefined and human power - at the very least, some parallelism between God’s 
action and Christian political ethics. Political ethics have at their centre the nature, 
use and distribution of power; hence the importance of the question of how far a 
Christian political ethic of power can mirror God’s power in its nature and use. Can 
a political ethic of power be constructed which ‘goes along the grain’ of creation as 
theistically interpreted?  
 I will argue that such an ethic can be constructed – with some important 
provisos. First, as Kant taught, in ethics ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Is a kenotic ethic 
possible in a sinful and fallen political world? Niebuhrian realism would, as we 
have noted on many occasions, argue that a kenotic, cruciform ethic, may be the 
ideal, but needs to be adjusted if it is not to be irrelevant in a world of power over. 
As has been argued above, ‘realism’ is not a blank cheque for abandoning any 
attempt to form a cruciform ethic, but the possibly harmful consequences of such an 
ethic cannot simply be ignored. Second, is a parallelism between divine and human 
power obligatory? Does the correspondence have to be total between divine 
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character and human ethics? The powerlessness of Jesus on the cross signals that 
divine power is of a certain type, but the crucifixion is not necessarily the exclusive 
paradigm of divine-human relationships. It may well be overwhelmingly decisive, 
but is not the only paradigm. To put the problem another way, is it axiomatic that 
the Christian has to imitate the cruciform nature of God in all circumstances? Or are 
there circumstances where faithfulness to God requires the Christian not to share in 
the cruciform divine nature? The problem of conflicting duties has already been 
mentioned in our discussion of Yoder, and is relevant here. There exists also the 
possibility that there may be parts of the divine personality which are solely divine 
and have no easy correspondence to human politics. There is no automatically 
straightforward correspondence between Christian doctrine and questions of power.  
 This difficulty can be illustrated by twentieth century attempts to build 
social ethics on certain aspects of Christian doctrine. For Moltmann, the trinitarian 
doctrine of God as a community of three equals, whose life consists of a self giving, 
cruciform love, provides a good indication for a social ethic of democratic 
socialism. For Caputo, a ‘strong’ theology leads to militarism and violence, and so, 
in order to promote peace and justice a ‘weak’ theology is needed. It is a widely 
accepted maxim that if the object of worship is hierarchical or oppressive, the 
ensuing social ethic will probably be similarly hierarchical and oppressive. David 
Nicholls, in Deity and Domination (Nicholls 1989), outlines a fascinating history of 
correspondence between images of God and concepts of political power, drawing 
attention to the potential pitfalls. For example the Nazi sympathizing jurist Carl 
Schmitt argued, in his teaching about the ‘sociology of the concept’ that the most 
important concepts in modern political and legal theory were ‘secularized 
theological concepts’, both in their historical derivation and in their formal 
resemblances. (Nicholls 1989: 106) The danger in the mutual interrelationship is 
clear: erroneous theological concepts can lead to erroneous political theologies and 
secular ideologies, and vice versa. The difficulty, as Nicholls suggests (Nicholls 
1989: 232) lies in avoiding the historical mistakes in such an analogia entis. He 
concludes:  
The attempt to find fixed criteria by which to assess the validity of the 
images used of God results in a wild goose chase…[there are] no wholly 
objective criteria to which we can appeal that are free from the taint of 
cultural context. (Nicholls 1989: 241) 
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This gloomy prognosis can perhaps be confirmed by surveying some of the less 
beneficial ways in which the divine-human correspondence, especially with regard 
to the cross, has been used. For example, the kenotic imagery of sacrifice has been 
widely used to glamorize war and imperialism. Rupert Brooke, with his seeming joy 
at the opportunity for self sacrifice in war (Now God be thanked, etc) and hymns 
such as ‘O Valiant Hearts’ take the theme of sacrifice and use it to support a 
militarist and nationalist ideology. There is indeed a sense in which the armies 
suffering the hell of the trenches could be said to form part of the crucified people 
(such imagery was not unknown in the war poets), and the poetry of Studdert 
Kennedy (significantly chosen by Moltmann as an outstanding pioneer of a 
theology of divine suffering) dramatically expresses God’s suffering and sympathy. 
However, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that such language was frequently 
commandeered by those who sought to inculcate a spirit of sacrifice for dubious 
ends.  
All this is not to argue that it is impossible to construct a social ethic which 
seeks to correspond to the character of God. To argue that there need be no such 
correspondence would remove such an ethic from any pretension of being called 
Christian. The problem is one of arbitrariness: how does one choose the particular 
aspect of God, or the particular aspect of Christian doctrine to which a Christian 
social ethic should correspond? There are perhaps three criteria by which the 
validity of a cruciform, kenotic ethic, corresponding to the character of God can be 
assessed. The first two are more associated with Yoder, the latter more with Sobrino 
and Boff. 
The first criterion is that of revelation. The Christian belief is that the 
incarnate Jesus reveals the truth about God. In order to gain access to the aspects of 
the nature of God with most relevance to political ethics, it would seem reasonable 
to look to those aspects of the life of Jesus which connected most closely to the 
politics of his day. If Jesus lived a kenotic political life which ended with the 
inevitability of crucifixion, if Jesus renounced power over in favour of power to or 
alongside, then something definitive is revealed both about the nature of divine 
cruciform and kenotic power and the kind of politics to which the Christian is 
committed in following Jesus at this point. The second criterion is that of imitation. 
The moral character of God is revealed in Christ, and the Christian is called to 
imitate Christ as part of ‘being in Christ’. This imitation forms the social ethic 
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which is an integral part of Christian discipleship. Yoder stresses that in the New 
Testament imitation of Christ is centred almost exclusively on the cross. There is no 
general concept of imitating random aspects of Christ’s ministry; the only imitation 
in the New Testament being of the cross-bearing Christ, and hence of the particular 
kenotic use of power which this implies. This imitation leads to an ethic which aims 
to reflect the character of God, not just any aspect of the character of God, but his 
kenotic and cruciform nature. The third criterion is that of vulnerability. If the 
previous criteria rested on contemplating Christ in his relation to first century 
politics, this third criterion rests on contemplating Christ in his present sufferings in 
the crucified people. What is the effect of a doctrine of power on the present 
sufferings of Christ? What does the solidarity of Christ with the suffering have to 
say about the nature of power a Christian should seek to exercise? In the following 
section an attempt is made to outline a cruciform, kenotic political ethic which 
seeks to correspond to the cruciform, kenotic character of God in accordance with 
the above criteria. 
 
Kenosis as a subversive ethic 
 If the ultimate power, the divine, is kenotic, all human pretensions to power 
are to some extent questioned and subverted. Kenosis parallels the ethic of reversal 
found in the Sermon on the Mount, and especially in the Beatitudes  which illustrate 
what Kraybill (Kraybill 1985) described as the ‘upside down kingdom’. Jesus 
frequently spoke in ‘power language’, of a ‘kingdom of God’, without overt irony. 
But the nature of that kingdom (where the first is last, and the meek inherit the 
earth) and the way of entering into it (as a little child) reveal a covert irony which is 
confirmed by the overall kenotic shape of his coming. Caputo captures this element 
in his description of the kingdom of God as ‘an anarchic field of reversals and 
displacements’, and invites us to consider the name of God as describing ‘a 
disturbance or a holy disarray – a sacred anarchy, a hieranarchy’. (Caputo 206: 14) 
Such a God cannot be a guarantor of any existing status quo, as in traditional 
conservatism, but a radical question mark against the nature and use of power. This 
questioning of power does not necessarily abolish structures of power, but makes 
them accountable, both to those for whose benefit such structures exist (for 
example, in order to maintain the necessary organizations of a technological 
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civilization) and to those whom such structures may, deliberately or inadvertently, 
exclude from power.  
 In my outline of a possible kenotic ethic I make a rough division between a 
personal ethic of political kenosis, centred on a spirituality of kenotic political 
discipleship focusing on issues of lifestyle, and a social ethic of political kenosis, 
centred on a redefinition of power with the stress on non-violence. I conclude with 
two provisos on the nature of such an ethic. I take as the most important arena for 
such an ethic the continuing crises of globalization, environmental degradation, 
poverty and inequality in the world economy, seeking to indicate how such an ethic 
can be of use in this arena.  
 
A spirituality of kenotic political discipleship 
 Murphy and Ellis, in On the moral nature of the universe (Murphy and Ellis 
1996) attempt to work out a kenotic political ethic on the basis of what they believe 
to be along the grain of both God’s kenotic nature and kenosis as demonstrated 
within creation. It is their political interpretation of kenosis which forms the basis 
for the discussion in the remainder of this chapter. Their ethic can be summed up as 
follows: ‘Self-renunciation for the sake of the other is humankind’s highest good.’ 
(Murphy and Ellis 1996: 118) This ethic or (equally accurately) spirituality consists 
of self-sacrifice, other-centredness, forgiveness, a willingness to accept suffering, 
and humility, exercised not merely privately but in relation to social and political 
life as a whole. We have already seen such a self-sacrificial cruciform spirituality in 
the writings of Boff and Sobrino in the context of Latin American discipleship and 
martyrdom. In a European context, Bonhoeffer, whose proclamation of Christian 
self sacrificial discipleship – ‘when Christ calls a man, he calls him to come and 
die’ (Bonhoeffer 1959: 79) – began as a metaphor and ended as a tragic reality, can 
serve as an example of such a political spirituality.  
 Such a kenotic ethic has been widely criticized. In its original Victorian and 
Edwardian forms (see Bradley 1995: 161) it has been interpreted as a product of the 
guilty consciences of wealthy members of the middle and upper classes. This 
criticism has particularly been made by feminists, who have seen self-sacrificial 
kenosis as relevant to a predominantly male paradigm, and dangerous to women, for 
whom it leads to a self-destructive subordination (see Hampson’s rejection of 
kenosis in the discussion in Coakley 2002: 3). According to this feminist critique, 
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self development and self realization rank higher than self sacrifice. This criticism 
is valid, as a warning against the ever present tendency for any spirituality to 
become corrupted in the interests of those holding power. It would be ironic in the 
extreme for a kenotic spirituality to be used as an instrument of confirming the 
powerless in their powerlessness, rather than as an encouragement for power 
sharing on a basis of equality. As we will see, kenosis is an insufficient ethic in 
itself if isolated from wider considerations. However, this criticism does not fatally 
vitiate a kenotic ethic, if by means of such an ethic the overall aim is, in the words 
of the Magnificat, to ‘cast down the mighty from their thrones and lift up the 
lowly’.(Luke 2: 52) In that task, self sacrifice, renunciation, suffering, and 
detachment from material reward may well be essential virtues. If a general kenotic 
social ethic is indicated, there is also a need for a kenotic spirituality and a 
cruciform spiritual discipline to give that ethic support, impetus, staying power and 
validity. 
 
Kenotic lifestyle choices 
 In the light of the environmental crisis and the continuing destructive 
economic and political inequality between ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds, a kenotic ethic 
is required from those at present enjoying a disproportionate share of the world’s 
resources. This kenotic ethic would take the form of a voluntary self limitation in 
the use of resources, food and wealth. The link between kenosis and lifestyle has 
long been established. For example, in ecumenical theology of the 1970’s, Mar 
Ostathios (Mar Ostathios 1977: 104), in an article headed 'the rich must become 
poor voluntarily’ wrote of the church and the Christian using Christ's kenosis as a 
pattern to follow in adopting a simpler lifestyle.  
 I take as a recent historical example of this kenotic ethic the ‘Lifestyle 
Movement’ of the 1970s, the ethos of which has mushroomed in the contemporary 
Green Movement. Other similar examples were the evangelical ‘International 
Consultation on Simple Lifestyle’ which grew out of the Lausanne Conference, and 
Roman Catholic concerns for lifestyle initiated by the encyclical Populorum 
Progressio. (Details to be found in Peet, Crucible, 2005) The 'Lifestyle Movement' 
arose chiefly under the aegis of Horace Dammers (Dean of Bristol Cathedral) who 
set out the principles of the movement in Lifestyle, a Parable of Sharing (Dammers 
1982).  The movement had its beginnings in the Church Leaders Conference in 
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Selly Oak, Birmingham, in 1972, in the Commission on 'Man's Stewardship in 
God's World', where the following 'invitation' was put to the conference:  
The Commission, convinced that environmental responsibility and social 
justice on a world scale demand changes in personal as well as national 
ways of life, recommends to each of its own members and invites all 
members of this Conference to pledge ourselves to a simplicity of life which 
is generous to others and content with enough rather than excess; and that 
each should privately review his or her life before God so as to implement 
this pledge, as necessary, by altered patterns of consumption. 
(Dammers 1982: 106)   
The links between environmental responsibility, social justice, and the lifestyle of 
the individual, the ideals of 'simplicity', 'enough' and avoidance of 'excess', and 
private and personal responsibility for implementing the commitment were themes 
incorporated into the Lifestyle Commitment, which included the famous phrase 
used by the ecumenist / biologist Charles Birch ‘I therefore propose to live more 
simply that others may simply live.’ The commitment is given to ‘change my own 
lifestyle as may be necessary.....and to enjoy such material goods and services as are 
compatible with this commitment.’ Support is pledged ‘to such political and social 
action and to such economic policies as tend to conserve, develop, and redistribute 
the Earth's resources for the benefit of the whole human family.’  A percentage of 
income is to be given away, and participants are encouraged to join a 'Life style cell' 
or to form one. This 'simple lifestyle' is not seen as the end, but as a means to an 
end, in a holistic framework which presupposes and includes political action; it is 
not, at least in intention, a privatized and individualistic venture. Ronald Sider, the 
author of the work, Rich Christians in an age of hunger (Sider 1977), which, more 
than any other, influenced evangelicals towards a simpler lifestyle, wrote that the 
purpose of a simpler lifestyle was ‘a desire for structural change to bring about a 
new kind of global community’. (Sider 1982:  26ff) This was an attempt to answer 
the chief criticism of lifestyle movements, that they accept the existing economic 
order and power structure as basically sound and concentrate on the responsibilities 
and uses of economic power while ignoring the necessity for a more radical critique 
of the acquisition and maintenance of that power.  
 Lissner, a Dane working for the World Lutheran Federation, gave ten 
reasons for adopting a simpler lifestyle (quoted in Dammers 1982: 81-2). A simple 
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lifestyle is an act ‘of faith, of self-defence (against over-consumption); of 
withdrawal (from the 'neurosis' of a materialist society); of solidarity; of sharing; of 
celebration; of provocation (a prophetic act); of anticipation (of a new era); of 
advocacy; and an exercise of purchasing power.’ Historically, the lifestyle 
movement arose in the 1970’s from a sense of disillusionment with the prevailing 
model for development, with its assumption of a shared interest between the 
wealthy and the poor (an assumption which is still prevalent in much development 
economics). A more conflictual model may well be indicated by a cruciform 
political theology, accompanied by an uneasiness about benefiting from an unjust 
economic system – in the sixties phrase, a desire to cease from being part of the 
problem, and become part of the solution. The environmental crisis has added 
weight to what might be called a Kantian criticism of the present maldistribution of 
the earth’s resources, given the finite nature of these resources and an awareness 
that it is impossible for the whole of humanity to enjoy levels of consumption 
hitherto the norm in the richer nations. A Kantian ethic, by which a situation’s 
moral acceptability rests on the rightness (and possibility) of its universalisation,   
would seem to question the consumption of the rich, in the light of shortage of 
resources and the potential for conflict (military or economic) over them.  
 In this situation, some sort of a kenotic ethic would seem to be 
essential, for three reasons. First if (as seems overwhelmingly likely) the chief cause 
of the environmental crisis is over-consumption on behalf of the rich, some form of 
kenotic restraint is essential in order to remedy the situation. Second, one of the 
simplest arguments for a kenotic, simpler lifestyle, is the subsequent transfer of 
resources from the ‘first world’ to the ‘third’, either through massively increased 
charitable giving - a course of action vigorously advocated by Peter Singer in The 
life you can save (Singer 2009) or through socially useful forms of investment, such 
as micro credit schemes (as recommended, for example, by the Agra Covenant on 
Christian Capital – see Sider 1997: 234-5). This argument for a kenotic lifestyle 
circumvents the debate over whether the wealth of the ‘first world’ is a contributory 
factor to the poverty of the ‘third’. Even if it could be demonstrated that first world 
wealth and third world poverty are not causally linked, the Christian would still 
have a responsibility to alleviate the suffering that exists. In the New Testament, 
and especially the teaching of Jesus (for example, Matthew 25: 31-46, Luke 10: 25-
37, and Luke16:19-31) the rich are judged not so much for their part in directly and 
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consciously causing suffering, but for their callous indifference to it and their 
refusal to use their wealth to alleviate it. A kenotic lifestyle, lived in awareness of 
the suffering of the ‘crucified people’, adopted by members of the ‘first’ world 
would be an attempt to obey the teaching of Jesus at this point. Any charges of 
economic naivety, in that decreased ‘first world’ demand entails global economic 
recession, could be countered by the fact that ‘first world’ kenoticism would lead to 
increased ‘third world’ investment and therefore  beneficial economic activity. 
As we have seen, one of the criticisms (perhaps, in practice, unjustified) of 
lifestyle movements has been their tendency to cultivate a privatized ethic, which 
ignores the need for structural change. This leads to the third reason for a kenotic 
lifestyle, that such a lifestyle gives integrity to political campaigning for such 
structural changes and brings about a shift in public attitudes which are usually a 
precursor to change. Syder adduces the example of the abolitionists of the 
nineteenth century, who would have had no case against slavery had they 
themselves kept slaves (Syder 1991:  226). Elliot sees a significant role for the 
churches in the creation of an alternative consciousness which can bring about 
political change. This he sees as the ‘true task of the church in development’ (Elliot 
1987:117) advocating ‘centres of resistance’ - small cells of people ‘who are 
discovering the interpenetration of prayer and praxis in their own situation’- such as 
the Base Communities of Latin America and  the Sojourners of the United States. 
(Elliot 1987: 180) A kenotic theology could well form the basis for what Taylor 
called a ‘joyful resistance movement’ (Taylor 1975: 68) tackling environmental 
degradation and the persistence of poverty and inequality.  
 
Kenotic power as em-powering 
 So far we have examined a mainly personal kenotic ethic and spirituality.  
How might a kenotic ethic become capable of social and political embodiment? 
This begs the question of whether such an ethic is primarily for a relatively small 
number of committed individuals (i.e. a Yoderian disciplined church) or whether it 
is legitimate to extend such an ethic more widely. Whilst recognizing that the 
further removed from a committed minority grouping the greater the inevitable 
dilution of a kenotic ethic, it would be paradoxical to argue that what is valid for 
one group in society is not applicable in any way to society as a whole. If the divine 
intention for humanity is some form of a kenotic ethic, modelled by the church, then 
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it is legitimate to outline what a kenotic ethic might mean, and what social 
embodiment it might take, beyond the boundaries of the church.  
I wish to examine this with particular reference to both political and 
economic power – two sides of the same coin, converging in the running, for 
example, of the IMF, World Bank and other international economic organizations. 
In general terms, a kenotic doctrine of power aims to enable power in others 
through a degree, at least, of self giving and self sacrifice for the common good {the 
category of power to). As Aneurin Bevan is said to have remarked, the purpose of 
getting power is to be able to give it away. The logic of the cross, the ‘Son of Man 
coming not to be served, but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many’ (Mark 
10: 45) indicates a kenotic empowering through service and a renunciation of the 
power whose main object is domination. In the globalization debate, this would 
indicate a shift from coercive, dominating, centralized neo-imperialist power to an 
em-powering and enabling power, power to build up local strength and 
responsibility, power to enable others to fulfil their potential.  
Murphy and Ellis describe four levels of economic activity, from non-
kenotic to kenotic (Murphy and Ellis 1996: 122). First, where the aim is totally self 
serving; second, where there is sharing in order to create new economic 
opportunities (where my sacrifice means, in the end, my gain in addition to the gain 
of others, for example, in microcredit loans); third, where there is pleasure from 
seeing someone else use a resource, even if it excludes me from certain good or 
benefits (an example being the sacrifices made in family life); fourth, sacrifice for 
others, whose enjoyment will not contribute directly to my own happiness (for 
example, present sacrifices made for the environmental benefit of future 
generations).  
Given the intrinsically selfish character of liberal free market capitalism, 
which by its very nature is incapable of a kenotic instinct, the role of a kenotically 
influenced government would be to mould the course of the economic process by 
means of incentives and regulation towards a sharing and democratizing of 
economic power in the interests of those lacking that economic power. Here a 
paradox can clearly be seen: on a personal level, a kenotic spirituality or 
discipleship cannot be imposed by coercion or law, but can only be freely chosen. 
On as macro scale, a kenotic national or international ethic involves, where power is 
shared or devolved, a degree of coercion (or at least, governmental encouragement). 
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This would mark a kenotic decision by society as a whole as to how it wishes its 
economy to operate.  
 Similarly, Murphy and Ellis outline a scale of kenoticism in the political 
sphere, ‘a scale of attitudes and behaviour, characterizing how political 
organizations relate to their members and the community, and a similar scale for a 
government’s relations to its own citizens and to other states’. (Murphy and Ellis 
1996: 132) Murphy and Ellis suggest on the non-kenotic to kenotic scale: first, a  
centralized unilateral form of decision making enforced by tyrannical methods, with 
other groups dominated and brought into line by coercive methods; second, broadly 
democratic methods of majority decision making, but with the minority forced to 
accept the decision of the majority, power negotiations being undertaken with 
outside groups; third, participatory democracy, policy arrived at as general 
agreement, taking into account minority views, with methods of persuasion, 
negotiation, and accommodation used in relation to other groups; finally, consensus 
decision making within the organization, and ‘true political kenosis in outside 
relations, opening oneself to the opposition and using methods that have the 
potential of transforming enemies into friends.’ Examples of the latter might be 
individual leaders such as Gandhi, King, Dolci – but, significantly, not national 
governments. It is doubtful whether in a large complex society such pure or ‘true’ 
kenotic behaviour, in the form of consensus decision making, is at all viable, at least 
in the functioning of national government.  
However, a move towards kenoticism can certainly be made on what might 
be described as the structural and intentional levels. Structurally, policies such as 
the devolution of power, subsidiarity and federalism tend towards a kenotic power 
sharing away from the centre and bring about local political enabling. And if it is 
the intention of government not to govern in the interests of a section of society or a 
dominating class, but to seek the common good, both for its own citizens and in 
international affairs, then that government can move in a ‘kenotic’ direction, where 
power to gradually replaces power over.  Problems occur when conflicts arise 
between the supposed good of its own citizens and the good of citizens of another 
nation. This poses the question whether a government can obey a kenotic 
international ethic to the (at least short term) detriment of its own citizens, for 
example in refraining from increased national prosperity in the interests of sharing 
prosperity with others. A democratic government, elected on a kenotic manifesto, 
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would be justified in pursuing such a policy. Whether or not such a situation would 
be possible could depend upon a change of consciousness in a kenotic direction in 
which a kenotic church might be a significant catalyst. In fact, it is unrealistic to 
expect the adoption of a kenotic national policy without such a witness from a 
committed minority, in which a kenotic and cruciform church could play a leading 
role. 
 
Non-violence as the presumption 
 At the heart of a kenotic politics is the abandonment of expansionist self 
aggrandizement, whether territorial, economic, or political. Expressed thus, a 
kenotic ethic cuts decisively across the grain of human history, a history of the 
waxing and waning of self aggrandizing empires. It is important to recognize that a 
kenotic ethic calls for nothing less than a disposition and a policy diametrically 
opposed to this historical norm. Murphy and Ellis go so far as to declare that the 
kenotic ethic ‘entails the proscription of violence’ (Murphy and Ellis 1996: 142) 
and envisage a decreasing need for the violence of coercion as a kenotic ethic is 
applied: ‘A consistent policy of using the least coercive means possible in each 
social situation will affect the character of the individuals involved such that less 
coercion will be needed in future resolutions of conflict.’ (Murphy and Ellis 1996: 
151) They adduce various different forms of coercion, beginning with the most 
kenotic, and ending with the least: persuasion by argument and, if necessary, by 
accepting suffering or self-sacrifice; non-violent coercion, including indirect action 
through strikes or acts of non-cooperation; social coercion through ostracism or 
collective pressure; and finally, violent coercion (Murphy and Ellis 1996: 153-4). 
They comment that ‘the factor that distinguishes the kenotic category of actions 
from other non-coercive forms of persuasion is the issue of suffering and of 
sacrificing oneself for the sake of the other’. (Murphy and Ellis 1996: 156) 
 It is significant that, as in Yoder, the grounds for such non violence lie not 
so much in an inner logic of kenoticism as in an imitation of the character of God, 
who, in the historical cruciform paradigm given by Jesus, refused to resort to 
violence, and in his providential relationship with humanity does not violently 
coerce. Concern is therefore shown not merely for self defence, or for the defence 
of the neighbour, but for the good of the aggressor. There is a willingness to suffer 
in order to break a cycle of violence or, indeed, to prevent its initiation. A kenotic 
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non-violence renounces the right not only to attack, but to defend oneself if that self 
defence oversteps the possibility of reconciliation. Such an ethic is certainly not 
passive or negative, in the sense of the mere avoidance of violence. Nor does such 
an ethic ignore the necessity to initiate and accomplish political change; it does, 
however, recognize that there are limits to the degree of coercion permissible in 
bringing about that change.  
 We return now to the basic difference between Yoderian (and Murphy and 
Ellis kenoticist) pacifism, and the Niebuhrian realist position, whose stance on the 
permissibility of violence is shared (reluctantly) by Boff and Sobrino. Given the 
‘competing duties’ argument  inherent in any Christian discussion of violence, it is 
not clear why some degree of force, in terms of police action, should be totally 
excluded in a kenotic ethic. One can renounce self defence kenotically, but to 
renounce the defence of others may not be so easily justified. The nature, extent, 
and violence of force is certainly limited by a kenotic ethic, but force is not 
necessarily ruled out per se.  Indeed, as Ellis points out (Ellis in Polkinghorne 2001: 
123) a kenotic ethic involves putting oneself at risk in the interests of others. If the 
only way to defend those at risk is by force, it is, paradoxically, a relatively short 
step to a kenotically self sacrificial ‘just war’. It is important to recognize that both 
approaches rest on valid principles (and principles which can be justified by an 
appeal to the cross), the Yoderian pacifist imitating the kenotic action of God in 
Christ, and the liberation theologian being sensitive to the Christian’s 
responsibilities towards the suffering, including their defence.  
In practice, this tension is at least partially resolved by a kenotic spirituality 
which emphasizes the necessity for giving up revenge in favour of the long term 
benefits of peace, and of prioritizing reconciliation with the enemy over strict 
justice. Such a peacemaking theology has been developed, for example, by Shriver 
in An Ethic for Enemies (Shriver 1995) and the ‘Forgiveness and Politics Study 
Project’, initiated by the British Council of Churches. In practical politics this 
approach has been most recently exemplified in South Africa, in the forgiveness 
and magnanimity demonstrated by Mandela, and the workings of the Truth and 
Justice Commission.  
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Two Provisos 
 The Niebuhrian objection to a kenotic politics is not that it is wrong, but that 
it is disastrously unfeasible, given the sinfulness of humanity, and likely to result in 
the further suffering of the vulnerable. This is a significant objection, and not 
simply to be countered by a Gandhian (or Yoderian) belief in the purity of means, 
while leaving the ends to God. A kenotic ethic, according to the Niebuhrian, is 
certainly suitable for a highly committed minority, whose non-violent witness 
would no doubt be valuable in pointing towards an ideal, but is totally unsuitable 
for the practical politics of governing a state, or establishing international order.  
 This is partially countered by my first proviso – that a kenotic ethic is not 
absolute. There is a mean to be established between Yoderian kenotic risk and 
Niebuhrian responsibility. For example, a parent will, for the sake of a child’s 
personal, social and moral development, allow a degree of risk, but that allowing of 
risk is not absolute; it is limited by the responsibility for the prevention of excessive 
harm.  Here also we return to the theme which is basic to this subject – the necessity 
to construct a social ethic imitative of the character of God. It is essential to 
remember that the supreme and controlling attribute of God, on which all theology, 
political and otherwise must be modelled, is not kenosis, but love. Kenosis may be 
the overriding way in which power is ideally exercised in love and forms the 
definitive way in which God interacts lovingly with creation, but kenosis is a 
concept secondary and subsequent to that of love. It may be argued that love in 
itself is an insufficient concept, and needs to be ‘fleshed out’ by a kenotic 
incarnation which gives historical reality to that love, but love is still prior to any 
concept depending upon it. It is possible that love may sometimes override kenosis 
in divine providence, and therefore in a Christian politics.  
 This leads to my second proviso: kenosis in itself is not enough. Jesus’ 
kenotic advice to the rich young ruler was not simply ‘go, sell your goods, and 
follow me’ (Mark 10:17-25), but also ‘give the money to the poor’. The command 
was not simply for the good of the rich young ruler’s soul, in fulfilling an abstract 
kenotic demand, but for the good of the most vulnerable in the wider community. 
Likewise, kenosis does not consist of self-emptying or suffering for its own sake (or 
for the sake of the individual) but for the good of the world. Kenosis could lead to a 
self absorbed blind alley unless coupled with a further vision for justice and the 
desire, actively ‘to remove the crucified from their crosses’. 
 227 
Chapter 12 
The cross, the church, and the crucified people 
 The underlying question discussed in this concluding chapter is how a 
cruciform social ethic can be embodied in the community of the church. If, as 
Bonhoeffer asserts, the church is ‘Christ existing in community’ (Bonhoeffer 1995: 
65), then political theology, ecclesiology, and Christology are inextricably 
entwined. How can the contemporary church be a social witness to the Crucified 
and the crucified? In particular, how can a ‘mainstream’ church in Britain, such as 
the Church of England or the Methodist Church, live out a political ethic marked by 
the cross? These questions are essential to any British discussion of a political 
theology of the cross. Similarly, as Moltmann declares, ‘Every statement about the 
church will be a statement about Christ. Every statement about Christ will be a 
statement about the church.’ (Moltmann 1977: 6) What statement does the 
crucifixion make about the church, and the social ethics bound up with that 
ecclesiology? In answer to these questions I seek to outline a theoretical framework 
for the political role of the mainstream British churches, drawing on the insights of 
Yoder, Boff, and Sobrino, in particular Yoder’s vision of a cruciform minority 
church, and Boff and Sobrino’s emphasis on the ‘crucified people’. 
 
a) Questions of definition – the cruciform and the crucified 
 
The church as the body of Christ, and therefore cruciform 
 The mode and meaning of the death of Christ entails the cruciform character 
of the church as his present ‘body’. It is significant that the Christological definition 
of the church as the ‘body of Christ’ in Pauline thought is rooted from the beginning 
in the concept of the suffering, ‘crucified’, people of God. At his conversion, Paul is 
convicted that by persecuting the Christian believers he is persecuting Christ 
himself (as pointed out by Robinson 1952: 58). On this account, from the very 
outset, Paul sees the suffering church as Christ’s persecuted body. The church’s task 
is to embody Christ in the contemporary world and to create a continuing Christ-
shaped community. Since Jesus’ historical interaction with the society and the 
politics of his day led to his crucifixion, so that same vulnerability to suffering and 
persecution should inevitably continue in the contemporary church’s social and 
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political witness. The church’s cruciformity is an inescapable consequence of its 
nature as the body of Christ.  
 It is no exaggeration to assert that the very genuineness of the church is 
recognized by such cruciformity. This is certainly not the sole defining feature of 
the church; the church is a community of joy, of worship, fellowship, love and 
service, with the distinctive notae of holiness, catholicity and apostolicity. The 
church is also, in the words of Bishop Geoffrey Paul, a ‘glorious mixture of saints 
and fatheads’ (Paul 1986: 135), and its historical and sociological reality is 
therefore bound to fall far short of its ideal nature, being inevitably corrupted by a 
sinful conformity. It is however significant that in New Testament ecclesiology 
(most notably in Paul’s Corinthian correspondence, but also in Jesus’ teaching in 
the Beatitudes) suffering is pre-eminent as the distinguishing mark of the followers 
of Jesus. A Pauline theologia crucis leads inevitably to an ecclesia crucis. If the 
church’s identity is found elsewhere than in the vulnerability of the crucified Christ, 
it foregoes its right to be called, in any meaningful way, the body of Christ. The 
pre-eminent contradiction of Christendom lies in the creation of an ecclesiology 
which obviates the need for vulnerability and therefore severs the link, in its 
sociological practice as a community, with the historical Jesus. A church which thus 
pretends to be the body of an uncrucified Jesus is living a lie. The church’s essential 
cruciform vulnerability is well expressed in William Cavanaugh’s reflections on the 
Chilean church under Pinochet: 
The true body of Christ is wounded, marked by the cross. As the body of 
Christ, the church participates in the sacrifice of Christ, his bloody 
confrontation with the powers of this world. The church’s discipline then is 
only the discipline of martyrdom, for Christ’s body is only itself in its self-
emptying. The church does not exist for its own sake; it is not predicated on 
its own perpetuation, as is the state. Its discipline is a constant dying to itself 
for the sake of others. (Cavanaugh 1998: 271) 
 
The relationship between the church and the crucified people 
 Moltmann, in his systematic theology of the church (Moltmann 1977: 129), 
quotes Ignatius of Antioch’s Letter to the Smyrnaeans: ‘wherever Christ is, there is 
the catholic church.’ (In the Latin translation the formula ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia 
originally reinforced the authority of bishops!) Christ’s presence is located in the 
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fellowship and mission of the institutional, visible church, in the sacraments and the 
worship. But he is present also in the poor. ‘This double presence is needed if it is 
to be the church of the crucified Christ whose appearance it awaits.’ (Moltmann 
1977: 132) The crucified Christ is present both in his cruciform body, the church, 
and in his crucified body, the crucified people. There is a clear problem here for 
those who, like Yoder, stress the distinctiveness and the firm boundaries, enforced 
by discipline, of the believers’ church, rather than the broader crucified people 
defined by suffering rather than belief. Is ‘bearing the cross’ restricted to those who 
bear the name of Christ (defined here as the cruciform people) or can it refer more 
widely to those who have done to them what was done to Christ (the crucified 
people)? 
 I have suggested previously that Christ’s solidarity with suffering is not 
restricted to those who bear the name Christian, and that the concept of the 
‘anonymous crucified’ might express the link between those who consciously and 
deliberately bear the cross of Christ and those who unwillingly have it thrust upon 
them. One way of imagining the relationship is that of two overlapping circles – one 
representing the cruciform people and another representing the crucified people. 
There are areas where there is no real overlap – on the one hand, where ‘taking up 
the cross’ is purely voluntary, and, on the other, where there is suffering, but no 
overt consciousness of sharing the crucifixion of Christ. But there is a large and 
growing area of overlap, especially since, as Jenkins points out (Jenkins 2007a 
passim) the increasing majority of Christians are from the poorer areas of the world, 
in the ‘global south’, and there is huge population growth in many predominantly 
Christian countries (such as Uganda, the Philippines, Brazil). The crucified people 
will thus not be coterminous with the church, but will approximate to it much more 
closely than previously. On this ‘overlapping circles’ model, there is still a 
distinction between the cruciform and crucified peoples, but also a continuity and 
an ever increasing overlap. It may, at first sight, seem that there is little of this 
overlap in the predominantly middle class British mainstream churches, and 
compared to the gross disparities and deprivation in communities in the ‘global 
south’ British Christianity is, in general, economically prosperous. However, being 
disproportionately female and elderly (i.e. lower paid or no longer earning) the 
economic potential of British Christians is probably well below the average with 
regard to the population of Britain as a whole. Data is scarce, but this possibility is 
 230 
indicated by figures obtained through a recent exercise in the Bradford diocese to 
establish a fair diocesan share (the amount congregations contribute to the diocesan 
funds). This exercise, whereby individuals anonymously indicated their income, 
demonstrated that the earnings of congregational members appeared to be well 
below the average (unpublished statistics from the Bradford diocese).   
 A formal parallel to this model of the continuity and discontinuity between 
the ‘cruciform’ and the ‘crucified’ can perhaps be seen in Aquinas’ teaching on the 
relationship between baptism and martyrdom. Those who have not received baptism 
but share the suffering of Christ as martyrs (as may have been common in the 
persecutions in the early church) may be held as having received the sacramental 
effect of baptism in water without actually having received physical baptism. 
(Summa Theologiae 3.66.11) Rahner, whose concept of ‘anonymous Christians’ has 
been noted above with  reference to the crucified people, suggests that ‘In 
martyrdom, what had previously been signified and made present through the 
sacramental sign of baptism is here simply fulfilled.’ (Rahner 1961: 102-3) The 
martyrdom to which Aquinas refers is, of course, a conscious and willing witness to 
Christ, and it might perhaps be thought unreasonable to extend the ‘sacramental 
effect’ of baptism to those individuals who unconsciously (and unwillingly) witness 
to Christ’s sufferings. However, when considering the ‘crucified people’ as a whole, 
it is here that the continuing divine suffering is most made manifest and therefore 
stands as a continuing witness to the cross of Christ. It would be a mistake to draw 
the lines of demarcation too clearly, especially given the imprecise and provisional 
relationship in Jesus’ teaching between the community of his followers and 
membership of the ‘kingdom of God’.  
 
b) Unchosen cruciformity 
 
Chosen and unchosen cruciformity 
 In the remainder of this chapter I consider both types of cruciformity, 
chosen and unchosen. Chosen cruciformity can be seen in two ways – primarily as 
that of the Christian who seeks to take up the cross, but also as that of the non-
Christian whose service in the cause of  ‘removing the crucified people from their 
crosses’ adumbrates, if unconsciously, that of the Christian in performing the same 
task. This, as discussed above, has been a leading theme in Latin American 
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liberation theology. Likewise, unchosen cruciformity can be interpreted in two 
ways: first, as has already been described, the unchosen cruciformity of the 
‘crucified people’; and second, the unchosen cruciformity of the contemporary 
church in its marginalized situation in Britain and Western Europe.  
 
The unchosen cruciformity of British Christianity 
In the 1960’s Archbishop Michael Ramsey made a disturbing observation 
concerning the Church of England: ‘It may be the will of God that our Church 
should have its heart broken.’ (Hastings 1991: 533) In the 1930s Studdert Kennedy 
wrote of Jesus coming to Birmingham and simply being left out in the rain, weeping 
for Calvary. (Studdert Kennedy 1947: 34) Both describe the painful marginalization 
of the church in Britain, in Studdert Kennedy’s case when that marginalization was 
a shadow of the present situation. Compared to the physical suffering of the church 
under active persecution, it might seem a gross exaggeration to describe this 
situation by the metaphor of crucifixion, but the unchosen weakness, 
marginalization, and powerlessness of the present church in Britain can perhaps go 
some way towards justifying its description as cruciform, in contrast to its previous 
Constantinian status.  
 It is difficult to overestimate the revolution in political theology necessitated 
by this new situation, just as it is difficult to overstate the vulnerable position of the 
contemporary British mainstream churches. Most models of Christian political 
theology presuppose a strong, or at least a relatively strong, church. Even 
Moltmann, for all his radicalism, seems to presuppose a church numerically and 
sociologically strong enough to provide a powerful continuing political witness. 
Boff and Sobrino write against a background of a mass of people whose roots are 
firmly grounded in Christian practice and devotion. This is clearly no longer the 
case in Britain. Theology now has to be done ‘outside the city wall’, to aid a weak 
church in a situation where Christendom is only a memory, or is preserved merely 
in rituals which have become increasingly empty and meaningless. This decoupling 
from Christendom indicates a more Yoderian theology – yet even Yoder, with his 
minority ecclesiology, presupposes a strong and disciplined churche able to give a 
powerful witness. The changes to the future religious geography of Britain caused 
by both decline in numbers and the dangerously skewed age profile of most 
congregations, mean that such a witness will inevitably be weakened and 
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diminished unless the very process of numerical decline, by a kind of Darwinian 
selection, increases the cohesion and discipline of the churches which remain. A 
more ‘sectarian’ future seems unavoidable, with the inevitable consequences for 
social ethics. Yoder writes  
It is one of the widely remarked developments of our century that now one 
dimension, now another, of the ecclesiastical experience and the 
ecclesiological vision once called ‘sectarian’ are now beginning to be 
espoused by some within majority communions. (Yoder 1984: 5) 
Yoder adduces Rahner preparing European Catholics for a ‘diaspora’ existence, 
where it will no longer be a presupposition that the church can dominate a culture 
numerically or politically. Significantly, he also adduces the liberation theologian 
Juan-Luis Segundo’s prophecy that ‘the church of the future needs to be a 
ministering, voluntary minority, instead of the mass’. (Yoder 1984: 5) In such a 
‘sect’ or ‘diaspora’ existence, the task of political theology is to formulate a 
theology of divine power which coheres both with the cruciform God revealed in 
the scriptures and the situation of weakness in which the church exists.  
 
The marginalisation of the British Churches 
 The decline in institutional British Christianity has been well documented by 
religious sociologists such as Davie and Bruce. Davie has characterized British 
religion as ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 1994: 5) but even the diffuse 
penumbra of belief she describes seems now to be shrinking. Hastings, in his 
history of the church in England in the twentieth century, writes that ‘between 1960 
and 1985 the Church of England as a going concern was effectively reduced to not 
much more than half its previous size’. (Hastings 1991: 604) This dramatic collapse 
in Christian practice and observance is corroborated by current statistics. 
‘Whichever indicator is selected – electoral roll figures, communicant numbers, 
baptisms per live births, proportion of marriages taking place in church, 
confirmations and ordinations’ (Davie 1994: 52) there is a downward trend, with 
the added ‘generational time bomb’ in that the proportion of children and young 
adults attending worship is shrinking the fastest. This decline is regionally varied 
and countered, to some extent, by a rise in numbers of independents and 
Pentecostals, especially among immigrant communities, but it is difficult to 
disagree with Greenwood and Burgess in their statement that in Britain ‘the 
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churches are facing the death of their current incarnation’. (Greenwood and Burgess 
2005: 15) 
 This shrinking of institutional Christianity in Britain, at least in its present 
form, would seem to be incontestable and has serious consequences, not only for 
pastoral care, worship and evangelism, but also for political theology. If, as Davie 
argues, ‘nominal allegiance is by far the most prominent form of religious 
attachment’ (Davie 1994: 49) then the possibility of the church having anything 
approaching a traditionally conceived hegemonic role is slim, since it is unlikely 
that the non (or infrequently) worshipping Christian will have their political beliefs 
significantly influenced by church teaching or formed in a distinctively Christian 
matrix. As Hall points out, ‘What Peter Berger and others have called ‘cultural 
establishment’, that is, identification of Christianity with the cultural and social 
norms of society at large, is over.’ (Hall 2003: 160). Similarly, Bruce writes that 
‘the Christian churches have lost their ability to shape popular thinking… [popular] 
images of the supernatural are no longer structured by Christian precepts. They are 
amorphous and idiosyncratic and have few, if any, behavioural consequences.’ 
(Bruce 1995: 71) 
 This is not to argue that the churches in Britain have little or no social or 
political significance. Recent statistics show that one in six of Britain’s adults attend 
a church service at least once a month (Barley 2006:13) and the decline in 
institutional religion has to be set alongside wider sociological patterns, such as the 
widespread reluctance to join organizations or to take on responsibility for running 
them (membership of political parties being now a quarter of the 1964 level, and 
ever decreasing). Recent campaigns over international debt and trade justice might 
demonstrate some continuing influence on government by the churches – although 
the era of Temple and Tawney, whose Christian socialism shaped the welfare state 
for half a century seems far distant from the contemporary situation. The present 
‘exile’ of the churches, to use Whitworth’s phrase, (Whitworth 2008 passim) is in 
an uneasy dialectical relationship with the remnants of Christendom. On the one 
hand, there is an increased willingness by government to use religious agencies to 
plug gaps in the welfare state; on the other hand, we are seeing what van den 
Heuvel described as the ‘humiliation of the church’ (van den Heuvel 1967)  – the 
fact that, as Medhurst and Moyser put it in their discussion on secularization, 
‘organized expressions of religious life [have been] shunted aside from the 
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mainstream of social, economic, and cultural life, and inherited religious beliefs 
have seemingly lost immediacy or plausibility for significant sectors of society’. 
(Medhurst and Moyser 1998: 18) Christendom, in the sense of the church as the 
‘guardian of authoritative cultural norms’ and as a base for shared values and 
societal unity, is over. Christian ‘ideological hegemony’ can no longer be assumed; 
the churches have been forced (or, perhaps, eased) to the margins of ‘whole 
departments of life for which it once assumed the lion’s share of responsibility’. 
(Medhurst and Moyser 1998: 24) Given this loss of power and influence, this 
relocation of Christianity from ‘within the gates’ to ‘outside a city wall’, a new 
strategy is required.  
 
Loss and gain 
 Such a strategy, taking into account the enforced cruciformity of the church 
in the sense of its powerlessness and marginalization, may well lead to a more 
faithful witness to the nature of God and to a political role more consistent with the 
pattern exemplified by Jesus’ ministry and crucifixion. Bonhoeffer wrote of God, 
paradoxically, both at the centre of life (i.e. not a ‘God of the gaps’ or a deus ex 
machina) (Bonhoeffer 1953: 282) and pushed to the margins (Bonhoeffer 1953: 
360). A cruciform church pushed to the margins better represents a crucified God 
pushed to the margins, since a powerful church can fall into the unconscious 
idolatry of attempting to represent a non existent God of misconstrued power. The 
God revealed in Jesus is a crucified God, and is therefore represented by and 
witnessed to most accurately by a cruciform church. God’s providential relationship 
with the world does not entail control or coercive direction, and for a church to 
represent God as controlling and powerful in this way is both spiritually and 
politically disastrous. Exile, or cruciformity, may be the church’s best friend (as 
argued in Whitworth 2008: 97). A recurring theme in the Old Testament is how, 
through the painful process of exile, God made the chosen people fit for purpose by 
making them totally vulnerable; it is not inconceivable that a similar process could 
be at work for the good in a cruciform church.  
 While considering the possible benefits of the weakness of the church, it is 
worthwhile enumerating the potential dangers of this weakness. First, although 
‘exile might be the church’s best friend’, is it in the best interest of the society in 
which the church is called to serve as the ‘leaven in the lump’? Christendom 
 235 
certainly had its disadvantages, but it could well be argued that it provided at least a 
check against an even greater barbarism than European history has so far 
demonstrated. Second, whereas a weak church may be a more ‘purified’ body for 
the furthering of God’s purposes, Davie asks (Davie 1994: 75) ‘is there a minimum 
size beyond which an active minority is no longer effective in society?’ A church 
which is too small, fragmented, and marginalized could reach a point where it 
simply becomes irrelevant and virtually invisible. Third, weakness and a sense of 
persecution may turn the church’s political outlook into that of a selfish and self 
interested pressure group, concerned above all with self protection. Bartley draws a 
useful contrast between the persecution of the European churches in the pre-
Christendom and post-Christendom eras (Bartley 2006: 128). Then, persecution 
involved torture and death; now, ‘persecution’ involves exclusion from the 
mainstream and complaints over loss of privilege. Fourth, and most significantly, a 
minority church is not necessarily a healthy witness of Christ to the majority 
society, if and when its morality is believed to fall below the standards of that 
society. Recent child abuse scandals are an obvious example. Perhaps less widely 
recognized within the church is the effect on wider society of the debate over gay 
relationships, where a defensive and embattled church can appear to be fighting on 
the wrong side against what many ‘in the world’ would see as a more gracious 
morality.  
 Given these reservations, the end of Christendom could provide a liberating 
opportunity for the British churches, so that the sociological actuality of the church 
might better fit its theological and cruciform essence. It is foolishly unrealistic and 
theologically naïve to envisage a church totally freed from corrupting political and 
cultural structures so that it somehow achieves its pure being, since the church 
cannot exist in a vacuum, and its life is inevitably shaped in a dialectical interaction 
with the society in which it is placed. Nevertheless, any study of church history will 
provide examples of where that corruption has been almost overwhelming, and 
where attempts have been made (as is the nature of all movements of spiritual 
renewal) to return to a more purified essence. Yoder writes that the 
deconstantinianisation of the church need not be feared, but welcomed ‘as an 
opportunity for the free church to be the church – to live out its vocation as a visible 
people in the world bearing witness the Lordship of Christ over the world’. (Yoder 
1984: 54) The decline of civil religion where, for example, the Church of England 
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risked becoming merely the amorphous religious expression of the British people, is 
a liberative opportunity, especially since that religion played a key role in the 
maintenance of an hierarchically structured society. One sign of this healthy trend 
might be the increasing refusal of the Church of England automatically to support 
the state when it wages war. This questioning stance was negligible during the First 
World War, developed through the prophetic work of George Bell in the Second, 
and continued in the ‘Church and the Bomb’ report, Archbishop Runcie’s refusal to 
turn the Falklands memorial service into a triumphalistic celebration, the opposition 
of the Scottish churches to nuclear weapons, and the misgivings voiced by 
Archbishop Williams over the Iraq war. Hastings comments that the traditional 
structures of conservative English religion were put up ‘not only to fortify religion 
but to domesticate it…to sacralise society this much, secularize religion that much, 
effectively encapsulate the spirit within a given social and political order’.(Hastings 
1991: 586) A cruciform, marginalized church is free from that overtly benign, yet 
inwardly corrupting control. Willingly to accept this enforced cruciformity, to 
welcome its challenges, and not to look back nostalgically to the old Christendom 
model, repeatedly to make the choice to take up the cross, is the only realistic 
option for the English churches, both pastorally and politically.   
 
c) Chosen cruciformity 
 
A corporate taking up of the cross 
 Taking up the cross is not primarily for the individual, but for the 
community of which the individual is a member, as part of a communal, corporate 
commitment in a cruciform church. Before discussing what form this taking up of 
the cross might take, it would be useful to sum up what is meant by a cruciform 
church. A cruciform church is one which has a minority status – it is not the ‘state 
church’ of the majority; it operates in a context of political weakness – it does not 
have, or aspire to, Constantinian power; it exists as an ‘exposed nerve’ to suffering 
– it consists of, or is in close touch with, the ‘crucified people’; and it seeks to 
witness to the crucified Christ (and his current embodiment) by word and action. 
Such a church attempts to shape its political ethic by Jesus’ incarnational social and 
political exemplarity (the historic political actions of Christ which led to the cross) 
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and seeks a cruciform imitation of the character of a crucified God in the context of 
a crucified world.  
 This is the ideal, but this ideal must be worked out in the reality of a mixed 
and sinful body of people whose commitment to that ideal is variable and often 
unfocussed. Yoder’s vision of a highly disciplined and tight knit church is, in the 
Anglican context, neither sociologically possible (although contraction, especially if 
it involves a diminution of a ‘penumbra’ of occasional worshippers, will inevitably 
make church membership more closely defined) nor theologically desirable. One of 
the strengths of the Church of England has been its inclusivity, where the boundary 
lines between church and kingdom of God have not been too tightly drawn, and it 
would be dangerous to abandon that balance in favour of a more disciplined, but 
more exclusive body.  
 I describe chosen cruciformity, the corporate taking up of the cross, using 
two images: first, the Isaianic image of the suffering servant; second, the metaphor 
of the woman in labour. Together these may convey the sometimes painful but 
potentially creative political witness which is the task of a cruciform church. 
 
The suffering servant – solidarity 
 The servant songs of Isaiah 53 describe a figure (interpreters differ on the 
figure’s historical, corporate, or symbolic status) which combines the roles of 
solidarity, prophecy and martyrdom. The Servant stands in solidarity with the 
people of Israel (to such an extent that the servant figure has, in some 
interpretations, been thought to represent the exiled community); speaks a message 
from God to the contemporary society from a situation of affinity and solidarity; 
and undergoes suffering, death, and eventual vindication. The parallels with the 
work of Christ are clear (although New Testament scholarship is divided as to how 
the suffering servant figure affected Christ’s self understanding or the early 
church’s interpretation of him – see the discussion in Jesus and the Suffering 
Servant. (Bellinger and Farmer 1998)) No less clear are the parallels with Christ’s 
body, the cruciform church.  
 Just as the ‘suffering servant’, displays solidarity with the exiled people of 
Israel, the social and political location of the cruciform church is essential to its 
identity. In the Christendom model, the church’s location has been alongside and in 
a collegial relationship with those in power. A cruciform church, by contrast, is 
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located with the crucified rather than the crucifiers, in solidarity with those who 
suffer from power rather than those who exercise it. This can be seen as a variant on 
Bonhoeffer’s call for Christians to ‘share in God’s sufferings at the hands of a 
godless world’. (Bonhoeffer 1953: 361) The Christendom temptation is to be within 
the structures of power as insiders exercising, at best, an ameliorating chaplaincy to 
power, at worst, an inquisitorial theocracy. The cruciform role is to stand outside 
the structures of power, or if, as may sometimes be necessary through historical 
circumstances, the Christian or the church is positioned within those structures, still 
to take a guiding perspective from those situated on the outside. This political, 
social and psychological location is crucial to the political witness of a cruciform 
church, and involves a deep attentiveness to suffering.  This attentiveness can, 
undoubtedly, be attained by those located within the structures of power, but the 
temptation to become insulated by those structures and to treat power as an end in 
itself can be fatal to such attentiveness. As has been previously mentioned, because 
of such solidarity Christian political involvement is on the basis of affinity 
(salvation from inside) rather than alterity (salvation from a distance). Moreover, 
solidarity with the suffering means that political neutrality is not possible; the 
Christian is called, if necessary, to take sides and not to maintain a bland even 
handedness. This is not naively to minimize the problems of moral decision making 
in the complexities of modern economic and political systems. Rather, it is first, to 
determine the rightness or otherwise of economic decisions by their effects, both 
short and long term, on the most vulnerable, as experienced from their perspective, 
and, second to exercise a prophetic and critical discernment based on that 
perspective. The churches in Britain, with their strong links to sister churches in the 
‘global south’, and through their missionary societies and relief organizations, are in 
a better position to realize this solidarity with the poor abroad than any other 
institution within British society. Similarly, the church’s presence within the 
Britain’s own marginalized communities can facilitate that solidarity with the poor 
at home. It is significant that possibly the most effective instance of recent Anglican 
intervention into politics, Faith in the City, (1985) gained a certain moral authority 
because of the presence of the church among the powerless in the inner city and 
urban estate parishes, and not because of the church’s association with the powerful. 
This intra-national and international solidarity does not occur naturally, 
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automatically, or easily, but it forms the basis for any meaningful British political 
theology.  
 
The suffering servant - prophecy and martyrdom 
 The ‘Suffering Servant’ spoke God’s message as a prophet, from a location 
in solidarity with the people of Israel. Similarly, the role of a cruciform church is to 
exercise a prophetic ministry based on such solidarity. An important aspect of this 
role is to ‘unmask the interiorities’ (to use Nancey Murphy’s phrase, in Gingerich 
and Grimsrud, eds. 2006: 37) of social and political systems by demonstrating their 
outward effects on the most vulnerable. These ‘interiorities’ are brought to light in 
two ways: first, by having their effects not only made visible but also widely 
publicized by the church as it stands in solidarity and continuity with the 
vulnerable; and second, by being analysed in the light of the gospel of a crucified 
and vulnerable God. This deeper prophetic role stands alongside the church’s 
ongoing dialogue with government and secular authority.  
 In addition to the role of prophet in solidarity with the people, the ‘Suffering 
Servant’ fulfilled a martyr role, in witnessing to the truth of God through suffering. 
The location of a cruciform church, alongside and attentive to the suffering, brings 
its own vulnerability. A cruciform church witnesses to Jesus, both the risen Christ 
present in and among the faithful and the crucified presence of Christ in and among 
those who suffer. This witness can be from a position of safety or of minor 
discomfort, but can also take the form of suffering when that witness is rejected by 
an unbelieving or oppressive society. As we have previously seen, the concept of 
martyrdom can usefully be extended from the traditional form of suffering on 
account of explicit faith in Jesus to a wider form of suffering as a result of 
witnessing on behalf of the present ‘crucified people’ and taking up Jesus’ ‘historic 
project’ of the kingdom of God. These related concepts of martyrdom, both 
‘Christian’ and ‘Jesuanic’, have played, as we have seen, an increasing role in Latin 
American liberation theology (for example Okura et al 2003). The task in Britain 
may well be to develop the wisdom to discern the difference between ‘martyrdom’ 
for the wrong reasons (for example standing up for the perceived interests of an 
embattled and minority church) and for the right reasons (a willingness, if 
necessary, to go against the grain of society’s expectations for the sake of others, 
and to pay the penalty for such a stance).  
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The cruciform church as a woman in labour – an agent of change 
 The image of a woman in labour can convey the sometimes painful process 
of new creation which belongs to the political role of the cruciform church. 
Cruciform weakness does not mean withdrawal or ineffectiveness. The church may 
have relinquished the Christendom model of ‘responsibility’ for society, but, as 
Yoder stresses (Yoder 1998: 63) his critique of the Christendom view of social 
ethics does not posit the two alternatives, responsibility or withdrawal. A post-
Christendom church continues to have, as an integral part of its mission, a 
responsible involvement in society, even if that responsibility is exercised from 
below rather than from above. Yoder writes of the original disciples  
 There are thus about the community of disciples those sociological traits 
 most characteristic of those who set about to change society: a visible 
 structured fellowship…a clearly defined life-style distinct from that of the 
 crowd… The  distinctness is not a cultic or ritual separation, but rather a 
 nonconformed quality of (secular) involvement in the life of the world. 
 (Yoder 1994: 39): 
Similarly, he writes that ‘Only a continuing community dedicated to a deviant value 
system can change the world.’ (Yoder 1971: 136) The church’s political 
responsibility is not diminished by its marginalization or by its primary focus on 
‘being the church’, since an integral part of ‘being the church’ is a love which 
encompasses the whole of society and which therefore necessitates political 
involvement. This political involvement, marked by (to use Yoder’s terms) 
nonconformity and deviance from oppressive value systems, risks conflict and 
therefore the possibility of the cross – a possibility which forms the dramatic 
background to much of the writing of the liberation theologians. 
 A key role of the church is to give birth, or at least to act as a catalyst, to 
new liberative human possibilities. The role of the church as politically creative is a 
necessary adjunct to a cruciform doctrine of power and the kenotic ethic which 
flows from it, as discussed in the previous chapter. A kenotic ethic, and the creation 
of a community increasingly marked by such an ethic, cannot be imposed by law or 
coercion, but can only be a voluntary choice – and in a democracy the critical mass 
of voluntary choices shapes the policy of the government. The role of the church is, 
then, that of a persuasive exemplar, giving birth to increasingly kenotic possibilities. 
Hinze writes, ‘Since a group has not real capacity for reflective or moral self-
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transcendence, leaders never have warrant to agapaically sacrifice the multiple 
interests of their own constituencies.’ (Hinze 1995: 93) One of the main political 
roles of a cruciform church is to embody and enhance such moral self-
transcendence, in order that society may move in a kenotic direction. To use 
Gramscian terms, it is the task of such a church to promote a gradual cruciform and 
kenotic counter-hegemony, not by coercion (which is not possible, even if it were 
desirable) nor by sheer weight of numbers, but by (suffering) servant witness. The 
birth of such a gentle counter-hegemony may not be without pain or sacrifice, since 
it will cut across the grain of society’s expectations or challenge vested interests, 
which will fight back. The relevance of this political role is growing, especially in 
Western Europe. If MacIntyre is correct to assert in After Virtue (McIntyre 1984: 
263) that the unifying metanarratives of society have all but collapsed, and that new 
and smaller scale moral communities are needed, the church, even if a small 
minority, can have a significant part to play in forwarding its own kenotic and 
countercultural metanarrative by its prophetic being and actions. To use Richard 
Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (Niebuhr 1951) categories, Christ may best be seen in 
creative and painful tension with culture, the cross symbolizing the labour pains of 
that process.  
 
The cruciform church as a woman in labour – a sign of hope 
 If, according to the Yoderian analysis, ecclesiology is the starting point for 
social ethics, the pattern of existence of the church is both a model for the present 
and a foretaste of the ultimate divine intention for the world. God’s intention for 
human social interaction is prefigured in the church, which is a sign both of present 
witness and future hope. This statement must, of course, be set uncomfortably 
alongside the continuing imperfection and sinfulness of the existing church, but the 
ideal cannot be set aside. A cruciform church is inextricably caught in tension 
between the pessimism of the cross and the hope of the resurrection. The cross 
indicates an almost Hobbesian pessimism about politics and liberative human 
possibilities in general, given the sinful nature of human power structures illustrated 
so dramatically, and so dreadfully, by the crucifixion of Jesus. There is no necessary 
progress in history; that is a nineteenth century liberal or Marxist concept, and not 
Christian, at least in terms of relatively short term progress on earth. In a Christian 
reading of history, ‘resurrection’ will be followed by further ‘crucifixion’, and so 
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on. The aims of the church in the light of this necessary but realistic pessimism are 
limited, if essential: to take the crucified from their crosses, but with the expectation 
that they or others will probably be put back there again. The political task of the 
church is to stand again and again alongside the vulnerable, pointing to the divine 
sympathy exemplified in the cross and the hope offered by the resurrection. 
Resurrection hope means that the present situation of injustice and suffering does 
not always have to continue – there is no fatalistic necessity against which it is 
impossible and pointless to struggle – but the force of sin shown by the crucifixion 
means that such hope cannot be an easy optimism in an almost automatic movement 
of history. This is certainly not a counsel for despair, but a recognition that earthly 
hope is not for a decisive once-and-for-all breakthrough to a new utopia, but for the 
continuing possibility of the removal of the crucified from their crosses and for the 
promise of divine power in accomplishing that task. The kingdom of God does not 
advance inexorably; the persistence of the crucified people throughout history 
decisively denies that illusion.  
 Hope, then, this side of heaven, is limited and temporary but nonetheless 
real. The cruciform church is to be a sign of that hope, a model and bearer of 
renewed human possibilities. Hope, shaped by the cross and resurrection, is not 
facile or unrealistic, but based on the unchanging divine purposes and character 
which it is the church’s task to live out and to which the church bears witness. 
There is no automatic, easy causality in ‘moving history’ since history cannot be 
‘moved’ except by slow and painful steps. Rather, a politics informed by the 
political actions of Jesus proposes a cruciform causality radically different from the 
violence of the world. The church is thus both a sign of that hope and a participant 
in making that hope a reality. The church, in its life of worship, fellowship, love and 
evangelism, becomes a context where these present practices and future possibilities 
are explored, clarified and shared, where an ethic of reliance upon the character of 
God and the promised Holy Spirit can be lived out. Such a church may not have the 
numbers or strength coercively to bring about change, as was attempted by the 
Christendom project which failed both theologically and historically – but can be 
the matrix of wider transformation through its witness and example, and through its 
cruciform contradictions of the powers of the world. Sharon Welsh writes of the 
church as a community of ‘solidarity and resistance’. (Welch 1985) This could 
usefully be extended to the church as a community of solidarity with the crucified 
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people, of resistance to the crucifiers (risking crucifixion in the process) and hope in 
the resurrection of the crucified.  
 
d) Conclusion 
 
The future of a cruciform church in Britain 
 Part of my aim in sketching a political role for a cruciform church arises 
from my position as an Anglican Vicar and Methodist Minister in two small semi-
rural / commuter villages. Here, the marginalization of the church is painfully 
evident, even in communities where there is much good-will. Given the age profiles 
of the congregations, it is probable that the religious geography of these 
communities, and of much of the surrounding area, will be significantly different in 
a few years time. The church will still be present, in the form of groups of 
committed Christians, living and witnessing in the local community, but the future 
of the church as a powerful institution, with an assured and integral place in society, 
would seem to be precarious. This undeniable institutional decline is uncomfortable 
both for those in positions of leadership who have to manage a shrinking and 
therefore pressurized organization, and also for those at the grass roots who feel 
marginalized and powerless in the face of sociological factors beyond their control. 
However, grim pessimism is a temptation to be avoided by those who believe in a 
God of resurrection hope. In 1832, the pessimistic assessment of the Church of 
England given by Thomas Arnold, ‘The church, as it now stands, no human power 
can save’ (Edwards 1978: 30) was overtaken by the subsequent Anglican revival. 
The church will continue, but in a different form. Jenkins uses an analogy from 
astronomy in describing the smaller, but more focused bodies which will probably 
constitute the future for the European church: ‘When a star collapses, it becomes a 
white dwarf – smaller in size than it once was, but burning much more intensely. 
Across Europe, white dwarf faith communities are growing within the remnants of 
the old mass church.’ (Jenkins 2007b) For such a church, Yoder’s vision of a new, 
cruciform, way of doing politics, eschewing ‘control’ (which is impossible anyway) 
and concentrating on bearing a consistent and faithful witness to Christ crucified 
and risen is a useful pointer to a realistic political role. This is not to minimize the 
dangers inherent in institutional decline and marginalization. A critical choice faces 
the church: to embrace a Yoderian redefinition of power and witness, or through 
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panic, confusion or resigned pessimism to retreat into a defensive and fearful semi-
fundamentalism. How the church in Britain deals with its marginalization will be 
crucial for its internal nature and external political role.  
 
Lessons for the wider church 
 If the church in Britain and Europe is moving away from a Constantinian 
role vis-à-vis political power, that is certainly not true for the church worldwide. 
Jenkins (Jenkins 2007a Chapter 5) draws attention to the ways in which the 
churches of the global south are increasing in terms of numbers, spiritual dynamism 
and political power and influence. This is a time both of great opportunities and 
potential pitfalls. In particular, Jenkins (Jenkins 2007a Chapter 8) points to an 
increasing tendency for communities or nations to define themselves by their 
religion, especially on the dangerous fault line between Christianity and Islam in 
Africa, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The sad consequences of such identification 
of Christianity with nationalism are amply demonstrated by a reading of European 
history. At this critical juncture, it would be particularly tragic if churches of the 
global south repeated the mistakes of the European churches and attempted a 
Christendom-type social theology. It is to be hoped that the churches of the global 
south, as they emerge into a new era of independence, confidence and strength, can 
resist the temptation to use their new found power in a way which has been shown 
in Europe, by hard experience, to be both a political dead end and a spiritual hazard. 
The adoption of a cruciform doctrine of power is a useful corrective to this danger. 
 
The political role of a cruciform church 
 The political role of the church can be described in general terms as the 
shaping, by its words and actions, of a liberative vision of what it is to be human, in 
imitation of the character and workings of God as seen through the lens of Jesus 
Christ. In particular, the church can witness to a redefinition of power and its uses, 
by exercising a two-fold critique. First, the critique must be inward, recognizing 
that a marginalized church is not necessarily less likely to misuse power than a 
dominant church, but may do so in very different ways. A dominant church will try 
to exercise power over society as a whole; a marginalized church may seek to 
exercise a crude power internally, as it pulls up drawbridges against ‘the world’. 
Second, the critique must also be outward, challenging a totalitarian use of power 
 245 
both in society as a whole and in religion in particular. A totalitarian exercise of 
religious power is an increasing phenomenon worldwide, and one of the tasks of a 
cruciform church is gently to counter such totalitarianism. This critique should not 
merely be verbal, but by living out an alternative model of religion and power. 
 If Yoder can be said to provide the means to that end, Boff and Sobrino 
provide the content – the criteria by which a Christian politics can be judged – 
through their emphasis on the ‘crucified people’. Again, in very general terms, what 
differentiates a ‘Christian’ politics from others is its interpretation of suffering. The 
dominant political doctrines of the twentieth century had at their heart a willingness 
to sacrifice huge numbers of human beings for the sake of the (supposed) greater 
good of other human beings, either in the present or the future. Nazism was 
prepared ruthlessly to cleanse the world of what it saw as a Jewish and Slavic threat 
in order to create a better world for the Aryan ubermensch. Communism was 
willing to sacrifice millions of those who were seen as barriers to the revolution on 
the altar of industrialization and political repression in order to achieve utopia for 
the ‘workers’. Liberal capitalism, with a similar, if less deliberately pernicious, 
anthropology of regarding human beings as mere units of production, was and is 
willing to commit millions to a subhuman existence in order to achieve economic 
progress which would, ultimately, bring wide benefits. Nazism and Communism are 
now discredited. Liberal capitalism still seems to rest on the assumption that a 
certain amount of suffering, usually on the periphery, is a price worth paying for 
general future prosperity. The supposed ‘impossibility of making an omelette 
without breaking eggs’ could well be the motto of twentieth century politics, and 
continues into the twenty-first. Such thinking, in the light of the cross, is revealed as 
not only anti-humanitarian, but blasphemous. The ‘eggs’ that are ‘broken’ are the 
crucified people, with the value and dignity of people made in the image of God, 
loved by God, and revealed by the cross to be in solidarity with the crucified God. 
The crucifixion of Christ and the dehumanization of those who are thus written off 
are in close parallel. The church best exercises its political function in pointing to 
that cruciform parallel, in identifying with and, if necessary, defending the 
‘crucified’,  in solidarity with them, and in bearing witness to the causes of their 
‘crucifixion’.  
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In conclusion – the church as a beatitude community of solidarity, resistance and 
hope 
 A cruciform church will seek to live out a spirituality of kenotic generosity. 
Such a spirituality bears a striking resemblance to that outlined in the Beatitudes of 
Matthew 5:3-12. A cruciform church will be ‘poor in spirit’. Whatever Jesus meant 
exactly by that enigmatic phrase, a cruciform church will know the poverty of lack 
of power and of marginalization. It will not be a proud and domineering church, but 
will be conscious of its own weakness.  A cruciform church will ‘mourn’. One of 
the roles of the church is to act (as the Jewish people have been described) as an 
‘exposed nerve of humanity’ consisting of or closely connected to the ‘crucified 
people’. Such a church will mourn, in that it will feel deeply the pain of the world. 
A cruciform church, unless it falls prey to self-delusion, cannot be other than 
‘humble’ or ‘meek’, since the appurtenances of power will have been stripped 
away.  A cruciform church will ‘hunger and thirst’, not for power for itself, or for 
past glories, but for righteousness and justice. The political role of such a church 
will not be self-defensive, but will actively work for the rights of ‘the other’.  A 
cruciform church will be ‘merciful’. Such a church will be conscious of its own 
sinful past responsibility and present potential for inflicting crucifixions, and so will 
be merciful to fellow sinners.  A cruciform church will have the ‘pureness of heart’ 
of having the external trimmings of power and success stripped away, in order to 
concentrate on its essential being and task.  A cruciform church will, most of all, 
‘work for peace’, in that it will seek to mirror God’s character of peacemaker. 
Finally, a cruciform church will, by its very nature, be vulnerable to persecution, in 
seeking to do what the crucified God requires.  
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